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
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

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
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a country study

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
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## Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books written by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Area Handbook Program. Its title, format, and substance reflect modifications introduced into the series in 1978. The last page of this book provides a listing of other country studies published. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, military, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the work of Foreign Area Studies and are not set forth as the official view of the United States government. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions.

William Evans-Smith  
Director, Foreign Area Studies  
The American University  
Washington, D.C. 20016



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Special thanks are owed to S. Martin DePass who produced the cover design and chapter illustrations for this book and to Michael T. Graham, of The American University Department of Art, under whose direction it was done. The inclusion of photographs in this study was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. We acknowledge our indebtedness especially to those persons who contributed original work not previously published.

## Preface

The present study supersedes the *Area Handbook for Tanzania*, which was researched and written in 1968 by a team composed of Sidney A. Harrison, Howard J. John, Susan MacKnight, and Barbara Skapa, under the chairmanship of Allison Butler Herrick. The present study incorporates some of the material in the 1968 book but is a substantial revision, and most chapters were totally rewritten.

When research and writing for the 1968 *Area Handbook for Tanzania* were completed in January of that year Tanzania had only recently embarked on a new course expressly seeking to establish a socialist economy and society. It had also begun to be deeply involved in the leadership of and support for liberation movements in central and southern Africa. Ten years later it seemed desirable and feasible to look at the extent to which its internal and external goals had been realized. This study is a result of that decision.

This study is based on a variety of published and unpublished sources, primary and secondary. A few gaps in information were filled or ambiguities clarified through direct consultation with individuals having firsthand knowledge of Tanzania. The gaps that remain, resulting problems of analysis, and differences of interpretation have been noted in the text. Where available books and articles provide amplification of detail and interpretation of the matter presented in a given chapter, its author has noted them in a paragraph at the end of the chapter. Full references to these and other sources are to be found in the Bibliography.

It should be noted that Tanzania's domestic experimentation and foreign affairs activism have aroused the interest of large numbers of scholarly and other observers, resulting in a massive flow of description and interpretation, often differing in emphasis and sometimes in conflict. Time has not permitted examination of all available sources, but an effort has been made to sample the range of interpretation.

The authors have tried to limit the use of foreign and technical terms. These are briefly defined where they first appear in any chapter or reference is made to the Glossary, included in an appendix for the reader's convenience. Swahili is Tanzania's official language, and certain Swahili terms and phrases appear regularly in English-language sources. Where a simple translation is not feasible (for example, the word *ujamaa*), the Swahili is used.


Most ethnic, language, and place-names in Tanzania originate in Bantu languages and are therefore characterized by class prefixes that vary with the language: thus, in the language of the Haya, the people are Bahaya, their land Buhaya, and their language Luhaya. In Swahili (strictly, Kiswahili) the same people are Wahaya, the land, Uhaya, and the language, Kihaya. Bantu-class prefixes have been omitted except where they are embedded in international

geographic terminology and are found in the publications of the United States Board on Geographic Names to which usage in this study conforms.

In the text all measurements are given in the metric system and are followed by their American equivalents. In tables such equivalents are given in footnotes.



## COUNTRY PROFILE



### Country

**Formal Name:** United Republic of Tanzania.

**Short Form:** Tanzania.

**Term for Nationals:** Tanzanians. Residents of Zanzibar are Zanzibaris.

**Preindependence Political Status:** Tanganyika, a United Nations Trust Territory under British trusteeship, was granted internal self-government in May 1961 and achieved independence on December 9, 1961. Zanzibar, a British protectorate, was granted independence on December 10, 1963. After a revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was established on April 26, 1964 (April 26, Union Day, is the national holiday); in October the name was changed to that now used.

**Capital:** Since October 1974 the official capital has been Dodoma, but the shift of government from Dar es Salaam, the former capital, may not be completed until 1990. Zanzibar town is the capital of Zanzibar.

## **Geography**

**Size:** Total area 931,082 square kilometers (363,708 square miles) including 3,100 square kilometers (1,200 square miles) for offshore islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia, 20,650 square kilometers (nearly 8,000 square miles) of inland bodies of water.

**Topography:** Coastal lowlands average sixteen to sixty kilometers (ten to forty miles) in depth in the north and south but are much deeper in the center, especially around the Rufiji River Valley. Most of the country lies on the East African plateau, 900 to 1,800 meters (3,000 to nearly 6,000 feet) high bordered east and west by two branches of the Great Rift Valley. Mountains to 2,750 meters (9,000 feet) border the country in the southwest and also constitute the southeastern rim of the central plateau. Mount Kilimanjaro at 5,895 meters (19,340 feet) caps the northeastern highlands. The major rivers drain into the Indian Ocean, but a few empty into interior bodies of water and lakes Tanganyika, Victoria, and Nyasa.

**Climate:** Weather conditions are dominated by Indian Ocean monsoons that bring two rainy seasons, one long, one short, affecting different parts of the country at different times. Most of the country is quite dry and the rainfall uncertain. Temperature varies with place and altitude, but ground frost rarely occurs below 2,500 meters (more than 8,000 feet) except in the Southern Highlands. Minimum temperatures tend to occur in June and July in most places and range between less than 10°C (50°F) at Mbeya in the Southern Highlands to around 20°C (68°F) at Tanga on the northern coast. Maximum temperatures range from about 25°C (77°F) at Mbeya to about 35°C (87°F) at Tanga.

## **Society**

**Population:** 1977 mid-year estimate, about 16 million based on 1967 census and 2.7 percent annual growth rate. On mainland urban population is 6 percent; on Zanzibar, more than 25 percent. Rural densities highly variable ranging from large, nearly uninhabited areas in central interior and southeastern quadrant to populations of 385 per square kilometer (1,000 per square mile) or more on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and some other places.

**Languages:** Each of the 120 or so ethnic groups has its own tongue, but Swahili is the official language, now very widely understood. Until 1967 English had joint status as an official language; it remains the language of higher education and is used in international contexts.

**Ethnic Groups:** About a dozen of the 120 ethnic groups make up roughly 50 percent of the population. The largest, the Sukuma, constitutes nearly 13 percent; the others are under 5 percent; none is politically predominant.

**Religion:** From one-quarter to one-third claim to be Christian

(Roman Catholic and various Protestant groups). Estimates of the number of Muslims are in the same range (but the bulk of the population of Zanzibar and Pemba is Muslim). The remainder (one-third to one-half) adhere to one of the indigenous religious systems.

**Education and Literacy:** Emphasis on universal primary education to prepare for nonacademic rural life. Small proportion of funding goes to secondary education and even smaller amount to university level. Secondary and higher education integrated with practical projects to prevent rural-urban split, and graduates obliged to join National Service for two years. Universal literacy in Swahili attempted through widespread adult education; effort fairly successful.

**Health:** Government attempts to provide minimum of basic health care through rural health centers and maternal and child care centers. Numbers of these and of paramedical personnel have increased very substantially since 1967 in association with villagization process that clusters hitherto largely dispersed rural population. Major medical problems result from dietary insufficiency and tropical and parasitic diseases. Tuberculosis, pneumonia, and venereal disease also common. Preventive medicine campaign in effect, stressing cleanliness and nutrition.

### **Government and Politics**

**Form:** Republic, led by a single, constitutionally supreme party. Greatest power resides in the office of the president, who is also chairman of the Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—CCM). Although party and governmental authority formally extend throughout the country, in practice Zanzibar, comprising the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, retains considerable autonomy under its head of government—who is also vice president of the republic and vice chairman of the CCM—and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. There is universal adult suffrage. The National Assembly includes both elected (the great majority) and appointed members.

**Administrative Divisions:** Many governmental functions are handled separately by the union government, for the mainland, and the Zanzibari government, for Zanzibar. The country contains twenty-five regions, twenty on the mainland and five on Zanzibar and Pemba. Most regions contain about four or five districts. Districts contain further subdivisions, which may have a geographical base, such as a village or town, or a functional base, such as a place of work. The lowest administrative division is the Ten-House Cell, ordinarily comprising ten households.

**Politics:** The only political party is the CCM, formed in 1977 by the merger of the mainland's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The CCM is supreme over the government and is a centralized party dominated by its chairman, Julius K. Nyerere. Party officials tend to hold

positions in the government comparable to those they hold in the party. At its highest levels, where policy decisions are made, Zanzibar and the mainland are equally represented despite their differences in population. The major thrust of domestic affairs is the attempt to introduce rural socialism, ultimately to be based on communal production in villages. The program strongly emphasizes egalitarianism. It reflects Nyerere's basic philosophy, and criticism of its desirability as Tanzania's ultimate goal is not tolerated, but criticism of specific programs and the ways in which they are carried out is not uncommon.

**Legal System:** Three levels of courts on the mainland: primary, district, and the High Court. On Zanzibar there are people's courts with appeal to the People's High Court and then to a body referred to as the Supreme Council. The Constitutional Court, established in 1977, was to deal solely with constitutional questions. Both civil and criminal laws and procedures have been most greatly influenced by British practices, but elements of Muslim and indigenous African practices persist.

**Major Features of International Relations:** Tanzania insists on remaining nonaligned with all of the major world blocs but maintains close relations with the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), which has been an important source of aid. Its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union have been polite but formal. Heavily dependent on Scandinavian financial aid but also receives much help from the World Bank Group (see Glossary). One of the leading supporters of the southern African liberation movements against the minority regimes in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia (Southwest Africa), the Republic of South Africa and, until its independence from Portuguese rule, Mozambique.

**International Memberships:** The United Nations (UN) and its affiliated organizations, Commonwealth, African Development Bank, International Cotton Advisory Committee, and Organization of African Unity; a member of the East African Community until the breakup of that organization in 1977.

### **Economy**

**Salient Features:** Largely socialist economy but permits considerable private-sector activity especially in small-scale enterprises. Principal industries, services, and all financial institutions operated by parastatal corporations; dominant agricultural sector in extended process of transformation from private smallholdings to communal pattern of production by nationwide system of villages. Development emphasis on rural sector, manufacturing industry, and limited known mineral resources in that order; half or more of budget deficit resulting from development expenditure financed by external sources. Tanzania listed by UN as one of twenty-nine least developed countries; per capita gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) estimated at US\$180 in 1977.



**Agriculture:** Employs over 90 percent of active labor force and accounts for about two-fifths of GDP with contribution of subsistence and monetary sectors about equal. Major export crops: coffee, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts, tobacco, and tea. Principal food crops: maize, millet, sorghum, wheat, rice, cassava, potatoes, bananas, plantains, and beans.

**Livestock, Forestry, and Fisheries:** Very large national cattle herd having high but still only partially used potential because of traditional owner reluctance to sell. Forests, covering one-half of mainland, adequately met needs. Fisheries provide substantial protein supplement to diet in lakeshore and Indian Ocean areas; freshwater catch constitutes about three-quarters of total fish take.

**Industry and Mining:** Growing manufacturing sector mainly processes agricultural products for local consumption and export. Major industries besides food processing include cigarette and textile manufacture, vegetable oil refining, cement and fertilizer production, refining imported petroleum, and producing a variety of daily-use consumer items; import-substitution products meet large part of consumer goods demand. Most important mineral product in late 1970s was diamonds.

**Electric Power:** Total installed capacity in 1976 was 266,000 kilowatts, of which 151,000 kilowatts hydroelectric and 115,000 kilowatts thermal. Expansion of facilities will increase hydroelectric capacity to over 250,000 kilowatts in early 1980s. Mainland electric power sales in 1975 totaled 486 million kilowatt-hours by monopoly parastatal Tanzania Electric Supply Company.

**Foreign Trade:** Mounting trade deficit from the mid-1970s as rising world prices for petroleum products, raw materials, and capital goods not offset by export growth; but balance of payments usually in surplus because of net earnings on transportation services and large capital inflows. Principal exports: unprocessed and processed agricultural commodities, diamonds, and petroleum products. Principal imports: machinery and transportation equipment, consumer goods, chemicals, petroleum products, and industrial materials. Principal trading partners (1976): main suppliers, Great Britain, PRC, countries of the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), United States, Kenya, and Iran; main buyers: Great Britain, United States, EEC countries, India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Kenya.

### **Transportation and Communications**

**Railroads:** About 3,570 kilometers (2,215 miles) of railroads in two noninterchangeable systems: combined Tanga and Central lines (about 2,580 kilometers—1,600 miles) serve northern and transcentral areas and have tie-in to Kenya and Uganda systems; the Uhuru Railway, also called the TAZARA (see Glossary) line (1,000 kilometers—620 miles) from Dar es Salaam to southwestern border with Zambia, carried mainly Zambian traffic.

**Roads:** Some 33,500 kilometers (20,770 miles) of roads in 1977 including 2,600 kilometers (1,610 miles) hard surfaced, 1,100 kilometers (680 miles) engineered gravel, 29,800 kilometers (18,480 miles) dry-weather roads and tracks. Primary system of about 7,200 kilometers (4,465 miles) of trunk and main roads of all kinds interconnect national capital, regional capitals, and ports; remaining system largely feeder roads.

**Ports:** Three major ports on Indian Ocean: Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and Mtwara; several inland ports on lakes Victoria and Tanganyika.

**Air Services:** Until early 1977 provided by East African Airways (EAA), common organization of East African Community. Separate Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC) established April 1977; provided domestic service between two international airports (Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam) and about eighteen regional airports (1977); country also had some thirty other officially designated airfields and landing strips. ATC began international air service to several other African states in late 1977. Zanzibar separately established Zanair in early 1977.

**Telecommunications:** Some 27,000 telephone lines in 1975, increasing at rate of 2,000 to 3,000 a year. International radio telephone and cable service. Independently operated radio stations in Dar es Salaam—regional transmitters at Arusha, Mwanza, and Mbeya—and in Zanzibar; estimated 300,000 radio receivers. Zanzibar had color television from 1973, but mainland had no plans for installation as of 1977 based on government premise television chiefly benefits urban population, which conflicts with primary emphasis on development of rural sector.

### **National Security**

**Armed Forces:** Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) includes army—17,000; air force—1,000; and navy—600. Two-year term of service; all voluntary.

**Units:** Army—fourteen tactical battalions: ten infantry; two artillery; one tank; and one engineer battalion—deployed in four or five territorial brigades. Air force has three fighter squadrons and one transport squadron.

**Equipment:** Mostly of PRC origin, but inventory includes some artillery pieces and armored personnel carriers of Soviet manufacture.

**Foreign Military Treaties:** Nonaligned; leans heavily on PRC for military aid.

**Military Budget:** Estimated 1975 defense expenditure about TSh520 million (for value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary).

**Police:** National police forces—about 12,000.

**Armed Militia:** People's Militia—35,000.

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




Figure 1. Republic of Tanzania



## Chapter 1. Historical Setting





*Wood carving from a Nyamwezi chief's throne*



THE UNION IN 1964 of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania joined two entities whose connections before the nineteenth century had been few and whose political, social, and economic systems in the precolonial and colonial eras were quite different. Moreover there were overwhelming differences in size between the two islands constituting Zanzibar and the land mass of Tanganyika. Their populations in the mid-1970s—roughly 15.5 million for the mainland and about 500,000 for Zanzibar—indicate the proportions at the time of union and earlier.

Early in the second millennium A.D. Zanzibar was one of a number of coastal and insular city-states oriented to the Indian Ocean trade, Islamic in culture, and inhabited by a mixed, largely Afro-Arab population. The mainland had been peopled over a very long period by a number of groups that were different linguistically, culturally and, in some respects, physically. By the second millennium, however, Tanganyika's population was composed chiefly of groups speaking Bantu languages, using iron implements, and relying on agriculture (supplemented by hunting, gathering, and fishing) for subsistence.

The arrival and mixing of groups on the mainland continued through the nineteenth century. In the course of this process each amalgam evolved its own social and political institutions. Bantu (and non-Bantu) groups were, however, generally characterized by relatively small-scale political units. Even when such units were linguistically and culturally similar a sense of ethnic identity encompassing all of them emerged very slowly.

By the late eighteenth century Zanzibar became the seat of an Omani dynasty, and by the early nineteenth largely Arab-owned clove plantations dependent on slave labor dominated its domestic economy and that of Pemba. Not long after, trading links (including the slave trade) between Zanzibar (and its dependencies) and various groups in the mainland's interior were firmly established, directly and indirectly affecting the economies and politics of mainland societies.

By mid-century European traders had established themselves in Zanzibar, but the chief official presence was that of the British who were there to stop the sale of slaves to Europeans. Except for a few explorers the only Europeans on the mainland before the 1880s were missionaries, Roman Catholic and Protestant, of diverse origin. Substantial success in converting Africans was not to occur until the twentieth century, however. An ancillary but important task, that of bringing Western education to Africans, was also begun and became a major mission responsibility throughout the colonial period.

### *Tanzania: A Country Study*

In 1885 Germany authorized the German East Africa Company to administer what had become a German colony in the division of Africa arranged by the European powers. The company's ineptitude led to the German government's assumption of administrative responsibilities in 1890. For the rest of the nineteenth century and much of the first decade of the twentieth, the German colonial authorities began the development of the territory at the same time that they dealt with African recalcitrance, including a major rebellion in 1906. By the time they had instituted unchallenged control only a short interval remained before the onset of World War I and the loss of the colony to British troops by 1917. In 1922 the mainland, now called Tanganyika, became a League of Nations mandated territory administered by Great Britain.

Meanwhile Great Britain had established a protectorate over Zanzibar (including Pemba and a coastal strip later ceded to the Germans). In principle the sultan continued to rule, but the British increasingly dominated administration and government finance. Despite their subordinate role in government and their growing dependence on Indian merchants and financiers, the Arabs, particularly the Omani elite, maintained their social status. That status was supported by the British who thought of Zanzibar as an Arab state through the colonial period, although Arabs constituted less than 20 percent of the population.

In the interwar period political, social, and economic development in Tanganyika proceeded slowly. The territory lacked easily exploitable natural resources, and much of its land was characterized by poor soils, uncertain rainfall, and tsetse fly, making it unsuitable for cultivation or herding. The considerable investment required for more rapid social and economic development was not forthcoming from Great Britain for a variety of reasons, including the depression of the 1930s.

The Tanganyika government, in part as a matter of principle, in part to cope with a shortage of personnel, instituted the system of indirect rule. The system entailed administration through traditional chiefs or their analogues on the assumption that as natural rulers they would be the appropriate channels not only for the maintenance of law and order, but also for gradually introduced change. The demands made on chiefs by authorities, their increasing dependence on the regime for approval, and the use of chiefs to introduce unpopular measures (even more marked after World War II) led to distortion of the precolonial relations between chiefs and people, and chiefs gradually lost their legitimacy.

By the end of World War II, despite the slow pace at which the educational system had developed, a number of literate Tanganyika Africans, many of them working at lower levels in the civil service, had appeared on the political stage organized as the Tanganyika African Association (TAA). Local political agitation and organization had also begun in some rural areas, often set off by resentment of rules governing agricultural and herding practices

imposed through and enforced by the Native Authorities (chiefs and their appointed subordinates). These resentments, coupled with antipathies accumulated over the years, and the political movements that grew out of them were to provide a significant basis for mass support for the nationalist party that emerged in the mid-1950s.

The TAA began to ask for elected representation at various levels and to protest the operation of a *de facto* color bar in most political, economic, and social relations. Resentment generated by the color bar was focused on European colonial authorities and settlers; part of it was turned against Asians, almost ubiquitous in the kinds of commercial enterprise and civil service positions to which Africans were beginning to aspire and often considered more remote than Europeans by Africans.

The colonial government responded to these manifestations of discontent slowly and attempted to carry out its own, sometimes uncertain, plans for development, predicated on colonial rule for a long period. The authorities emphasized growth in the educational system, continuing development in plantation agriculture and cash cropping by peasant smallholders, and road construction. They also intended a very gradual introduction of elected representatives in the Legislative Council and at local levels. Closely associated with the notion of election was the notion of multiracialism calling for the representation for both Europeans and Asians equal to that of Africans who vastly outnumbered them. This point of view, urged by the governor of Tanganyika from 1949 to 1958, was disliked by the ordinary African and was to provide a major issue for African nationalists.

In July 1954 the TAA became the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) under the leadership of Julius K. Nyerere. Rejecting multiracialism (and tribalism) TANU emphasized the African nature of Tanganyika and called for African majorities at all levels of government. It was the first African organization to indicate that independence was its ultimate goal, but it set no timetable for self-rule. Despite the obstacles the colonial authorities put in its way TANU, sparked by Nyerere's leadership and eloquence, rapidly gained membership and support. By 1958 internal and external developments had opened the way to self-government, achieved in September 1960; independence quickly followed in December 1961.

Progress toward independence in Zanzibar, initially slow, gathered steam in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The situation in Zanzibar and Pemba was not simple, allegiances and antipathies based on race, socioeconomic class, and religion cutting across one another. In the end the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) achieved a popular majority, but a coalition of two minority parties held a parliamentary majority when independence was granted in December 1963. In January 1964 a revolution led to the ouster of the Arab-led coalition and the end of the sultanate. On April 26



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Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (later the United Republic of Tanzania) (see fig. 1). The reasons for the union were complex and are not altogether clear. In any case there were no significant implications for the internal political and economic systems of the mainland or the islands. Zanzibar maintained its autonomy in virtually all matters. Only in 1977 when the ASP and TANU formally became one under the name of the Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—CCM) were tentative steps taken toward the integration of the two territories (see ch. 2).

From self-rule in 1960 to the mid-1960s, Tanganyika was a *de facto* one-party state, but TANU was given a subsidiary role as Nyerere and his colleagues sought to function in terms of the parliamentary system given by the independence constitution prepared by the British. They also relied heavily on British civil servants and assumed that development necessarily required a great deal of foreign aid, British and other. These assumptions gradually gave way in the face of internal discontents and conflicts with the Western powers. The internal pressures, present from the beginning, arose from Nyerere's reluctance to Africanize the civil service too swiftly lest expertise and efficiency be diminished and from his unwillingness to cater to what he considered African racialism. Nevertheless some adjustments were carried out.

Nyerere also struggled with the concept of democracy: in his view the Western notion implied a win-lose system in which different interest groups sought to maximize their power and influence at the expense of others. An African system implied the consensus of a moral community in which the welfare of all was considered. To approximate the latter, amendments to the constitution formally instituted a one-party state. It is doubtful that most of his colleagues shared Nyerere's philosophical orientation, but they had no difficulty in accepting the change: a one-party system confirmed their oligarchic experience and their certainty that as leaders of the independence movement they had a right to rule.

Nyerere, however, was not fully satisfied. He saw signs of an incipient class division in the country, not only between well-off party and government leaders on the one hand and peasants on the other, but also between urban and rural Tanzanians and among the peasantry where the structure of rewards for enterprising farmers was leading to significant economic differentiation in the rural areas. A basic tenet in Nyerere's philosophy was equality, and after tentative writings on socialism in the early 1960s he explicitly urged the institution of a socialist economy and society in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and other official expressions. Like his conception of democracy, Nyerere's idea of socialism was based on his perception of traditional African communities.

The growing wealth of party and government leaders was dealt with by instituting a leadership code; the code required that they

give up most of their sources of wealth other than their salaries, a step that led to some disgruntlement but was in part, at least, effective. Above all, Nyerere's conception of socialism was founded on his view of the nature of the traditional African rural community, and it was oriented to the axiom that the great bulk of the mainland's population would remain agricultural.

This set of ideas and assumptions accounts for the salience of the idea of *ujamaa* in the years after the Arusha Declaration. *Ujamaa*, inadequately translated as familyhood, refers to a pattern of equality, cooperation, interdependence, and sharing presumably characteristic not only of the family but also of traditional rural communities, even if they are not composed of kin. Given Tanzania's essentially rural character, *ujamaa* was to be made concrete in *ujamaa* villages. But if a mode of village social and economic organization was to go hand in hand with economic development and the provision of social services to which all Tanzanians were entitled, the dispersed communities characteristic of much of Tanzania would have to give way to nucleated ones—a process that came to be called villagization.

After a slow start and a good deal of coercion, villagization proceeded rapidly in the mid-1970s; *ujamaa* as a set of attitudes and social arrangements took hold much more slowly, a fact recognized by Nyerere and others (see ch. 2; ch. 3; ch. 4). The idea was not abandoned, however; it was assumed that the process would take longer and that it could not be coerced.

A second salient point in the Arusha Declaration was the notion of self-reliance (*kujitegemea*). Both leaders and followers had come increasingly to assume that economic development depended on huge quantities of aid from foreign sources, untenable and unfortunate in Nyerere's view. He did not reject such aid (and it was, in fact, still very important in the late 1970s), but he considered the attitude an obstacle to hard work by Tanzanians. One of TANU's early slogans was "Freedom and Work" (*Uhuru na Kazi*); the latter intended to disabuse Tanzanians of the idea that independence alone would bring the millennium. His insistence on self-reliance was consistent with the earlier notion.

These attempts to institute socialism involved a degree of coercion. Further, it has been assumed that a consensus existed and that opposition to that postulated consensus could stem only from a selfish perspective or from external sources, and suppression has followed (see ch. 2; ch. 5). Nevertheless public and private criticism of specific programs and, indeed, of instances of coercion does occur, and the government takes account of it, even if after the fact.

A comparison of Tanzania with other African states of roughly similar size and population suggests that it faces some problems that others do not and is free of some that trouble others. As a consequence in part of its history as one of the three East African territories governed by the British it had only a rudimentary

industrial base at independence, the bulk of industrial investment having gone to Kenya. Except for diamonds, expected to run out in the not distant future, it lacked mineral resources. Some of its land was very good, but much of it was not, and the good land often supported excessively dense populations. There has been some progress in economic development, but Tanzania reached independence as a very poor country, and it has, in many respects, remained so (see ch. 4).

Like most African states Tanzania is ethnically heterogeneous; as many as 120 ethnic groups have been identified. Nevertheless ethnic relations have not become a political issue, in part because no single group is large enough to have become dominant (the largest constitutes no more than 13 percent of the population) in part because, except in a few cases, ethnic identification is not deeply rooted (see *The Peopling of Tanzania*, this ch; ch. 3). Moreover Nyerere himself and most other leaders are adamantly opposed to what is usually called tribalism. This does not mean that ethnic awareness does not affect local social and political relations, or that differences in culture and in the economic situations of ethnic groups have not affected perceptions and actions; it does mean that conflict in ethnic terms is not nationally salient. Tanzania has also been fortunate in that a combination of historic factors and TANU's insistence have given it a lingua franca, Swahili, that has become very widely known and provides an opportunity for most Tanzanians to become literate without learning a completely alien language.

If divisiveness on ethnic grounds is not a critical issue in Tanzania, it is not clear that efforts to minimize economic differences between urban and rural populations and in the rural areas will not lead to other difficulties. For example, some of the economic differences in rural Tanzania are based on the differences between the natural environments in which specific communities (ethnic groups or large segments of them) have the luck to be located. Whether such differences can be leveled without generating a sense of unfairness is doubtful. Perhaps more important is the problematic nature of Nyerere's assumptions and vision. In the circumstances there is no articulated opposition to that vision, but there are indications that many Tanzanians do not share his emphasis on economic equality. Moreover Nyerere's assumption that his goals are rooted in traditional values may well be misplaced (see ch. 3). Nyerere's popularity is not at issue, and his sense of the direction in which Tanzania should move remained the formal basis of public policy in the late 1970s, but whether his goals are really those of ordinary Tanzanians is another matter.

### **The Peopling of Tanzania**

With other countries in eastern Africa (Kenya and Ethiopia), Tanzania may have seen the emergence of the earliest ancestors of mankind, but no connection can be traced between those ancient

hominids or, for that matter, the earliest known *Homo sapiens* in the area and any element in the modern population. Some of the ancestors of the present inhabitants may have been in the area more than 10,000 years ago; others came as late as the nineteenth century. But the antecedents of the great bulk of the population arrived over a period of many centuries beginning some time in the first half of the first millennium A.D. and continuing into the eighteenth century.

The process was gradual: small groups of people moved in stages from a point of departure, arrived in the area, and adapted to local conditions. If a desirable niche was occupied leapfrogging might take place, or the earlier inhabitants would be absorbed or driven out. Often a group's first area of settlement was not its last. The community as a whole or some segment of it might find itself uncomfortable for ecological or sociopolitical reasons with its then current situation and move on.

#### **The Mainland Before the Iron Age**

The earliest inhabitants of mainland Tanzania to which some of its peoples may be tentatively linked were hunters and gatherers some of whose shelters, stone tools and weapons, skeletal materials, and rock drawings have survived. These people were certainly in the area 3,000 to 5,000 years ago, and it is likely that they were present much earlier. It has been suggested, on the basis of a variety of evidence, that they were a part of a once relatively widespread peoples, sometimes called Khoisan speaking, most of them localized for many centuries in southern and southwestern Africa where Europeans came to call them Bushmen and Hottentots. The Sandawe and Hadzapi in northcentral Tanzania are thought to be remnants of these early inhabitants (see ch. 3).

By the beginning of the first millennium B.C. parts of the Rift Valley of Kenya and northern Tanzania were occupied by a cattle-herding people using stone tools (and bows) and resembling the Cushitic-speaking peoples of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia). On the basis of linguistic and other considerations scholars consider southern Ethiopia the point of origin of peoples speaking Cushitic languages, and it is argued that some of them began to move south through the Rift Valley before the first millennium B.C. There is no evidence that they migrated south of central Tanzania, and it is likely that they lived interspersed with the hunters and gatherers who had preceded them in the area. One site, that at Engaruka between lakes Natron and Manyara in northcentral Tanzania, suggests that some of the Southern Cushitic speakers turned to iron and agriculture roughly in mid-first millennium A.D., but most remained pastoralists. What seem to be remnants of these early Southern Cushitic peoples are still found in northcentral Tanzania: the Iraqw, one of the larger ethnic groups, are among them (see ch. 3).



### **The Early Iron Age and the Coming of the Bantu**

Sometime in the first half of the first millennium A.D. small groups of iron-using people, acquainted with agriculture, entered Tanzania and other parts of eastern and central Africa. These people probably spoke Bantu languages, a set of tongues spoken in historical times by most Africans living south of the equator and by substantial numbers north of it. There is considerable agreement that the ultimate point of origin of their ancestors (the pre-Bantu) lies in western Africa (probably southern Nigeria and Cameroun). The location of later centers of dispersal remains in dispute, but there is no doubt that those entering Tanzania came initially from a westerly direction whatever their point of entry into the territory.

All but one of the authenticated and dated early Iron Age sites in Tanzania have been found in the north. Those west of Lake Victoria are apparently part of a series of related finds in the interlacustrine area: southern Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and eastern Zaire; a similar site has been discovered on the other side of the lake at Urewe in Kenya.

Another set of sites has been excavated in the foothills of the Pare and Usambara mountains in the northeast and in the Digo Hills between Tanga in Tanzania and Mombasa in Kenya. The only dated early Iron Age site farther south is that at the Uvinza brine springs not far from the eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika. The pottery there, however, resembles that found in Zambia rather than that turned up in the interlacustrine area to the north. Early Iron Age sites have not yet been discovered in southern Tanzania, but it may be assumed that Iron Age Bantu-speaking cultivators reached some part of the area as they clearly did in northeasternmost Zambia immediately south of the Tanzanian border.

The early Iron Age Bantu, limited by the kinds of crops (mainly vegetables) available to them and apparently lacking cattle, settled chiefly in the moister, more easily worked areas. Those in the interlacustrine area stressed fishing rather than hunting as a supplementary source of food. All relied to some extent on gathering. It is unlikely that there was much contact or conflict between the Iron Age cultivators and the hunting and gathering groups on the one hand or the pastoralists on the other given what must have been a generally sparse population and the fact that each of these groups had adapted to somewhat different ecological conditions.


### **The Later Iron Age**

Significant changes in the distribution of the Bantu-speaking peoples began to occur when peoples of non-Bantu origin moved down from the north bringing cattle and cereals, permitting a more intensive exploitation of areas hitherto more or less unoccupied. In a number of cases, particularly in the interlacustrine area, new political forms gradually emerged in the course of contact between disparate peoples (see Social and Political Differentiation to the Late Eighteenth Century, this ch.)



*Rift Valley region  
Courtesy Geza Teleki*

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Source: Adapted from Figure 17, "The Later Iron Age Intrusion," in Roland Oliver "The East African Intrusion," in Roland Oliver (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 3, from c. 1050 to c. 1600*, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

**Figure 2. Early Iron Age Sites and Non-Bantu Intrusions**

The northerners who moved into Tanzania from, roughly, the early centuries of the second millennium to the eighteenth century A.D. were, in linguistic and cultural terms, of three kinds: Central Sudanic, Nilotic, and Paraniotic (see fig. 2). In many

cases whatever their cultural contributions to the Bantu already present, they were linguistically, culturally and, often, biologically absorbed by them.

It has been hypothesized that the first of these peoples to arrive were speakers of Central Sudanic languages, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries located chiefly in the northeastern Zaire and southwestern Sudan but thought to have been a significant population in northern Uganda many centuries ago. Themselves Iron Age people but, unlike Bantu then living in East Africa, grain cultivators and cattle herders, they seem to have affected the ecological adaptations of the interlacustrine Bantu and to have contributed some terms to the local languages (e.g., the currently used word for cow). There is no firm evidence that Bantu contact with this first set of northerners (who probably infiltrated the interlacustrine area slowly and in small groups) led to significant changes in social and political organization, but it is likely that there were some. In any case whatever their contributions to interlacustrine society and culture, the Central Sudanic speakers came eventually to speak Bantu languages; there are no remnant groups in the area.

Again on the basis of fragmentary evidence it has been suggested that groups speaking Paraniotic languages (referred to as Southern Paraniotes) reached that part of Tanzania just east of Lake Victoria sometime in the first half of the second millennium A.D., having come ultimately from an area in what is now southeastern Sudan and westernmost Ethiopia. One set of peoples, now known collectively as the Kalenjin, came no farther south than the Kenyan Rift and the highlands immediately to the west of it, but another (linguistically and socially different) group of Southern Paraniotes, the Tatog (sometimes known as Dadog) reached central Tanzania south of lakes Manyara and Eyasi. The historian Roland Oliver (in the *Cambridge History of Africa*) has offered the hypothesis that these Tatog, remnants of which some are still to be found scattered in the area (Bantuized as Tatoga), brought cattle and cereal farming to central Tanzania.

On less substantial evidence it has been suggested that people referred to as Eastern Paraniotes arrived, via the eastern side of the Rift Valley, in the environs of Mount Kilimanjaro and the nearby plains and hills where, presumably, they interacted with early Iron Age Bantu already present, although it is not likely that the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro were heavily occupied by the Bantu-speaking Chaga until somewhat later. A remnant of these early Eastern Paraniotes are the Ongamo living on the northeastern slopes of Kilimanjaro. The last and most important incursion of Eastern Paraniotes occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the arrival of the Masai, a pastoral people (see *The Eastern Rift and the Northeastern Highlands*, this ch.).

Elsewhere in mainland Tanzania during the first half of the



second millennium Bantu-speaking peoples were gradually and, on the whole, sparsely settling the interior. Some areas in central Tanzania probably were not settled then and remained unsettled into the twentieth century, either because of inadequate and uncertain rainfall (which precluded cultivation) or tsetse fly (which precluded herding). Oliver points out that this central region, although as large as the interlacustrine area (comprising parts of several modern states) has had in modern times only a fifth of the interlacustrine population, and that ratio probably prevailed in the earlier period. For the purposes of this discussion the region's northern and western borders are the interlacustrine area and Lake Tanganyika, and its southern limits the mountainous area stretching from a point just north of Lake Nyasa west to Lake Tanganyika and northeast to the Iringa Highlands. In the east they are set by the western boundary of the eastern Rift Valley; that western boundary then (and now) marked off the Bantu peoples in the central region from the Paraniotic and Southern Cushitic peoples to the east.

The central Tanzanian region apparently drew small groups from the more densely settled Bantu-speaking areas to the west and the east (in the latter case Bantu speakers would have had to move through the eastern Rift peopled by Southern Cushitic and Paraniotic groups). Only in the area immediately south of Lake Victoria and a few other places was relatively dense settlement possible. In this early period political organization was small scale, each entity consisting of a few, usually dispersed, communities. Larger scale systems, just beginning in the interlacustrine area and among the Pare in the northeast, did not emerge until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

It is difficult to identify in these early settlers the specific ancestors of modern ethnic groups: there is no archaeology and oral history going back to this period; moreover there are indications that a good deal of movement and mixture went on in this and later times, and only some of the ancestors of modern peoples could have been present in the area at that time. The ethnic entities that developed out of usually heterogeneous peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (for example, the Sukuma, Gogo, Turu, Iramba, Hehe, and Fipa) had not yet emerged.

Chieftainship and slightly larger scale polities may have begun to develop as early as the fourteenth century A.D. in the ecologically and economically mixed highlands south and southeast of the central region. There the partly pastoral Bantu speakers of the drier northeastern sections of these highlands came eventually to mix with the more intensive cultivators of the south and southwest leading to a process of state formation that took several centuries to effect. In any case the states were small. Again movement and mixture preclude the establishment of a clear connection between a fourteenth or fifteenth century group and modern ethnic groups in the same area. In some cases it is quite clear that a degree of

ethnic self-consciousness embracing a number of independent communities did not emerge until the late nineteenth century or later.

East of the Rift Valley and north of the lower reaches of the Pangani River lies a series of highland areas (Mount Kilimanjaro and the Pare and Usambara mountains) with minor exceptions inhabited in historical times and earlier by Bantu-speaking peoples. In the Pare Mountains early Iron Age sites, presumably associated with Bantu speakers, have been excavated. Although early Southern Cushitic and Eastern Paraniotic peoples may well have preceded the Bantu, by the end of the first half of the second millennium the bulk of the population consisted of Bantu peoples who continued to move into the area for centuries. Oral history and traditions of origin suggest diverse geographic origins for these people. Kilimanjaro in particular seems to have been a refuge for a variety of largely Bantu-speaking groups, although some Chaga descent groups (see Glossary) claim origin among the Paraniotic Masai.

In the coastal hinterland north of the Pangani, also the locus of early Iron Age sites, other Bantu-speaking groups (in part the ancestors of the set of ethnic groups sometimes collectively called the Nyika) were certainly present by the end of the first half of the second millennium and may indeed be linked to those early sites. Among the people in the area, however, was at least one pastoral group, the Segeju, perhaps Paraniotic in origin but Bantuized in historical times.

Most of these northeastern Bantu groups, whether in the highlands or the coastal hinterland, were in one degree or another influenced by the pre-Masai Paraniotics, the Masai, or the Southern Cushitic speakers. The most marked indication of that influence is the presence among them of a system of age-sets (see Glossary).

The northeastern Bantu consisted of relatively small communities until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with one exception, that of the northern Pare who seem to have been organized into a hierarchical political system in the sixteenth century (that polity was called Ugweni). The pattern began when a clan of blacksmiths became to a limited extent the focus not only of a market for iron but for the settling of disputes and the holding of initiation rites. Another clan, the Suyia, then established political overlordship by what oral history depicts as a coup d'état; the new rulers organized a hierarchy of councils, sent members of the ruling clan to rule over various districts, and made clan (see Glossary) initiation rites into national ones.

South of the Pangani River the coastal hinterland, most of it low and hot, stretches into the interior for roughly 150 to 300 kilometers (100 to 200 miles). Except for the area south of the coastal town of Lindi to the Ruvuma River and stretching west to the town of Masasi, this southeastern quadrant of Tanzania is relatively

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sparsely peopled, a situation that may be attributed largely to its climate but may have been caused in part by the depredations of slave raiders in the nineteenth century (see *Raiders and Traders: The Nineteenth Century*, this ch.). Most of the groups in this area are and have been organized in small communities and have lacked a ruling group concerned to support its status by the keeping of detailed genealogies and the development of oral history. Moreover there has been very little archaeological research in the area, and no sites dated to the sixteenth century or earlier have been found. The Arab and mixed Afro-Arab settlers on the coast and offshore islands make no reference to these groups although they must have traded with them.

#### **The Coast and the Islands: the Early Period**

From the earliest records sometime in the first millennium A.D. until the end of the eighteenth century the East African coast and the islands from the Benadir Coast of Somalia to the Zambezi River and below in what is now Mozambique were oriented to the Indian Ocean and the lands abutting it, particularly those of Southwest Asia, and had little to do with the interior. A partial exception was the interaction of Arabs and later Portuguese with the East Central African states from trading posts on the Mozambican coast.

The first apparent references to the Tanzanian coast occur before 500 A.D. in a Greek commercial guide, but they are vague and no connection can be made between them and later developments. The earliest Arab sources alluding to the coast occur in the ninth and tenth centuries A.D. Arabs of the Persian Gulf area (and perhaps a few Persians) were clearly engaged in trade at that time, and by the twelfth century there were a number of trading posts and settlements on the coast and on the offshore islands—Zanzibar and Pemba (then called Qanbalu) in the north, Mafia and Kilwa Kisiwani (Kilwa on the island) farther south. Some of the immigrants were either from the Persian Gulf and Yemen directly or had settled elsewhere on the coast before moving to the Tanzanian area: thus merchants said to be of Shirazi origin (in modern Iran) settled first on the Benadir Coast from which some of them moved to Mafia and Kilwa islands, controlling them by the beginning of the thirteenth century. Whatever their geographic origin most of these settlers were Arabs.

The earliest (ninth century) references to the indigenous peoples of the coast seem to indicate that most were Cushitic speakers, but there is some evidence of Bantu speech, not surprising in light of the early Iron Age sites in the hinterland between Mombasa and Tanga. By the fourteenth century the non-Arab coastal and island population was almost entirely Bantu speaking, and the dialects they spoke provided the Bantu base for what was to become Swahili, the mother tongue of all of the inhabitants of Zanzibar and Pemba and of most of those living in coastal towns in this early period and later.

For the most part, each of the coastal or island settlements during this period (to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and into the eighteenth century) was essentially a small city-state, culturally Islamic and mercantile in orientation. For a long time the most important of the independent Swahili coastal towns or city-states was Kilwa Kisiwani. By the thirteenth century Kilwa controlled the sea routes to and from Sofala, the outlet—located on the coast of what is now Mozambique—for gold brought by Africans from the interior basin of the Zambezi River. Consequently Kilwa gained and maintained an economic ascendancy over the coastal area, which lasted into the fifteenth century, when it was overtaken by Zanzibar and Mombasa.

Other towns, such as Pemba, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu, located mostly on the islands just off the coast for purposes of security, developed a pattern similar to that of Kilwa. These towns depended on the monsoons and on such African products, provided by African traders, as ivory, timber, iron, tortoise shell, leopard skins, ambergris, gold, and slaves, although the slave trade for export was not important in the Tanzanian region until the nineteenth century. At the coast these goods were then taken by Arab and sometimes other traders for resale in Asia. The trade intensified steadily from the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries.

In most of these communities, according to Neville Chittick, there were three categories of people: the first consisted of a mixed Afro-Arab population that included the ruling families, the landholders, the merchants, the artisans, and most of the religious functionaries. The second category comprised full-blooded Africans who had been enslaved on the mainland and who performed agricultural and other labor. The third included transient or recently settled Arabs and perhaps a few Persians.

#### **The Portuguese**

The entire coast felt the destructive impact of the Portuguese arrival, partly because the city-states were unable to present a united front against the invaders and also because the Portuguese were sometimes aided by discontented mainland groups as well as by the possession of cannon. The first visit by Vasco da Gama to East Africa took place in 1498. Two years later Kilwa was made to pay tribute, and in 1505 Sofala, with its gold trade, was taken, and Kilwa and Mombasa were sacked. By 1506 Portugal had claimed control over the entire coast and over trade on the Indian Ocean.

The forces of the Portuguese were never sufficiently large to give their claim of control over the coast much validity north of Sofala, and they never attempted systematic administration. Hurt by local intrigues, disease, and their own failure to cooperate with Africans or Arabs, the Portuguese gained little from their presence in the area. They did not leave many enduring marks on the life of the coast, with the exception of some food crops, such as cassava, and certain utilitarian items, such as handkerchiefs and screws,



for which the Swahili names closely resemble the Portuguese. Although the northern cities recovered somewhat both commercially and culturally after the initial Portuguese blows, the southern ones did not, partly because the trade ties that had been cut by the Portuguese were not reestablished.

In the 1580s several events occurred that lessened the already tenuous hold of the Portuguese. In 1585 a Turk, Amir Ali Bey, visited several ports along the northern coast, and at his urging the people united and rose up against the Portuguese. This revolt was suppressed in 1587, but the next year Amir Ali came again, and once more the northern coast rose up in rebellion. A fleet was dispatched from Goa to put it down, and with the help of some Africans loyal to the Portuguese, this force was able to drive the Turks and their Swahili and Arab allies into the walled town of Mombasa. At the same time there arrived from the south a marauding band of some 5,000 Zimba warriors (whose origins lay in the political turmoil of the Mozambican area) who had destroyed Kilwa in 1587 and then proceeded northward along the coast, leaving a trail of destruction and depopulated villages. Accepting their offer of aid, the Portuguese permitted them to enter Mombasa, where they massacred the defenders and destroyed the city. They then moved northward, preparing to destroy Malindi as well. There, however, they were defeated and destroyed by a coalition of local rulers, the Portuguese, and the warlike Segeju people that had been moving downward along the coast.

In 1593 the Portuguese attempted to consolidate their hold over the northern coast by building Fort Jesus at Mombasa. For another 100 years they continued to claim the coast from Cape Guardafui to Cape Delgado, but little real authority was exerted. An uprising in Malindi and Mombasa that led to the temporary capture of Fort Jesus further undermined Portuguese control, and in 1652 Arabs from Oman began to assist the coastal towns. They had driven the Portuguese out of their own lands in 1650. After finally taking Fort Jesus in 1698 the Omani Arabs established garrisons on Zanzibar, Pemba, and Kilwa, and the Portuguese were never again in control of the area north of the Ruvuma River.

### **Social and Political Differentiation to The Late Eighteenth Century**

By the end of the eighteenth century most of the ancestors of the peoples of mainland Tanzania had arrived within its boundaries. Movements of small groups from adjacent territories continued into the nineteenth and even the twentieth century, but the only important arrivals were those of the Luo, already alluded to, and of the Ngoni, whose origins lay in southernmost Africa (see *Raiders and Traders: The Nineteenth Century*, this ch.).

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, to a lesser extent, in the nineteenth, the internal movement and mixing of peoples characteristic of the earlier period continued. Often a



group on the move brought to another that it encountered in situ a technique (a better way of smelting or working iron or of planting cereals), a symbol (the conus disc representing the sun or the drum as a symbol of authority), or apparent solutions to problems (how to organize a larger group, how to relate more adequately to the supernatural). Out of these processes there emerged in many cases political units of greater scale and encompassing more heterogeneous populations than that common in the first half of the second millennium. Few were very large, however, and none matched the scale and complexity of some of the systems that developed in Western Africa then or earlier.

In some cases state formation involved the conquest of one segment of a population by another, often intrusive, one. At least that is the version given in the oral histories of ruling dynasties. Rarely, however, was conquest the sole basis for the establishment of a state, whether large or small. Often the local population had some experience of chieftainship, even if only on a small scale, and at least some of the communities in a given area accepted the newcomers as bearers of techniques, symbols, and solutions to problems without the need for military conquest.

In the larger and more heterogeneous societies with more complex political hierarchies, inequalities of status and, to a lesser extent, of wealth also emerged. The links between social status and political power were not simple, however. Occasionally old dynasties that had lost political power retained ritual status and, not uncommonly, political arrangements incorporating diverse populations made a point of giving commoners certain powers as advisers.

Although many parts of the mainland remained sparsely populated, most areas were penetrated to some degree, and there must have been an overall increase in population. The variety of crops and of skills was greater than it had been, and local resources were more thoroughly exploited. Out of all this came the development of regional trade and even of limited links between one region and another. One source of trade goods was iron, a second was salt, a third, pottery. The availability of iron or better techniques for smelting and working it gave a group as a whole an advantage in local trade and to the smelters and smiths themselves status and sometimes power. Less significant politically, but important economically, was the availability of good clays and ceramic skills.

By the latter half of the eighteenth century a reorganized and increasingly vigorous coastal economy led to a growing demand for ivory and other goods, to which some of the peoples of the interior responded. At this time, however, few Arab or Swahili traders penetrated to the interior themselves: the demand was communicated to hunters and others in the coastal hinterland, and they often covered a great deal of territory in their quest. In addition some goods were passed from one regional network to another, eventually reaching the coast. By the end of the eighteenth

century some of the people in the interior took the initiative, carrying goods to the coast and back. Among the more important of these were members, called Nyamwezi by the people of the coast, of small chiefdoms in what is Tabora Region.

Much of the portrayal of developments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries relies on a source available to a very limited extent for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and not at all for the first half of the second millennium: the genealogies of ruling groups and other oral history (sometimes cross-checked by natural events such as eclipses). Oral history has its shortcomings, especially when it seeks to recapture events and relations several centuries old. It may, however, be cautiously adduced to indicate general patterns, as it is here, even when it is ambiguous or uncertain with respect to particulars.

#### **The Interlacustrine Area**

State-building processes that may have begun as early as the fifteenth century in southern Uganda soon spread to northwestern Tanzania when immigrants from the more northerly states, perhaps displaced as rulers by newcomers, established dynasties west and southwest of Lake Victoria. The keepers of the official dynastic histories portray the process as one of conquest, but as historians Edward Alpers and Christopher Ehret point out, it may be seen as one of absorption of immigrants with special qualifications into traditional roles of leadership, which then expanded in power and scope.

The Hinda dynasties in what is now the West Lake Region were founded by Ruhinda (and his descendants) who had fled a Ugandan kingdom. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Karagwe was the largest state in the area and maintained a degree of ritual, but not political, supremacy over the others. The heads of these states ruled populations composed—in different degrees—of agri-cultural peoples and pastoralists. The former may have stemmed at least in part from the early Iron Age Bantu; the pastoralists, non-Bantu in origin, filtered down from the north later. By the time they settled down, however, all spoke a Bantu language—Haya in Karagwe and most other states, Zinza in one case.

The pastoralists may have enjoyed a higher status than the cultivators, but the castelike inequalities that later developed in some states in Rwanda and Burundi did not emerge here. The clans and lineages that had prevailed among the cultivating peoples continued to be important providing a kind of buffer against royal excesses. Moreover, although members of the royal family might be important administrative officials, the first minister (*katikiro*) of the king (*mukama*) was always a commoner.

#### **Central Tanzania**

By the end of the eighteenth century a large number of rather small chiefdoms—many encompassed only 1,000 persons—had been established in the central interior. Most of them can be

linked to ethnic groups as they were defined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by outsiders, but the traditional histories of any group so defined indicate their diverse origins despite their similar cultures and common language. They also indicate historical relationships between segments of one ethnic group and segments of another. Thus a section of the heterogeneous Kimbu (east and northeast of Lake Rukwa) may have provided the ruling group for some chiefdoms of the even more heterogeneous Nyamwezi to the north, and another section provided such a group to Hehe chiefdoms to the east.

From the southern shores of Lake Victoria to just north of Lake Rukwa are five ethnic groups—Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Sumbwa, Kimbu, and Konongo—in what scholars have come to call Greater Unyamwezi (Unyamwezi proper is the home of one of these groups) or the *ntemi* region because many of the chiefs bear that title. By the mid-eighteenth century the region was the locus of a host of small chiefdoms as migrants of varied origin staked out territories for new chiefdoms, took over preexisting ones or, as losing claimants to chiefly succession in established chiefdoms, departed to establish new ones. The chief in the senior chiefdom of a set of related chiefdoms might have a higher ritual status than the others, and in a few cases a chiefdom might owe tribute to another, but only in the nineteenth century, as trade with the coast intensified and firearms became available, did some chiefs seek to establish hegemony over wider areas (see *Raiders and Traders: the Nineteenth Century*, this ch.).

Chiefs were, in the first instance, religious figures whose physical well-being and ritual activities were essential to the health and prosperity of their people. Sometimes a chief was also administrative head of a set of headmen and councillors. Perhaps more often a chief's political function reflected his primarily ritual role: decisions often required consideration of the supernatural.

At the southwestern edge of the central interior between lakes Rukwa and Tanganyika live the Fipa. Sites just outside the Fipa plateau suggest that the first occupants of the area were probably hunters and that early Iron Age cultivators may have lived in or near it. Fipa traditional history, however, begins around A. D. 1700 when the founders of the chiefdom of Milansi and related chiefdoms arrived. Their ultimate origin probably lies in Luba country, locus of a large kingdom in southern Zaire. Cultivators of millet and iron smelters and smiths, these immigrants may have carried with them the notion of rule over territory as opposed to a pattern common in simpler societies in which a chief led a band of personal followers but did not control a specific territory and all of the people in it. As in the case of sets of linked chiefdoms elsewhere in central Tanzania, the idiom of kinship was used in describing the relations between members of the set: the head of the senior chiefdom was thought of as father or elder brother of the other heads.

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In the mid-eighteenth century a second set of migrants, probably stemming from the ruling group of one of the interlacustrine kingdoms, established their rule over the Fipa in a centralized system. The chief of Milansi became the chief priest of the kingdom, and political authority passed into the hands of the newcomers who instituted a system in which subordinates, instead of inheriting their positions, were appointed by the paramount chief and therefore directly dependent on him. That pattern continued, but the unity of the Fipa did not: dynastic conflict in the early nineteenth century eventually led to the establishment of two chiefdoms.

Developments in the eastern and southern sections of central Tanzania resembled those to the west and north despite considerable differences in cultural detail. Here, too, multidirectional movement and mixing of Bantu-speaking agricultural peoples led to the emergence of many small chiefdoms, as among the Hehe and the Bena. Again ethnic consciousness did not arise until the nineteenth century.

At least one of the groups in the area, the Gogo on the eastern edge, was influenced in the late eighteenth century by the southernmost extension of the pastoral Paraniotic Masai from whom they borrowed many aspects of costume as well as the age-set system. The Gogo, however, remained agriculturalists.


#### **The Eastern Rift and the Northeastern Highlands**

To some extent developments in the Eastern Rift Valley and the largely Bantu-occupied highlands immediately to the east were influenced by the incursion of the pastoral Paraniotic Masai in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Organized into age-sets, making for an effective military organization, the Masai began to move south from the tripoint area of Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia in the Lake Rudolf basin and came for a time to dominate the Eastern Rift Valley grasslands from the lake as far south as the Gogo country near present-day Dodoma. The Kisonko, as the southern section of the Masai is called, reached that point toward the end of the eighteenth century.

As Alpers and Ehret have noted, the nature of Masai relations with their neighbors ranged from chronic warfare to economic exchange to intermarriage, sometimes simultaneously. For the most part Masai interactions with Tanzanian Bantu speakers, such as the Chaga and the Pare, were peaceful, entailing the exchange of cattle and hides for iron, iron products, and the like, but the traditional history of Chaga chiefdoms on the eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro does indicate Chaga-Masai warfare in the late eighteenth century.

In some cases the Masai age-set system and the associated initiation and circumcision rites were taken over in whole or in part by their Bantu neighbors, perhaps as a way of organizing themselves to cope with the Masai. Among the Tanzanian groups that may have been so influenced were the Chaga, although their





*View of earth's surface showing northeast Tanzania and the  
Kenya border area made from Landsat-1 920 kilometers  
(570 miles) in space. Mount Meru appears lower left  
center, Mount Kilimanjaro right center  
Courtesy NASA earth resources technology satellite*

age-set system may have been borrowed from the Eastern Paraniotes who preceded them on Mount Kilimanjaro.

In the environs of Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru there have long been groups, most of them quite small, of settled agricultural people called Kwavi who speak a Masai dialect. Whether they preceded the Masai in the area and took on the language of the former (who dominated the area) or whether they were offshoots of the Masai is not altogether clear. The largest such group is the Arusha, settled on the southwestern slopes of Mount Meru and in the adjacent plains. The first settlers came to Mount Meru as late as 1830, but there had been Masai-speaking settled peoples before that, chiefly in the plain south of Mount Kilimanjaro.

Indirect effects of the arrival of the Masai may be seen in the history of the Shambaa of the Usambara Mountains. Masai raids apparently forced Shambaa living on the lower slopes of these mountains into the higher areas and encouraged the formation of large central communities for protection. In addition cattle-keeping peoples, the Mbugu and the Nango (the former, at least, Cushitic speaking), entered the area after having left their homelands in the west under Masai pressure. The Mbugu herded their cattle above the settled zone, but the Nango lived among the Shambaa and, in places, dominated them. These conditions of Masai pressure and increasing population density and heterogeneity set the stage for political centralization.

Traditional dynastic history and other Shambaa sources give somewhat different pictures of the development of political hierarchy, but it seems that a hunter called Mbegha, originating elsewhere, became a provider of meat and a dispute settler among the Shambaa sometime in the eighteenth century and married the daughter of a Nango leader. Their son established the Kilindi dynasty. Kilindi effectiveness as dispute settlers in a divided society and as organizers of defense against the Masai led to their acceptance by many Shambaa, but there was also resistance. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, a dispute over succession led to the founding of a small independent kingdom in the far northeast part of the mountains where it could be defended against attempts to reincorporate it into the larger kingdom.

#### **The Southeast and the Southern Highlands**

The paucity of information for the eastern mainland south of the Pangani River persists into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is likely that some of the matrilineally organized peoples of the area were already present but relying more heavily on hunting and gathering than on agriculture. Still others arrived in the nineteenth century when the introduction of maize made settlement by somewhat denser populations more feasible. The pattern of scattered communities and small-scale politics continued, although there were minor exceptions. One group,

the Yao, made its appearance in the late eighteenth century as slave raiders and traders responding to the demand for labor generated by the Omani Arabs (who were just beginning to take hold in the islands and on the coast), the Portuguese, and the French (who had established themselves on various islands in the Indian Ocean).

In the southern highlands between lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika a good deal of movement was going on, fed in part by peoples from the east, north, and south. As far as can be determined this was the period in which the small chiefdoms characteristic of the area were formed, and various ethnic groups began to crystallize, although the lumping of some peoples into such groups (for example, the Nyakyusa) took place at a later time.

#### **The Islands and the Coast**

By the end of the seventeenth century the Portuguese had left the coasts of Tanzania and Kenya, but the situation that had prevailed during their stay persisted. The city-states continued to insist on their autonomy and, oriented to their short-term advantage and marked by internal factionalism, were no more able to unite against the Omanis whom they had called to their aid in the struggle against the Portuguese than they had been able to unite against the latter. Nevertheless the local rulers were not prepared to give up their independence, and the Omani dynasty then in power, itself riven by internecine struggle, could not impose its rule firmly on the island and coastal principalities.

By 1741, however, it was replaced in Oman by the Busaidi dynasty, which very gradually established its hegemony on the islands and coast south of Mombasa and generated the policy and some of the conditions for renewed prosperity in the area. Under Busaidi rule relatively sustained interaction between the coast and the peoples of the interior got under way toward the end of the eighteenth century. These relations were not extended and intensified until well into the nineteenth century, however, and Arab and Swahili traders did not themselves make their way into the interior until after 1840.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century Zanzibar became important, and the towns opposite it on the mainland, particularly Bagamoyo, became dependent on it. Farther south, Kilwa, for some time in decline, became the major port for the southern interior, trafficking in both ivory and slaves. There had always been some slaving, but in this part of eastern Africa slaves had hitherto been acquired largely for local use. The kind of plantation agriculture intensifying the demand for slaves had only recently been established by the French and Portuguese and was soon to be instituted by the Omani Arabs on Zanzibar and Pemba.

The arrival of the Omani Arabs also marked the beginning of a change in the social system of the coast, particularly on Zanzibar. Judging by the use of Swahili titles and Bantu names in the traditional histories, the Africanization of Arab colonists had con-

tinued through the Portuguese period, but by the last quarter of the eighteenth century—and as the power of the Busaidi Omanis increased—the Arab element seems to have established and maintained a stronger position than it had earlier, although they were, and remained, a minority.

### **Raiders and Traders: The Nineteenth Century**

Most of the nineteenth century was marked by the increasing significance of trade in the interior and between the interior and the Zanzibar-dominated coast and by the influence of that trade on the politics of ethnic groups directly and indirectly affected by it. Another development, independent of the largely east-west movement of commerce was the arrival in Tanzania of the Ngoni, a raiding people whose origins lay in South Africa, their relatively swift movement from south to north, and their political impact on the peoples they touched.

Interior trade had to some degree characterized relations between groups for centuries, and by the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth some regional networks, for example, that centered on Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika, provided a substantial range of goods produced by a number of specialists. Moreover some items, of which ivory was perhaps the most significant, had reached the coast from the interior through links between regional networks, and other items moved in the same way from the coast to the interior. Indeed the Nyamwezi had made their way to the coast by the end of the eighteenth century, thus bypassing the step-by-step movement from one region to another.

Specialization and trade notwithstanding, the great mass of Africans still relied on and were chiefly engaged in subsistence agriculture, and many who were specialists or traders retained their bases in the subsistence economy, engaging in their specialties only part-time. Local markets for the exchange of food-stuffs did exist, but food production primarily for the market was rare. Later in the nineteenth century when a fairly large number of Africans, Arabs, and Swahili required provisioning because of their full-time involvement in commercial activity, some Africans did engage in food production to meet their needs. Often, however, these were slaves. Although most Africans were not producing for the market or engaged in trade, many were directly or indirectly affected by the development of commerce, either because they were enslaved or because of political developments stimulated in one way or another by trade or the presence of aliens in their midst.

### **Zanzibar and the Development of Trade Routes**

In 1806 Sayyid Said bin Sultan became ruler of Oman, and by 1814 he began to establish a firmer hold on Oman's dominions south of Mombasa and to consider gaining control over Mombasa and its environs, which, under the Mazrui family, had maintained



its independence of Oman and had developed a good deal of influence in areas to the north and west. In 1822 Said's forces took over Pemba, which had served Mombasa as a granary, but it was not until 1837 that Said established Busaidi rule in Mombasa and exiled the Mazruis. In 1840 the capital of the Omani state was transferred from Muscat to Zanzibar.

Although Said was concerned with establishing a degree of political control over the islands and the coast, his primary interests lay in commerce. As long as the flow of production and trade was maintained and the suzerainty of the Busaidis duly recognized, *de facto* political control of specific communities remained in the hands of local elite families. Still less did the Zanzibaris attempt to dominate politically the peoples of the interior. As the century wore on, Arab and Swahili traders were increasingly found in various parts of mainland Tanzania, and some towns had a substantial resident population of coastmen. These traders played a part in local politics—as advisors and as suppliers of weapons—but they did not, either on their own behalf or as agents of the sultans of Zanzibar, seek to govern the communities in which they lived or traded.

Said was interested not only in developing Zanzibar's external trade but also in making it a center of clove production. By the end of his reign in 1856, Zanzibar was producing three-quarters of the world's clove supply. In order to do this, local Africans on Zanzibar were forcibly removed from the most productive land to make room for plantations, and many of them were required to do forced labor. The remainder of the labor force consisted of slaves brought from the mainland's interior. Arabs were less intrusive on Pemba where the mixed Afro-Arab population became involved in clove production.

The growth of the plantation economy attracted numbers of new Arab immigrants and contributed to the rise of an Arab planter aristocracy supplementing the Arab urban elite, itself increased by officials and administrators brought in by the sultan. As a consequence of these economic and social changes, the relative political autonomy of African communities on Zanzibar gave way to direct rule by Arab administrators. By the mid-nineteenth century the so-called pure Arab, once a minor element in the Zanzibari population, respected but not politically or economically significant, wielded great political and economic power; it remained a numerical minority, however. Not all of the non-Africans were Arabs, nor were all the Arabs Omanis, although the Omanis were politically the most important. In addition to relatively small groups of Arabs from Yemen and the Persian Gulf, there were large numbers from the Hadramaut and adjacent areas on the Arabian Peninsula. Said had also encouraged the immigrations of Indians (locally called Banians) because of their financial expertise and as sources of capital for trading ventures. In 1840 there were 2,000 Indians on the island or working out of

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it; by the 1850s there were 5,000, both Hindu and Muslim. There was also a smattering of other peoples including Somalis, Comorians, and Baluchi.

By the 1830s Zanzibaris were ready to respond to opportunities in the interior. Their interest specifically aroused by the ivory delivered by the Nyamwezi, the Zanzibaris undertook the development of a number of trading routes, some already established.

There were three major routes: the southern route from Kilwa west and southwest through Yao, Bena and Hehe country; the northern route from Tanga via the Pangani River valley northwest past the Pare Mountains to Mount Kilimanjaro, a branch veering off to what is now Kenya; and the central route from Bagamoyo through Sangu country east of Lake Rukwa to the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. A second branch of the central route went through Gogo, Nyamwezi, and Ha territory to the important regional market at Ujiji near the northern end of Lake Tanganyika. At Tabora in Nyamweziland, the central route branched north to Sukumaland and the southern shores of Lake Victoria and northwest through Karagwe west of Lake Victoria and thence to Buganda, which in the nineteenth century had become perhaps the most powerful of the interlacustrine Bantu states. By the 1850s Tabora had become the chief focus of trading activities for Arabs, Swahili, and Nyamwezi, and Indian financiers had sent a representative to the town to look after their own interests.

#### **Social and Political Consequences of Trade**

In the first half or more of the nineteenth century, slave trading dominated the activity on the southern route, but the chief interest of the traders on the northern and central routes lay in ivory. Traders using the central route in search of slaves tended to go as far as the Congo for them, and the slaves they brought back via Tabora were often retained locally to till the land that Arabs, Swahili, and many Nyamwezi were too specialized and busy to do.

Kilwa had become an important slave exporting town in the latter half of the eighteenth century in response to European, particularly French, demand for slaves. In 1822 the Moresby Treaty, to which European powers and the Sultan of Zanzibar were signatories, made the sale of slaves to Christian powers illegal. The Europeans continued to buy slaves, however, until the British developed a more adequate policing system later in the nineteenth century. In any case the development of clove plantations on Zanzibar and the existence of slave markets in the Middle East led to a sustained demand for slaves.

The effects of the slave trade varied from one region to another. In the sparsely populated southeast inhabited by politically fragmented matrilineal communities the impact was severe. The Yao, themselves matrilineal and not centrally organized, had adapted early to commercial activity and led by entrepreneurial raiders took slaves from the other peoples of the area such as the Makua and the Makonde. Some of the peoples of southern and south-

western Tanzania such as the Nyiha and Fipa were also dislocated by the slave trade to some extent. In the far northeast, the Pare and the Chaga were touched by the slave trade to some extent especially after the middle of the nineteenth century. In the case of the Chaga it was not so much that they were directly raided as that interchiefdom warfare generated the taking of captives, and the opportunity to sell them provided an additional reason for raiding. The Chaga did not always export their captives but relocated them in such a way that they became dependents and supporters of the chief who had taken them.

Among the Nyamwezi, the Gogo, and others the slave trade led to the displacement of elements in the population and to economic gain for those involved. These groups did not so much export slaves as turn them into cultivators. Among the peoples of northeastern and central Tanzania, the slave (and other) trade led to the development of a system of stratification more complex than the comparatively simple one in which the major difference lay between the chiefly family or lineage on the one hand and commoners on the other.

In some parts of Tanzania slave raiding and warfare led to a change of settlement patterns: the Nyiha and Fipa in the south and southwest, for example, built fortified towns encircled by trenches, and the Nyamwezi and others in the northcentral Tanzania concentrated their populations in towns in response to interchiefdom warfare. Much later, during the colonial period, these northcentral peoples were to revert to the dispersed settlement patterns that had characterized them earlier.

There were other effects of nineteenth century trade. In some places the rectangular huts of the coast came to be built in place of or in addition to the circular huts indigenous to most of Tanzania. Some groups, or at least their more powerful and wealthier segments, came to wear cloth instead of skins. The movement of peoples, particularly traders such as the Nyamwezi, led to the development of the institution of the joking relationship (Swahili, *utani*) in which members of one ethnic group passing through the territory of another engaged in a kind of formal joking with them—a kind of substitute for overt conflict. In the hinterland of the northeast a form of spirit possession that had hitherto been limited to the coastal peoples spread to the Pare and the Shambaa.

The one element—Islam—that might have been expected to spread as a consequence of the development of the trade routes had no significant impact until after the establishment of European rule late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century. The Arabs made no great effort to proselytize, in part because the conversion of Africans to Islam would have closed off a source of slaves, in part because the Arabs and Swahili in the interior were primarily traders. Moreover, except for a few sects, none of them then present in East Africa, Islam does not emphasize missionary activity.

Although chiefs often adapted to the slave and ivory trade in such a way as to shore up their traditional status with the wealth and power acquired through the trade, the nature of chieftainship changed. The religious base for political power (and in some cases the primarily ritual character of the chiefly role) gave way to military power or to wealth as bases for political power. Military power and wealth were frequently associated, as when military leaders were able to acquire and sell slaves and ivory, which in turn brought them guns and supporters. Sometimes, however, traders were able to become wealthy largely because of their entrepreneurial acumen and were therefore able to acquire followers.

Men who acquired wealth and guns were often members of chiefly families, and competition for a chieftainship thus had an intradynastic character. At times, however, commoners were among the successful entrepreneurs and were prepared to challenge the chiefly family.

In some cases competition for political power generated by economic developments contributed to the dismemberment of large entities when neither competitor was able to achieve complete victory, and the conflict permitted hitherto subject peoples to break away from the control of the dominant dynasty. In other cases the development of new bases for gaining followers and more effective ways of enforcing a chief's will led to the establishment of larger political entities than those that had prevailed earlier. Thus Mirambo, a Nyamwezi chief who came to power in a small chiefdom about 1860, established a considerable degree of control over the trade route from Tabora to Ujiji, getting tribute from a number of other chiefdoms and tolls from Arab traders with whom he was in intermittent conflict. He also sought to establish links with the Sultan of Zanzibar and the king of Buganda. His successes were largely a function of his adaptation of Ngoni techniques of warfare and his use of a professional army, composed to some extent of non-Nyamwezi (see the Ngoni Raiders, this ch.). Whatever his long-term visions and ambitions his authority rested on coercion and material rewards for his followers, and he came into conflict with too many competitors, Arab and African, simultaneously. When, therefore, he was succeeded by a less able man the political structure he had put together gradually disintegrated, a process that was helped along by the presence in Nyamwezi country of other strong warlord chiefs and, eventually, the coming of the Europeans.

In addition to the specifically political consequences of nineteenth century trade, there were other effects on the social system. Before the extension and intensification of trade, the free cultivator, the hunter, and the ritual specialist were the persons of highest status. Some highly specialized hunters, such as the members of the Nyamwezi guild retained and may even have enhanced their status because they provided the ivory and some of the other



elements in trade, but the traders themselves became the persons of greatest standing, at least in some communities. A successful trader could invest in plantations, hire workers (or buy slaves), and produce enough food to feed others and thereby gain their support. They also acquired imported goods and guns, both of which contributed to their prestige.

### **The Ngoni Raiders**

In the 1840s two contingents of Ngoni—South Africans who had fled their homeland to escape domination by the Zulu under the warlord chief, Shaka—reached Tanzania. They brought with them the military organization, tactics, and weaponry developed in the southern African conflicts of the first decades of the nineteenth century. Characteristically, as they migrated, the Ngoni incorporated some of the people they conquered as slaves and wives and others as soldiers.

One section, the Maseko, having reached the area near modern Songea, incorporated the local peoples in their system, but by the 1860s internecine conflict, stimulated in part by elements of the second section, the Jere, led to their deposition. Some of the groups that had been under Ngoni rule and had been trained in the Ngoni military style went off on their own as raiders and soldiers of fortune, devastating the hinterland of the coast between Kilwa and Lindi and leaving parts of it uninhabited.

The Jere section moved initially to Fipa country where their leader died in 1848. Two subsections turned east and settled near Songea where eventually they took over from the Maseko section. Two others moved up the eastern and western shores of Lake Tanganyika, some reaching northern Tanzania where remnants were still to be found in the mid-twentieth century. Many of the Ngoni became involved in the slave trade, independently, as allies of local chiefs or in conflict with them.

Whether in alliance with the Ngoni or in conflict with them, a reasonable degree of security came only to those who were quick to adopt Ngoni techniques, above all the idea of a professional army. This was in good part the basis of Mirambo's success, and the adoption of Ngoni tactics enabled the patrilineal cattle-keeping people of southcentral Tanzania, such as the Bena, Hehe, and Sangu to repel the Ngoni and, in the process, to build somewhat larger states.

By the end of the nineteenth century the most important Ngoni elements in Tanzania were those in the Songea area, but the population of the two chiefdoms there numbered only 20,000 in the 1880s, and only 10 percent of these were descendants of migrants from Fipa country. As elsewhere in that part of Africa, the Ngoni were a minority among the people they ruled, often speaking the local language rather than their own, but retaining an extraordinary tradition.

### **The Coming of the Europeans and the Partitioning of East Africa**

The Europeans who appeared in East Africa in the early and mid-nineteenth century included traders, explorer-adventurers, missionaries, and diplomats representing several European countries but not necessarily their governments. Eventually, however, all managed, whether intentionally or not, to involve those governments in the area.

A variety of traders operated through Zanzibar—European goods reached the mainland interior, and some African goods reached Europe or were carried in European bottoms to West Africa—but European merchants themselves did not work on the mainland until the 1880s. American whalers provisioned their expeditions at East African coastal towns, and a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1833 led, in 1837, to the establishment of a United States consulate on the island. Massachusetts white cloth, later called *merikani*, came to be valued in the interior and was sometimes used as a currency there. Similar treaties permitting free trade in Zanzibar were signed with France in 1844 and with the Hanseatic Republics in 1859. Even before that German traders had a significant role in Zanzibari commerce. By 1870 they accounted for from a quarter to a third of Zanzibar's trade, second only to the trade with British India.

In the early and mid-nineteenth century, British Indian trade was important, but much of this was carried out not by the British but by Indians. Initially Great Britain's concern with the islands and the coast lay in the enforcement of the Moresby Treaty of 1822 outlawing the sale of slaves to Christians. It was also interested in limiting the influence of the French in the area. In the course of gaining the Sultan of Zanzibar's agreement to the treaty, Great Britain recognized his claims to the East African coast from Cape Delgado just south of the Ruvuma River to the Horn of Africa. In 1845 a second treaty forbade Muslims to move slaves by sea to the Arab peninsula. Coastal trade was still permitted, and slaves continued to be available for the Zanzibari clove plantations.

A British consul was assigned to Zanzibar in 1841 to see to Great Britain's interest with respect to both the abolition of the slave trade and the development of legitimate commerce. In time the British consul (later consul general) came to wield considerable power as adviser to the sultan, but the enforcement of the anti-slavery treaties was difficult: the British naval force was not large enough to cover all the points at which slaves left the coast, and neither the sultan's subjects nor the Africans of the interior who profited from the slave trade were prepared to stop it.

Sultan Said died in 1856 and was succeeded by Majid, less effective than his predecessor in suppressing the slave trade but able, nevertheless, to consolidate his power on the coast. Before his death Said had suggested the division of the Omani territories into Arabic and African sections, and this was accomplished in

1861 when the then governor general of India arbitrated rival claims to the Omani throne. A joint British-French treaty in 1862 recognized the independence of the Zanzibari ruler's dominions from Oman.

The final blows to the slave trade (but not to slavery as such) came in 1873 and 1876 in the form of a treaty prohibiting all exports of slaves and closing all slave markets; two further proclamations forbade conveying slaves up the coast by land or from the interior by caravan. Under threat of a naval blockade of Zanzibar the sultan agreed to the treaty. In fact after the end of the slave trade the value of trade in other goods, including rubber, ivory, and cloves, increased. So did the influence of the British, which had grown during Majid's reign and expanded even further when Sultan Barghash came to power in 1870. The man primarily responsible for this was John Kirk, a Scottish doctor and former associate of David Livingstone, who became vice consul at Zanzibar in 1866 and general consul in 1873. His primary task was ending the slave trade, but he tried to foster ordinary commerce, and he supported the Zanzibari sultanate's rights as he understood them.

The European explorers of the interior in the mid-nineteenth century were both laymen and missionaries. Among the latter were the Germans Johann Krapf and Johann Rebmann who came to the area in the late 1840s as representatives of the British-based Church Missionary Society. They were the first Europeans to see Mount Kilimanjaro, and their reports had some impact on German interest in the area.

In 1857 two British explorers, Richard F. Burton and John Speke, having begun their journey at the coast, reached Lake Tanganyika. Speke later moved north to Lake Victoria, which he claimed was the long sought source of the Nile. Livingstone reached Ujiji on his last trip, coming north along the eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika, and his writings had a substantial effect in generating the Protestant missionary effort in central and eastern Africa.

Livingstone's earlier writings had stimulated the formation of the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA), which arrived in Tanzania in the 1860s and despite setbacks founded mission stations in the Usambara Mountains and around Lindi and Masasi. In part UMCA's activity was a response to Livingstone's view that slavery could be successfully ended only if legitimate commerce were introduced and that, in addition to evangelization, missions had the task of educating Africans in practical matters of trade, crafts, and advanced agriculture, a perspective that was to inform the work of many missionaries.

Other Protestant missions established stations in the 1870s: the Church Missionary Society at Mpwapwa and the London Missionary Society at Ujiji. These, like the UMCA, were British-based. The Roman Catholics were represented by missions established at

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Bagamoyo by the Holy Ghost Fathers in 1869 and by the White Fathers at Tabora in 1878, both staffed by French priests. Representatives of German churches did not arrive until after Germany acceded to colonial power in the mid-1880s. In this period the missions had few converts and tended to operate in a generally hostile environment given their opposition to the slave trade and slavery. Some of them did, however, begin a work that was to be of long-run importance—the systematic study of Swahili and initial attempts to render it in a Latin orthography (it was already written in an Arabic one).

Until the 1880s Germany was concerned chiefly with protecting the interests of German traders in Zanzibar. Meanwhile some sentiment for colonization had developed in German intellectual and economic circles, and the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, interested not so much in colonies as in the enhancement of the position of Germany vis à vis other European powers, especially Great Britain, gave his support to the ventures of the Society for German Colonization led by Karl Peters. Peters and his associates landed secretly in Zanzibar in late 1884 and made their way to the mainland where they held conversations with local chiefs who they claimed signed treaties accepting German protection. Bismarck approved the treaties in early 1885. The society, given a charter to administer the area on behalf of Germany, ceded its rights to the German East Africa Company, also headed by Peters.

Because of the British need for German cooperation elsewhere and because British missionaries and traders were to be allowed to work in the German area, Great Britain, despite the sultan's protests, acceded to the establishment of the German protectorate. Giving way to threats of force, the sultan gave up whatever claim he had to the interior and granted the right to the passage of goods across the coastal areas that he did control.

In late 1885 a joint Anglo-German commission met, without the sultan, to determine the exact extent of his domains. The resulting Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 allotted to the sultan the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Mafia, and Lamu, a six-kilometer-deep strip along the coast from Tungi Bay (in Mozambique) north to the Tana River (in Kenya), and a number of towns in southern Somalia, up to and including Mogadishu. The interior was divided between the British who acquired much of present-day Kenya and the Germans whose territory ran south to the Ruvuma River. In 1888 the Germans obtained a fifty-year lease of the coastal strip adjoining its territory.

For the first few years after it had been granted an imperial charter in 1887, the German East Africa Company exercised both commercial and administrative rights. The company's ruthless exploitation of the area and the opposition of the coastal traders to their collection of taxes, led to rebellion in the coastal towns in August 1888, and German reinforcements and the aid of British



warships were required to put it down. The German East Africa Company's financial difficulties and the unrest it had engendered led to the German government's taking over the administration of German East Africa in April 1891.

Rivalries in what is now Uganda between British and German companies led in the same year to the Anglo-German Agreement on East Africa, of 1890, which established British rights in Uganda and a British protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba. At British urging the Sultan of Zanzibar later gave up the coastal strip and the island of Mafia to Germany in exchange for an indemnity. The boundary between German and British spheres of interest, hitherto drawn only from the coast to Lake Victoria, was extended across the lake to the Congo border at 1° south latitude. Also fixed were the borders between German East Africa and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to the south.

The administrative system was initially supervised by Germans, mainly military officers, posted to each district. The use of military men as administrators was in part a function of their availability, in part of the unsettled state in the interior. The first resistance to German rule had occurred on the coast, but others soon occurred elsewhere, and not until 1907 when the Maji Maji Rebellion was finally put down were the Germans in firm control of the territory.

Perhaps the best known instance of local resistance to the Germans was that of the Hehe in the southcentral interior. About 1860 Muniyumba, who had acceded to chiefly office in one of the small chiefdoms of the heterogeneous people later to be called Hehe, began a process of military expansion that led, by the time of his death in 1878 or early 1879, to his domination of much of the area. The Hehe had also acquired a considerable reputation as warriors, although they did not then have the guns that had begun to make their appearance among the Nyamwezi and others.

Muniyumba was eventually succeeded by his son Mkwawa who, by the early 1880s, was in unchallenged control of all Hehe country. The processes of military expansion and raiding continued as before, the Hehe coming into conflict with the southernmost extension of the Masai with whom they competed for control over the weaker peoples in the area.

Hehe advances to the north and east occurred at the same time that the Germans began to move into the interior. When, after the Germans had begun to construct administrative forts at Kilosa and Mpwapwa, Mkwawa's forces continued to raid the peoples presumably under German protection, the Germans decided that the Hehe would have to be dealt with. Negotiations with subordinate Hehe chiefs had little effect, and the Germans sent a military expedition to deal with the problem. On August 17, 1891, the expedition was attacked by Hehe forces, its commander and nine other Germans killed and arms and ammunition captured. Hehe losses were very heavy, and they undertook no major forays for

two years because of them. Nevertheless their reputation among the Germans and other Africans as warriors was confirmed.

A better organized German expedition including many Africans managed to seize Mkwawa's fortified capital on October 30, 1894, despite strong resistance by some Hehe in hand-to-hand fighting. Mkwawa and his Arab ally, Rumaliza, had fled, however.

Despite his defeat Mkwawa continued to have an effect on events in the area. German patrols operating out of the fort that was built at New Iringa (later called Iringa) in 1896 were attacked by the Hehe who also continued to raid neighboring Africans. By 1898, however, German pressure and the onset of famine had told on the Hehe. In July of that year the Germans, responding to news of Mkwawa's whereabouts, dispatched a patrol in pursuit of him. By the time they reached him, however, Mkwawa had committed suicide.

Hehe opposition to German rule was less a matter of rebellion against oppressive rule—it had begun before the Germans had a chance to establish themselves in the area—than the resistance of a people who had developed a predatory way of life and saw the Germans as still more powerful predators who would have put an end to their mode of existence. The Hehe leader, Mkwawa, apparently could not see an alternative to armed resistance, and all save a few of his people were loyal to him. So important was his part in maintaining resistance that it ended after his death. Later the Hehe were perfectly prepared to join the Germans in putting down the peoples involved in the Maji Maji Rebellion, some of whom the Hehe had fought against earlier.

Few peoples offered so stiff and prolonged a resistance to German authority, although there were other instances of short-lived rebellions in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Some chiefs adapted very well to German administration to the point that they acquired power and territorial jurisdiction that exceeded any they had held in the precolonial period. So it was, for example, that Chief Marealle of the relatively small Chaga chiefdom of Marangu persuaded the Germans for a time to make him a kind of paramount chief over a substantial section of Mount Kilimanjaro, and it has been argued that German recognition of one of the Haya chiefs in Bukoba District gave him greater status than he was otherwise entitled to. In any case chiefs were given new responsibilities—for example, tax collection—which from one perspective enhanced their power but from another was the first step in diminishing the legitimacy of many of them in the eyes of their people.

The years from 1891 to 1898 were largely spent in consolidating the German hold on the protectorate with the help of African mercenaries (for example, Somali and Sudanese) from outside the territory and some local soldiers (*askari*). The consolidation was accomplished through a combination of treaties and violent actions, the latter frequent enough to overshadow the more conciliatory policies of some German administrators.

Because of the lack of a sufficient number of German administrative personnel and the absence among some ethnic groups (particularly in the southeast) of territorial chiefs, the Germans made use of Swahili (and in some cases, Arab) *maakida* (political agents; sig., *akida*). These men, together with village headmen (*majumbe*; sing., *jumbe*) handled local administrative matters. Elsewhere the presence of (usually hereditary) chiefs permitted a kind of indirect rule, although an *akida* was often posted to a chiefdom as adviser and supervisor. Generally the power of the *akida* was greatest in areas such as the southeast that lacked larger scale indigenous political organization and had been terrorized for much of the nineteenth century by the activities of slave raiders.

Even in the last decade of the nineteenth century, when much of their manpower and energy was devoted to the task of establishing political control, the Germans began, if slowly, to introduce new crops, development capital, and modes of transportation. The earliest plantations were established in the hinterland of Tanga and in the Kilimanjaro and Usambara mountain areas. The crops of greatest long-run importance were coffee, cotton, and sisal (the last introduced in 1892). Rubber plantations, very important before World War I, were insignificant later. Although missionaries on Kilimanjaro induced some Africans to grow coffee, and the Haya west of Lake Victoria had cultivated it before the arrival of the Europeans, the German emphasis was on European-owned plantations, not on small-scale peasant agriculture. To this end Africans were persuaded in various ways to give up some of their land. Further the need for plantation labor led to the imposition of a hut tax, payable in cash, which forced Africans to seek wage labor. Some would have been prepared to do so in any case, but not at this stage in sufficient quantity for German needs and not as plantation workers.

At this early point plantation agriculture contributed relatively little to the economy, and ivory, collected (and often paid for with firearms) by Arab and Swahili traders, still played an important part in exports. The export of significant quantities of cash crops had to await the development of transportation facilities from the coast to the interior. The construction of roads and bridges from Tanga to the Kilimanjaro area began as early as 1894, and in 1896 work began on a railroad to run from Tanga via southern Usambara to what the Germans then called New Moshi (later Moshi) at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro, completed in 1911 and opened in 1912. A railroad running west from Dar es Salaam (which became an important town only under the Germans) to Kigoma, a port on Lake Tanganyika (near the old market town of Ujiji), begun in 1905, was completed in 1914. Other rail lines were begun and telegraph lines constructed. The Germans were also quick to open research facilities—the Department of Surveying and Agriculture was established in 1893 and agrobiological research centers set up at various points. Before World War I German East Africa was the

best mapped area in the region.

As transportation links opened the interior and more land was alienated from Africans to Europeans, the number of plantations grew—from 180 in 1905 to 758 in 1912. In the course of this growth, Africans were brought into the German-controlled monetary economy (many had already been involved in a market economy of a different kind) but, as Adolfo Mascarenhas puts it, "the methods were coercive and the benefits [to Africans] were largely incidental." There were, however, a few places where Africans, responding to the market, produced as peasant farmers. Thus, just before the beginning of World War I, the Haya of Bukoba District accounted for three-quarters of the output of coffee and the Sukuma near Mwanza for three-quarters of the peanuts.

Coercion of African workers occurred in two contexts: getting the Africans to go to work when and where they were wanted and their treatment while at work. Getting Africans to work sometimes involved direct recruitment just short of slavery. More often the mode was indirect; a hut tax was levied, and except for a few groups engaged in cash-cropping themselves, the only way to obtain the money was to work for Europeans (or Asians) either on plantations or as carriers. In a number of cases, especially where the *akida* worked directly on the local population in the absence of the mediating influence of a traditional chief, the collection of taxes as well as recruitment of wage workers could be brutal. So too could be the disciplining of workers by those who employed them.

Bitterness was widespread, but only in one area did significant rebellion occur after the beginning of the twentieth century. The Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905 to 1907 spread through the entire coastal hinterland from Morogoro south of the Ruvuma River and inland to areas now covered by Morogoro and Ruvuma regions. Maji Maji (literally, water, water) refers to the medicine, consisting of water and grain (maize and sorghum seed), which was believed to create an immunity to bullets.

The uprising took place among a congeries of peoples, diverse in some respects, similar in others. Except for the Ngoni of the Songea area at the periphery of the region involved, most groups were matrilineal and politically fragmented, a situation that had been exacerbated by the depredations of the Yao and Ngoni slave raiders. A good deal of mixing had taken place, however, and most groups were able to communicate with one another directly or through a third party. Moreover their religious beliefs were similar in many respects.

Those beliefs were combined in a new way by a man named Kinjikitile who was not only a doctor (*mganga*), that is, a specialist in dealing with illness and witches, but was also believed to have been possessed by a spirit representing a major divinity. The importance of water had long been associated with that divinity,



although it had not been used as protective medicine. There was, however, a widespread belief in the efficacy of various war and hunting medicines, each restricted to a specific group. Kinjikitile persuaded the people that the *maji* had universal applicability.

His emphasis on the universality of the *maji* was consistent with his teachings that all Africans were one, one of the major elements in his ideology. Beyond that, as the historian G.C.K. Ōwassa summarizes it, Kinjikitile argued that Africans "... were free men, and that those who partook of the *maji* (water) would be immune from European bullets. The dead ancestors would assist them in a war which had been commanded by God."

The development of such an ideology was essential to the uprising. Despite their sense of oppression and their desire to throw off the German yoke, it is unlikely that so politically fragmented a people would have been ready to undertake a rebellion unless they had assurance, consistent with their understanding of the nature of the world, that they had some chance of success.

In fact they had very little chance. The absence of political cohesion among the Africans of the southeastern quadrant made it difficult to organize and time the rising in various places, despite Kinjikitile's use of ambassadors. Moreover Kinjikitile, although a charismatic religious leader, was not himself an organizer. In any case he had no opportunity to exercise command after the first signs of rebellion broke out in July 1905 without his authorization. He was caught and hanged in August 1905.

The rebellion continued and spread. All Europeans, Arabs, and Swahili were attacked by warriors using the *maji*. Missionary establishments were destroyed and a Roman Catholic bishop killed. New forces were brought in by the Germans, and by the end of 1906 they controlled most of the important settlements in the area. The Ngoni of Songea continued to resist until 1907.

The suppression of the revolt was vigorously and brutally carried out. The rebel villages were burned and their harvests destroyed. The official German count of Africans killed was 26,000, but the destruction of the harvests and the otherwise difficult conditions under which the Africans lived probably means that several thousand more died of hunger and sickness.

The Maji Maji Rebellion (and the Herero uprising in German Southwest Africa at the same time) shook the German public and government. The result was substantial reform in policy and procedures beginning with the creation of the Colonial Department under Bernhard Dernberg and the installation of Freiherr von Rechenburg as the first civilian governor of German East Africa. For the first time, too, government officials were given some training. Under Rechenburg forced labor, except for public works, was ended, African rights to land were protected, and African agricultural production encouraged. Further he ordered a reduction in corporal punishment and forbade the use of the whip by private persons. The institution of these reforms was not always

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easy: in particular, settlers in need of agricultural and other labor were not happy with the prohibition of forced labor and other labor regulations. Nevertheless there was a considerable improvement in the status of workers.

Perhaps for fear that action would arouse the chiefs and other prominent men, the German administration was slow to take one step that would affect the indigenous social systems of some of the mainland's peoples: the outright abolition of slavery. Nevertheless beginning in 1901 household slaves were permitted to purchase their own freedom, and in 1907 it was decreed that all children born after 1906 were free. Complete abolition did not occur until 1922 after the British had come to power.

In the pre-Maji Maji period and later many of the representatives of European culture were not soldiers, settlers, or administrators but missionaries. In some respects they were to have the longest range effects, on the religion of many Africans obviously, but also as the early (and, indeed, later) purveyors of education, as important contributors to the diffusion of Swahili, spoken and written, and as the sources of training in many practical skills.

From 1887 on other missionaries arrived to supplement the work of the UMCA (Anglican) and the Roman Catholic Holy Ghost Fathers and White Fathers. The Evangelical Missionary Society for German East Africa established missions at Dar es Salaam and Tanga and in Shambaa and Zaramo country in the hinterland. The Evangelical Missionary Society of Berlin and the Moravians worked in the Southern Highlands, and the Leipzig Lutheran Mission began work among the Chaga in 1893. The Holy Ghost Fathers expanded their activity, establishing stations among the Chaga and elsewhere in the eastern mainland. In general the missions of different denominations avoided direct competition. Among the Chaga where both Lutherans and Roman Catholics were present, the mission posts of each denomination were established in different chiefdoms.

In response in part to the Maji Maji Rebellion and to the new policy emanating from Germany, education was increasingly stressed after 1907, and missionary enterprise was crucial to its development. The government itself was directly involved only to a limited extent: the inadequate statistics of the period show a little more than 6,000 students in government schools in 1914 but well over 150,000 in mission schools.

Some missions attempted to use local languages for their religious and educational activities, but most made early use of Swahili, and a few engaged in systematic research into that language as did missionaries stationed in Zanzibar and Kenya. Between the precolonial introduction into the interior of rudimentary Swahili by the coastal traders and the widespread use of Swahili by missionaries and administrators, mainland Tanzania got an early start on the lingua franca that was to become the national language, although it was to be a long time before the language

was almost universally understood.

It is very difficult to generalize about the religious impact of the Christian missions. That impact varied with the nature of the religious and social systems of the peoples the missions encountered, the particular emphasis of each denomination, and often enough the personal peculiarities and the particular situations of missionaries and the African political leaders in each mission area.

The early missionaries often had their first contacts with freed slaves dependent on them for protection and sustenance. Later as the missions moved into other communities, missionaries were sought out by chiefs who saw them as closely linked to, if not agents of, the colonial power and therefore as potential allies in the ongoing process of bolstering or aggrandizing their own power and status. In addition most Africans understood missionaries not simply or solely as religious figures but as sources of knowledge and help in educational, medical, agricultural, and other practical matters. Further some missions initially approached the indigenous peoples as if they lacked religion or anything resembling it. These and others learned, after a time, that each group had a somewhat complex set of beliefs and rituals. Missions evaluated these sets in various ways: some saw indigenous beliefs and rituals as something to be wholly replaced by Christian dogma and practice. Others sought parallels between local notions and Christian ones in an effort to make adjustments in their teachings that would further the missionary enterprise.

In the German period as later, men and women became Christians and remained Christians (or became so-called backsliders) for a variety of reasons, and the intensity of their Christianity and extent to which adherence to Christianity excluded continuing participation in aspects of the indigenous system also varied. For some adherence to Christianity was a way to retain power and status, for others, lacking such power and status in the indigenous community, it was a way, not necessarily consciously sought, of seeking status in a different kind of community. For those who saw education as significant, missions provided access to it. Often women found it easier than men to become and remain adherents of Christianity. Some missions, at least, would accept and retain a woman who was or became one of several wives of a polygynist, but they would not accept a man who was married to several women or who married a second woman after having converted. In almost every group in which missions operated there were a few persons for whom the message transmitted by a Christian mission was a response to a deeply felt need, but even those who became Christians out of a mixture of motives and with lesser degrees of intensity and clarity about what they were doing were, nevertheless, the fathers and mothers of the next generations who were to become Christians of one kind or another almost automatically. Only later were Christian Africans to raise the question of whether what they had been taught and come to believe was Christianity

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pure and simple or only one version of European culture from which the essentially Christian must be detached.

The German presence in East Africa came to an end as a result of World War I. The British blockade of the German area began in August 1914. In March 1916 the British forces took the offensive, driving from Kenya into the German-held area along the Kilimanjaro front. By September 1916 the British forces, larger than the German, controlled the great bulk of the territory and population. German-led troops continued sporadic resistance, harassing the British whenever they could, but by November 1917 they had been pushed into the Portuguese-held territory of Mozambique, and the British controlled all of what was to become Tanganyika.

### **Zanzibar to the End of World War I**

The Anglo-German Agreement on East Africa of 1890 provided for the British Protectorate over Zanzibar (including Pemba). Technically the control of internal affairs and succession to the sultanate were left in the hands of the traditional rulers. Great Britain was to take over foreign affairs. In fact British control was gradually extended to all aspects of internal administration and finance, including the sultan's income, and most key posts were eventually filled by British personnel. In 1896 the British determined the succession to the throne, and the sultan became even more dependent on them than earlier ones had been.

In 1913 the essentially colonial status of Zanzibar was acknowledged by the transfer of Zanzibar's affairs from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. A British resident replaced the consul general, and Zanzibar was placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of the East African Protectorate (then the name for that part of Kenya from the coast to the eastern edge of the Rift Valley).

The British formally abolished the slave trade in 1876, but they moved slowly in enforcing the law and did not abolish slavery itself until 1897, in part because they feared effects on the labor supply, in part because they saw Zanzibar as an essentially Arab state, the social system of which would be disrupted by the freeing of a substantial number of African slaves. Provision was made for compensation to slave owners by the state, and the slaves themselves were required to take the initiative in applying for freedom. Moreover the use of slave labor was not made a crime, and some kinds of slaves (for example, concubines) were exempted from the law. No employment programs for freed slaves were devised, and former slaves were subject to vagrancy laws if they were without a job or fixed residence.

For these reasons, the lack of free land and an improvement in working conditions, relatively few slaves applied for freedom in the first decade or so. In 1909 a law eliminated compensation for slaves freed after 1911, a sanction that speeded up their emancipation. Nevertheless forms of hidden slavery and semislavery



remained, and there was no program for helping ex-slaves adjust to their freedom. Some of them became tenants on clove plantations, exchanging their labor on the plantation for the right to build a house and plant food crops on a small plot nearby. The demand for labor was apparently not filled by these tenants, and many of the migrants from German East Africa who came for the clove harvests stayed on as squatters.

In these early years, and later, the British persisted in seeing Zanzibar as an Arab nation. Although the Arabs had lost much of their authority to British administrators, the sultan remained, and Arabs were given special consideration with regard to such matters as government positions and education.

### **Tanganyika from the End of World War I to World War II**

The British had established a rudimentary administrative structure in 1917. Sir Horace Byatt, who had been administrator of the territory while it was occupied by British troops, became its first governor. British administration was formally established by the Tanganyika Order in Council, which empowered the governor to make ordinances but directed him to respect "native law and custom." The Executive Council, consisting of the governor and his four highest officials, was formed and the High Court instituted.

On July 22, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations formally gave Tanganyika the status of a mandated territory, making Great Britain responsible for the "peace, order and good government of the territory" and for promoting "to the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress of its inhabitants." Although the Permanent Mandates Commission of the league superintended the mandatory powers neither it nor the council of the league had effective authority.

The power of the commission was minimal. Such influence as it had depended on the willingness of the European state holding the mandate to respond to its appeals. In the case of Tanganyika, the commission's comments on some matters, particularly labor conditions, had some effect. In the long run the fact that Tanganyika had been a mandated territory was significant in that it became a candidate for trusteeship under the United Nations (UN) after World War II, a status that had greater consequence than that of a mandate under the League of Nations.

After the British takeover all Germans, including missionaries, were expelled. During the war estates had fallen into decay, overseas trade had stopped, and African production was neglected. Many Africans had been away serving as soldiers or porters, and disease and famine had taken a toll. It has been estimated that thousands of African porters died during the war and that 30,000 Africans had perished because of famine. Others died in battle.

Given this difficult situation and his lack of personnel and money, Byatt moved slowly in his brief period as governor. He

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retained the German administrative districts and permitted the more experienced *maakida* to remain in power. Local administrative officers were permitted to make their own arrangements for local government.

In 1924 Donald Cameron, appointed as governor of Tanganyika, introduced the system known as indirect rule, the basis of which was the use of traditional sociopolitical systems as an integral part of colonial administration. These systems were to be gradually adapted to new needs and methods. It was felt that not only would Africans gain experience in managing their own affairs without the dislocation resulting from the institution of an entirely new system, but that it would be easier to implement new social and economic policies if the traditional rulers became the agents of such change. In addition to the political and philosophical considerations influencing the decision to introduce the system there were others: at that point in the history of British colonialism, there were comparatively few persons ready to become colonial administrators at local levels, and Great Britain either did not have or would not allocate the money to pay them.

The notion of indirect rule had been developed in Northern Nigeria, an area characterized by large-scale, hierarchically organized states, which, if somewhat different from those of Western Europe in the early twentieth century, seemed to the British to warrant the kind of system they introduced. Typically when they came to a territory like Tanganyika in which such states were rare if not nonexistent, they looked for chiefs that would fit into the system of indirect rule and either misinterpreted what they found or tried to convert what they found into what it should have been. In any case the process of adaptation was often not so gradual. Beyond that, the colonial authority's insistence that the chiefs, whether traditional or newly made, act as agents of change eventually led to situations in which many chiefs, whatever the basis of their traditional legitimacy, were seen by their people largely as agents of the colonial regime. In general the colonial authorities tended to assume that traditional authorities had more power than in fact they did, and they also tended to overlook the traditional sanctions and checks that a chief's people had been able to apply if they were unhappy with his rule.

Under Cameron's governorship the districts were grouped into eleven provinces, and a secretary for native affairs was appointed. The Africans in positions of authority worked under the direction of the provincial and district commissioners. A series of ordinances formally gave local African authorities executive, judicial, and financial duties. These authorities were to maintain law and order, and later they were required and empowered to undertake certain social services. Their financial duties involved the collection of taxes, part of which was reserved for local use.

Soon after his arrival Governor Cameron also created the Legislative Council consisting of fourteen official and up to ten unof-

ficial members nominated by the Governor. In the second category there were, in practice, five (later seven) Europeans (always British subjects) and two (later three) Asians (then called Indians). There were no Arab or African representatives. This composition of the council was maintained throughout the term of the mandate.

Article 6 of the mandate stipulated that the laws, customs, rights, and interests of the African population should be considered in matters of land allocation and that there should be no transfers of land except between Africans without official consent. Until 1923 former German estates were leased by Europeans and Asians on a yearly basis. The Land Ordinance of that year made all land public land but recognized existing rights and titles. It forbade new grants of freehold, granted leases of up to ninety-nine years, and stated that no more than 5,000 acres could be leased to a non-African unless approved by the colonial secretary. Later that year and again in 1930 certain heavily populated areas were closed to further encroachments by non-Africans.

In 1925 Germans were allowed to return to Tanganyika, and over the years a variety of other settlers arrived. In the long run the two largest European groups were Germans and Greeks. In the 1930s the depression, more favorable conditions in Kenya, and perhaps a fear that Hitler might succeed in his demand for a return of the territory slowed the arrival of new settlers.

The Asian population of roughly 10,000 in 1921 had grown to 25,000 by 1931. All had their origin in the Indian subcontinent, but by the beginning of World War II a fair number had been born in East Africa. Asians did not constitute a homogeneous community. Many came from Gujerat (and Gujerati was the single most important Indian language in East Africa), but many had originated elsewhere, and there were significant religious differences among them. In addition to Hindus there were several different groups of Muslims, Sikhs, and even a few Parsis.

A number of Asians had benefited economically from the German defeat, having acquired nearly all of the real estate in Dar es Salaam and many of the German sisal estates. George Delf reports in *Asians in East Africa* that in 1939 "the Indian economic interest in Tanganyika was estimated at 13 million [pounds sterling], including 17 percent of non-African agricultural land, 90 percent of town property, 80 percent of the cotton industry, 80 percent of sisal production, 50 and 60 percent of import and export trade and 80 percent of transport services." By no means all Asians were rich, or even well-off. If the 80,000 acre sisal estate of the Karimjee Javanjee family suggests the wealth at one end of the spectrum, the hundreds of small general stores (*maduka*; sing., *duka*) run by Asians, most of them in rural areas, indicates the other end.

After a slow start agricultural production rose steadily during the 1920s until it far surpassed the levels reached during the German period. Like the Germans the British encouraged the production of Arabica coffee by the Chaga on Mount Kilimanjaro

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and of Robusta by the Haya west of Lake Victoria. African farmers were, in fact, responsible for a large part of the territory's coffee production. The British emphasized export crops because of their potential as revenue earners. Little attention was given food production until World War II when territorial self-sufficiency in food became a goal.

Some gold was produced near Lake Victoria and along the Lupa River, and its production rose rapidly in the middle 1920s, but gold was not to be an important resource in the long run. In general agriculture, whether for subsistence or the production of export crops, was to remain by far the most important sector of the economy through World War II and beyond. Diamonds were discovered near Shinyanga in 1940, but mining employed relatively few persons.

Revenues derived directly or indirectly from various kinds of taxes covered the territory's expenses by 1926, thus conforming to the British government's wish that its colonies be self-sufficient, but that self-sufficiency could be attained only by not attempting too much. Then and later much of the income derived from export crops or mining was not reinvested in Tanganyika given the liberal rules on the export of earnings.

An attempt was made in the late 1920s to expand government services, but the depression of the 1930s caused a swift retrenchment. After 1925 the government placed special emphasis on education for Africans, responding to critical reports on the educational situation by the Ormsby-Gore East Africa Commission of 1925 and by an advisory committee on African education. Until that time there had been a number of mission schools and a very few government schools. Mission schools continued to be important, but a few more government schools were established, and beginning in 1927 grants-in-aid were given to schools established by African communities. Such grants were extended to Asian schools in 1929.

Education suffered cuts during the depression, however. Those cuts meant that the problems connected with the development of technical and secondary education that had just begun to get under way could not be solved in the 1930s. Education beyond the secondary level was not really available until after World War II and then only at a single college for all three British East African territories.

The development of so-called Native Authorities proceeded by adapting the principles of indirect rule to the exigencies of efficient administration as the colonial authorities saw them. Often the size of the chiefdoms characteristic of many of the mainland's ethnic groups was thought to be too small to warrant paid chiefs, and some of the chiefs in any area were thought to be either too uncooperative or uneducated to perform the tasks required of them.



If lack of cooperation or education were the sole problem, a chief might be retired early to make way for a brother or son who would be more satisfactory. If, in addition, an unsatisfactory chief's domain were too small, consolidation of two or more chiefdoms might take place; a chiefly family then lost its rights and privileges. These developments did not always occur entirely at the initiative of the colonial authorities: ambitious chiefs careful to cooperate with district and provincial commissioners were sometimes able to influence consolidation if only because the presence of these chiefs suggested an alternative to the existing situation.

In some instances the use of the chiefs as agents of change led to difficulties between them and their people, although widespread problems were not to occur until after World War II (see *The Road to Independence*, this ch.). For example, when the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) was established in the 1930s among the Chaga and made the mandatory marketing agent for the coffee they produced the chiefs were expected to help enforce that requirement. At the time private buyers were prepared to pay more to the producer than the KNCU, and in 1937 riots broke out, focused primarily against the cooperative but also expressing bitterness against some chiefs.

By 1929 there were enough African teachers, minor civil servants, and others with some degree of Western education to form the African Association. It had a number of branches on the mainland, often located at district headquarters, and in 1939 the African Association of Zanzibar affiliated itself. Many of the association's activities were social and educational, but it did express political views from time to time in the 1930s. Another organization, the African Commercial and Welfare Association, whose members consisted of traders, businessmen, and urban workers, was also fairly active in the 1930s, but it was the African Association that survived into the postwar era to become the nucleus of increasing political activity.

Tanganyika was not a battleground during World War II, but the territory felt the effects of the war: approximately 80,000 Tanganyikans served in the British forces, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia against the Italians, on Madagascar, and in the Burma campaign. Emphasis was placed on self-sufficiency in food production, and after the Japanese seizure of plantations in Southeast Asia new stress was put on the production of sisal, and rubber production once again (and briefly) became important. Transportation facilities were improved, but education and medical care for civilians were given little emphasis. The estates of 3,025 Germans (who had been repatriated or were interned) were managed by neighboring British farmers, by the staff of the Custodian of Enemy Property, or by companies. District officers, often preoccupied with other matters, gave the Native Authorities greater rein, and some of them took the opportunity to aggrandize their

power even beyond that permitted or demanded by the colonial regime, thus alienating themselves from their people.

### **Zanzibar to World War II**

Political change in Zanzibar in the period from 1918 to 1945 was slow. The British colonial regime had developed a fairly efficient bureaucracy, and the financial policies of the sultanate had been reformed. In 1926 the Executive Council and the Legislative Council were introduced. The latter, chiefly an advisory body, had limited lawmaking responsibilities. Except for the highest posts, which were filled by European officials, the senior positions in the bureaucracy were held by Arabs and a number of the minor ones by Asians. The Shirazi, descendants of Middle Easterners and Africans, and other Africans of mainland origin were not involved, a situation that in part reflected the British conception of Zanzibar as an Arab state, in part the fact that the largely rural Africans (including the Shirazi) had little access to the available educational facilities. Africans were also excluded from the unofficial side of the Legislative Council until 1946 when the first Shirazi was appointed.

As they had been since the nineteenth century, clove and coconut plantations held by Arabs remained the significant elements in the agricultural sector of Zanzibar's economy; earlier attempts to develop other crops had failed. Commercial activity was chiefly in the hands of Asians, some of whom also held large mortgages on many Arab-owned plantations.

Several ethnic organizations emerged in the interwar period, but they did not become bases for political party formation until after World War II. The Arab Association was formed in the early 1920s primarily to seek compensation for losses deriving from the emancipation of slaves. The depression of the 1930s led to the increasing dependence of Arab landowners on Asian creditors, and the association turned its attention to defending their interests against the latter.

The African Association was formed by mainlanders in 1934 and the Shirazi Association in 1939. Both were essentially welfare organizations and had some of the characteristics of unions but were not active politically. At this time there was a considerable gulf between the mainlanders and the Shirazi who, unlike the mainlanders, saw themselves as subjects of the sultan and shared adherence to Islam with the Arabs. The members of the African Association, however, maintained their connections with the mainland, and in 1939 the association affiliated with the African Association in Tanganyika. The Indian Association, concerned chiefly with financial and business matters, was formed in 1910 but, unlike the others, did not become politically significant after World War II.

### **The Road to Tanganyika's Independence**

In 1945 neither the colonial government nor the relatively few Africans with a national—as opposed to a parochial—perspective foresaw independence in sixteen years. In 1954, however, when Julius K. Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) burst upon the scene, the issue was drawn, and the question was how quickly the Colonial Office in London and the colonial authorities in the territory, particularly those at the highest levels, would adapt to the new situation.

In fact the Colonial Office and territorial officials were by no means always in concert in their initial perspectives on political, economic, and social development or in the way they reacted to specific stimuli in Tanganyika or in Great Britain. In addition a change in the international status of Tanganyika provided a new framework for the plans formulated by the colonial authorities and for the expression of internally generated political expression.

In 1946 Great Britain reluctantly agreed to place Tanganyika under the trusteeship system established under the UN, reluctantly because several features in Chapter 12 of the United Nations Charter stipulated changes in the old mandate system of the League of Nations: among other things, representatives of the trust territory were to sit on the Trusteeship Council, and missions were to visit each territory every three years. However reluctant Great Britain may have been, international opinion immediately after the war seemed to demand trusteeship.

Once under the system the territory was not only subject to periodic visiting missions but to questionnaires concerned with political and constitutional matters. Moreover nationalists could find a forum at the Trusteeship Council, and petitions for redress of grievances could be submitted to it directly. Tanganyika Africans took advantage of these opportunities at one time or another. Nevertheless the direct impact of Trusteeship Council suggestions to the Tanganyika government was not very great.

In the late 1940s senior officials at the Colonial Office supported by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, anticipated the growth of nationalism in the colonial areas and sought to persuade the authorities in the African territories to take account of the educated Africans already in place, to bring more Africans into the civil service, including its higher reaches, and to make provision for more popularly elected members even if still a minority in the legislative and executive councils. Moreover it was suggested that representative local governments replace the Native Authorities who were either traditional chiefs or modeled on the notion of chieftainship. It was assumed that such elected local governments could not only provide experience in self-government for rural Africans but would have a better chance of gaining the support of local populations for economic development. This view turned out to be prescient.

The East African governors rejected these proposals. They and many of their senior subordinates distrusted the educated Africans and persisted until very late in seeing the chiefs as the only legitimate representatives of the African. The Tanganyikan authorities were also extremely slow in preparing Africans (and for that matter, Asians) for the administrative service, that is, as district officers. Moreover local government reform, which did take place little by little was intended first to make the colonial regime more effective rather than to prepare for its demise, and then to be a barrier to the effectiveness of TANU and as a way of retaining a substantial voice for Europeans and Asians.

### **Economic and Social Development**

The perspective of the Colonial Office having been rejected, the territory's colonial authorities embarked on a series of related policies, which political scientist Margaret Bates has summed up as "one of social engineering, in which changes were to be brought about by a paternal Tanganyika government, working in general alliance with sympathetic settlers, businessmen, missionaries and members of the small westernized African community." The involvement of the latter was predicated on their acceptance of policies in the formulation of which neither they nor the population at large had been consulted.

In 1946 the Ten-Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory was issued (revised in 1950) as the guide not only for efforts at economic development but also to provide the basis for ancillary plans, such as the one for education issued in 1947. Perhaps the greatest emphasis was put on agriculture, transportation, and education. Little attention was paid to the development of industry, a consequence in part of Kenya's head start and the tendency to see it as the major locus of industry in an increasingly interrelated East Africa.

In the government's view, improvements in the educational system were essential to economic development, and a fair amount of money was devoted to it. The education plan itself and the government's perspective on Tanganyika's needs were, however, limited, perhaps because there was no sense of urgency about preparing Tanganyikans to rule themselves.

The plan stressed primary schooling; some attention was to be given to secondary education but very little to education at university or advanced technical levels. The number of Tanganyika Africans entering Makerere College in Kampala, Uganda, the sole East African college in the plan period, was much smaller than the numbers from Kenya or Uganda, although Tanganyika's population was roughly the same as that of Kenya and exceeded Uganda's. This was in part a consequence of the very slow progress of primary and secondary education in Tanganyika before the war, but it also reflected the government's doubts about the desirability of having large numbers of Africans with higher education in the territory, at least in the early 1950s.



In 1947 about 7.5 percent of Tanganyikan children were in schools, and it was hoped to have all eligible children in primary school at the end of the plan period. This was not achieved; moreover only one child in ten went to school beyond the fourth year. In part this failure to meet the goal was a consequence of lack of money and trained teachers. There were ethnic groups, such as the Chaga, who did better but at their own expense.

Minor additions to the existing railroad system were made in response to specific needs, but these needs were short-lived, and the additions had no long-run value.

The development plan placed the greatest emphasis on road construction, a decision then and subsequently supported by a number of analysts. For most of the period between 1946 and independence, however, the government stressed the construction of first-class asphalted roads in the face of great increases in cost, leading to an extraordinary drain on Tanganyika's limited resources. The standards were lowered in 1955, and as Tanganyika neared independence greater emphasis was put on building graveled feeder roads, still expensive because many areas had to import the materials but perhaps more useful in the long run to African peasants who had to get their produce to the market.

Cyril Ehrlich, writing on Tanganyika's economy in the period from 1945 to independence puts it plainly: "In 1945 Tanganyika was desperately poor." He attributes this in small part to the exigencies of war, but the basic problems in his view were other: a harsh environment and an ill-educated population; "an infrastructure whose sparseness and inadequacy was remarkable even by the standards of tropical Africa;" a negative administrative policy toward economic development; and an uncertain international status that was a barrier to investment and entrepreneurial activity. These obstacles were not overcome. Again in Ehrlich's words, "Tanganyika entered the 1960s as one of the poorest and least developed of African countries."

Part of the problem, before the war and after, was the lack of money; in the 1930s because of the depression, later because Great Britain itself took a long time to recover from the effects of the war and in some instances extracted wealth that might have remained in Tanganyika. Initially the single largest source of grant aid was Great Britain's Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme; a little came from the United States as Marshall Aid. There were also some internal resources, and a substantial amount was borrowed. An export boom in the late 1940s and early 1950s (of sisal and other cash crops) also generated a good deal of revenue, although governmental policies precluded its generating even more. The government tended to be very reluctant to anticipate such revenue and to plan for its spending, however, in part because the one extraordinary expenditure of money, the Groundnuts Scheme, had turned out so badly. It must be noted further that shortages of men and materials in the plan period

outside the government's control would have set limits on a more imaginative and aggressive program.

The Groundnuts Scheme, begun in 1947, was formulated not in Tanganyika but by the Ministry of Food in Great Britain and later turned over to its representative, the Overseas Food Corporation. It was a disaster. Great Britain, suffering from balance-of-payments problems and hoping to earn dollars as well as provide peanut oil to relieve shortages at home, poured millions of pounds into the project in the hope of turning 5,000 square miles of Tanganyika into a major producer of groundnuts (peanuts). The emphasis was on large-scale mechanized agriculture. A virtually uninhabited tract of land east of Dodoma was chosen. Preliminary investigation was superficial, and no experimentation was carried out before men, money, and machines were poured into the area.

The soil was poor and unsuited to the use of heavy machinery. Lack of rain in 1947 and 1948 contributed to the failure of the first harvest. By 1949 there was a second bad harvest, and in 1951 the scheme was abandoned. The local people knew the territory as the land of perpetual dryness, but they hadn't been asked, nor for that matter had local colonial agricultural officers.

The scheme had no major direct impact on the Tanganyikan economy, but it may be argued that the same amount of money invested in a number of better planned and less grandiose projects might have had a positive effect. That kind of investment was not forthcoming because the scheme was conceived not as a contribution to the development of Tanganyika but as a contribution to the British economy.

The income of Tanganyikans and of the Tanganyika government was also affected by British policy. For example, the territory's sisal industry dominated the world market from 1942 until the mid-1950s, but it did not reap all the benefits it might have nor did the government derive as much revenue as it could have because from 1941 to 1948 the British government had an agreement to buy at prices substantially below those available elsewhere. Prices were increased in 1946 and again until the end of the agreement, but it has been estimated that the industry lost about £11 million in that period, and whatever revenues the government might have derived from that sum were also lost. Sisal was almost exclusively plantation grown, and the loss was felt directly by its non-African owners. It is possible, however, that some revenue could have been reinvested in replacement of sisal plants and development of capacity with implications for the comparatively large African labor force on the plantations.

A similar British policy also affected some of the peasant producers of coffee. For example, from 1946 to 1952 the British government was the sole purchaser, at a fixed price, of coffee grown by the Chaga and marketed by the KNCU. At the insistence of the Chaga who were aware of world market prices, the agreement was ended in 1952. It may be argued, as indeed it was, that

the original contract provided a guaranteed base price for the peasant producers, permitting them to get under way after the war without the risk of fluctuating prices. Nevertheless the British were not quick to take the initiative to change the policy.

Although in principle government plans emphasized measures that would show a quick return, in practice, as Ehrlich points out, a great deal of money was spent on transport, particularly on first-class roads, which were not only costly but inadequate for developing areas and hardly used in backward ones. Much less money went into communication, and the expenditures on roads were much greater than total expenditures on agricultural and veterinary services. Perhaps more important was the tendency of the government to distort the idea of self-sufficiency in food production, at least in the first half of the period (to 1953 and sometimes later). Self-sufficiency came to be seen not as a territorial matter but as a provincial or district one, each such unit being expected to provide for itself. In practice such a policy tended to entrench subsistence farming. A territorial perspective would have emphasized market exchange of different products cultivated in different parts of the country. It is perhaps ironic that the burgeoning (and sometimes fully flowered) African participation in a partial market economy in the nineteenth century should have been, in effect, smothered in the twentieth (see *Raiders and Traders: The Nineteenth Century*, this ch.)

Efforts to increase production in specific areas took the form of improving agricultural techniques and land usage imposed by fiat through and enforced by the Native Authorities. The rules governing cultivation and animal husbandry varied from place to place and in their degree of complexity, but their violation was treated as a criminal matter, and many of the so-called criminal cases heard in the courts of the Native Authorities dealt with these matters. Although some of the practices enforced may have been desirable from a purely technical point of view, others were of doubtful value. In any case widespread resentment of these rules and the way in which they were enforced provided TANU with a degree of support in the rural areas that might not have been otherwise forthcoming, at least so soon (see *The Emergence of TANU*, this ch.).

#### **Political Developments to 1954**

The territorial authorities, having rejected the initiatives of the Colonial Office, did institute a number of changes in local government, sometimes in response to local discontents and sometimes in response to its own conception of what increased efficiency entailed. In the late 1940s the authorities increased the number of unofficial members of the Legislative Council with the informal understanding that the four new members would be Africans. Two chiefs were in fact appointed, but other appointments did not come for several years, on the grounds that appropriate persons with adequate English were not available. It is not clear whether

persons other than chiefs were considered at the time. Such persons were, however, appointed later.

The colonial authorities, although prepared to make changes in local government, seemed to be unsure of what they wanted to do and in any case tended to proceed very gradually and without reference to the wishes of the local people unless, as in the Chaga and some other instances, they were pressed very hard. In general the emphasis was less on representation of the peasants than on efficiency, and there was still a reluctance to depart swiftly from the notions of indirect rule.

In the towns and administrative centers the African Association, hitherto primarily a social and welfare organization for the more educated African, began increasingly to involve itself in political matters. At a March 1945 conference in Dodoma, it criticized the government for its educational and agricultural policies, opposed white settlement and closer union with Kenya (in which white settlers were entrenched), and argued that government salaries not be based on race. In 1948, after a split with the Zanzibar group with which it had been affiliated, the group became the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and its activities even more intensely political.

TAA's headquarters were in Dar es Salaam, but local branches had a great deal of autonomy; their activities were often directed to such local issues as controversy over the role of chiefs and agricultural rules. The TAA did take general positions on a number of national matters, however, among them the continuing de facto racial discrimination characteristic of the territory despite the legal banning of the color bar in 1947. Moreover the national group commented on the report of the Committee on Constitutional Development, established in 1949 and composed of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council (including two African chiefs), the Attorney General, and the member for Local Government; it also submitted its views to United Nations Visiting Missions.

By the early 1950s a substantial number of educated Africans were members of the TAA. A few of the more educated chiefs had joined it, and there were also a number of businessmen, often Muslims, in the group. Nevertheless it lacked a mass base, and it had not developed a strong national leadership or organization.

In 1953 the government, reacting to the active participation of civil servants (including teachers) in what was increasingly nationalist politics, forbade them to join any political movement, let alone hold office or play an important part in such a movement. Given the high proportion of educated Africans in the civil service this prohibition, in Pratt's words, "robbed the TAA and later TANU of the participation and leadership of that most important stratum of the African community." Native Authorities were encouraged to follow the central government's lead, and a number of missions also forbade those who worked for them to join TANU (or



similar organizations). Workers at any level of government who wished to be politically active had either to resign their posts or keep their involvement covert.

### **The Emergence of TANU**

In July 1954 the TAA became the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) under the leadership of Julius K. Nyerere. TANU's formation and its program told the colonial authorities, in Great Britain and the territory, that some Tanganyika Africans, at least, were prepared to work explicitly for an end to colonial control. At that time and even later, however, TANU did not insist on a timetable for independence.

Nyerere, a member of a small ethnic group (the Zanaki) in Musoma District and son of a minor chief, went to Makerere College and, on a government bursary, to Edinburgh University where he earned a degree in the social sciences. In 1952 he became a teacher at a Roman Catholic secondary school, but his political activities with the TAA led to conflicts with his supervisors and his resignation. In his own words he became a full-time "political agitator."

Initial support for TANU, overt or covert, came from educated Africans and the not very large number of persons, many of them not highly educated but with a good deal of personal ambition and a fairly strong entrepreneurial orientation, who were frustrated by their inability to make their way in an economic and social hierarchy dominated by Europeans and Asians. Support soon came from others, however, despite government efforts to put obstacles in TANU's way. In 1956 Nyerere claimed 100,000 members. Among the obstacles was the Societies Ordinance of 1954, which gave the governor the power to refuse or revoke the registration of all associations (or their branches). Under the ordinance TANU branches in various places were denied registration.

In the early years efforts by Nyerere and others to develop party organization and discipline notwithstanding, TANU suffered from some of the same problems experienced by the TAA. Local branches engaged in activities not necessarily cleared with the center, and there were entanglements of various kinds with local ethnic political entities.

Moreover there was not always unanimity in TANU. Despite Nyerere's prominence, leadership was not then (or later) his alone, although he wielded a good deal of influence among his colleagues, and he came to have an extraordinary impact on ordinary Africans. Efforts to come to collective decisions on important matters usually succeeded, but there were differences of opinion on tactics and other matters within the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee (the larger, more inclusive body).

The reaction of the governor of Tanganyika, Sir Edward Twining (appointed in 1949 and reappointed to a second term in 1955), and

of most of the higher officials in the colonial government to TANU tended to be negative and in many cases remained that way to the late 1950s. Some officials at the district level may have been more sympathetic although others were strongly opposed to it. As Cranford Pratt suggests, most colonial officials in the territory thought of themselves as selflessly devoted to the ultimate good of the African, but paternalism, no matter how well-meaning, assumes the superiority of those practicing it and tends to ignore the possibility that nationalists might be angered by that sense of superiority and suspicious of the motives of those manifesting it.

The hostility of the colonial authorities to TANU took several forms: the Societies Ordinance, although applicable to all associations, was enforced only against TANU branches. For example, in 1957 TANU could not function overtly in ten districts. In 1955 an amendment to the Penal Code prohibited the printing or publishing or the making to an assembly of "any statement likely to raise discontent amongst any of the inhabitants of the territory."

Some of the specific actions of the colonial authorities were in fact taken because TANU branches directly motivated by local concerns and antagonisms did appear to threaten public order. Thus some branch officials attempted to hear disputes, bypassing the local judiciary; others ignored the jurisdiction of local courts, and some urged people to disobey orders of the Native Authority. In the mid-1950s this sort of behavior was fairly widespread and had its origins not in central TANU directives or even TANU encouragement but in deeply felt local antipathies sometimes involving European colonial officials but more often directed, in the first instance at least, against the Native Authorities. Indeed, as Pratt puts it, "TANU itself remained ambivalent towards these local protest movements." Nyerere and other national leaders did not care for protests that sometimes became violent and that they could not control. Moreover they were initially ready to accept the technical views of professional officials on agricultural matters.

Although there were reasons for government action in particular instances, the colonial authorities were concerned not only with the preservation of public order but also with the preservation of the existing system. In 1954 Governor Twining told the Legislative Council that "Government will not tolerate such activities which are contrary to the best interests of the people and are designed to damage, if not destroy good government." From Twining's perspective TANU's activities were essentially of that character.

The program set out in TANU's constitution of 1954 was revolutionary: it looked forward to great change in the political and social, if not yet the economic, arrangements in Tanganyika. The question was when the colonial power and the colonial authorities would decide that the time was ripe for them to collaborate in the revolution.

The significant points in TANU's program were: that Tanganyika be prepared for self-government; that tribalism be rejected in favor of nationalism; that a democratic government be established; that all governmental bodies have African majorities; that all forms of racialism be eliminated; and that TANU encourage and cooperate with unions, cooperatives, and other groups, such as tribal unions, if they were sympathetic. In TANU's view there was no contradiction between its opposition to tribalism and its willingness to cooperate with tribal unions. A number of unions already existed and had shown themselves to be antipathetic to colonially imposed political forms and racialism as well as to chiefs who could sometimes be seen as the embodiment of tribalism.

Racialism had been legally eliminated, but in fact it was pervasive. All Africans, whatever their other views, were opposed to a racialism manifested in European and to a lesser extent Asian dominance, but Nyerere took a wholly principled view of it, rejecting it even when applied to the minorities by the majority.

In principle nobody objected to democratic forms of government. The issue at this time was how fast those forms would be instituted. Later it was to become, for Nyerere at least, a matter of finding democratic forms suitable to an African society.

The major conflict between TANU's program and the program of the colonial authorities, especially Governor Twining's, lay in TANU's opposition to multiracialism and its concomitant insistence that Tanganyika was an African country. The notion of multiracialism had been strongly supported by Twining from the time he took office in 1949. Late in that year he appointed the Committee on Constitutional Development that was to examine the entire range of constitutional and political development. The committee's report, delivered in May 1951, dealt with a number of issues, but its basic recommendation was to establish, in Bates' language, "equal representation of numerically unequal racial groups" among the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. Concretely it called for seven members each from the African, Asian, and European communities. Twining had originally called for an equal number of Africans and non-Africans on the council, but he accepted the committee's recommendation. The Tanganyika European Council, formed in 1949, had opposed Twining's initial recommendation, and many of its members opposed the committee's views as well. When these views were accepted the organization came to an end.

African views on constitutional development were also presented to the factfinding subcommittee of the Constitutional Development Committee. According to Pratt, despite a lack of coordination among them, a common element in their presentations was their insistence that there continue to be an official majority and that Africans constitute 50 percent of the unofficial side (Twining's original recommendation). The TAA's Dar es Salaam branch supported that position, suggested the new ar-

rangement continue for twelve years and that it be succeeded by an election using a common roll (as opposed to separate communal rolls) for what was to become an unofficial majority. The fundamental concern of Africans in the late 1940s and early 1950s was that immediate change to an unofficial majority composed of equal numbers of Asians, Europeans, and Africans would result in dominance by the minorities.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, accepting the committee's recommendations in 1952, strongly indicated that he expected the newly established constitution of the Legislative Council to last for a "considerable time." The Legislative Council was not in fact immediately reconstituted. Instead the governor recommended first the development of multiracial county councils, each of them embracing a number of districts. Because they were not really local entities, had been imposed without reference to African needs or wishes, and tended to be dominated by officials representing the central government and by the Europeans who sat on them, they eventually failed. A later effort was made to establish such multiracial units at the district level. The government insisted that they include Europeans and Asians even when there was only a handful of them in the area. These too had little success, and even when they worked better than the councils, Africans tended to be suspicious of the motives of government in insisting on them.

Opposition to the government's insistence on multiracialism was a matter on which Africans could agree, for it seemed to them a policy implying continuing European and Asian domination of Tanganyika. Africans also opposed moves toward closer union of Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda on the grounds that settler influence in Kenya was so strong that union in any form foreshadowed white dominance in all of East Africa. For TANU and Nyerere it meant that the colonial authorities refused to consider Tanganyika an African country. In Nyerere's view, the representation of Europeans and Asians on government bodies was entirely legitimate, and for a time in the late 1950s he was willing to accept guaranteed minority representation for the non-African communities. Guaranteed parity, however, he saw as undemocratic and as an effort to entrench the power and status of the minorities.

Much African support for TANU was generated by the government's own actions—its slowness in changing the system of indirect rule despite Twining's and others' formal intention of doing so. For Africans, among the most important government units were their own Native Authorities, but the introduction of elected councillors into the Native Authority system was slow in coming so that educated and ambitious Africans and ordinary peasants alike had no place to exert influence or to vent their grievances. Initially the rural African turned to tribal unions (the Chagga Citizens Union is one case), but by 1954 TANU was avail-



able and attracted first the more educated persons and, not long after, the peasants.

A second (and related) source of support for TANU was the use of the Native Authorities to impose agricultural and land usage rules on the peasants. TANU's own initial uncertainty about its position on what it saw as technical matters and its lack of control of TANU branches protesting the rules and other matters notwithstanding, these two sources of (sometimes violent) discontent, together with African suspicions of multiracialism, helped to give TANU its mass base.

### **Elections and Steps Toward Independence**

In May 1954 the reconstituted Legislative Council—thirty-one official and thirty unofficial members—came into being. The unofficial members had been chosen on the basis of racial parity from each of the eight provinces and Dar es Salaam. Three special members, apparently representing the Arabs, the sisal industry, and Bukoba District, were also appointed. For the first time Swahili could be used in the council. The first meeting of this entirely appointed council in March 1955 was the occasion of a government proposal to hold elections for unofficial members in a few years, probably in 1958.

By 1956, therefore, the attention of all Tanganyika residents was turned toward elections and, with Twining's encouragement, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was formed to provide an alternative to TANU. The UTP, headed by a European, was financed chiefly by European and Asian business interests, but African support was also sought. After Twining had decided that chiefs did not come under the ordinance forbidding civil servants to engage in politics, some important chiefs joined the party. The UTP's manifesto clearly supported the colonial government's policies on multiracialism.

The government fully intended the elections to reflect its multiracial policy, but it had not yet decided how that was to be accomplished. In the fall of 1956 it suggested that in three or four constituencies elections be held on a common roll but that each voter be required to vote for an African, an Asian, and a European. The formal qualifications for the franchise were set so high (an annual income of 4,000 shillings, or a Standard XII education—that is, advanced secondary schooling, or employment in certain posts) that relatively few Africans could have qualified. The Africans in the Legislative Council, whatever their views, could not accept these limitations, which would have disqualified persons holding quite responsible posts. A committee of the council was then formed to reconsider the matter.

The government accepted the committee's recommendation that the educational qualification be lowered to Standard VIII (completion of middle school) and that the income qualification be changed to 3,000 shillings. These qualifications made all Europeans, most Asians, but only about 60,000 Africans (of between 9

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and 10 million) eligible to vote. Shortly thereafter it was decided that there would be a common roll in all constituencies, elections to be held in five of them in 1958 and in the remaining five in 1959. Thirty unofficial members, equally divided among the races, were to be chosen.

TANU and many Africans considered the limitations on the franchise and the insistence of the government that each voter choose a candidate of each race so contrary to their goals that, for a time, they contemplated boycotting the elections. In early 1958, however, a TANU conference decided that the party would contest them.

The preparation for elections was taking place in conjunction with a variety of government and TANU activities as each tried to develop support. In May 1957 Governor Twining called the Convention of Representative Chiefs. Assuring them that the British proposed to remain in the territory for a long time, he stressed the significance of the tribe (ethnic group) as the fundamental African entity and of the chiefs' role as political and spiritual leaders of their groups. Further he urged their opposition to a political party made up of detribalized individuals moved by alien ideas.

The chiefs owed their positions to the approval of the colonial authorities, but they had been put into a very difficult position by these same authorities who had insisted that they support and enforce unpopular rules. Moreover the chiefs did have varying personal and cultural backgrounds, and their political views were not homogeneous. In late 1957 and early 1958, therefore, many of them sought to come to terms with TANU. In 1958 a leading chief, Fundikira, decided to ask for its support in running for the Legislative Council, and the Convention of Representative Chiefs formally supported his decision.

TANU, which had emphasized work in the rural areas from its inception (and continued to do so) had occasion in 1957 and 1958 to cooperate with the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, supporting it in a number of strikes and in a boycott. At this time Rashidi M. Kawawa and Michael Kamaliza, already associated with TANU, became leaders of the organization. The increasing influence of unions notwithstanding, policy remained in the hands of TANU.

Unrest in this period was endemic in the rural areas, often in reaction to government efforts to establish multiracial district councils. The strongest manifestation of unrest occurred in that part of Sukumaland included in Geita District. The first, probably spontaneous, demonstrations developed over a period of months into other outbreaks of dissatisfaction, including riots, and a march to Mwanza, the provincial capital. The leaders of these activities were not, to begin with, members of TANU, although they joined it later. The area was visited by Paul Bomani, the province's African representative in the Legislative Council and sympathetic to TANU, and Nyerere who, at that time, was forbidden by govern-

ment order to make public speeches. At that point he did not have to: there was a significant public demonstration for TANU.

As the elections neared Nyerere was under constant pressure. In the summer of 1958 he was tried for criminal libel because TANU's newsletter alleged that several district officers had discriminated against Africans. By this time Sir Richard Turnbull had succeeded Twining as governor of Tanganyika, and it has been suggested that he acted to relieve tensions when Nyerere was convicted by urging a fine rather than a prison sentence. On the one hand the government thought that violent action might follow a harsher sentence; on the other, TANU would have lost its most significant and persuasive voice at a crucial point.

In the spring of 1958 TANU decided that it must seek to elect not only the five African candidates it had nominated but that it also ought to try to influence the outcome of elections for European and Asian candidates. (Nyerere could not succeed in his effort to open TANU itself to European and Asian members, but a splinter group insisting on a purely African Tanganyika and objecting to any cooperation with non-Africans had no electoral success.) Under the circumstances TANU could only do so by urging African voters to support non-UTP candidates already nominated. In September 1958 all fifteen seats were won by members of TANU or by Europeans and Asians supported by TANU.

It was clear that this strategy would also succeed in the elections of February 1959 for the remaining fifteen seats, and only three of them were contested. The new Legislative Council was to have thirty unofficial members who were either members of TANU or backed by it.

In October 1958, with the results of the first elections in and the results of the second anticipated, Governor Turnbull, in a speech to the Legislative Council, came to terms with the part of TANU's program that Governor Twining had resisted as long as he held office. Referring specifically to the district councils, but in effect speaking to the general issue of multiracialism, he stated that there was no bar to purely African councils. He further indicated that parity of the races in the Legislative Council and the Executive Council was a temporary measure and that he expected Africans to constitute a predominant majority in both when "self-government is eventually attained." In short Tanganyika was seen as an African country.

#### **Self-Government and Independence**

Although Turnbull had made a major adjustment in Twining's policies, he did not set out a timetable for self-government and independence, and there are indications that he did not expect things to move as quickly as they did. He was, however, prepared to introduce a minority of TANU-supported elected members into the Executive Council (soon to be renamed the Council of Ministers) in 1959, five years before Twining had envisaged such a change. Nyerere was willing, for the time being, to accept the fact

that unofficial members on the Executive Council would constitute a minority. Neither he nor other TANU leaders were willing to accept the notion that racial parity be the basis on which they were chosen. Finally it was proposed that the unofficial minority be enlarged from three to five, of which three were to be Africans, one Asian, and one European. The proposal was accepted by the Tanganyika Elected Members Organization (TEMO), formed by TANU and TANU-supported European and Asian members of the Legislative Council. TEMO had been put together by the unofficial members as a parliamentary opposition and had apparently succeeded in developing considerable cooperation among European, Asian, and African members; its leader was Nyerere, its deputy leader Derek Bryceson.

At the time of the formal announcement of the new constitution of the Council of Ministers in March 1959 nothing further was said about a timetable for self-government, but the Post-Elections Committee was appointed to consider further developments. In December 1959 Turnbull, in a speech to the Legislative Council, said that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had agreed to the committee's recommendations that the next Legislative Council should consist of an elected majority comprising fifty members elected from open seats in fifty constituencies. Some of these constituencies would elect two members, and a few would elect three. These additional seats would be reserved for Asian or European candidates, thus giving eleven seats on the council to Asians and ten to Europeans. All voters would vote for all candidates (the common roll). Requirements for voting were made less stringent, and the registered voters could number about 1 million.

Turnbull's speech also included the announcement of another major step toward self-government. The Council of Ministers to be formed after the election of August 30, 1960, was, for the first time, to be based on an unofficial majority. In April 1960 details were announced: nine elected ministers and a chief minister were to represent the unofficial side; the deputy governor and two civil service ministers (in the event, the attorney general and the minister for information services) were to constitute the official side.

In the election TANU candidates were unopposed for fifty-eight of the seventy-one seats, and they lost only one of the other thirteen. Immediately thereafter the governor appointed Nyerere as chief minister and, on his advice, chose an additional nine unofficial members as ministers. Nyerere accepted the appointment and indicated that he expected full independence in 1961.

Talks between Nyerere and Iain MacLeod, the colonial secretary, in Dar es Salaam in March 1961 led to the announcement that full internal self-government would begin on May 15, 1961. After this date Nyerere became prime minister and presided over the Council of Ministers composed wholly of elected members. The governor retained control of foreign affairs and the military, but he had only a titular role as head of state with respect to





*Prime Minister Nyerere speaking on Independence Day, 1961  
Courtesy United Nations*

internal matters. The interval between full self-government and complete independence was very short. On December 9, 1961, Tanganyika became fully independent.

### **Zanzibar: To Independence, Revolution, and Union**

At the end of World War II socioeconomic and ethnic divisions in Zanzibar and Pemba coincided, but the divisions were not clear cut and some interests and attitudes crossed boundaries: many Arabs were in fact of mixed origin, and some who might have called themselves Shirazi at one time had come to think of themselves as Arab. The Shirazi of Pemba shared certain economic interests with Pemba Arabs, and there were cases of inter-marriage. All Arabs and Shirazi were Muslims; most mainlanders were not. On Zanzibar, Shirazi and mainlanders might have had some grievances in common, but in certain situations they were competitors. Arabs and Shirazi alike looked down on mainlanders, especially those of slave origin. This complex social situation set the stage for the sometimes ambiguous politics leading to independence.

Politically the situation remained fairly quiet until the mid-1950s. The Legislative Council, like that on the mainland, included an appointed unofficial minority, Arab in composition. Except for one instance of violence in the early 1950s, there was little overt political activity. The violence occurred when farmers, already angry because some of their land had been taken to extend the airport, rebelled against the government's intention to impose inoculation against anthrax. Out of this incident emerged the National Party of the Subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar.

A few years later, in 1954, the Arab Association, increasingly political and influenced in part by developments in the Middle East, published a series of strongly anticolonial articles in its newspaper. Alison Smith suggests that some Arabs had begun to think that if they were to remain in control of an eventually independent Zanzibar in which they were clearly a minority, they would have to speed up the process lest they be preempted by the majority. The articles led to the trial for sedition of the executive groups of the association. The British authorities had counted on the continued cooperation of the generally conservative Arabs to whom they had become accustomed, but they were confronted with an eighteen month boycott of government by all save one Arab member of the Legislative Council (who was murdered in 1955).

In 1955 a number of Arabs led by Ali Muhsin Barwani, a young member of a family of wealthy landowners (like the editor of the Arab Association paper that had published the anticolonial articles) affiliated themselves with the National Party founded by rebellious peasants some years earlier. In 1956 Ali Muhsin became the unofficial leader of that group, now called the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). Like other activist Arabs he was moved

by Islamic ideas, but he had also been influenced by his understanding of nationalist movements in nineteenth century Europe.

The ZNP, now led by Arabs, included Shirazi but excluded mainlanders who were not subjects of the sultan. Like the Arab Association, it called for elections to the Legislative Council on a common roll, apparently assuming that an Arab-led, if not entirely Arab, delegation would be chosen under such conditions.

The British authorities, assuming that the Arab Association radicals and the ZNP represented an extremist fringe, offered their own views of constitutional change in October 1955. Elections were not included, and the Arab boycott of government continued. In 1956 a senior official from Kenya who had been called in as an adviser recommended common roll elections in 1957. The franchise was to be highly restricted, however, and the proposal was modified to limit the vote to subjects of the sultan, thereby excluding all but a few mainland Africans.

Most Shirazi and mainland Africans were not sure that they wanted the changes because they seemed to be steps toward an independent Zanzibar likely to be controlled by Arabs. The colonial authorities, long committed to Zanzibar as an Arab state, were nevertheless not ready to accept an election dominated by an increasingly radical Arab minority and encouraged the Shirazi and the few eligible mainlanders to vote. In fact not many could because of the British failure to stress secondary education for the non-Arab population.

Despite their doubts, the hitherto independent African and Shirazi associations, confronted by the prospect of elections, did join in an alliance and their activity, as well as the large number of votes (40 percent of the total) cast for unaffiliated candidates meant that the ZNP lost all of the six seats in the first round of elections in July 1957. One representative of the alliance, Abeid Karume, of working-class background, emerged as a major figure at this time, defeating Ali Muhsin for one of the six seats.

As a consequence of the election racial conflict intensified. On the one hand Afro-Shirazi consumer cooperatives forced many Arab shopkeepers out of business. On the other, Afro-Shirazi dockworkers who had long held a monopoly on waterfront jobs were eliminated in favor of members of the ZNP. Arab plantation owners also evicted long-tolerated mainlander squatters.

The ZNP, despite its losses, took the initiative, seeking support from several foreign sources for its drive to independence. Ali Muhsin gained the approval of Ghana's president, Kwame Nkrumah, and the party's general secretary, Abdul Rahman Mohammed (known as Babu—grandfather), used his links with communist states and with Labour Party members in Great Britain to gain the advice and support of the left. On such advice, particularly from Labour Party professionals, he developed a varied group of voluntary organizations that provided him and the party

with a power base in addition to his personal base as a union leader.

Beginning in the mid-1950s unions had become increasingly important: several of the larger ones under Afro-Shirazi influence formed the Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labour and affiliated with the Western-oriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Babu organized agricultural and some Shirazi waterfront workers into the Federation of Progressive Trade Unions and affiliated it with the communist-oriented World Federation of Trade Unions.

This network of organizations, including numbers of Shirazi and a few mainlanders, enabled the newspapers subsidized by the ZNP to insist on its multiethnic nature, a position that the ZNP took from the 1957 elections to the early 1960s. Nevertheless the leadership was largely Arab.

Meanwhile the alliance of the African and Shirazi associations had converted itself into a party—the Afro-Shirazi Union (ASU). It was not able to take real advantage of its relative success in the elections, however, because it had little organizational experience, and it lacked the resources of the ZNP, which, despite the radical stance and connections of some of its leaders, was able to draw on Arab wealth.

The ASU's greatest problem lay in the ideological differences between the mainlanders and many of the Shirazi. The mainlanders, strongly anti-Arab, continued to fear early independence lest it mean Arab rule. The Shirazi, linked to the Arabs by religion and in some cases by intermarriage, were not prepared to take the anti-Arab position of the mainlanders. The Pemba Shirazi in particular were on good terms with the Pemba Arabs, disliked the mainlanders, and despised the working-class background of Karume.

In 1959 two leaders of the Pemba Shirazi and their followers withdrew from the ASU and joined a Shirazi member of the Legislative Council in forming the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP), an almost entirely Shirazi entity. The remainder (and larger part) of the ASU then became the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).

The British resident throughout this period retired at the end of 1959 and was succeeded by Sir George Mooring. His background and other developments in East Africa at the time seemed to signal a change in the long-standing British emphasis on the Arab character of the Zanzibari state. In early 1960 Sir Hilary Blood was appointed to look into the Zanzibari situation and recommend the next series of constitutional changes. His proposals included an enlarged Legislative Council with an unofficial majority and a council of ministers, including a chief minister.

Testimony before the Blood Commission indicated some of the complexity of the divisions in Zanzibar. On the one hand some ZNP positions emphasized loyalty to the sultanate, and there was also a question as to the qualifications necessary to permit recent



immigrants to become citizens of Zanzibar. The resolution of that question would speak directly to the weight carried by mainlanders. Moreover the ZNP proposed a bicameral legislature that seemed to favor continued Arab influence. On the other hand the ZNP insisted on immediate independence and full adult suffrage, and it stressed its nonracial character, claiming that the other parties were racial groupings willing to permit continued British rule in order to survive. The ASP in turn claimed that the ZNP was communist oriented (it had given eighty-five scholarships to students for study in Moscow, Peking, and Cairo, then the center of Middle Eastern radicalism).

In the elections in January 1961 the ASP won a little more than 40 percent of the vote and ten of the twenty-two seats; the ZNP took nine seats with nearly 36 percent of the vote. The balance of power lay with the ZPPP, which won three seats with 17 percent of the vote. Two of the ZPPP leaders allied themselves with the ZNP, the third with the ASP, leading to a tie. An extra seat was added and another election scheduled for June.

The tensions in this period were high. The ZNP was accused of stressing racial and religious differences in its campaign and in its turn objected to the financial and other aid (including speakers) given the ASP by TANU. The election itself was followed by a week of rioting in which sixty-eight Arabs were killed and several hundred other persons hurt.

Once again the results of the election were ambiguous. Both major parties won ten seats, but the ASP had gained a little more than half of the total vote. The ZPPP, which had campaigned with the ZNP held three seats, and the alliance was therefore able to form a government. In the circumstances, the leader of the ZNP offered the position of chief minister to the head of the ZPPP.

Between mid-1961 and mid-1963 the coalition government was in power, but stresses within the coalition parties were beginning to make themselves felt, and the ASP seemed to be gaining additional internal support as well as the support of a number of mainland parties in east and central Africa, some of them dominating already independent states. These were joined in an organization called the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA).

The radical elements in the ZNP led by Babu had been responsible for much of its organizational work and its propaganda, but the bulk of the members and the leaders of the ZNP and the ZPPP actually in government were Muslims and in many respects conservative. In mid-1962 ten of the more radical members of the ZNP, including Babu (already convicted of seditious statements) were held responsible for several cases of sabotage alleged to have been committed by the Youths' Own Union, a ZNP group. When Babu and others were convicted and jailed for fifteen months, the government leaders did not object. After serving his term, Babu urged on the ZNP his own candidates for the next election.

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objecting specifically to the ZNP's practice of choosing candidates who were of the same race as the dominant one in their constituencies. His list rejected, Babu left for the mainland, to return before the election. With two other former ZNP leaders he then formed the Umma (Masses) Party, an explicitly radical group, leaving the ZNP dominated by its Islam oriented, largely conservative elements.

The intervention of Tanganyikan and Kenyan elements in PAFMECSA, concerned that independence might be delayed by strife between the two leading parties, brought the ZNP and the ASP together briefly, but the reconciliation did not last. Among other things the ZNP was persuaded that PAFMECSA's sympathies lay with the ASP.

By late 1962 and early 1963 the ASP as well as the ZNP were looking forward to independence. The parties differed, however, on whether elections should be held before or after the granting of self-government. The ASP, apparently confident that it could command a majority of the votes, preferred an election before self-government on the grounds that if the minority party were in power when self-government was granted it would find ways of retaining that power no matter what the results of the subsequent election.

The elections were in fact scheduled for July 1963, two weeks after internal self-government was to be established. Thirty-one seats were to be contested, and all adults were eligible to vote, this time at the ASP's insistence.

With a turnout of more than 99 percent, the ZNP won twelve seats, and its ally, the ZPPP, six—more than enough to form a government. The ASP had polled 54.3 percent of the vote, however, and resented the fact that their clear popular majority was not reflected in control of the Legislative Council.

Mohammed Shamte, the ZPPP leader, remained the head, now prime minister, of the coalition government, which quickly tried to find ways of shoring up its strength so that it might prevail after independence. Loyal members of the ZNP were sent in to take over rural administration, and the mainlanders in the police force, its most experienced component, were dismissed. The government also made plans to forbid political opposition when full independence came.

Independence was granted on December 10, 1963. In January 1964 a bloody revolution did away with the coalition government and the sultanate. Curiously the revolution was not the work of the ASP, which continued to manifest organizational weakness and was marked by internal quarrels in the months between the elections and independence. The strongest opposition to the government was offered by Babu's Umma Party and the Federation of Progressive Trade Unions, which he carried with him when he deserted the ZNP. He somehow managed to get that union and its rival, the Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labour, to form the

National Labour Committee. Landless workers also supported him, and the All Zanzibar Journalists Organization threw their weight behind him effectively in newspaper attacks on the government.

The actual task of overthrowing the regime fell to a soldier of fortune, John Okello, a Luo from Kenya. On his own he enlisted a small force, including Umma Party members and, most important, those mainland police who had not returned to their homes. During the night beginning on January 11, 1964, Okello's forces seized two police armories and quickly took over Zanzibar town. There was no further fighting, but numbers of Arabs were killed after the coup had, for all practical purposes, succeeded.

Okello's part in the revolution was soon over. The Umma Party and the more radical elements of the ASP led by Karume took over almost immediately. Three months later (on April 26, 1964) Zanzibar joined Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar—shortly thereafter changed to the United Republic of Tanzania (see ch. 2).

### **From Self-Government to the Arusha Declaration**

Both Great Britain and Nyerere expected that links between the former colonial power and Tanganyika would persist for the foreseeable future and that Tanganyika would depend heavily on Great Britain for help of various kinds. Some TANU leaders did not accept this view but, in the beginning at least, Nyerere's position prevailed.

As Pratt has it, there were six elements in the British and Tanganyikan understanding of what continuing relations entailed. It was assumed, first, that there were not enough educated Tanganyikans to provide an adequate civil service, especially at the senior levels, and that substantial numbers of British officials would therefore have to be retained or recruited. A second assumption, in a sense a corollary of the first, was that, although the cabinet would be political (as in all parliamentary states), the senior civil service—almost entirely British—would prepare and implement the details of policy.

The third and fourth assumptions were also related. It was urged that the minorities, having given up claims to political power and special privilege, could nevertheless make valuable contributions to the nation and that it ought, therefore, to be made clear that their contributions would be welcomed. A related proposition was that private investment, foreign and domestic, was essential. The chief sources of domestic private investment were likely to be Asian and European individuals and companies.

The emphasis on private entrepreneurship was not restricted to foreigners and minorities. It was assumed that development in the rural areas was most likely to occur by carrying forward what had in theory been the policy of the colonial government: progressive farmers were to be encouraged in the hope that their success

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would persuade others to follow. Progressiveness presumably entailed both an openness to innovation in farming and entrepreneurial élan. It may be recalled that Nyerere was not prepared to ignore what was thought to be the expertise of colonial agricultural specialists, even in the face of peasant recalcitrance.

Finally TANU was to have two tasks: it was to prevent outbreaks of antiminority racialism, if only because such outbreaks might well lead to the resignation of British civil servants and cuts in private investment, both local and foreign. Second, TANU was to be the instrument for getting the people to support national development policies.

By 1962 some of these understandings and assumptions had begun to break down, particularly those entailing such heavy reliance on Great Britain and British expatriates and the passivity of TANU members. By the mid-1960s other assumptions were also under critical examination. In the 1950s and early 1960s Nyerere's speeches and writings were concerned with democracy, equality, and socialism, but socialism seems to have been made a concrete goal only in response to developments in the 1960s. In early 1967 he was prepared to offer a different approach to Tanzania's economic, political, and social problems. Some elements in that approach had already been formulated and, to a degree, implemented, but the Arusha Declaration of February 1967 and related statements articulated it fully for the first time.

#### **The Early Years**

As self-government was established and independence approached all but a few senior civil servants (ranging from the permanent secretaries in each ministry and professional specialists to provincial and district commissioners) were non-Africans, chiefly British. Rapid change in this situation was unlikely if the system and the formal standards of recruitment remained unchanged, so small was the number of secondary school graduates, let alone those with university training. The numbers in secondary and higher education began to rise as independence approached and immediately thereafter, but the process would take time.

The system instituted in Tanganyika at independence was outlined in a constitution drawn up in Great Britain and accepted, for the time being, by Nyerere and other leaders of TANU. That constitution provided for a parliamentary and cabinet government modeled on that of the former colonial power and implied a heavy dependence on a permanent civil service for the details of policy construction. Nyerere, in his appointments to the Council of Ministers (after independence, the cabinet) in the period from 1960 to 1962 chose Africans who had some experience of interaction with the British and could be expected to get along with their permanent secretaries and other senior officials. Moreover not all ministers were Africans; some were local Europeans and Asians. The most influential of them was Sir Ernest Vasey, not a



### *Historical Setting*

Tanganyikan, brought in by Governor Turnbull as minister for finance in early 1960 and reappointed by Nyerere when he became prime minister in September 1960. Vasey had been minister of finance in Kenya and was sympathetic to African goals there. His responsibilities in Tanganyika were much wider than those ordinarily assigned a finance minister. Specifically they included economic policy, development planning, and its inevitable concomitant, foreign aid.

The detailed planning for the Three-Year Development Plan (1961-64), drawn up in 1960, was done by expatriate civil servants in each ministry and cleared through the Ministry of Finance. The policies and projects embodied in the plan had sources external to Tanganyika: the views of the civil servants in the various ministries, particularly the finance ministry and the recommendations of a report by a World Bank (see Glossary) mission. Other policy recommendations had similar sources. The cabinet had its say only after detailed plans developed by non-Africans reached it for final decision, and TANU was represented only in the persons of those ministers who were its members. At this time, indeed, Nyerere's statements accorded TANU a subordinate role both in government and in economic development.

In order to retain the British civil servants the Tanganyika government found it necessary to take responsibility for their pensions, including the part earned before independence. At British insistence Tanganyika was also to pay the pensions of those who retired even if asked to continue. Although Tanganyika was given loans and grants to cover much of these obligations, it had agreed to the burden on the assumption that Great Britain would keep its part of the implied bargain by providing substantial aid. That assumption was made not only by Nyerere and other African leaders but by Vasey who had based the final formulation of the Three-Year Development Plan on it.

In July 1961, six months before independence, it was learned that Great Britain's independence settlement would in fact contribute very little to the realization of the development plan. It was only after a bitter protest from Nyerere and further negotiations that a grant meeting some development costs and a further small loan to cover pension costs would be forthcoming.

Perhaps more important than the hard bargaining with Great Britain over pensions and aid as an impetus for change was the growing reluctance of TANU's more active members to tolerate a situation in which the British retained their elite status, not only politically but also socially. Pratt argues further that the paternal (and superior) attitudes of many British officials persisted, even in relation to the ministers who were constitutionally their masters. The social tensions that may have arisen as a consequence were only part of the picture. More important in Pratt's view was the reluctance of the ministers to take initiatives and to respond to

African pressures when these seemed to run counter to proposals and practices formulated by British experts.

**The Issue of Africanization and the Role of TANU**

Even before independence and more strongly after it, many TANU activists and other Africans had looked forward to rapid Africanization of government service. Beginning at the end of the colonial period provisions had been made to introduce Africans into mid- and high-level jobs if they met the standards, but those standards remained very high—with Nyerere's acquiescence. Moreover no effort was made to institute an accelerated program to train Africans. Nyerere himself was persuaded of the need to retain high standards, and he also disliked the odor of self-aggrandizement in the insistence of many Africans that jobs be opened to them. In addition Nyerere's principled antiracialism was affronted by the anti-Asian implications of some African pressures.

Whatever Nyerere's personal views, he found it necessary to give way a little to the demands pressed upon him. He began in October 1960 by conceding that Tanganyika African candidates for new appointments should have preference, and he followed it up in December 1960 by stating that Tanganyika Africans should have preference for promotion over non-African Tanganyikans. Senior British civil servants opposed these changes although they did not significantly change either the composition of the service or satisfy the TANU rank and file.

Just as Nyerere was making these concessions two specialists from the Ford Foundation were called in as advisers on the question of Africanization. Their two reports (in November 1960 and May 1961) took a quite different position from that strongly held by the expatriates and accepted in good part by Nyerere. In their view rapid Africanization was bound to occur, and the real issue was how to provide for it with minimal damage to effective administration. Nyerere, impressed but uncertain, did not act on their recommendations, and it was not until 1962, after he had resigned from the prime ministership, that the recommendations were implemented (see Nyerere's Resignation, 1962, this ch.).

Closely linked to the issue of the Africanization of the higher civil service was the Africanization of rural administration and the status of the chiefs. Most provincial and district commissioners in the period of self-government and immediately after independence were former British colonial officers, and chiefs still held their offices even if their status and power had been somewhat diminished. The rank and file of TANU who had fought the chiefs and supported Nyerere in his struggle for independence had no significant role. Nyerere was aware of the situation in late 1961 but was not yet ready to do anything about it.

In 1960 and 1961 Nyerere therefore found himself defending a program that he accepted and even felt necessary. Sometimes he was almost alone in doing so, and he was criticized in the party and

in the National Assembly for his failure to speed up Africanization. When some of these criticisms took on strong anti-European and anti-Asian overtones, he responded, often acerbically, to them. In several cases only his intervention in debates in the National Assembly prevented the defeat of a government-sponsored law. The clearest instance of this was the debate over the citizenship law in October 1961. Many in the assembly spoke bitterly against the law as proposed, which made no distinctions between Africans and non-Africans in their eligibility for citizenship. Nyerere's reply was equally bitter, denouncing the racialism explicit in his opponents' arguments and, finally, threatening to resign if the law as drawn was rejected. He carried the day, but the basic hostility toward the patterns prevailing to that point had not been dealt with. Something had to be done about TANU and Africanization.

#### **Nyerere's Resignation, 1962**

In 1962 Nyerere resigned his post as prime minister to devote all his time to his work as president of TANU. This act seems to have been motivated by his sense that he had become remote from the rank and file and that he had to engage in political work at the grass-roots level if he were to find an important role for TANU and to regain the support of the people. Further, he felt that the government was overly identified with him personally and that it was necessary for his colleagues to learn to carry on without him. Most important, in Pratt's view, was Nyerere's sense that he had to communicate to the people the need for hard work and the view that such work ought to be on behalf of Tanganyika rather than for self-aggrandizement. Nyerere proposed to give full time to the role that had given him the respected honorific *mwalimu* (teacher).

Nyerere spent much of 1962 traveling through the country listening and talking to local TANU officials and the rank and file, but he was not concerned with organizational rebuilding nor, for the time being, with increasing TANU's participation in policy-making or administration. He continued to consider the government, not the party, as the source of policy.

His chief task was teaching, which he did orally and through writing. In the pamphlets he produced at this time he argued that African society had had a moral order in which people cared for each other but that this order was giving way to aggressive acquisitiveness. That conception of a traditional African moral order underlay Nyerere's notion of socialism, which, increasingly, constituted a significant part of his message. But he was concerned at this time not with the institutions of socialism but with its values, and he drew not upon Marxist or other European ideas of socialism but on what he thought of as African roots for it.

In his view, in traditional African communities, the members took care of the community, and the community took care of its members. Individuals had neither the need nor the desire to exploit each other. These attitudes had to be retained and to the

extent that they had been lost, recovered. In 1962 Nyerere wrote: "True socialism is an attitude of mind. It is therefore up to the people of Tanganyika . . . to make sure that this socialist attitude of mind is not lost through the temptations to personal gain (or to abuse of positions of authority) . . . or through the temptation to look on the good of the whole community as of secondary importance to the interests of our own particular group."

Linked to this basic concept of the underlying character of traditional African society were Nyerere's general policy recommendations: because exploitation—living on the labor of others—was unjust and destructive of social harmony, such exploitation must end. Concretely in rural society that meant an end to individual ownership of land. This seemed to fly in the face of the earlier assumption that progressive farmers were to be encouraged and that their success, presumably in the market, was to serve as a model for others. Further, substantial differences in income must be prevented. An Asian and European economic elite was not to be succeeded by an African one.

The party's role was also dealt with, not in terms of detailed structure and function but in relation to the achievement of a just and moral society. TANU was to urge Tanganyikans to work hard, particularly in order to eradicate poverty, but it was to do so by living and learning among them, not by imposing its preconceptions on them. Further TANU leaders were to permit, even encourage internal criticism.

#### **Prime Minister Kawawa and Africanization**

When Nyerere resigned he was succeeded as prime minister by Kawawa who had been secretary general and then president of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour and was appointed to the cabinet by Nyerere when he became chief minister in September 1960. Kawawa was more oriented to ordinary political considerations than Nyerere and less willing to cater to the presumed need to retain expatriate specialists.

He began his term by choosing a number of new ministers whose claim to their positions was based less on their experience than on their political activism—some of it in the form of anti-minority acts and rhetoric. He did keep some of those initially appointed by Nyerere, but he did not reappoint Vasey, and he saw to it that some of the powers concentrated in the Ministry of Finance were allocated elsewhere.

In October 1961, before he resigned, Nyerere had made one specific recommendation—that the provincial commissioners, all British, be replaced by regional commissioners, expressly political rather than administrative in character. In February 1962, therefore, acting in consonance with Nyerere's recommendation and clearly in accordance with his own strong predilections, Kawawa appointed eleven regional commissioners, all TANU activists, most having held high office in the TANU provincial structure.



Later that year he replaced a number of district commissioners with what were now to be called area commissioners, also political men.

This was only a part, if an important one, in the Africanization of the government service undertaken during Kawawa's tenure. Basing his program on the recommendations of the Ford Foundation consultants, to which Nyerere had given his assent but had not acted on, Kawawa changed actual practice rapidly. Heavy emphasis was given in-service training of Africans instead of requiring new civil servants to have the same credentials as those demanded earlier, and secondary school graduates were carefully allocated to jobs reflecting government priorities. Further the role of district officer, formerly entailing diverse duties, was broken into several components to which different persons were assigned, thus allowing individuals without university training to cope with them. Finally a commission was instituted to see to it that Africanization affected every aspect of the civil service. Despite this significant change in emphasis and the rise of the number of Africans in government service, in general the number of expatriate officials did not diminish rapidly.

Kawawa was particularly concerned to Africanize those positions that were highly visible politically, thus his replacement of largely British provincial and district commissioners by African regional and area commissioners. He also quickly replaced the permanent secretaries of the ministries with Africans. Finally, triggered by a conflict between Kawawa and the British Commissioner of Police, the officer ranks of the police service, hitherto very largely non-African, were rapidly Africanized.

Just as Kawawa was less reluctant than Nyerere to Africanize the government service, he was more reluctant to tolerate external criticism. Differences within the leadership were permitted expression, but strong criticism from outsiders seen as contenders for power was disliked. Among the chief sources of external criticism were some of the leaders of independent unions not under the direct control of Kawawa and his colleagues. The battle may have been simply a struggle for power between two groups of union leaders, but the ideological terms in which the battle was carried on were of long-run importance for the role of unions and other groups in Tanzanian society. Those union leaders in the cabinet argued that the main task of the unions was to support TANU and the government and to cooperate in the drive to increase production. The outsiders claimed that their chief function was to fight for the economic interests of the workers.

Given Kawawa's position in TANU and the government, he was able, in various ways, to render the opposition impotent. Among these were laws forbidding the participation in unions of senior civil servants, severely restricting the right to strike and bolstering the position of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour and weakening that of the independent unions. Finally, the Pre-

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ventive Detention Act of September 1962 gave the government considerable power to control opposition.

Kawawa coupled these restrictive acts with the introduction of material benefits to ordinary union members. In January 1963 a minimum wage improved the situation of the lowest paid workers and was the base on which a generally higher wage structure was erected. Other benefits were also forthcoming.

In general, and despite the restrictive laws, the speeding up of Africanization and the granting of material benefits to wage workers helped considerably to mitigate the dissatisfactions of many Africans. The increased wages for largely urban workers were, however, to contribute to a problem that Nyerere would have to cope with later—the increasing discrepancy between urban and rural levels of income and the pull that higher wages exerted on rural migrants.

In this period too Tanganyika changed its formal status. The 1961 constitution, prepared by the British, had defined Tanganyika as a dominion, and its head of state remained the queen, represented by a governor general. In November 1962 Tanganyika became a republic and ended its status as a dominion, although it remained a member of the Commonwealth. The constitution of that year established a president as head of the republic.

In Pratt's words "[t]he main thrust of policy under Kawawa was nationalist and oligarchic, not radical or socialist." That thrust conformed to the values of a new African political elite but not necessarily to those of Nyerere. Indeed his teaching had had little effect on most other party leaders or on ordinary Africans, although a few young people attempted, with some initial success, to establish the kind of community he seemed to be calling for.

In these circumstances Nyerere could make an impact only by returning to the government. On December 9, 1962, an election for the presidency was won overwhelmingly by Nyerere, and he became the first president of the republic.

**Domestic Affairs 1963-67**

In 1962 the constitution of TANU, first promulgated in 1954, was revised to accord with Tanganyika's independent status. On that occasion TANU included among its goals a socialist society, but its list of specific aims did not go much beyond that found in African declarations elsewhere. It included the promotion of co-operative activities in connection with production and distribution and referred to collective control of land, water, transportation and, significantly, the media for disseminating and receiving information. In 1965 further amendments to the TANU constitution were somewhat more socialist in tone, but they did not significantly affect actual government policy or practice. Nyerere had recommended them to the party, and they were accepted, but

they were a stage in Nyerere's education of his colleagues rather than a program.

In agriculture the emphasis was on increased technical and other aid to enable the individual peasant to operate more efficiently. Among the policies pursued were the expansion of local commercial outlets and more effective distribution of goods on the assumption that the availability of more desirable consumer goods would spur production. In fact the policy had some success: from 1962 through 1967 the quantity of export crops produced, generally by peasant smallholders, and their aggregate value rose despite decreases in their unit value on the world market.

In the commercial and industrial sectors private domestic and foreign investment was still invited. The processing and marketing of agricultural products by cooperatives was encouraged, however, partly as a matter of principle, partly because the encouragement of private domestic investment in such enterprises would have been seen by the ordinary African as an opportunity for Asians to extend their economic power.

In any case there was some success in developing import substitution and agricultural processing industries. Moreover resources were found, often through foreign aid, to develop Tanganyika's social infrastructure, particularly secondary and higher education.

In the period between the establishment of the republic and the Arusha Declaration, a number of political developments with long-term consequences occurred. The first of these was the army mutiny of January 1964. Apparently based on the discontent of the military with respect to wages and other benefits and the continuing importance of expatriate officers rather than a desire to seize power, it was put down only with the embarrassing aid of British troops. In the end the army got much of what it wanted, but it was also reorganized (see ch. 5). In this case the army was supported by the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, which led in February 1964 to the latter's reorganization into the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA).

A second important event, although its long-run effects were uncertain at the time, was the union in April 1964 of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as the United Republic of Tanzania. The process of union and its aftermath took some of the energies of government and meant the introduction of Zanzibaris into the National Assembly and the cabinet but did not significantly affect matters on the mainland because Zanzibar maintained almost complete political and economic autonomy for more than a decade after the union (see ch. 2).

Perhaps the most significant political development was the introduction of the Interim Constitution in 1965, interim because its central features applied to the mainland despite the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The most important change was the establishment of a *de jure* one-party state on the mainland; Zanzibar's party, the ASP, like the islands themselves, retained its

autonomy; and the situation was not to change until 1977 (see ch. 2).

Nyerere had been wrestling with the idea of democracy for some time and had come to the conclusion that the kind of parliamentary system bequeathed to Tanganyika by the British-made constitution at independence was not suitable for an African state. In his view the model for a democratic society in an African state was the traditional community (as he understood it) in which decisions were reached by a consensus of equals concerned for the welfare of all. The transformation of such a pattern to the level of a complex state was, however, a problem. He acknowledged the likelihood that members of a parliament might pursue their own interests and those of their supporters, but he thought that the governmental system should nevertheless be organized on the assumption that decisionmakers would look to the public welfare. He further held that those in government should be freely elected by the people who, knowing their (presumably) true interests, would choose representatives who genuinely represented those interests and would deny their votes to those who failed to do so. Because by definition multiple parties represented multiple and conflicting interests, a single party oriented to the people was more appropriate in an African setting.

In 1964 Nyerere appointed a presidential commission to look into the formal establishment of a single party. Tanganyika had in fact been a one-party state despite the provision for several parties in the independence constitution. During Kawawa's term as government leader in 1962, he had managed to eliminate in one way or another such budding rivals as there were.

Nyerere carefully framed the terms of reference of the commission. He referred first to the need to conform to what he considered the national ethic, defined as a commitment to individual liberty, social justice, democratic participation, and racial equality. He also added a set of detailed questions in which, among other things, he stressed the need to find ways to maintain "full expression of the people's will . . . and untrammelled free choice of the people as regards their President and their Representatives in the Legislature."

It should be emphasized that Nyerere appointed the commission in the context of a growing insistence by leading members of TANU that a one-party state be established and an increasing tendency toward elite rule and authoritarianism with which many leaders felt quite comfortable. Nyerere himself had agreed to the passage of the Preventive Detention Act and had defended its use on the grounds that the lack of a strong tradition of nationhood or of the means to maintain the national security meant that a few individuals "can still put our nation into jeopardy and reduce to ashes the efforts of millions." Whether or not Nyerere himself believed this argument and acted in terms of it, most TANU leaders in government were moved to act in authoritarian fashion



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
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by somewhat different considerations. Having lived under a colonial regime with many authoritarian features, and certain of their rightness in having fought that regime and of their continued right to represent the nation, these leaders found it easy to consider their critics disloyal. Moreover many higher level and middle-level TANU officials, having "fought the good fight," considered themselves entitled to their posts.

Nevertheless Nyerere felt very strongly that officeholding for financial reward was not desirable. Even more strongly he considered the people to be the final judges, and he insisted on elections and the commission's report provided for them. Candidates, however, had to be members of TANU, a requirement that gave TANU not only the right to approve the candidates initially but to decide whether they ought to remain in the National Assembly: if TANU expelled a member from the party he was also expelled from the legislature. These and other weaknesses of the assembly led in the next few years to a situation where the *de facto* governing body was the party (see ch. 2).

Associated with the emergence of Tanzania as a single-party state was the growing tendency to restrict the autonomy of institutions whose actions might run counter to policy decisions made by party and government and, perhaps more important, might serve as power bases for dissidents. More positively Nyerere and others saw the principal function of such organizations to be that of mobilizing the people in support of government and party initiatives.

The most important of these institutions were the unions and the cooperatives. After the Tanganyika Federation of Labour was transformed into the NUTA in early 1964, it was affiliated to TANU, and its secretary general (Kamaliza, already minister for labor) was appointed by Nyerere. The NUTA was required to promote TANU policy and to urge its members to join the party.

Cooperatives had been much encouraged by TANU—they had nearly doubled in number from more than 800 in 1960 to more than 1,500 in 1966. Given the role as exclusive marketing agents for export crops grown by peasant smallholders, their efficient operation was crucial to the economy. Moreover they held a substantial amount of capital in reserve, and the government wanted a control over the way in which it was invested.

Efforts to maintain the autonomy of cooperatives had little success. All were included in the Cooperative Union of Tanzania and their leadership, like that of the labor unions, made part of the National Executive Committee of TANU. Rules intended to ensure their honesty were established.

By 1966, however, there were a number of indications that the cooperatives and the NUTA were not functioning as the TANU leadership had hoped, and commissions were established to look into their operation. The commission's findings with respect to the NUTA were, in Pratt's summary, that it was "unpopular, ineffec-

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tive, out of touch with its rank and file and corrupt." A second commission investigated the cooperatives. In addition to finding extraordinary mismanagement and corruption in specific cooperatives, it found significant shortcomings throughout the cooperative movement, and it emphasized that the peasant growers were becoming increasingly dissatisfied. In short the expectations of TANU and particularly Nyerere, that NUTA and the cooperatives would both support government and TANU policies once established and would enlist the participation of the rank and file member in political discussions before final decisions were made, were not realized.

#### **The Arusha Declaration**

By mid-decade a number of problems—economic, social, and political—faced Tanzania, and they were likely to become more intense with time. Despite increases in agricultural production and in import-substitute manufacturing, the world market was such that the country was confronted with difficulties in its balance of payments. Where once there had been a shortage of primary and particularly secondary school graduates, soon there would be too many without appropriate job openings. The peasants, despite their contributions to the production of export crops had not been rewarded as well as urban workers, and there was a growing discrepancy between urban and rural incomes, exacerbated by the tendency of government to allocate more social services to the urban than to the rural areas. That discrepancy was a major factor making for the continuing migration of primary and secondary school graduates and others to towns that were not in a position to absorb them.

Beyond these there were, for Nyerere at least, other more important issues. The policies followed to encourage peasant production had had some success but only at the cost of increasing differences in rural incomes. These differences and those between rural and urban incomes were bound to lead to a class system if they had not already done so. Perhaps more troubling to Nyerere was what he saw as the increasingly self-aggrandizing and elitist perspectives of his colleagues in the TANU leadership.

That leadership had also come to accept the view that major foreign aid was essential to economic development, and that view was reflected in the actions of the National Development Corporation, which had been established to deal with private investment in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy. Much of that investment came from foreign sources, and the corporation sought to maximize it, a tendency that Nyerere decried in early 1966.

Toward the end of 1966 the government under Nyerere's guidance undertook an examination of its strategies for attaining economic development and a just society. The outcome was the Arusha Declaration of 1967, presented by Nyerere and showing his very substantial influence. In October 1967 the declaration was added in toto to the Interim Constitution.



The Arusha Declaration began by explicating the meaning of socialism: it is said to require not only absence of exploitation and the public control of the principal means of production and distribution but also a democratic government and leaders who believe fully in socialism and practice what they believe. The last element encapsulated Nyerere's approach to one of his chief concerns. TANU and government leaders had shown an increasing tendency to seek various material perquisites of office and to acquire, in part because of their comparatively high salaries, additional means of accumulating wealth. Nyerere was adamantly opposed to this, not only because he considered it wrong in itself but because it would be impossible for an economic elite to lead the people toward a socialist society. In the declaration itself a set of leadership rules limited very strictly the extent to which leaders could acquire wealth beyond their salaries and, in Nyerere's terms, exploit others (see ch. 2).

The extent to which Tanzania remained dependent on foreign aid and accepted this dependence was also dealt with. In the mid-1960s a number of events had led to severing dependency relations with Great Britain and other Western powers and a limited turn to communist states for aid, although Nyerere clearly expressed a policy of nonalignment with respect to political issues dividing those states and the West (see ch. 2). As time went on the Western powers and international agencies linked to the West, such as the World Bank Group (see Glossary), were once again relied on for aid. In Nyerere's view such reliance on outsiders was excessive and tended to be a barrier to hard work by Tanzanians on their own behalf. Hence the call in the Arusha Declaration for self-reliance (*kujitegemea*). It did not exclude foreign aid, but it reversed the previous emphasis (see ch. 2; ch. 4).

The leadership rules and the call for self-reliance were made in the context of a statement—the Arusha Declaration—insisting on socialism as the path Tanzania was hereafter to follow. The path, in Nyerere's view, was not to be precipitate. Socialism was an attitude of mind. Institutional changes might be made quickly, as indeed they were—witness the nationalizations that soon followed the declaration—but he did not expect socialism to develop overnight and, indeed by his definition, it did not (see ch. 2; ch. 3; ch. 5).

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There is an increasingly voluminous literature on various phases of the history of the mainland and Zanzibar, only a part of which has been cited in the Bibliography. The books and articles noted here include further citations on specific periods and problems.

Articles by Roland Oliver ("The East African Interior"), H. Neville Chittick ("The East Coast, Madagascar and the Indian Ocean"), Edward A. Alpers and Christopher Ehret ("Eastern Africa"), and A.C. Unomah and J.B. Webster ("East Africa: The Expansion of Commerce"), all in volumes of the *Cambridge History of Africa*, provide surveys of the history of the region from

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the beginning of the second millennium A.D. until the establishment of European colonial regimes in the late nineteenth century, placing the mainland and the islands in the context of the region as a whole. J. Desmond Clark's *The Prehistory of Africa* puts together the material available on East Africa before the Iron Age. D.W. Phillipson, a leading authority, published *The Latter Prehistory of Eastern and Southern Africa* after this chapter was completed, but it is probably the source of choice for the early and late Iron Age.

*A History of Tanzania* edited by I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu offers an introduction to Tanzanian developments from earliest times to the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The articles in *Tanzania Before 1900*, edited by Andrew Roberts, deal with the histories of a sampling of specific ethnic groups and indicate the sometimes complex processes of interaction among segments of each group and the relations between each group and others including, in some cases, coastal traders and Europeans. Some of the authors of chapters in this volume have produced more detailed accounts of the histories of specific peoples—for example, Steven Feierman's *The Shambaa Kingdom: A History* and Isaria N. Kimambo's *Political History of the Pare of Tanzania c. 1500-1900*. C.F. Holmes and R.A. Austen deal with the history of Tanzania's largest ethnic group in "The Precolonial Sukuma." R.A. Austen's "Patterns of Development in Nineteenth Century East Africa" raises questions of interpretation including that of the impact of the coastal trade on the interior. G.C.K. Gwassa's "Kinjikitile and the Ideology of Maji Maji" gives an interesting description and analysis of the religious underpinning of the major rebellion against the Germans.


Two somewhat different perspectives on political developments in Tanganyika from 1945 to independence in 1961 are provided by Cranford Pratt's *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* and Margaret Bates' "Social Engineering, Multi-racialism and the Rise of TANU: The Trust Territory of Tanganyika 1945-1961." Pratt's work, very sympathetic to Nyerere, carries the story to cover the immediate consequences of the Arusha Declaration. Analyses of social, political, and economic developments on the mainland, including some historical work, from a Marxist or other radical perspective are to be found in the papers collected in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.) *Socialism and Tanzania: Politics and Policies*. Henry Bienen's *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* approaches the period preceding the Arusha Declaration from the perspective of American social science and indicates some of the intricacies of intra-TANU relations at the national and regional levels. Perhaps the most thorough description and analysis of local politics in the interval between World War II and independence appears in G. Andrew Maguire's *Toward Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Participa-*

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tion, which deals with Sukumaland. The development of Julius Nyerere's thought from the early 1950s through the Arusha Declaration may be found in two volumes: *Freedom and Unity* and *Freedom and Socialism*.

The social, economic, and political background for developments in Zanzibar are to be found in Michael F. Lofchie's *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* and John Middleton and Jane Campbell's *Zanzibar: Its Society and its Politics*; Alison Smith's "The End of the Arab Sultanate: Zanzibar, 1945-1964" provides a helpful analysis of the intricacies of Zanzibari politics. (For further information see Bibliography.)

## Chapter 2. The Political System





Chapter X The Cultural System



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THE UNITED REPUBLIC of Tanzania was formed by the union in 1964 of Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar. The union was a strange one, for the two countries had not been closely associated in the colonial period, and their systems of government were quite dissimilar.

The dominant ideology on the mainland reflected the beliefs of one man—Julius K. Nyerere, the president of the republic and the chairman of the Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—CCM). Nyerere had been instrumental in winning Tanganyika's independence from Great Britain and by 1978 was perhaps the most respected leader in black Africa. He provided both the philosophical framework and the political impetus for Tanzania's attempt to achieve an egalitarian society based on villages that produced and owned goods communally. He expected that with such a society would come an uncorrupted government and individual dignity. The final stage, when all of this would be achieved, Nyerere referred to as *ujamaa*, or familyhood. Domestic politics from 1967 through 1977 centered on the attempt to bring about *ujamaa*.

The term *ujamaa* was heard less often by 1978, a reflection of the failure to achieve the idealistic society envisioned. Emphasis was shifted from *ujamaa* to villagization. The moving of people into villages was defined as the first step toward *ujamaa*. But the methods for bringing about villagization have at times included considerable use of force.

Nevertheless the rule of the single party on the Tanzanian mainland has been milder and more concerned with the citizens' welfare than has been the case in many other one-party states. This, like the general thrust of Tanzanian political programs, is in large part attributable to Nyerere. He himself leads a modest life, and his integrity has not been questioned; he has tried to ensure that the rest of Tanzania's leaders are equally honest and austere.

The upper echelons of Tanzanian leadership seem truly to desire a broadly based consensus for their programs. The CCM and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) before it were mass parties. Although it appeared that between 3 and 4 million were members, figures giving the exact size of CCM membership were unavailable for 1977, in part because of the ease with which past members or relatives of members could claim to be members themselves. The party was not interested in excluding people. Criticism and debate over programs were permitted and often encouraged as long as the basic concepts of socialism and egalitarianism went unchallenged.

Power and authority in Tanzania were to a considerable degree centralized. This centralization was reinforced by the practice of

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having top party leaders also hold high posts in the government. In some cases, however, local leaders could exert decisive influence in matters affecting their own jurisdiction. Their ability to do this was in part by design, in part a function of the strengths of their own personalities, and in part the result of a dearth of capable administrators from the central government.

Tanzania's most publicized concern in the late 1970s was the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Nyerere had long been a champion of African efforts to throw off colonial domination. Tanzania was the principal African benefactor of Mozambique in its fight against the Portuguese, and it remained among the major supporters of Africans in Namibia (Southwest Africa), Southern Rhodesia (called Zimbabwe by the African nationalists), and the Republic of South Africa.

If, despite the idealistic goals toward which it was working and its attempt to ensure the rights and dignity of its citizens, the mainland leadership sometimes resorted to the use of coercion, the Zanzibari leadership was even less restrained in its use of force. They were at their corrupt and bloody worst under the presidency of Abeid Karume. Frequently they used charges of sedition and subversion to justify the use of violence against ethnic minorities. After the assassination of Karume in 1972 the worst abuses of power seemed to moderate, and the new Zanzibari leader, Aboud Jumbe, even took steps that were interpreted as broadening the base of power and attempting to curb the rampant corruption among the rest of the leadership. Jumbe also proved more willing to work with Nyerere. This has meant that Zanzibar has become less distant, if not less autonomous, from the mainland.

### **Political Geography**

The Tanzanian mainland comprises by far the larger part of the country. Situated at about the midpoint on the African east coast, it is bordered by eight other countries: clockwise from the south they are Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya. The boundaries have changed little from those that emerged from nineteenth-century colonial agreements. In a number of places the international boundaries split ethnic territories, but these separations have not been the source of any friction between Tanzania and its neighbors.

The territorial waters on the Indian Ocean extend fifty nautical miles from the mainland around the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia. Most of Tanzania's international land boundaries follow natural terrain features. The exception, other than those that bisect bodies of water, is the northern border with Uganda and Kenya.

Internally Tanzania was divided into twenty-five regions. Five were on the islands of Zanzibar, three on Zanzibar itself, and two on Pemba. The remaining twenty were on the mainland (see fig. 1). Until 1974 there were only seventeen mainland regions—Dar

es Salaam had been part of Coast Region, Lindi was the northern portion of Mtwara Region, and Rukwa was divided between Tabora and Mbeya regions. Regional capitals were ordinarily located in towns with about 5,000 to 10,000 population although such capitals as Tanga and Mwanza were much larger.

The regions of mainland Tanzania were administratively subdivided into districts. These districts were geographically defined and usually named after their capitals, which sometimes had populations of fewer than 1,000. There were between two and six districts in each region, with a total of seventy-seven districts on the mainland. The size of a district was based roughly on its population. Districts were ordinarily about 15,600 square kilometers (6,000 square miles) in area, although some were as small as 2,600 square kilometers (1,000 square miles).

The national capital was officially moved from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, near the center of the country, in October 1974. The decision to move the capital was made by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of TANU in August 1973 and was announced the following October. The theory was that having the capital in the center of the country would make administration easier. It would also be closer to an area the party had taken special interest in developing.

The change of the capital had not met with a great deal of enthusiasm by late 1977. Those civil servants who had to, went to work in Dodoma, but many commuted to that city by air from Dar es Salaam, preferring its urban attractions to the sparser life in Dodoma. At the beginning of 1978 the CCM was headquartered in Dodoma, but it was unclear how much of the government had actually moved there. It appeared that most government functions remained centered in Dar es Salaam.

### **Political Developments from the Arusha Declaration, 1967 Through the Formation of the CCM, 1977**

At the beginning of 1978 it remained to be seen whether the formation of the CCM from the previous year's merger of TANU with Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) would be a true turning point in Tanzanian history. The merger indicated increasingly better relations and mutual trust between the mainland and Zanzibar, and the new Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania that followed the party merger not only stood as a symbol of the permanence of the union but made initial steps toward bringing the governmental practices of the islands more closely in line with those of the mainland. Nevertheless Zanzibar still retained considerable autonomy, both politically and economically. For this reason, and because of the autonomy Zanzibar has exercised in the past, developments in each of the two major areas of Tanzania will be considered separately.

The Arusha Declaration of 1967 undoubtedly was a turning point in Tanzanian political development and in many other areas



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(see ch. 1). After the Arusha Declaration attempts to promote rural development became central to Tanzania's development activities, shaping all other policies.

The Arusha Declaration reflected Nyerere's view that human life and activities are carried out most naturally within a community and that man exists first as a member of a community. From a philosophical viewpoint life in a village community is preferable to that lived by many Tanzanians on isolated homesteads. It is preferable practically because health, educational, and sanitary services can be more easily provided to villages. Thus the concept of the *ujamaa* village logically followed the Arusha Declaration. Socialist *ujamaa* villages were to be the end product of the currents set in motion by the declaration. People would live in *ujamaa* villages where they would produce in common, have common ownership, and benefit in common from their production. At the same time they could receive state services and be educated to this new—but Nyerere would maintain traditionally rooted—way of life.

In the late 1970s the government, responding to some of its critics, noted a distinction between *ujamaa* and villagization. *Ujamaa* was the ultimate goal, but first people had to live in villages, cooperating with each other while receiving social services and education, in preparation for the final stage. The government claimed that this distinction had always existed, but statements and documents from the late 1960s and early 1970s do not emphasize such a distinction. They appear, in fact, very optimistic, as though *ujamaa* would be the natural and rapid result of village life and that, recognizing the benefits of *ujamaa*, Tanzanians would hurry to move to villages (see ch. 3).

The effort to bring about *ujamaa* has been largely unsuccessful, and it may be this that has forced the government to stress instead its success in moving the vast majority of the population into villages. Villagization has not been accomplished without difficulty. Initially there were debates over the speed with which villagization should proceed; in one area a TANU official was assassinated in what at the time was widely regarded as a protest over the government's appropriation of private land for villages; and ultimately the government, has had to resort to force to move the populace into villages. But a constant element in Tanzanian politics has been the leadership's willingness to experiment—to scrap programs or organizations that do not seem to be meeting their expectations. The only things safe from scrapping are the ideological foundations of the system—the belief in the ultimate desirability and workability of *ujamaa*—and the practical foundations that are essential to support the ideology. These last might include the maintenance in leadership positions of people committed to *ujamaa*.

The program is not unanimously supported, and Nyerere's efforts to introduce *ujamaa* have not gone unopposed; however,



*Aerial view of Dar es Salaam harbor  
Camera Press photo*

the opposition has only rarely been violent. It is possible that, with ideological education and the increasing importance of the younger generation in the decade since the Arusha Declaration, support for *ujamaa* has increased. The enormous personal prestige of Nyerere may also help carry *ujamaa* forward, but support based on respect for Nyerere may not survive intact once Nyerere leaves the political scene.

There is little doubt that Nyerere wants a broad-based, popular consensus for *ujamaa*. It should be a program that the people of the country want, are enthusiastic about, and voluntarily support. But the entire concept is the product of one man. Since those whose interests are damaged by *ujamaa* socialism do not share Nyerere's enthusiasm, the Tanzanian leadership has been forced to impose the system, the essence of which is voluntary cooperation and participation, from the top down. In many different ways since the declaration Nyerere has tried to broaden and lower the locus of political decisionmaking. As power has been exercised at the local level it has in some instances not been directed toward things that accord with the *ujamaa* ideal. In these instances the central leadership has stepped in to restore *ujamaa* orthodoxy. At the same time, however, such actions reassert the authoritarianism of the central leadership and are destructive to the democratic participation in the political process Nyerere values.

Integrally associated in Nyerere's thinking with *ujamaa* socialism is a strong commitment to egalitarianism and an accompanying discouragement of elitism. The insistence on antielitism has created difficulties for Tanzania in the decade since the Arusha Declaration. Members of the educated elite are the only people capable of administering Tanzania. *Ujamaa's* success depends in good part on them, but some see their counterparts in Kenya growing wealthy while they are not permitted to reap financial rewards for their abilities (see Relations with Neighboring States, this ch.).

#### **The 1967 Leadership Code**

The behavior of the TANU leadership was one of the party's major concerns in the late 1960s. A code of leadership had accompanied the Arusha Declaration and was intended to ensure compliance with the spirit of the declaration from the highest levels of party and government down through civil servants and local officeholders. Such officials were forbidden to own more than the house they lived in, to own shares or directorships in a private company, to employ workers except in certain permissible cases, or to draw a salary from more than one job.

It was hoped that the code would encourage a socialist commitment among the leadership while it discouraged an elitism of wealth and the exploitation of the laboring class. There was a distinctly antiurban bias in the code, since leaders could develop rural properties so long as they did not contribute to capitalistic or "feudalistic" practices. The code prohibited only hiring urban workers for permanent, full-time employment. This meant that





*Self-help road clearing project in Dodoma  
Camera Press photo*



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temporary workers in private agriculture and industry could continue to be hired. Farmer-employers were thereby neither prevented from assuming leadership positions nor from hiring—or exploiting—migrant workers or peasants willing to work only for subsistence.

There have been other problems with the leadership code. It lacked any enforcement mechanism. Prohibition of leaders holding directorships in private enterprise did not rule out their holding useful connections at lower levels. And many attempted the subterfuge of transferring ownership of their various properties to relatives, hoping thereby to continue to draw wealth from them indirectly. A study of members of parliament (usually called MPs) by Helge Kjekshus, at one time a member of the faculty at the University of Dar es Salaam and a close observer of Tanzanian politics, concluded that among them as a group, none of the purposes of the leadership code had been achieved. Other observers, commenting more generally on the whole of Tanzanian leadership, found that the code had successfully separated leaders from urban-based enterprises.

It became apparent by the mid-1970s that the TANU leadership was not satisfied with the code. Mounting complaints of corrupt leadership forced the NEC to action in March 1973. Most complaints alleged that leaders were being bribed by businessmen or that some were silent partners in businesses that hired permanent employees. The NEC recommended that the National Assembly (Bunge, also called the parliament) be called into special session to pass a bill establishing a committee to enforce the leadership code. The NEC also instructed the Central Committee of TANU to investigate the cases of leaders who had been accused of code violations. Very few of these leaders were found guilty, but a committee was set up in May 1973 to investigate future violations. This committee's proceedings were to be confidential, and the committee itself would be directly responsible to the president. At the same time special units were set up in the offices of the prime minister and the senior commissioner of police to keep an eye on corruption. The extent to which candidates met the requirements of the leadership code came under close scrutiny during the 1974 party elections.

#### **Assertion of Party Supremacy**

Under the provisions of the Interim Constitution of 1965, supremacy was to reside in the National Assembly. The party would screen candidates for the National Assembly, but it was presumed that thereafter representatives would be responsible to their constituents. This turned out not to be the case; by 1977 the party had become the supreme organization in Tanzania and the National Assembly reduced to a rubber stamp.

As early as 1966 the people considered the party to be more important than the assembly, but Nyerere introduced electoral reforms that year that were expected to make the political system

more democratic and to increase the actual power of the National Assembly. Henceforth MPs were to be truly representative of their constituents.

These reform measures did not produce the result Nyerere had hoped for. By 1968 the president was meeting a great deal of opposition from the assembly. Backbenchers introduced measures to strip from the office of the presidency many of its prerogatives and to give these to the assembly. This and several other of the measures that were introduced in the early stages of the opposition Nyerere accepted, but the opposition to the government, its ministers, and its policies only intensified. When it became impossible to deal with the parliamentary critics within existing political institutions, the NEC, in October 1968, expelled the dissident MPs from the party, which meant that they were also expelled from the assembly. It was thus clearly established that the party could discipline its members, that it would tolerate dissent only within limits, and that the party remained dominant over the National Assembly.

The initial view of the National Assembly as a supreme, vigorous, and self-assertive institution had thus changed since Tanzania's independence and its establishment as a one-party state in 1965. After 1968 it was allowed to react to but not inaugurate policy. Kjekshus, who lived and worked in Tanzania and had an opportunity to observe conditions there at first hand, observed that the demotion of the National Assembly could be seen in such practices as submitting major policy documents to that body merely for routine enactment after they had first been thoroughly debated by the party and particularly by the NEC. The party had become the sole policymaker. Kjekshus also pointed out that expulsions from the National Assembly demonstrated that the political elite was now under absolute control of the party.

The 1971 TANU Guidelines (Mwongozo) state that the reins of power should be in the hands of the party. No more formal action was taken in this regard, but any lingering doubt about where ultimate authority resided was resolved by the much milder opposition of National Assembly members in 1973. In November of that year the MPs rejected an income tax bill, probably because most of them would have suffered personally under its provisions. Nyerere took them to task for this action, admonishing them for defeating a bill that would clearly benefit the majority of the people. The next month the bill passed with only minor amendments, again demonstrating that MPs hesitated seriously to oppose the party.

At a November 1974 TANU meeting it was recognized that the party had become dominant and the people had accepted that dominance. Consequently in January 1975 the TANU Central Committee instructed the government to initiate a constitutional amending process that would make party supremacy formal. This does not appear to have become a part of the constitution until the permanent Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania took

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effect in early 1977. Under this Constitution it was not TANU that was supreme but the new CCM.

#### **Decentralization**

The effort to move the population into villages was accompanied by an attempt, initiated in 1972, to decentralize the nation's political structure. According to the TANU argument, the more power people had to make decisions about things that directly affected them, the more they would be able to develop themselves and enjoy self-respect and dignity. Decentralization was to permit the people in villages and rural towns to make their own decisions on local issues as well as to assist integrated development and planning by the central government on matters of wider than local interest. The party organization at each level of government would play a critical role. The municipal and town councils that the people had elected to represent and govern them were abolished—although village councils remained—and their functions transferred into development channels.

It seems that Nyerere fully intended the actual decentralization of the political decisionmaking power to lower levels of government. By early 1978 it was apparent that this had not happened, and it is by no means certain that it will, because decentralization poses the dilemma of trying to maintain democratic procedures while advancing a program that requires a high degree of central control.

One of the first major steps toward decentralization came in 1973 when the NEC increased the number of regions in the country and the number of districts in Dar es Salaam. By creating more units of government at lower levels it was apparently hoped that each level would be able to concentrate its attention on fewer people and a smaller geographic area. At the TANU biennial conference the party adopted constitutional amendments that enabled district and regional executive committees to form political, economic, cultural, and defense subcommittees to deal with these subjects at the local as well as the national level.

Local authorities had for some years been losing their powers to central government encroachments. District roads and rural health centers were maintained and run from national ministries, and while schoolteachers were paid by district councils, the funds with which they were paid came from grants from the central government. It seemed, therefore, that the best means of rectifying overcentralization were by altering the governmental structure. Regional and area commissioners, who at regional and district levels were empowered to make policy decisions regarding development and economic problems, were henceforth to be assisted and advised by regional or district development directors. District development directors would replace area secretaries and district executive secretaries and would be the accounting officers for the jurisdictions to which they were assigned. They would also be in charge of all government officers in the region or district and

apparently were the real powers at both the town and district levels.

An eleven-man team would assist each development director and would include officers responsible for planning, finance, personnel, health, agriculture, natural resources, water, land development, communications, education, and industries. These positions would replace those of representatives to the central ministries who had previously dealt with such matters. Frequently the same people who had been ministerial representatives before decentralization became members of a new development team. These arrangements were expected to create a coordinated team within each region or district because all concerned were responsible to the development director. Under earlier arrangements rivalry and competition had sometimes arisen because some of a jurisdiction's officials were responsible to its residents while others were responsible to the central ministries.

The people would participate through advisory development committees. The district staff would be expected to get ideas from the people in villages and, based on these ideas, make a district development plan for presentation to the District Development Council. These councils comprised elected district councillors, the MPs of the district, the area commissioner, a district development team, and a district development secretary. The council would be chaired by the TANU district chairman who would, after evaluating the ideas submitted, decide on the district's priorities and then present them to the party district executive committee. This committee would consider the conformity of each plan with broad policies and not criticize individual programs. Then the plan would go to a regional development committee to ensure that it fit in with the regional plan. This regional development committee would forward it to the TANU regional executive committee and from there it would enter central government channels. Higher levels of government were responsible for providing policy direction and planning guidelines for lower levels. Specific agricultural and industrial programs, rural health programs, primary education, and other smaller projects would come under the authority of districts or regions as appropriate.

The people's representative bodies at the local levels of government would be abolished under decentralization, and the matters of local government—at least at the regional and district levels—would be handled through the new development channels or through the party. But the people would be consulted before plans were made and would have a chance to contribute their ideas and suggestions.

A. H. Rweyemamu, a professor of political science at the University of Dar es Salaam, has pointed out that decentralization was not, as promoted, a decentralization of decisionmaking power but was merely a decentralization of administrative powers and procedures. The people would have some input to the District Devel-



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opment Council, for example, but this body was only advisory; the real decisionmaking rested with the area commissioner and the district development director at the district level and with the regional commissioner and the regional development director at the regional level. Although civil servants in a jurisdiction were responsible to the development director rather than central ministers, the development directors themselves were government appointees, responsible to the central government. Furthermore a regional development committee was a government committee, not a representative body.

It is obvious, therefore, that plans coming from the districts were to be passed on by government appointees rather than by local representatives, and that not only were all plans to conform to guidelines set down by the central party organization, but the party also was to approve any development plans suggested. Funding was to come from the national level. Furthermore local people have been handicapped by a lack of technical expertise. Although higher salaries have attracted better educated people to local leadership positions, those with technical expertise still tend to work for the central government and are not found in all localities. This disparity of expertise has in the past intimidated local bodies into deferring to the judgment of the central government, encouraging additional dependence on central government officials.

There have been other problems. Decentralization was supposed to give the people a voice in development. In some areas, however, the people as well as members of the development committee have shown themselves less interested in development projects than in obtaining such social services as schools and health clinics, and few development projects have actually originated at the lower levels. The combination of these practical and organizational problems suggest that the central organs have in fact relinquished little of their control over decisionmaking. There was evidence, however, that the degree of local autonomy varied widely, depending on such conditions as the strength of the local leadership and the capability of individual central planners and administrators.

#### **Zanzibari Politics**

Whatever its defects in planning and putting its programs into effect, mainland Tanzania has expressed its preference for democratic methods and for making its leadership responsive to the desires and needs of the people. The situation in Zanzibar has been a good deal different.

After the 1964 revolution that ousted the sultan and brought to power the Zanzibari Revolutionary Council (ZRC), Zanzibar was ruled by a very small group of men. The undisputed strong man was Abeid Karume, the president of the ASP. Karume was not dedicated to democracy; at one point he declared that Zanzibar would have no elections for fifty years, and none took place as long

as he lived. His distrust of elections was not without reason. In elections held in 1963, the year before independence, the ASP received more votes than did its two major opponents together but got fewer parliamentary seats than its Arab opponents.

After the uprising of January 1964 Karume was declared president, and the ASP became the only political organization in Zanzibar and Pemba. Shortly thereafter Zanzibar merged with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania. According to the terms of the merger Karume, as leader of Zanzibar, became first vice president of the union government. Nyerere, as president of the republic, was permitted to intervene in Zanzibari affairs but seldom did so, even when Zanzibari policies or actions were repugnant, embarrassing, or diametrically opposed to the mainland's. At various times under Karume they were each of these things.

Zanzibar retained so much autonomy after the merger that it prompted a number of observers to question what made the merger worthwhile to the mainland. The answer appears to be that Nyerere saw in it an opportunity to advance pan-Africanism. Furthermore the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) had shown an interest in the islands and Nyerere feared that, should either become established there, it could use Zanzibar as a base from which to become involved in mainland affairs. The union forestalled this.

Because under Karume the Zanzibari leadership felt free to do whatever it wished in its relations with the mainland, Zanzibar received all the benefits of the union and bore as few of the costs as possible. The Zanzibari civil service, police, and defense forces were paid for by the union's budget, while Zanzibar remained free to dispose of its own revenues however it wished. While it had representation in the union government, it was not bound to accept its edicts except on the matters agreed on at the time of the merger. These matters included constitutional affairs, foreign relations, defense, police, nationality and immigration, foreign commerce and loans, taxes on revenue and customs, control of the currency, mineral resources, banking operations, industrial patents, higher education, communications, ports, civil aviation, and the post. In practice Zanzibar retained control over a number of these areas.

There reportedly was close consultation between the Zanzibar and mainland governments on the Arusha Declaration, but the Zanzibaris showed no inclination to adhere to the leadership standards that were promulgated at the same time. The ZRC made little attempt to hide the fact that some of its members owned as many as six houses while mainland officials were prevented from owning more than the house in which they lived. Many of the Zanzibari leaders were clearly involved in corrupt practices, a source of considerable discontent among the islanders.

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Zanzibari politics under Karume were marked by a high degree of paranoia. The Zanzibari leaders, perhaps because they themselves came to power by means of a coup after the islands had grown used to being controlled by nonindigenous ethnic groups or foreign interests, were quick to see subversion and conspiracy around them. It seems that alleged participation in subversive activities was often an excuse to attack groups that for any reason incurred the ZRC's disfavor. In 1968 people originally from the Comoro Islands ran afoul of the ZRC for no apparent reason other than that they chose to remain a community unto themselves rather than identify with the Zanzibaris or Africans. In March 1970 the Zanzibari leaders attempted to deport twenty-one Shirazi families who ostensibly had hindered development and refused to cooperate with the "people." In 1971 five Arabs and four Africans were accused of coming to the islands to overthrow the government. All received the death sentence and were subjected to public display, but reportedly only the Arabs were killed; the killings were unusually brutal. It was not coincidental that the Arabs and Comorians had been associated with the Umma (Masses) Party (which had been forced to merge with the ASP after the coup), some of whose members remained a source of opposition (see ch. 1).

In 1971 Karume made a statement that suggested that racial differences were at least as great a concern as subversion. In direct opposition to Nyerere's views, Karume said that Tanzania was for black Africans and not for others. One could still be Tanzanian if one of his parents was black, but anyone less than half-black should not be a Tanzanian.

Karume's fears of opposition were not without foundation. His harsh and often bloody policies had endeared him to few islanders. He was assassinated in April 1972. The actual assassin had a personal motive for killing Karume, but the four men who accompanied him had backgrounds that invited speculation on the reasons for the act. The force behind the assassination seems to have been Abdul Rahman Mohammed (Babu), a former Tanzanian minister and a man who was described as being the theoretician of the Umma Party. A total of eighty-one were eventually tried for treason. A number of those arrested reportedly were beaten and tortured as the authorities attempted to extract information.

Babu and twenty-two others were apprehended by the mainland government. All of those detained were ethnically Arab, Comorian, or Shirazi, the greatest number being Arab. Some were of mixed ethnic origins. Ten were army officers whom Babu had sent to Cuba in 1962 for guerrilla training, and several others had some kind of connection with Babu. Another army officer was the senior officer in the Umma Party. Six were believed to be junior naval officers. All the ethnic groups represented had been attacked in the past by Karume, as had the Umma Party.

The Zanzibaris demanded the return of the detainees for trial. A

similar situation had arisen in 1968, when Nyerere returned prisoners for trial only to have them executed. Unable to get assurances from Zanzibar's new leader that Babu and the rest would have a public trial and be permitted defense attorneys, Nyerere refused to turn them over.

The trial began on Zanzibar in May 1973, and sentences were handed down in 1974. According to the government's case, Babu was the mastermind behind a plot to introduce scientific socialism to the islands. The meaning of this charge was unclear. Of the eighty-one who stood trial, twenty-three were acquitted, fifteen received prison sentences of varying lengths, nine pleaded guilty and gave evidence for the government, and thirty-four, including fourteen of those on the mainland but tried in absentia, were found guilty. All those found guilty were sentenced to death, although there was some talk of showing mercy to the nine who helped the government. In December 1972 the ASP had passed a resolution calling for the public execution of anyone found guilty of Karume's killing. Those on the mainland were still in prison in early 1978 and were expected to remain there in preventive detention indefinitely, for Nyerere had not returned them to Zanzibar. He probably could not allow them a separate trial on the mainland either, since the Zanzibari verdict would prejudice their case.

In 1975 some of the sentences were commuted, and even some of those sentenced to death were acquitted by the High Court of Zanzibar. Twelve remained sentenced to death. They had the option of appealing their cases to the Supreme Council and then seeking clemency from the president.

Karume's assassination and its aftermath, stretching from 1972 through 1975, was by any standard the most dramatic event in Zanzibar during the decade from 1967 to 1977. It removed from power a bloody tyrant and paved the way for a Zanzibari government that in time showed itself to be less inclined to violence and more willing to cooperate with the mainland.

Aboud Jumbe inherited the leadership of Zanzibar from Karume. According to Tanzania's Interim Constitution of 1965 Jumbe also became first vice president of the republic. In his announcements immediately after the assassination Jumbe indicated that he would continue the policies of Karume, but even before the end of 1972 differences were evident. These included such measures as permitting the teaching of the Quran in schools and arranging a visit to India for 1973; the new measures signaled to the persecuted Arab and Asian minorities that their lot might improve. Jumbe also made the ASP rather than the ZRC the center of Zanzibari decisionmaking. Reportedly the party was his power base whereas the council had been Karume's. This seemingly was confirmed by Jumbe's August 1972 announcement that ministries would be shifted from the control of the ZRC to become departments of the party. As in Tanzania this shift permitted more



people to participate in the decisionmaking process; only thirty-two members had sat on the council.

Jumbe also tightened control over the party. A 1972 ASP conference prohibited people who had been members of pre-revolutionary political parties from holding leadership positions in the ASP or the government. They were also barred from full ASP membership. Resolutions were also passed prohibiting anyone who disagreed with ASP politics from working in party departments on defense, police, and security.

The number of ASP branches was to be increased. At the November 1975 ASP conference the party constitution formally incorporated the practice of having the ZRC recommend the president, the national executive committee of ASP nominate him, and the party congress confirm him. He would hold power as long as three-fourths of the NEC supported him.

Jumbe took steps to diminish the corruption among Zanzibar's political leadership. He did this primarily by stressing the importance of the leadership code that had been in effect on the mainland since the time of the Arusha Declaration. His attempt to come to grips with the problem further enhanced his stature with the mainland but there was no indication of how successful he had actually been by the end of 1977.

Jumbe devoted more attention to his role as Tanzania's first vice president than had his predecessor. Where Karume had taken little interest in affairs outside the islands, Jumbe made frequent visits to several African heads of state, representing the union government rather than Zanzibar alone. He also made efforts to become personally close to Nyerere, proving far more willing to cooperate with him on union affairs than Karume had been. Even his criticisms of mainland measures displayed more interest in the union government than had usually been displayed by Karume. Jumbe toured the countryside supporting the merger of TANU and the ASP, a proposition about which Karume had been lukewarm at best. For his part Nyerere seemed resolved to keep Zanzibar more closely in line with the policies of the union government.

Nyerere must also have been pleased by the milder nature of Jumbe's rule. Even though Jumbe maintained a strict regime, much of the persecution and violence that characterized life under Karume had disappeared. Nevertheless the leadership remained quick to find subversion and coup attempts, many ostensibly planned and supported by the deposed sultan or the leaders of parties suppressed after 1964. If Jumbe's actions have been more moderate than Karume's, he has not completely forsaken violent words: he promised that anyone trying to overthrow the government in the future would not even receive a trial as had those involved in Karume's assassination.

As early as 1973 Nyerere visited Zanzibar. He expressed particular interest in the system whereby ASP committees could

summon any government official or functionary from anywhere in the islands to explain his actions or account for his success or failure. There was some speculation that Nyerere was considering introducing a system modeled on this to Tanzania.

A sweetener for Jumbe's cooperation with Nyerere was the prospect that he would probably succeed Nyerere as president of the republic. His support of the merger of parties, his interest in union affairs, and his work in foreign affairs have increased his stature as a national leader, and Nyerere and other mainlanders undoubtedly would feel more comfortable with Jumbe becoming president than they would have with someone like Karume.

#### **Party Merger and After**

That the merger of the ASP and TANU did not occur before 1977 was due to Zanzibari resistance. Karume had given up as much power as he intended to at the time the union was formed in 1964. However, Jumbe was far more in favor of merger, and Nyerere had always hoped for it.

In 1976 Nyerere and Jumbe established a joint commission to draft a new constitution and supervise the merger of the parties. Headed by the secretary general of the ASP, the commission submitted a draft constitution that was adopted by a joint meeting of the national executive committees of TANU and the ASP in November of that year. The formal merger was arranged for early 1977. It would end the anomaly of an ostensibly united state having two basically autonomous political and administrative units. The party would provide the first nationwide political body with which all Tanzanians could identify.

On January 21, 1977, a joint ASP-TANU conference dissolved the two parties and ratified the constitution of the new party—the Revolutionary Party (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*—CCM). At the same time the conference elected Nyerere chairman of the party and Jumbe vice chairman. They officially took office on February 5. CCM members were registered by March 1977, and elections of leaders at the grass-roots level took place in April and May. Subsequent echelons of party leaders were elected throughout the summer, and later in the year the CCM's first national conference was held to elect delegates to the NEC. The NEC then met to elect a thirty-member central committee. The Central Committee was responsible for appointing the CCM administration. The head of the party administration was the national executive secretary, who was aided by one deputy for the mainland and another for Zanzibar. The party's headquarters was Dodoma.

The party merger was not without benefit to Zanzibar. Its representation on the most important committees of the party was equal to that of the mainland, despite the substantial disparity in their populations. If the party merger fulfills the expectation that it will bring about a true union of the administration and economy of the two partners, then Tanzania as a whole will benefit in many ways. For example, the foreign reserves Zanzibar earned from the clove

trade have always been retained by the islands for their own use; under a united administration they would go to the union treasury, although initially they still might be used only for Zanzibar. There would also be an integration of development strategies. A Zanzibari official pointed out that, acting autonomously, Zanzibar might build its own tobacco factory although it may actually be more efficient to expand an already existing one on the mainland.

These benefits of union were not going to come immediately. At the time that he accepted the chairmanship of the CCM, Nyerere, apparently not wishing to push things too far too fast, made it clear that party merger did not mean the complete integration of the mainland and islands. The islands would still keep their own ministries and, at least for the time being, their earnings from the clove trade. The major importance of the merger in intranational affairs, therefore, seems to be that it provided the first step toward an eventual integration and demonstrated that the leaders had finally accepted that the union ought to be permanent.

The merger was expected to have important ramifications in Zanzibar. According to the CCM constitution, the party's legitimacy came from the masses, who had a right to elect their leadership at all levels. Thus party merger would eventually open the door to elections in Zanzibar.

On April 26, 1977, the thirteenth anniversary of the union, Nyerere officially put into effect Tanzania's new Constitution (see *Government and Politics*, this ch.). For the first time, residents of Zanzibar were permitted to elect representatives to the Tanzanian National Assembly. Although a step toward democracy, this still did not give Zanzibaris a real say in their government, because in practice the assembly was relatively unimportant in decision-making. It was overshadowed by the party, whose leadership Zanzibaris did not elect.

### **Government and Politics**

The creation of the CCM brought with it new constitutions for both the party and the government. These brought the mainland and the islands closer together politically by bringing their party and state organizations closer in line with each other.

Nevertheless the new constitutions did not represent radical breaks with the past, at least insofar as the mainland was concerned, for it appeared that they generally reflected existing practices. But there were also a number of things that the constitutions did not reflect—how much influence the central government had in local decisionmaking, for example, or the effectiveness of the bureaucracy; these matters seemed to be affected by local factors, and no general model was applicable to all of Tanzania.

### **Party Organization**

The CCM is the only political party in Tanzania, and it exercises supreme authority over all state organs. According to its constitution, which became effective in January 1977, its principal doc-

trines are that all human beings are equal, that every individual has a right to dignity and respect, and that only with socialism and self-reliance can a society of free and equal citizens be built.

Constitutionally the party's National Conference, its largest entity, was its supreme organ and the ultimate authority on all party matters. The NEC was in principle subordinate to and a subunit of the National Conference. It in turn was superior to and included the Central Committee. But in actual operation the National Conference was far too unwieldy a body and met too infrequently to be realistically considered the seat of the country's highest political power. This is confirmed by the fact that although it had the power to amend or revoke actions initiated by others, it had no responsibility of its own for the initiation of policy. Further, although the NEC was accepted by many as the center of decisionmaking, its agenda was set by the smaller Central Committee. The picture that emerges, therefore, is of a much more centralized party than its formal organization suggests. Overall direction, including decisions on policy, seemed to come from the top officials, who sat not only in the Central Committee but also in the NEC and the National Conference. Each of these bodies was chaired by the national chairman, whose influence appeared decisive (see Organization of the CCM, Appendix B).

The suggestion of a high degree of centralization is confirmed by the relation between the national and subnational party units. Just as the chairman at the national level closely controls the party's national organs, so can the chairmen at lower levels—region, district, and branch—control the party organs there. These chairmen are appointed from the center: the national chairman appointed party secretaries down to the district level, and the Central Committee appointed them at the branch level.

The party had a broad membership. Any citizen eighteen years or older could become a member if he accepted the beliefs, aims, and objectives of the CCM. According to the best figures available in 1977, the CCM had between 3 and 4 million members. To join the party a potential member had to complete a special application form and obtain references from three members. The application form was first considered by the Branch Executive Committee, which forwarded its recommendations to the District Working Committee. This committee had the power to accept or reject any application, but a rejected applicant could reapply.

Before admission to the party, a potential member had to take a course of instruction in the party creed, aims, objectives, and party policy in general. Once accepted each new member paid an entrance fee of TSh5 (for value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary) and then a monthly membership fee of TSh1, which were both low enough for many Tanzanians to afford. Members could be dismissed for failing to pay these fees for an extended period of time, for failing to attend three consecutive meetings



without good reason, or for violating the provisions of the CCM constitution, but those dismissed could reapply.

A party leader was defined as being any member entrusted with any responsibility within the party, whether by election or appointment. He was prohibited from using his official position for personal gain, from engaging in corrupt practices, from receiving illegal income or bribery, or from being associated with smuggling. If he engaged in any such activities, he could be dismissed from his position and barred from other leadership positions for a period of five years. Before becoming a leader, a person had to be a party member for at least five years.

All party property was vested in the Board of Trustees, consisting of eight members elected by the NEC. Their chairman would be appointed from among these men by the chairman. Each trustee's term of office was five years.

In 1977 there were five designated mass organizations, the Youth Organization, the Union of Tanzanian Women, the Union of Tanzanian Workers, the Union of Cooperative Societies, and the Tanzanian Parents Association. A designated organization was one whose members united to achieve certain objectives. Each mass organization was authorized to make rules governing its own operation, but these rules had to be approved by the NEC. The organizations' chief executive officers at the national, regional, and district levels were appointed either by the party chairman or by the Central Committee. They had the status of party secretaries. The organizations' activities were conducted under the guidance and supervision of the Central Committee.

#### **Governmental Organization**

From 1965 to 1977 Tanzania operated under an interim constitution. This constitution incorporated the principles of the equality and dignity of all men, their right of protection of life, liberty and property, their freedom of conscience, expression, and association, their right to participate in government, their duty to uphold the laws of the state, to respect the rights and dignities of others, and to prevent the exploitation of one man by another, and their duty to conduct the affairs of the state so that its resources would be preserved, developed, and enjoyed for the benefit of its citizens. The government was to be the instrument of a democratic society, responsible to a freely elected representative parliament, and free and impartial courts of law. Suffrage was granted to all citizens of at least twenty-one years of age.

The constitution omitted mention of certain individual rights that were described by Nyerere as part of the "national ethic." These were the right to fair trial by an impartial judiciary and the right to be free from discrimination on grounds of race, tribe, color, sex, creed, or religion. Freedom of religious belief and equality of opportunity for all men and women, irrespective of race, religion, or status were provided for in the TANU consti-

tution. These guarantees were absent from the CCM constitution of 1977.

According to the Interim Constitution of 1965 an electoral conference of the party—TANU at that time—nominated the presidential candidate for the presidential election. The cabinet ministers and their assistants, the junior ministers, were appointed by the president from among members of the National Assembly. All of these had to be endorsed by the party. The NEC approved the nomination of candidates for those members who represented institutions or organizations. The electoral commission defined the constituencies of the National Assembly, and the NEC approved or selected nominees for constituency elections.

Executive power was vested in the president, who was the head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. He had to be at least thirty years of age, a party member, and win election in what was essentially a plebiscite to confirm the party's choice of him as national leader.

The cabinet was composed of the president and the ministers and was to be the principal instrument of policy for the united republic. The president controlled the structure and membership of the cabinet through his powers of appointment. Most ministers had the responsibility for a particular ministry, but others could be ministers of state, with or without specific portfolio. In 1977 there were twenty-four ministerial posts, including that of prime minister.

The legislature consisted of the National Assembly and the president, who could not be a member of the assembly. A candidate for a constituency had to be nominated by at least twenty-five registered voters in his district. The nomination was then reviewed by the NEC, which accepted two nominees as candidates. The NEC paid attention to local preferences in the choice of candidates but was not required to accept them, reserving the final say for itself.

The Speaker of the National Assembly was elected by its members. He could not hold any other office and could be removed from office by a vote of two-thirds of the assembly.

Unless dissolved, tenure in the National Assembly lasted five years, except in times of national emergency or war, when it could be extended by periods of twelve months at a time for five additional years. A quorum of at least one-fourth had to be maintained at all times for the assembly to meet. A presiding officer could vote only to break a tie vote.

The interim constitution provided for six standing committees of the National Assembly: finance and economic, political affairs, public accounts, social services, standing orders, and general purpose. The legislative power of the assembly was exercised through bills passed by it and assented to by the president. The president could veto a bill and return it to the assembly with his reasons for the veto. In this case the bill could not be again presented to him for six months unless it received a two-thirds majority vote in the

assembly. The president then had to confirm the bill within twenty-one days. In practice the veto was sparingly if ever used.

The Constitution was intended to emphasize the permanence of the union between the mainland and Zanzibar. According to the Constitution the CCM was the only political party in Tanzania, with final authority on all matters. Any political activity had to be carried out under the party's auspices. The party also replaced the cabinet as the main organ for advising the president on matters of policy, although the cabinet was still the main source of advice on the implementation of policy. The new Constitution made the NEC rather than the chief justice the body that determines when the president is incapable of carrying out his duties.

The governmental leadership's structure was made parallel to that of the party. Henceforth there would be only one vice president where previously there had been two. When the president came from the mainland the vice president had to come from Zanzibar, and vice versa. There was some speculation that this measure had an immediate political motive. The second vice president of the country had been Rashidi Kawawa, who had long been a close associate of Nyerere. Not only had Kawawa been associated with an unsuccessful economic policy, but it was believed that Nyerere hoped that the union could be further solidified if there was no question that Jumbe would become the next president of the republic. This could be made plainer by having Jumbe the only vice president and demoting Kawawa to a ministerial position.

According to the new Constitution the National Assembly was to have 106 members elected from constituencies, one member from each of the twenty-five regions, fifteen members representing the mass organizations, twenty-five regional commissioners, and up to thirty presidential nominees from the islands or mainland. The constitution also established the Constitutional Court to arbitrate constitutional disputes. It was to be made up of an equal number of judges from the islands and the mainland.

The Constitution gave the citizens of Zanzibar the right to vote for the first time since the revolution of 1964. Previously there had been forty-five Zanzibari representatives in the National Assembly, all either members of the ZRC or its appointees. The Constitution authorized the Zanzibaris to elect ten constituency representatives. In addition, according to Tanzanian practice, these representatives would elect another representative from nominees chosen locally for each of the islands' five regions. The ZRC would itself elect thirty-two representatives, so its members were not relinquishing their control of the majority of Zanzibari representatives.

January 1977 also saw a change in the administrative structure of Zanzibar, bringing its government closer in structure to that of the mainland. Each Zanzibari district would have its own revolutionary committee responsible for regional administration. Further-

more most of the responsibilities of the ZRC were delegated to ministries.

In 1977 local government on the mainland had been shifted from such representative bodies as municipal and town councils into channels set up for development during the move to decentralization begun in 1972 (see Decentralization, this ch.). The Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, 1975, made provisions for the registration of settled villages by a registrar, who in practice was a regional development director. Registration conferred legal status on a village and gave it considerable power. Registration indicated that an entire village was a cooperative entity, and for this reason other cooperative societies could not operate within it.

Every registered village was required to have a village assembly consisting of everyone of age eighteen or older and a village council elected by the assembly. This council would not exceed twenty-five residents, all of whom had to be at least twenty-one years of age. The council was authorized to do anything necessary or expedient for the economic and social development of the village. Each council had to establish five committees, each with a maximum of five members. These were to be for finance and planning; production and marketing; education, culture, and social welfare; work and transport; and security and defense. Each council was also to maintain three funds: a fund for capital expenditure, a reserve fund for any contingency expenses, and a disposable fund for any purpose outside the scope of the other two funds. These funds could be financed in any of a number of ways: gifts, borrowing, fees, and the like. These funds had to be audited at least annually by someone authorized by the registrar.

Villages were not automatically *ujamaa* villages. *Ujamaa* villages had to be designated as such, and a prerequisite to this was that a substantial portion of the village's economic activities be carried out on a communal basis. The Village Council owned all of the village's capital goods, being required to obtain any owned by individual residents. Individuals could own livestock and small farm tools. Every village resident was also required to contribute his work or some other service to communal activities. During the years from 1965 to 1977 there were several modifications to this system, but its essentials appear to have remained the same.

In 1978 there were reports that, where the district development offices had assumed governmental responsibilities from the defunct town and municipal councils, social services and local government in general had deteriorated. It was rumored that, as a result, Nyerere had determined to return to the previous system.

In 1961 a government commission argued that the civil service that had served Tanganyika as a colony had to be changed into an indigenous service responsive to the new government and able to be rapidly Africanized. The civil service structure it recommended was modeled on the British civil service. It had four



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generalist classes: subclerical, clerical, executive and administrative, and corresponding classes in the professional, technical, and industrial branches of the service. The middle grades were to be used for recruitment to the higher ones. This system had changed very little by the mid-1970s.

The most important acts regulating civil service affairs were the Civil Service Act, 1962 and the Civil Service Regulations, 1970. There were also schemes of service for different cadres. The Civil Service Act established the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which was responsible for the appointment, promotion, and discipline for all but those for whom the president was responsible.

By 1974 the commission's power had apparently become a mere formality, and the real power rested with the National High-Level Manpower Allocation Committee (NHLMAC). The NHLMAC had ultimate authority over how civil service manpower resources were to be allocated. The personnel constituting this body gave it more prestige than the CSC, and it also performed the all-important task of allocating graduating students to specific openings. Government-sponsored students were only permitted to accept employment with the organization to which they were assigned, increasing the real power of the NHLMAC.

The major influence on Tanzania's judicial system was the legal system the British had introduced during the colonial period. On the mainland the British elements remained greatly in evidence in 1977, but the autonomy of Zanzibar's courts had permitted substantial changes there (see ch. 5).

### **Political Dynamics**

Although the formal organizations of the party and government suggest the people have the major role in decisionmaking—and while they may in fact exert considerable influence on local issues—Tanzania is a state that relies heavily on central direction. A factor strengthening this central authority is the Tanzanian people's genuine affection for Nyerere. The image they have is reflected in the references to him as *mwali*mu (teacher). Much of his support comes from admiration for what he has achieved, the people's awareness of his status as one of the leaders of the movement for African independence, his real concern for the citizenry, and his personal moderation, dedication, and honesty. Support for Nyerere the man is so great that it is difficult to determine with any accuracy how many of the Tanzanian people, on the one hand, and the elite, on the other, share his values and goals; consequently it is difficult to judge the extent to which they would continue to support the most rigorous aspects of Nyerere's programs should he leave the political scene.

### **Central Authority and Decisionmaking**

Inherent in the dominance of the party and the critical role of the president is a centralization of power. At all levels the party dominated the government. The government process did not, as

originally intended, provide a two-way avenue whereby the central government could implement programs at the local level and the masses could get their information and ideas back to the central government through their representatives. In 1978 the role of the elected representative was seen not as one of making demands for his constituents but of generating popular support among them for party policies. The representative was both to explain national policies to his constituents and to help implement them at the local level.

The central party organs had final authority over such things as development plans in the sense that they could approve or disapprove them. At each stage of the planning process the local party organizations were involved, and the bodies formally responsible for planning were chaired by party personnel. At each administrative level it was the party executive committee that reviewed not only development plans but the implementation of all party policies. The people that filled these local party leadership posts, all the way down to district level, had to be approved by the CCM Central Committee.

Central planning has increased in the decade since the Arusha Declaration, and this has been useful because it allows for the broadest comparison of alternatives. But the existence of centralizing tendencies does not tell the entire story. Although party and governmental structures have been set up so that central organs can intervene at the local level, Nyerere has attempted to establish a balance among Tanzania's institutions. When he has found his basic ideological system challenged, or when he has felt that something important could wait no longer, Nyerere has tipped the balance toward authoritarianism. But at the same time he has always welcomed discussion and debate about how best to achieve the goals he has set for the country, as long as the debate is carried out within established channels and does not extend to debate on the goals themselves.

Nyerere has also long advocated local decisionmaking for local concerns, albeit within the framework of national policy. Local decisionmaking would help relieve the central government from the pressure of having to fulfill unrealistic expectations, as well as permitting those most familiar with a problem to try to solve it. In at least some parts of Tanzania local leaders have not been hampered in making decisions on such purely local issues as granting licenses. It has not been unusual for the central authority to be more closely involved in the process when it is contributing funds to a project or when a project is part of a development scheme.

The central authority can become involved in local matters simply by having to give final approval to any project or by appointing the local officials who will directly supervise it. But it can also become involved by default. Government officials frequently did all the planning for a locality because the people involved lacked technical expertise or at least thought they were less qual-

ified than the central government to do the planning. They also were more concerned with obtaining additional or improved services than with planning for development. In many cases they lacked a clear concept of what planning actually meant.

The lack of an adequate number of properly trained administrative personnel provides the most important limitation on the central party's ability to exert its authority in the countryside. K.E. Svendsen, a Dane who served as personal assistant to Nyerere, has written that "central capacity to make an eventual formal and extreme centralisation effective has not existed." It requires a considerable number of capable administrators not only to plan a central policy but to direct it as well—far more than would be needed merely to monitor local initiatives. These were not present in Tanzania in early 1978.

The lack of trained administrators manifested itself at the level where orders were given as well as where they were executed. It was not uncommon for the central authorities to require a certain action without having given sufficient consideration either to the actual method by which the action could be carried out or its possible ramifications. An example of the former is the forced villagization of great numbers of people in 1974, when much of the population suffered outrageous abuses at the hands of overzealous local administrators. It should have been incumbent on the central authorities to provide directions to prevent such abuses. An example of the second was the 1972 invitation to the citizenry to move to the area around Dodoma. Caught completely unaware by the size of the migration that followed, the authorities were not prepared to provide even the most necessary services (see ch. 3).

Any discussion of the degree of centralization versus decentralization of decisionmaking must take into account the wide variety presented by different areas of Tanzania. A strong party or government official who is also a capable administrator and an adherent to the national policy could be the vehicle through which a great deal of central authority is exerted in his jurisdiction, just as a strong administrator less understanding of or sympathetic toward the central authority's efforts could initiate programs not conforming at all to national policies. Strong local leaders in an area could have a great deal of influence on what went on about them regardless of the centralized party organization. Most of the scholars who have studied this problem have viewed it only from the perspective of one—or at best a very few—localities. That their reports so frequently conflict with one another about who controls the decisionmaking power on local issues suggests that the answer to this problem depends largely on where one looks.

The central government has clearly and repeatedly rejected the use of compulsion to bring about in the countryside policies established in the capital. Nyerere himself has never believed that rural socialism could be brought about through force. Many local leaders or administrators, however, have been less concerned

than Nyerere about the employment of coercion. Clyde R. Ingle, a political scientist who studied the use of compulsion in Tanzania, noted that by 1970 the growing frustration of local administrators over their inability to bring about desired change by persuasion alone had created a gap between the anticompulsion policy articulated at the center and that implemented in the field.

In the instances when compulsion has been used—the effort to resettle much of the population in cooperative villages was one of the few examples—it has been attributed to the excesses of local officials rather than to central government policy. However, Cranford Pratt, a student of Tanzanian political history, has stated that Nyerere has considered coercive measures justified to bring about change that he felt basic to progress. The resettlement of the peasantry in villages is, perhaps, the most important instance. Pratt believed that such actions were motivated by an impatient nationalism—Nyerere's conviction that his country must develop. Nevertheless the use of coercive measures by the central government has not been a notable feature of Tanzanian life.

#### **Leadership and Elitism**

According to the Arusha Declaration, a leader was anyone in the party executive committee, MPs, cabinet ministers, senior officials of organizations affiliated with the party or of parastatal organizations, anyone elected under any clause of the party constitution, councillors, and middle- and upper cadre civil servants. Most of the strategic positions in Tanzania were encompassed by this definition. It was toward these people that the leadership code was directed (see The 1967 Leadership Code, this ch.). It was hoped that leaders would be drawn from worker and peasant ranks, and measures were taken to eliminate wealth as a basis for consideration.

Inevitably education became a primary criterion for leadership. The problem was that increased education also fostered elitism, separating as it did the educated few from the mass of the citizens. Emphasis on education also meant that the Tanzanian leadership tended to be drawn more and more from people who had held teaching or clerical positions in the past and not from the group of farmers and workers as originally hoped. By the beginning of the 1970s it had become increasingly difficult to reach a position of high leadership starting out as a farmer or worker. There was evidence by the mid-1970s that despite the government's efforts, patterns of recruitment for leadership positions had not significantly changed since colonial times. Thus by the early 1970s an educated elite held occupations that conferred status and, despite certain limits, had incomes substantially higher than the national average. This elite was found not only in Dar es Salaam but also at regional and district levels. The government's problem has been that it needed these people to provide capable administration for its ambitious programs. This not only confirmed their elite status



but, given the limited number of opportunities outside the public sector, entrenched many in the expanding bureaucracy.

In the late 1970s education remained the only significant distinction between the leadership class and the mass of the population, apart from the occupational and status differences that were themselves based on educational differences. Most of the major ethnic groups were represented in the leadership. Geographically each of Tanzania's regions was represented. Discrepancies were not significant nor were they viewed as significant; a slight overrepresentation of certain regions was attributed to their greater degree of modernization. Representation of religious groups among the leadership was not a source of discontent. Christians were overrepresented relative to Muslims by the end of the 1960s and, among Christians, Protestants were overrepresented. That few or no leaders adhered to indigenous religions may in part reflect the role of missions in education in the colonial period and to some extent thereafter (see ch. 1; ch. 3).

The party and governmental leaders were also able to absorb many members of the traditional ruling families or clans. Although no titles were used after 1963, these ruling families remained important socially in a number of places. Not enough research had been done to be certain, but it appeared that governmental policy was to offer the capable members of such families opportunities to serve in elected or appointed posts under the party. Many persons in this category were also fairly well educated, so that bringing them into the national leadership was not incompatible with general practice.

The closest that the CCM has come to obtaining the kind of leadership it has wanted is at the cell level. Several studies showed that these leaders often were not a local elite and frequently were neither young (in some areas the average age was between forty and fifty), nor better educated (many were illiterate or semiliterate), nor more modern than the other members of their cells. At the most immediate level of leadership, therefore, it appeared that people tended to elect as leaders others who were much like themselves.

Although an elite based on education and occupational status mans many of Tanzania's leadership positions, including a disproportionately large number of the higher positions, some of these people are not properly trained for their jobs, some appear to have jobs of minimal importance, and some imagine that they would be far better off financially if they were permitted the same entrepreneurial opportunities as their counterparts in Kenya. To keep the elite's discontent in proportion, it should be noted that they have offered no concerted resistance to Nyerere's policies and that, especially since the introduction of the leadership code, leaders as a group have been commended by outside observers for their puritanism and self-sacrifice.

### **Expansion of the Bureaucracy**

Even in 1961 it was believed that the civil service was too large for Tanzania's needs, and a government commission recommended reducing the number of senior posts. But in the ensuing ten years the civil service more than doubled, having an average annual growth of more than 11 percent. The cumulative rate of growth for the entire service was 118 percent over those years, and senior and middle-grade posts grew even more rapidly. There were several reasons for this growth. Public demand and the government's ideology gave rise to an increase in government services. Furthermore there was an increase in the money available to the government during the 1960s, resulting in even greater increases in public expenditure and consequently in the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has also grown because the government felt it had a responsibility to provide work for its educated population, especially because government policies limited employment possibilities in the private sector.

Accompanying the increase in size of the civil service was its increasing Africanization. During the colonial period the service had been dominated by whites and Asians. Beginning in 1960 Nyerere introduced an attempt to give Africans priority for civil service positions. By the early 1970s more than half of the civil service posts were held by Africans, and 94 percent of higher and middle-level government jobs were held by Tanzanians by 1974. Africanization could only be achieved, however, by lowering educational requirements. Appointments tended to be made according to the relative results of candidates taking a competitive examination. To try to make up for the deficiencies permitted by lowering the educational requirement, the government offered a nondegree program in public administration at the University of Dar es Salaam. In the early 1970s it was reported that civil servants who had finished that course were better qualified for their posts than those who had entered the civil service by examination, but they were not as highly qualified as university graduates. Furthermore the training offered in the public administration course was geared primarily for the lower grades; practically no training existed for the senior grades.

Some observers discerned an improvement by the mid-1970s. It was even argued that some of the best minds in the country were in the civil service. As a result the government permitted the participation of civil servants in politics and eventually allowed them to run for office provided they resigned their civil service posts after being nominated. Although many who ran for office came from the civil service proportionately few civil servants chose to run for office, since there was no guarantee that they would be elected. In addition their civil service salaries, although low by East African standards, were in many instances higher than the parliamentary salaries they could expect.

Even if the quality of the civil service had improved as much as some believed, serious problems remained. While it might seem that the expansion of the civil service would have provided enough administrators to allow a greater centralization of authority, evidence suggested that the overall competence of the civil servants remained low. Too frequently even those who were among "the best minds in the country" were educated in ways that lacked the slightest relevance to conditions in Tanzania, and they were therefore unable to provide the quality of administration needed.

Beset by declining production of some of the country's major cash crops and declining exports, the overmanned civil service proved an attractive target for government cutbacks. In July 1975 Nyerere announced that he intended to reduce the civil service by 20 percent. Government employees at all levels would be affected, with older ones being encouraged to retire and younger ones, who had proved lazy or unproductive or otherwise unnecessary, simply cut. It was estimated that as many as 28,000 might be released. It was unclear what other jobs these people could find.

#### **Elections**

Since the Arusha Declaration national elections were held in 1970 and 1975. The November 1970 elections were the second held since Tanzania became a one-party state. In March of that year the Electoral Commission had increased the number of constituencies from 103 to 120 and the voting age for parliamentary elections was lowered to eighteen. Candidates were chosen at the district level by party conferences. Two candidates ran in each constituency. The NEC, which had the right of final approval of candidates, did not appear to interfere greatly with the local choices.

In the elections three ministers were defeated, a much lower number than had been turned out in the 1965 elections. A considerable number of new MPs were elected because some incumbents did not stand for reelection, others failed to qualify as candidates, and still others were defeated. Nyerere himself was overwhelmingly reelected as president, although one of the ministers defeated was a close Nyerere aide.

Most of the candidates were employed by the government or the party at the time of their election. In such positions they had a secure income that was several times greater than that of the average Tanzanian. The economic gap between the National Assembly members and most of the people meant that it was not to be expected that the interests of the MPs would always coincide with those of the masses—thus the parliamentary attempt to defeat the 1973 income tax bill (see Assertion of Party Supremacy, this ch.).

The 1975 elections were held in October. With the party acknowledged as supreme, Nyerere had to persuade the electorate that the National Assembly was not irrelevant. As he explained it the government was the party's instrument for enforcing the law.

The party made some changes that affected the elections. At a March 1975 meeting of TANU it was decided that the parliamentary constituency would be the same as the TANU district, with only one MP therefore elected from each district. This change enabled the MP to be part of a team, the other members of which would be the district chairman and the district secretary, all of whom would be concerned with the same geographic area. Previously the MP's link with the other two had been weak where his constituency either overlapped districts or comprised only a portion of a district. The meeting also determined that one additional MP would be elected from each region, not by the people of the region but by those elected to the National Assembly, meeting as a constituent assembly. Candidates were to be nominated by each region's development committee and reviewed by the Central Committee and the NEC.

Registration for the elections was carried out during July and August 1975, with candidates being nominated on August 11. Nearly 1,000 nominees sought to run in ninety-two constituencies while nearly 200 stood for the twenty regional seats, fifteen national seats, and nine seats for the East African Legislative Assembly, a supranational body comprising representatives from Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. These numbers were cut by the NEC review of candidates for suitability and conformity with party leadership standards. The almost 1,000 candidates were reduced to 184 and the nearly 200 reduced to 114. For most categories of seats the number of candidates was almost or exactly twice the number of openings, but the ratio of candidates to vacancies for the regional seats was more than three to one. Furthermore the NEC endorsed four unopposed constituency candidates, three of whom were ministers.

Increased party control of who was permitted to be a candidate, combined with increased concern over ensuring that representatives conform to TANU ideals, produced candidates that, as a group, may have been more highly educated than in the past. There were still a disproportionately high number of candidates who were either civil servants or employees of parastatals. Nyerere took a personal interest in this matter, as might have been expected. He was concerned that the people not elect candidates merely because they had held other offices and impressed on the people that they should take care to elect true socialists rather than those who were mere bureaucrats or convincing speakers. Too often, he felt, speech-giving or report-writing were more highly valued than was actual work toward raising the masses' standard of living.

The philosophy of the election was stated by the Election Manifesto issued in September from the same NEC meeting that reviewed the candidates. Elections did not imply a choice between different positions, for the only fundamental goals were those of socialism and self-reliance advanced by TANU and the ASP. The



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elections would merely permit the people to choose who was most suitable to achieve those goals. This statement was followed by an enumeration of more specific party plans for the five-year life of the new National Assembly.

The number of registered voters was 10 percent higher than it had been in 1970, and almost 82 percent of those registered voted. Nearly 92 percent of those voting reelected Nyerere president. Two ministers lost their seats, and twelve were reelected. Of the 184 candidates who stood for constituency seats there were eighty-six former MPs, only half of whom were reelected. Only eleven women stood for election, of whom three were elected; Nyerere and parliament used their control of national and regional seats to increase the total number of women in the government to seventeen.

#### **Public Information**

At the time of the Arusha Declaration, mass communications media directly affected in an important way only the small number of educated persons and the small percentage of the population living in urban areas. Most of the population was more directly affected by word-of-mouth communication. At that time public information was also largely free from government control and interference, although press and radio freedom were limited insofar as editors recognized that criticism of the government's major policies might not be tolerated. Government supervision of public information media was exercised by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, which also operated its own radio network for the dissemination of information. This network was used to publicize government programs and policies for various health, agricultural, and general education campaigns.

By the late 1960s, however, the government's attitudes were changing, although this change often was slight. In 1966 Nyerere expressed the view that freedom of expression had to be limited in the interests of more important goals. Freedom of speech could be perverted to promote attitudes and actions that would be detrimental to *ujamaa* socialism.

The British had fostered journalism in the colony by encouraging the growth, through funding, of many local newspapers. After independence British funds were cut off; any support of local papers would come from the Information Services budget. This too was soon cut off, and the number of newspapers declined dramatically. By 1968 district newspapers had vanished, and the number of those produced by religious missions and private companies had shrunk, but the government was printing more. Most of the publications originated in Dar es Salaam.

A similar shift developed in broadcasting, where it was believed that the radio—the most important means of communication to most of the country—should be used to advance government policies. The 1960s were a time of experimentation to find how the radio could best be used. For a while in the mid-1960s more and



*Celebration of the twentieth anniversary of TANU  
Camera Press photo*

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more news centered on Tanzanian leaders, especially Nyerere, but when the people refused to listen to this the radio began to broadcast more stories about ordinary people. The mainland government, unlike that of Zanzibar, maintained that its people were not ready for the luxury of television; television was therefore not introduced, and the government's effort instead went into further developing radio.

Where his grand plan for Tanzania is concerned, Nyerere has frequently followed a policy that has been described as containment of dissent by Graham Mytton, a British journalist. One of the measures that helped contain dissent was the Newspaper Ordinance (Amendment) Bill of 1968. This empowered the president to force a newspaper to cease publication when he decided that cessation of publication was in the public interest. This bill was not passed until the government had already—without having the legal authority to do so—shut down and seized copies of a newspaper that was run by a brother of a political opponent.

That incident, sparked by someone with access to communications media using the media to attack the most fundamental policies of the government and party, apparently convinced the government that the central authority had to be able to control the content of all public information. The party already published the *Nationalist*, an English-language daily, and *Uhuru*, a Swahili daily. In addition the National Union of Tanganyika Workers, the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives each produced its own newspaper. But the *Nationalist* did not meet the same quality of journalism as the privately published *Standard*, which attracted a wider audience among the professional and middle-management groups. In February 1970 the government nationalized the *Standard*, renaming it the *Daily News* and the *Sunday News*.

In October 1976 Prime Minister Kawawa inaugurated Shihata, the Tanzanian news agency. Its announced aim was to educate the masses on world and domestic events. Kawawa urged the agency's journalists to report the people's development activities. The agency was to work under party directives.

By the late 1970s the government and party had succeeded in gaining control over the major public information channels of the mainland. But it appears that it has never intended to shut off all criticism. As always, the Tanzanian leadership's major concern was to prevent any attack on the basic concepts of egalitarianism and rural socialism. In addition the Tanzanians were very sensitive about reporting defense or police force matters. Controlled media could prevent both of these things.

Finally in the eyes of the Tanzanian leadership, press freedom actually worked to the advantage of the group who owned the newspapers and not necessarily to the advantage of the majority of workers and peasants. Only by controlling the press, or having the

capability of doing so, could the government ensure that minority interests would not be advanced at the expense of the people.

The newspapers were the most important sources of comment and criticism (radio was primarily used to dispense official information), and some have in fact severely criticized the government. They did so, for example, in 1976 when the police forcefully rounded up the unemployed remaining in Dar es Salaam in the wake of Nyerere's civil service cutbacks. Newspapers have also done investigative reporting, and they provide a forum for discussion of the advantages of various policy alternatives. There was no apparent interference or pressure from the government on matters of this kind.

Observers have pointed out that censorship and control by the government were not as important constraints on the media as the expense and general unavailability of newspapers and the high rate of illiteracy in the country. Even though most Tanzanians in 1977 had access to a radio, the broadcast medium had insufficient funds to really make it an effective organ of public information, and the poor communications network within the country hampered news collection and distribution.

### **Foreign Relations**

There are two enduring features that dominate Tanzania's foreign relations, and both reflect the influence of President Nyerere. The first is the country's effort to avoid alliances binding it to any of the major world blocs. The second is its continuing support for majority rule in white-dominated southern Africa.

With Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere is very much the senior statesman of the front-line countries of Tanzania, Angola, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique. These support black nationalist forces challenging the governments of Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, and South Africa's control of Namibia (Southwest Africa). In the mid- and late-1970s, in addition to their interest in furthering majority rule in Zimbabwe, they were giving strong backing to the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in its struggle for the independence of Namibia.

Two other characteristics of Tanzania's foreign policy are its support of pan-Africanism and its tendency to take rigid stands on moral grounds. These too reflect the influence of Nyerere. The first was a factor in the union with Zanzibar. Tanzania has also shown an eager interest in other schemes to promote African unity, including the ill-fated East African Community (EAC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the front-line countries and, at the end of 1977, the attempt to merge the ruling political parties of Tanzania and Zambia.

Almost all aspects of Tanzania's foreign policy demonstrate its efforts to avoid either political or moral compromise. One manifestation of this is its insistence on nonalignment, even when this



has been economically detrimental. But Tanzania has also broken relations with Great Britain over what it saw as the latter's failure to act forcefully against Southern Rhodesia's continued sale of arms to South Africa. Tanzania also risked offending the PRC, its closest communist friend, by supporting in the Angolan conflict a faction opposing the one supported by the PRC. In some instances such actions have cost Tanzania a considerable amount in foreign aid. Tanzania also seriously damaged its relations with Nigeria by supporting the Biafran secessionists during that nation's civil war in the late 1960s through 1970, even though Nigerian troops had helped Nyerere maintain stability after the army mutiny in 1964 (see ch. 5). The two countries were reconciled after the collapse of Biafra, but similar stands, whatever their risk, recur regularly in Tanzanian policy.

Of more immediate importance are Tanzania's deteriorating relations with its neighbors. It appeared in 1977 that the EAC (Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda) had finally broken up amidst mutual rancor. Tanzania was the most important African nation to have stated unequivocally that it opposed the regime of Idi Amin in Uganda, and it has a long-standing if not intense border dispute with Malawi.

#### **The Policy of Nonalignment**

During the 1960s Tanzania's priority in foreign affairs seemed to be to leave no question of its independence (see ch. 1). In addition to remaining politically nonaligned among major world blocs, Tanzania also tried to maintain friendly relations with such states as the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Arab nations, and Israel.

Despite its hopes to become self-reliant, as a poor nation Tanzania was forced to depend on outside sources for economic aid, especially if Nyerere's increasingly ambitious social programs were going to be successful. From the mid-1960s the PRC became a major patron. By 1967 its loans were second in importance only to Great Britain's, and by 1971 they had become more important. About one-third of all PRC aid to Africa was going to Tanzania by the beginning of the 1970s. The PRC often made these loans at no interest. The PRC also sent workers and advisers, contributing as many as 15,000 engineers and technicians to work on the TAZARA (see Glossary) line (see ch. 4). In 1974, when Nyerere made an official visit, the PRC agreed to lend Tanzania more than £30 million by 1979 to develop coal and iron resources. Tanzania became quite dependent on aid from the PRC in the 1960s but was careful to avoid making firm political alliances in return. Although by 1978 Tanzania remained heavily dependent on PRC military aid, once the TAZARA railroad was completed, financial and technical aid from Scandinavian countries and from various international organizations would assume major importance (see ch. 4).



*International trade fair visitors await remarks by  
President Nyerere  
Camera Press photo*

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Tanzania continued to interact with a wide variety of countries and organizations at the political level in an attempt to increase its diplomatic maneuverability. Some of these included the World Bank (see Glossary), the United Nations (UN), Canada, and Japan. By 1974 they had bettered their relations with Great Britain, and they were among the first to recognize the current regimes in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic.

#### **Tanzania's Role in the Southern African Liberation Movement**

Support for the establishment of majority rule in Southern Africa is probably the dominating element in Tanzania's foreign policy. Since independence in 1961 Nyerere has tried to draw attention to the injustice and oppression existing in southern Africa, beginning with a break in relations with Portugal over its policies in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. It was the main supporter of Mozambique's efforts to win independence from Portugal, providing the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—FRELIMO) with arms and permitting them to establish bases and conduct training in Tanzania, as well as to organize political and educational facilities there.

In addition to breaking relations with Portugal in 1961, Tanzania also boycotted all trade with South Africa over its policy of apartheid. In 1965 Tanzania broke off relations with Great Britain—a move that cost it an important loan—because it was felt that Great Britain was not earnestly negotiating with the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia to ensure majority rule before independence. The next year Nyerere committed Tanzania to support the southern African liberation movements.

Just as consistently as he has opposed the minority regimes in southern Africa, Nyerere has favored a peaceful, negotiated solution to the conflict there. In early 1975 he suggested that a transition to majority rule could be achieved if Southern Rhodesia were willing to return to its previous status as a British colony. Failing this, he promised that the war against Southern Rhodesia would intensify.

Since then Nyerere has remained in the forefront of the negotiations affecting southern Africa. He has several times expressed the view that the African nationalists are not an ally of either side in East-West hostilities. Their issue was freedom and opposition to racism. Since Africans did not produce their own arms they were forced to obtain them from whomever they could, and acceptance of arms from communist countries did not mean that their struggle was for these nations' advantage or to introduce communism into Africa. If the West supported the white regimes on the basis of their anticommunism they would only make the black nationalists more dependent on those who supplied them. Nyerere did not necessarily want Western support for the liberation of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It would be enough for them not to support white minority regimes.

Southern Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique, where some of the Zimbabwean guerrillas were based, in late 1976 drew from Nyerere the statement that Tanzanian troops would be used if the independence of any of the front-line countries was threatened. There was evidence that Tanzanian troops had already been moved to Mozambique for purposes of defense and training, but there had been no claim that they were engaged in operations against the Southern Rhodesians (see ch. 5). Shortly after Nyerere made this statement the front-line presidents agreed on a joint defense strategy against any possible aggression by the white minority regimes. Henceforth an attack on any of the front-line countries would be regarded as an attack on all of them.

Tanzanian efforts to unify the black Zimbabwean nationalist factions met with some success in January 1977, when the two leading factions joined to form the Patriotic Front. Chairing a meeting of the front-line countries in Luanda, Nyerere announced the front-line presidents' unqualified support for the front.

By the end of 1977 the front-line countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Zimbabwean nationalists, and even the governments of Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa had accepted in principle the eventual establishment of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, although the mechanics of how this would be brought about remained in dispute. Even the otherwise warm relationship between Nyerere and Kaunda had cooled somewhat over this issue. Kaunda, arguing that elections immediately after a war would cause bloodshed in Southern Rhodesia, favored the establishment of a government of national unity, including the Patriotic Front, in an independent Zimbabwe. Nyerere felt that having supported full and free elections as a precondition of Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) independence from the beginning, Tanzania should continue to support such elections. In his view the danger of lawlessness during the period of transition to full independence could be dealt with by a strong UN force.

#### **Relations with Neighboring States**

Of the eight states Tanzania borders, it has had difficult relations with four. These are Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Malawi.

The EAC was set up in 1967 to strengthen the financial ties among Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. In the intervening years, however, the politics and economies of the three nations followed separate paths, with Tanzania adopting its own brand of socialism, Kenya prospering from an essentially capitalist economy, and Uganda afflicted with political and economic chaos. These divergencies were at the heart of the disagreements within the EAC.

More specifically, however, there have been a number of incidents in recent years that have contributed to the worsening of Kenyan-Tanzanian relations; and difficulties at the end of 1977 seemed to be the product of an accumulation of minor annoyances. For example, the Kenyans continued to send heavily loaded trucks



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over Tanzania's hard-surfaced roads despite Tanzania's requests to lighten the load to prevent the roads' breaking up. This led to Tanzania's closing its border and intervention by the World Bank in 1974.

Through 1977 the disagreements increased to the point where it appeared, by the end of that year, that the EAC was doomed. The final series of problems began with the February 1977 collapse of East African Airways because of enormous debt, most of which was owed to Kenya. The collapse left Tanzania without an airline, and the Tanzanians vented their anger by closing their borders and impounding a considerable number of Kenyan-registered vehicles and aircraft. They justified their action by accusing Kenya of unilaterally breaking up the airline, of seizing jointly owned steamships on Lake Victoria, and of nationalizing the East African Harbours Corporation (EAHC). The purpose of the border closure was to damage Kenya's tourist trade, which uses Tanzanian game parks. Although the Tanzanians later released Kenyan hostages they refused, even under British pressure, to release the impounded vehicles and made travel between Tanzania and Kenya very difficult unless it was done in a Tanzanian vehicle or was part of a traveler's longer international route.

Other EAC organizations—the External Telecommunications Company and the EAHC—were in imminent danger of collapse because members of the EAC refused to forward the funds necessary to maintain them to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where the organizations were headquartered. Tanzania froze the assets of the EAHC in response to which Kenyans ordered Tanzanian workers out of the country to make room for returning Kenyan workers thrown out of Tanzania.

Tanzania completely closed the border to all traffic in April, and after that many of the EAC organizations operated separately. None of the three members made the necessary payments to the EAC's general fund by July 1, at which time the EAC collapsed for all practical purposes. In December talks were under way to permit the border to be reopened, but no success had been achieved. There seemed little chance that the EAC would be revived since the three countries involved had reached an agreement on how to divide EAC assets.

Despite its experiences in the EAC Tanzania welcomed proposals for establishing a larger economic community, which would be able to overcome some of the problems that plagued the three partners in the EAC. Such a group could include all countries from the Sudan in the north to Mozambique in the south, but there were no further developments at the end of 1977.

Tanzania's relations with Uganda were even less cordial than its relations with Kenya. The two countries got along well while Milton Obote was president of Uganda. Obote was a personal friend of Nyerere, and by itself his overthrow in 1971 probably had some negative effect on Tanzania's attitude. But more important

was the very nature of the Amin regime, in which brutality and atrocities have become standard fare. Nyerere was one of the first heads of state in black Africa to condemn Amin, a condemnation that stood in marked contrast to the silence maintained by the OAU. Nyerere took that organization to task in 1975 for being unwilling to regard Amin's crimes as being as deserving of censure as those of the minority regimes of southern Africa. At the beginning of 1978 Nyerere remained one of the few black African leaders to have taken such a strong stand against Amin.

Hostility between the two countries arose shortly after Amin's 1971 coup. Obote sought refuge in Dar es Salaam whence he hoped to organize his return to power. For a short while there was a possibility that Tanzania would be used as a military base for training and operations against Uganda, but Nyerere refused to permit this. Tanzania did, however, increase its military budget and establish a People's Militia (see Ch. 5).

Amin's erratic behavior kept the countries in East Africa from relaxing their guard. In response to increased tension in 1972 Tanzania moved troops to its border with Uganda, and two former Ugandan colonels led an invasion of Obote's supporters into Uganda in mid-September. The invasion failed, and Somalia arranged a cease-fire. When Uganda broke the cease-fire Nyerere was under heavy pressure to retaliate by sending previously unengaged Tanzanian troops against Amin. Nyerere resisted this pressure, however, and preserved the cease-fire.

By the beginning of 1978 there was little to suggest that Nyerere's opinion of Amin had changed although Vice President Jumbe felt that closer relations with Uganda would be in Tanzania's interest. Amin has alternately professed his friendship for Tanzania and made pointed references to military action against it. His expression of either sentiment seems backed by no rational motivation. Through 1976 and 1977, however, Tanzania's deteriorating relations with Kenya have overshadowed its disagreements with Uganda.

Tanzania's difficult relations with Burundi were based on the moral issue of atrocities committed inside Burundi. Tanzania first became aware of the extensive killing and persecution of the Hutu carried out by the Michael Micombero regime in 1972. The following year Burundi troops killed Hutu refugees who had fled to Tanzania. Even though Burundi apologized, this attack proved not to be the last, and Tanzania was forced to move troops to its border. The Tanzanian government apparently also surreptitiously encouraged a strike by dockworkers in Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika. This boycott hurt Burundi because the vast majority of its trade passed through Kigoma. Under this pressure President Micombero admitted his country's responsibility for the attacks and offered to pay compensation.

After the payment of more than TSh3 million in 1974, the cessation of attacks into Tanzania, and the deposition of

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Micombero, relations between Tanzania and Burundi improved. Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda exchanged official visits in 1976, and in 1977 Tanzania welcomed the establishment by the three countries of the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin (OMDKRB). The three presidents signed the agreement setting up the organization in a ceremony on the Tanzanian-Rwanda border in August 1977. The organization's governing three-man commission will supervise the management of all multinational projects to develop and manage water and mineral resources, communications, wildlife and fisheries, agriculture and forestry, tourism, land reclamation, environmental protection, and disease control.

Nyerere was obviously enthusiastic about the organization in 1977, appointing a senior career diplomat as his personal advisor on OMDKRB affairs. In addition to promoting better relations with Burundi and Rwanda, it is an outlet for his pan-African hopes, especially since the collapse of the EAC. Furthermore it holds out hope of even greater international participation, for the Kagera contributes about one-third of the water in Lake Victoria. Because it therefore affects the source of the Nile, the development on the Kagera would be of interest to Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

From time to time disagreements have surfaced between Tanzania and Malawi. There is a standing dispute between the two countries over their border on Lake Nyasa. Most of the difficulties occurred in the late 1960s. Neither before nor immediately after independence did the government in Dar es Salaam suggest that its border extended onto the lake. In the early 1960s a chief in Tanganyika's Legislative Council pressed to shift the boundary to the middle of the lake on the grounds that there were more than 500,000 people living on the shore who depended on the lake's waters for drinking, cooking, and food. At the time his suggestion was put aside in the interests of pan-African unity.

Tanzania did not press a claim to the mid-line of the lake until 1967. It has been suggested by some that the reason for making the claim at this time was fear that Malawi would permit Portuguese troops to use parts of the lake in pursuing FRELIMO troops based in Tanzania. In 1968 Tanzania let the issue rest, perhaps because Nyerere recognized the imprudence of his accusation of Malawi. At any rate Tanzania lacked both the troops and the desire to fortify the lake border against incursions from Malawi. Tanzanians continued to use the lake as necessary without special regard for the fact that the Tanzanian border remains at its eastern shore.

Relations with Malawi have also been strained because Tanzania and Malawi's other neighbors among the front-line states felt that President H. Kamuzu Banda had been closer to the South African and Southern Rhodesian regimes than he had to be, even to safeguard Malawi's national interests. In 1974, its position threatened by the Portuguese collapse in Mozambique, Malawi proved receptive to Tanzanian and Zambian overtures. Economic agree-

ments provided an opening for improved relations and border trade between those countries. In 1975 Banda again made muted reference to the border dispute with Tanzania. Further attempts to settle the question ended without success in November 1977. In general Tanzania's relations with Malawi have remained cool. They are overshadowed by other Tanzanian concerns, but there remains a fundamental source of conflict between the two over the liberation struggle, for which Malawi's support has been lukewarm at best.

Tanzania's relations with Zaire became close in response to the threat posed to each by the Amin regime. By 1973 they had improved to the point that President Mobutu Sese Seko began having frequent informal meetings with Nyerere and Kaunda of Zambia. This friendship deteriorated steadily after 1975, however, in the wake of the Angolan crisis in which Mobutu opposed groups supported by Nyerere.

Tanzania's warmest relations in the late 1970s were with Zambia and Mozambique. It has had a long-standing working relationship with Zambia, a consequence in part of Nyerere's personal friendship with Kaunda. They are in the front-line group and together form the core of the Mulungushi Club, a group of heads of state that meet informally three times a year to deal with common problems. The two are partners in the TAZARA line, which runs from Lusaka, the Zambian capital, through Mbeya to Dar es Salaam, and the TanZam Highway, which also goes to Dar es Salaam. Together these routes provide Zambia's most important outlet to the sea. Furthermore in July 1977 the CCM, only six months after the merger of TANU and the ASP, proposed a merger with Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). Up to that time each party president had attended the other party's annual congress.

There were signs of tension between Tanzania and Zambia in late 1977 and early 1978. These were in part the result of differences over the way in which Zimbabwean independence and the transition to majority rule should be carried out and in part over economic matters. These last included the imposition by Tanzania in January 1978 of a tax on Zambian merchandise passing through the port of Dar es Salaam, and by the Tanzanian announcement that, effective July 1978, storage charges for goods in the port of Dar es Salaam would be increased by 60 percent. Zambia had claimed that these measures would have a drastic effect on its economy. Whether the proposed storage charges would in fact be implemented was not clear as of the end of January 1978. Given the long friendship between the two countries, there was some likelihood that the charges would be mitigated.

The friendship between Tanzania and Mozambique is also rooted in the liberation struggle. As early as 1975, only months after Mozambique's independence, Nyerere and Mozambique's Samora Machel signed agreements that bound the countries closer



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together economically and diplomatically than Tanzania was bound to the EAC. The agreements also established the permanent Commission of Cooperation, comprising ministers of each country who are to prepare comprehensive agreements for cooperation in the fields of economics, finance, trade, agriculture, industry, information, and culture.

In late 1977 Mozambique took measures to restrict Tanzanians in their attempts to cross the Mozambican border without first going through immigration procedures. Mozambican authorities had recently caught several Tanzanians who were illegally trading, fishing, and growing tobacco inside Mozambique. This did not appear to damage the relations between the two countries, and it is likely that the increased concern of all front-line countries with developments in southern Africa and their recognition of the need for cooperation made the Tanzanian-Mozambican friendship more solid.

#### **Relations with the West**

Tanzania's relations with the United States have been described as politely formal. In the years between the Arusha Declaration and the end of the 1960s they were friendly but not exuberantly so.

Tanzania objected to the United States' involvement in the war in Vietnam. This reflected in large measure Nyerere's opposition to what he defined as great power economic imperialism, aimed at control of the economic, educational, and social aspects of life in third world states. As the Vietnam war was approaching its end the United States' presence in the Indian Ocean increased, drawing two public condemnations from Nyerere by 1974. Nyerere has declared that he will permit no foreign bases in Tanzania and expressed his desire that the Indian Ocean be a zone of peace in great power competition.

Relations between Tanzania and the United States reached their nadir in 1975. In May of that year Tanzania refused to take part in negotiations to secure the release of three Americans kidnapped from Tanzanian territory by rebels from Zaire. Then, over United States objections, Tanzania helped bring before the UN a discussion of the colonial status of Puerto Rico. For a while it appeared that United States aid to Tanzania would be severely reduced. During the same period Tanzania attacked United States imperialism, suggesting that that country, far from being a friend of Africa, wanted more violence there.

The two countries got along better in the years after 1975. United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Tanzania in 1976 and had a cordial meeting with Nyerere. Nyerere paid a return visit to the United States in 1977. Beginning in 1977 it appeared that the United States and Tanzania were working closely together for negotiations directed to the attainment of majority rule in Zimbabwe. Tanzanian leaders appeared to be convinced of United States commitment to that goal. The United

States, in turn, seems to have felt that the characteristic open-mindedness and moderation of Tanzania's leaders enhanced the chances for success of its efforts.

Tanzania's relations with its former colonial power, Great Britain, became stormy shortly after Tanzania's independence. As has so often been the case, it appears that disagreements were brought on by Nyerere's uncompromising stance on matters he considered morally important. The first break came in 1965 over Tanzanian opposition to British policy on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia. The result was an interruption in foreign aid, which, with an interruption at the same time in aid from West Germany, restricted Tanzania's attempts to implement the First Five-Year Plan (1964-69) and forced it to seek aid from the PRC, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Matters grew even worse after Tanzania's nationalization of British firms in 1967.

Great Britain's pledge in mid-1968 that Southern Rhodesia would not receive independence until provision had been made for majority rule improved the situation. Tanzania continued to voice opposition to arms sales to South Africa, and it even appeared that it might leave the Commonwealth over the issue in 1971. By 1972 relations had again grown so bad over this and over Tanzania's nationalization without compensation of nearly £2 million of British-owned property after April 1971, that Great Britain vetoed a World Bank loan for tea development. Although the veto was subsequently lifted Great Britain continued to respond to its disagreements with Tanzania by seeking to have financial aid to the country withdrawn. By the end of 1973, however, relations between the two had improved, and in 1974 the British resumed financial aid.

Tanzania's strongest links in Western Europe have been with the Scandinavian countries. Canada has also been generous to the point of writing off Tanzanian debt when it became evident that it could not be repaid.

Relations with France became cool over France's atomic tests in the Pacific Ocean and its sale of arms to South Africa and Uganda. As a result of the October 1973 War Tanzania broke off its relations with Israel, voicing disapproval of that nation's aggression against the Arab countries. But it has also been critical of the policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a result of their pricing policies, which have more than quadrupled what Tanzania must pay for its much needed oil.

#### **Relations with Communist Countries**

Tanzania has refused to align with either of the two major communist powers but has long been close to the PRC. From time to time its relations with the Soviet Union have been even more coldly formal than they have been with the United States. In 1977 there was evidence that the Soviets were trying to improve their image in Africa, possibly to undercut PRC strength, by visibly supporting the front-line countries and the liberation struggle.

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The success of the PRC in remaining friendly with Tanzania can be attributed to their generosity with financial aid and technical support, their willingness to supply arms, and their low-keyed approach in providing all these things. They have offered money and help on Tanzania's terms and with no strings attached. Furthermore the PRC seems willing to provide this aid with no attempt to wield undue influence over Tanzania: they kept up an impressive amount of aid, including technical assistance in developing Tanzania's coal mining potential, even while Tanzania supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA), which the Soviets also supported. The MPLA defeated the PRC-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA), but this difference weakened neither Tanzania's friendship for the PRC nor the PRC's support of Tanzania.

During the 1960s the Soviet Union was not very successful in gaining Tanzanian friendship. Tanzania made it clear in 1968 that communist countries should not expect to interfere in its affairs simply because its relations with the West were strained, and the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia drew an extremely strong protest from Tanzania.

Soviet-Tanzanian relations remained cool but proper through the mid-1970s. The Soviets' feelings about Tanzania have no doubt been influenced by Tanzania's closeness with the PRC. The two nations were driven somewhat further apart by 1975 because of Soviet military support of Uganda. The Soviets tried to persuade Tanzania that Uganda would only be permitted to use Soviet arms for defense against foreign attack by its neighbors, but the Tanzanians remained unconvinced. It should be noted, however, that quite independently Tanzania supported the same rebel group as the Soviet Union in Angola.

In March 1977 Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny began a major tour of Africa in Tanzania. At this time Nyerere thanked Podgorny for Soviet support of Tanzania and of the liberation movement. Podgorny denied any Soviet intention of establishing bases in southern Africa and expressed his hope of seeing the Indian Ocean become a zone of peace. In April Tanzania signed two agreements with the Soviets covering the offer of Soviet scholarships, medical consultants, and cultural exchanges. The effect of this visit was difficult to judge by the end of 1977, in part because shortly after the trip Podgorny lost his post and power, but a significantly closer relationship between Tanzania and the Soviet Union was not readily apparent. Tanzania has gotten along better with some of the Soviet Union's East European neighbors, particularly Yugoslavia and Romania, although in general its relations with Eastern Europe also tend to be formal.

Tanzania has also proclaimed its friendship for Cuba, notably after Cuban troops played an active role in the conflict in Angola.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro visited Tanzania in March 1977 in the days immediately preceding Podgorny's visit. During this visit Castro said that it was the responsibility of Africans to liberate their fellow blacks in southern Africa. This statement carried the implication that Cuba would not contribute troops to that struggle. Cuban aid helps support an agricultural school, and they have sent to Tanzania a number of doctors and construction people.

#### **Foreign Relations of Zanzibar**

After Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika in 1964, in principle, Dar es Salaam was to have authority to conduct the union's foreign affairs. Whatever the official authority of the union over Zanzibar's foreign relations, Zanzibar has at various times pursued its own independent foreign policies. This has caused both embarrassment and concern on Nyerere's part. For example, in 1964 Zanzibar became the first noncommunist state to recognize East Germany, causing serious difficulties since West Germany had offered Nyerere a loan of TSh160 million but refused on the basis of an official policy, known as the Hallstein Doctrine, to lend money to any country that recognized East Germany.

In 1971 President Karume demonstrated that he would not hesitate to employ an independent foreign policy in matters close to home. At the beginning of 1971, probably in response to deteriorating relations with the mainland, Karume offered his services to Kenya in bringing about a rapprochement with the Sudan and then offered the Kenyans a gift of TSh1.5 million to aid drought victims. In March 1971 he went even further, offering Kenya the use of the Tanzanian forces stationed in Zanzibar should they be needed in the wake of the Amin coup in Uganda. Karume also spoke of establishing a bureau to combat illegal clove commerce. Finally, when in May 1971 nineteen people condemned to death for subversion stated that they had received aid from the Kenyan government, Karume took extreme care to let the Kenyans know that he did not believe such statements. He did all of these things on his own authority, without noticeable concern for what the mainland might think.

Independent Zanzibari actions in foreign affairs had not seriously threatened the union, however. Zanzibari policy was not a major source of division because Zanzibar's concerns, especially under Karume, were primarily domestic. Seldom did the Zanzibaris have any real interest outside their islands, and statements made on diplomatic subjects were often made for their effects on domestic politics. This same concern for domestic affairs meant also that Zanzibar exerted only a minor influence on foreign affairs conducted in Dar es Salaam. It cared little about what happened on the continent and became involved in foreign affairs only insofar as some Zanzibaris held high positions in the government and constituted half the members of the NEC. Zanzibari influence may have played some part in bettering the union's relations with the



PRC and, at least in the early years of the union, in increasing hostility toward the West.

After the revolution of 1964 Zanzibar's closest relationships with other states were with such communist countries as the PRC and East Germany, provoking completely unjustified Western claims that the islands were "the new Cuba of Africa." These countries provided Zanzibar with financial aid, technical assistance, and advice. Of the two the PRC was the more generous, offering in 1964 an enormous loan of TSh100 million without interest; there followed no pressure for repayment that was, at any rate, not due until 1989. East Germany also loaned Zanzibar TSh20 million the same year, but disappointment with the rate of interest and with the quality of advisory personnel and material accompanying the loan led Karume to require that the technical personnel leave the islands. Zanzibar then refused to repay the loan. The East Germans' departure left about 400 PRC personnel as the only notable foreign advisory group on the islands.

Just as Zanzibari relations with East Germany had grown cooler by the end of the 1960s, so had relations with the Soviet Union. Immediately after the 1964 revolution relations with the Soviets were cordial, the Soviets supplying a great number of technicians and much military equipment. By 1969 the technicians were being replaced with PRC instructors, and Kassim Hanga, vice president of Zanzibar and the main supporter of the Soviet Union, had been removed from the ZRC and executed for treason.

The Soviets had reason to feel especially disappointed at this turn of events. Earlier, when the clove market, which was the basis of the Zanzibari economy, was depressed, the Soviets signed a long-term agreement on terms highly advantageous to Zanzibar. At the end of the 1960s clove prices soared rapidly, far beyond the price agreed on in the arrangement with the Soviets. Ignoring the favor the Soviets had done them, the ZRC proceeded to introduce the Cloves' Special Duty Decree, which raised the price of the cloves sold to the Soviets to equal the world price.

Zanzibari relations have been much closer with the PRC who on one side tended to vie in Zanzibar's favor with the East Germans and the Soviets. This rivalry was reflected in two youth movements (one influenced by the PRC, the other by the East Germans) and propaganda and information distributed by the respective consulates. In general, however, Zanzibar has tried to prevent the two communist sides from introducing their disputes to the islands and insisted on maintaining friendly relations with both.

After initially hostile relations with Western powers, the situation at the end of the 1960s was one of quiet friendliness. The years immediately after the revolution saw the expulsion of United States consuls. By the early 1970s problems between the two had been patched, and the United States was financing a technical college. Although Great Britain did not reopen a consulate on

Zanzibar after resuming relations with Tanzania, trade has fostered better relations, and many children of Zanzibari leaders attend school in Great Britain. By 1972 the British high commissioner in Dar es Salaam was one of the most welcome visitors to Zanzibar and was able to capitalize on this by selling the Zanzibaris a television system to the considerable profit of the British electronic industry. The moderate relations with the Western powers have generally benefited financiers and businessmen.

Jumbe, who became the ASP president after the assassination in April 1972 of Karume, took a much more active interest in international affairs than had his predecessor. In his capacity as vice president of the republic he traveled to various countries in Africa, including Uganda, where he attempted to reduce the hostility between the two nations stemming from Nyerere's opposition to the Amin regime and the use of Tanzania as a base from which followers of deposed Ugandan president Obote invaded Uganda in 1972.

At the same time that Vice President Jumbe appeared to be taking a greater interest in foreign affairs, the government of the republic seemed in fact to have a greater control over Tanzanian foreign policy. It is impossible to determine to what extent the conflicts in Zanzibari and mainland policies might have been affected by the personality of Karume, but with his removal the conflicts have been far less prominent and the islands have been far less prone to pursue their own initiatives. This is probably a reflection of the basic concern of the Zanzibaris with their own domestic affairs along with a more pronounced spirit of cooperation in making the union a success, particularly on Jumbe's part.


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At the time of writing there had been little in-depth evaluation of the workings of the Tanzanian political system since the party merger and promulgation of the new Constitution in early 1977 and no full-length studies of Tanzanian politics in the 1970s. Because many of the fundamental characteristics of Tanzanian politics had not radically changed from those of the 1960s, it remains worthwhile to examine William Tordoff's *Government and Politics in Tanzania* and Henry Bienen's *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development*. Especially important for establishing the political trends from the period after World War II to the year after the Arusha Declaration is Cranford Pratt's *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy*. Helge Kjekshus has written several articles in scholarly journals examining aspects of the political system, particularly the National Assembly and the electoral process. Joel Samoff's *Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power* is perhaps the best of many studies that examine the functioning of local government in a specific area, but its attempts to generalize its findings to the entire country are excessive.

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Furthermore its information, like that in Clyde R. Ingle's very good *From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development* deals with conditions that changed after the introduction of decentralization. (For further information see Bibliography.)

### Chapter 3. Physical and Social Setting





*Composite of architectural elements from a Zanzibar doorway*

WHEN JULIUS K. NYERERE came to power in 1961 as president of what was then Tanganyika and leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), its ruling party, his notion of the future went far beyond independence and economic development. Indeed his definition of development entailed a complete metamorphosis of human relations, not just an increase in output and a better standard of living. He sums up his economic, social, and political vision in the Swahili word *ujamaa*, which he explained for the first time in April 1962 at the TANU Study Conference on African Socialism held at Kivukoni College. The closest English term for *ujamaa* is *familyhood*, a nebulous concept conveying notions of sharing, cooperation, and egalitarianism. It is not so much socialism—in most current meanings of that term, although it has been widely equated with it—as it is solidarity, a belief that a person's interests are bound up with those of his fellow men.

Nyerere claims that *ujamaa* is a natural outgrowth of African traditional society. "We, in Africa," he said, "have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our past—in the traditional society which produced us. Modern African Socialism can draw from its traditional heritage and the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family."

Nyerere argues, however, that traditional society was eroded by foreign notions of selfishness and individualism, and he acknowledges that it had its shortcomings, such as outdated ways of allocating and inheriting land, and that it suffered from a parochial outlook. In his ideal society the range of loyalties and obligations stretches beyond the family and beyond the ethnic group.

Nyerere spelled out his ideas in detail in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which has become the blueprint for Tanzania's social and economic transformation. A scattered, primarily agricultural people were to be resettled in *ujamaa* villages, where modern amenities would be available and where men would work, not for their personal gain but for the common good. They would do this voluntarily and spontaneously and not because it was imposed from above.

Ten years later one part of Nyerere's vision had been realized. Virtually the entire rural population was living in villages. It was admitted, however, that most were not *ujamaa* villages and that the ideal society of cooperation and sharing had not been created, and economic gains had been disappointing (see ch. 4). Even officially it was not expected that *ujamaa* would be realized within the living generation's lifetime.

Contrary to expectations the move from traditional homesteads into *ujamaa* villages did not prove to be easy and natural. Different emotions and rewards were connected with each form of

living. Perhaps more important, the cooperation and sharing that did exist in the traditional system was by its very nature limited to the kin-group or local community and could not easily be extended beyond them into wholly new situations. Observers, Tanzanians included, have reported bewilderment and mistrust in a number of cases. In the mid-1970s relatively few communities were engaged in the kind of cooperative behavior required by the ideals of *ujamaa*, a situation recognized by Nyerere.

Yet a resettlement on a scale involving millions of people had undoubtedly affected the social system. However, it is difficult to assess the depth and direction of these changes because of the conflicting maze of claims and self-chastisement in official pronouncements and because of the absence of systematic study by detached observers.

Indications are that authority has shifted from traditional elders to younger, better educated party leaders and civil servants. New laws regulating marriage and divorce and new educational policies are altering the status of women. Distribution of land is no longer the domain of lineage elders but of the Village Development Committees (VDCs). The economic, social, and political activities in which an individual can participate have proliferated. Continuous mobilization by the party, participation in national elections, holidays, and—not least—the influence of a charismatic and trusted leader are lifting the individual out of his isolated world, in which family, kin-group, and local community often defined his perimeters, into the larger society. From all available indications most individuals had not become communal minded members of *ujamaa* villages, but they were, by the late 1970s, at least aware that they were citizens of Tanzania.

### **Population**

The country where this experiment in social transformation is being tried is one of the poorest on the African continent. About 94 percent of the people live directly off the land, devoting the major part of their working hours to producing for their own subsistence. They raise their own food, construct their own housing, manufacture their basic utensils, provide their own fuel, and haul their own water, sometimes for great distances. They earn the cash they need for small purchases and for fees and taxes by selling some crops or animals or from the wage labor of one or more family members.

In mid-1977 the total population (including the roughly 100,000 on Zanzibar and Pemba) was estimated to be about 16 million. This figure was derived from the 1967 census—the latest one available in 1977—and an estimated growth rate of 2.7 percent. In August 1967 the total population had been 12,313,469, including 354,815 on Zanzibar and Pemba. This population was unevenly distributed, and there was a good deal of variation in regional populations

and in population densities (see *Density Patterns*, this ch; see table 1, Appendix A).

An analysis of the 1967 census also indicated a fertility rate (expressed as the total number of live children born to women who had completed their child-bearing years) of forty-seven per 1,000. This average hides variations depending on socioeconomic status, the education and health of the mother, ethnic affiliation, and social practices.

A high birthrate means a young population, which in turn puts a large dependence burden on the working population. According to the 1967 census 43 percent of the Africans were under fifteen (see table 2, Appendix A). The corresponding figure for Asians was 36 percent.

Mortality rates averaged about twenty-two per 1,000 in 1967. This figure, too, hides variations between urban and rural areas, differences in access to medical facilities, and in economic development. It also is influenced by a very high infant mortality rate. At the time of the 1967 census 160 to 165 infants out of 1,000 died within their first year. This high rate in turn contributed to an average life expectancy of only forty to forty-three years at birth, somewhat higher on Zanzibar. According to preliminary statistics, however, it seems that within the 1967-77 decade infant mortality declined to 152 per 1,000, and the average life expectancy rose to about forty-seven years.

### **Geography**

Tanzania, lying between one and twelve degrees south of the equator, stretches 1,180 kilometers (740 miles) north to south and about 1,200 kilometers (760 miles) east to west. The size of Texas, its total area is 931,082 square kilometers (363,708 square miles) including 20,650 square kilometers (nearly 8,000 square miles) of inland water.

Most of the country, rising steadily toward the west, consists of extensive rolling plains demarcated by the Rift Valley, a series of immense faults creating both depressions and mountains. Much of it is above 900 meters (about 3,000 feet) and some above 1,500 meters (nearly 5,000 feet). A small portion, including the islands and the coastal plains, lies below 200 meters (600 to 700 feet).

The landscape is extremely varied, changing from coastal mangrove swamps to tropical rain forests and from rolling savannas and high arid plateaus to mountain ranges. It contains both the highest point in Africa, Mount Kilimanjaro, and the lowest, which is the floor of Lake Tanganyika.

The essentially tropical climate is modified by local topography, particularly altitude. The mountain ranges and the area around Lake Victoria (Victoria Nyanza) receive generous amounts of rain, but vast plateau areas in the center of the country are so dry that they cannot support significant cultivation activity, and tsetse fly infestation precludes animal husbandry (see ch. 4). Four major



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ecological regions can be distinguished: high plateaus, mountain lands, lakeshore region, and coastal belt and islands.

#### **High Plateaus**

The high plateaus are characterized by monotonous undulating terrain cut slightly by mostly intermittent rivers. There are two major plateaus, the Central Plateau and the Eastern Plateau. The Central Plateau lies between the two branches of the Rift Valley. Its vast expanse forms a huge uplifted basin. Elevation varies from roughly 900 to 1,800 meters (3,000 to 5,900 feet) above sea level, the greater part lying at about 1,200 meters (4,000 feet). It is a hard dry plain dotted with granitic outcrops.

The Eastern Plateau is in effect a series of lower plateaus descending gradually to the coastal lowlands. In the north it consists basically of the Masai Steppe, an extensive semiarid plain of almost 70,000 square kilometers (more than 26,000 square miles). Varying from just under 250 to over 1,000 meters (800 to 3,500 feet) above sea level, the steppe is almost a desert with vast areas of dry bush and scanty grass. South of the Uluguru Mountains the plateau broadens to form a rough triangle, the base stretching from Lake Nyasa to the coast. The terrain is broken and toward the coast is characterized by outcrops of isolated hill masses rising sharply from the surrounding land. One of these is the Makonde Plateau in the extreme southeast, a poorly watered tableland of about 3,100 square kilometers (1,200 square miles).

#### **Mountain Lands**

One of three major mountainous zones extends inland from Tanga to near Lake Manyara. It includes the Usambara and Pare ranges, which together form a wedge-shaped mass reaching a height of almost 2,300 meters (7,550 feet) and the Northern Highlands, which contain Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru. Mount Kilimanjaro rises in two peaks united by a saddle. Kibo, the higher peak, is almost 5,900 meters (19,300 feet). The so-called glaciers on its top are rapidly decaying remains of a former, more extensive icecap. Meru, the lower peak, rises to 4,560 meters (14,960 feet). Both peaks receive considerable amounts of rain on the southern slopes, and tropical rain forest conditions prevail between the altitudes of about 1,700 and 2,900 meters (5,600 and 9,500 feet) above sea level on Mount Kilimanjaro and between 1,400 and 1,800 meters (4,600 and 6,000 feet) on Mount Meru.

The second zone stretches from the western shore of Lake Natron southward in a series of isolated mountains and mountain chains. They are interspersed with lakes and craters and connected with the northern part of the eastern Rift. Between Lake Natron and Lake Manyara are the Winter Highlands, a volcanic region containing Mount Loolmalassin and the Ngorongoro Crater—roughly 100 to 110 kilometers (sixty to seventy miles) wide—in which is found one of the heaviest concentrations of wildlife in Africa. The shores of Lake Manyara and the nearby

Serengeti Plain also teem with wildlife. West of the crater lies Olduvai Gorge, where the paleontological explorations of the late Louis S. B. Leakey, a Kenya-born scientist, and his associates led to the hypothesis that the earliest forms of man may have originated in East Africa.

The third major mountainous region includes the Southern Highlands. They stretch from the Nguru Mountains, about halfway between Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, and the Uluguru Mountains, farther south, to the Livingstone Mountains, which descend sharply toward the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa.

#### **Lakeshore Region**

The northern portion of the Central Plateau slopes gently downward to form the large shallow depression containing Lake Victoria, which lies at an elevation of about 1,180 meters (3,700 feet). West of the lake are long, narrow rocky hill ranges, which rise above flat lowlands. On the lakeshore are large flooded inlets.

The gradual slope of the land permits agricultural development not possible along the steep embankments of Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. The area is densely populated, and the people have a close cultural affinity with those living in the Uganda and Kenya portions of the Lake Victoria basin.

#### **Coastal Belt and Islands**

The coastal belt is narrow in the north and south, averaging between sixteen and sixty kilometers (between ten and forty miles) in breadth. It is broader in the center near the lowlands of the Rufiji River valley where it almost reaches the Uluguru mountains.


The 800 kilometer (500 mile) coast is difficult to approach because of numerous coral reefs and shifting sandbars at the mouths of rivers. The inland slopes sufficiently toward the coast to cause most rivers to be unnavigable because of rapids.

The islands are basically coral. Zanzibar, separated from the mainland by a channel thirty-five kilometers (twenty-two miles) wide at its narrowest point, is the largest coralline island on the African coast. It is about eighty kilometers (fifty miles) long and forty kilometers (twenty-five miles) wide with a total area of 1,657 square kilometers (640 square miles). Zanzibar rises from a flat eastern plain to a more hilly western area.

Pemba, north of Zanzibar, is smaller; it is sixty-seven kilometers (forty-two miles) long and twenty-two kilometers (fourteen miles) wide with a total area of 984 square kilometers (380 square miles). Its topography varies—with small steep hills and valleys. Mafia, forty-three kilometers (twenty-seven miles) long and more than fourteen kilometers (nine miles) wide, is a low island situated about halfway down the coast south of Tanzania.


#### **Drainage**

The country's rivers drain into four major basins (see fig. 3). Five important rivers and a number of minor ones in the eastern third



*Figure 3. Terrain and Drainage*

*Physical and Social Setting*





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of Tanzania enter the Indian Ocean directly. Streams around Lake Nyasa empty into the lake and reach the Indian Ocean via the Zambezi River. A number of short rivers (except for the longer Kagera River in northwestern Tanzania) drain into Lake Victoria and ultimately via the Nile River into the Mediterranean Sea. Several rivers in western Tanzania, the longest of which is the Malagarasi, drain into Lake Tanganyika and ultimately via the Congo River into the Atlantic Ocean. Streams in the northcentral and southwestern sections empty into interior basins.

Many of Tanzania's rivers are shallow or marshy with only seasonal flows. Some, particularly those draining into the Indian Ocean, offer potential for irrigation and hydroelectric power (see ch. 4). The use of others is limited by marked variation in flow. The Rufiji River and its tributaries, draining nearly a quarter of the mainland's territory, offer perhaps the greatest potential; some of it has already been realized. For example, the Kilombero River, draining a once marshy valley is now under sufficient control so that some of the area is used for cultivation of sugar, and the Great Ruaha River is the site of a hydroelectric station. The Pangani River, which rises in the northeastern highlands, has three hydroelectric stations.

The lakes provide transportation, are a source of food and livelihood, and offer abundant water supplies for irrigation. The largest lake in Tanzania and in Africa is Lake Victoria. Lake Tanganyika, the world's second deepest lake, has a precipitous coastline and a few poor harbors. Lake Nyasa also has poor harbors. Lake Rukwa to the east of Lake Tanganyika is small and shallow and tends to be brackish. A series of small lakes in the northern part of the country all have salty water—Lake Natron is commercially exploited for salt and soda.

### **Climate**

Water is the critical factor in the development of Tanzania, the distribution and seasonal fluctuations in rainfall determining agricultural practices. In most parts of the country there is either not enough rain or it comes at unpredictable times; unseasonable floods alternate with droughts.

The climate is basically determined by the country's position just south of the equator and by the airstreams coming from the Indian Ocean and southern Asia. Except for rainfall there is little seasonal variation. The rainy season varies. In general rains may begin as early as October or November in the southern part of the country and end in March. In the north, however, the heavy rains begin in March and end in May or June. There is also a good deal of local variation, and a few places, especially in the northern highlands, may sometimes benefit from a short rainy period in November or December.

Two major elements, rainfall and temperature, produce what is essentially a tropical equatorial climate. Temperatures are modified, however, by the altitude, resulting in a somewhat cooler

climate in the higher regions, where mean daily maximums range between 22°C and 30°C (72°F and 90°F). Altitude also plays a large role in determining rainfall patterns, with the higher elevations receiving more precipitation. Generally the total amount of rainfall is not very great. Only about half of the country receives more than 750 millimeters (thirty inches) annually. There are, however, great variations, from more than 2,540 millimeters (100 inches) annually just northwest of Lake Nyasa to less than 508 millimeters (twenty inches) in parts of the hot and dry Central Plateau and the Masai Steppe.

On the coast, including the area of the Rufiji Basin, which extends inland for about 100 kilometers (more than sixty miles), a warm and humid climate prevails. The offshore islands have a more tropical climate, with higher average temperatures and more precipitation than the coast.

#### **Density Patterns**

In Tanzania soil, climate (particularly rainfall), and the occurrence of the tsetse fly determined settlement patterns before European penetration; these patterns have not changed substantially. Population densities vary between regions and even between and within districts (see fig. 4). It is not known whether the process of villagization has altered patterns of density in the decade since 1967 (see Background to Villagization, this ch.). It is likely, however, that changes were primarily local.


Population is densest on the periphery of the country: the greatest concentrations occur in the northeastern highlands and the coastal area around Tanga, the areas adjacent to Lake Victoria, and the area around Mbeya just northwest of Lake Nyasa. Portions of these areas are in fact overpopulated. All these areas receive a minimum of more than 750 millimeters (thirty inches) of rainfall annually. There are lesser concentrations of population in the southwestern corner and around Dar es Salaam—a function of its role as a port and former capital.

When sufficient and dependable rainfall are combined with fertile soil as in the volcanic highlands of the Eastern Rift Valley, heavy concentrations of population can be supported, particularly when terracing and water control measures are employed, as is done by the Arusha. The Chaga who live on the slopes of Kilimanjaro don't terrace their land but are extremely skillful at controlling water. Their area is one of the most densely settled in Tanzania.

The area around Lake Victoria supports nearly one-fourth of the total population. The highest density on the mainland prevails near the lake, particularly around Mwanza and on Ukerewe and Ukare islands in the southeastern part of the lake. Both the Haya to the west of the lake and the Sukuma to the south use their fertile areas intensively, farming cash crops successfully.

Rainfall is another important determinant of settlement patterns. The more southerly parts of Sukumaland and the Makonde


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Source: Based on information from L. Berry (ed.), *Tanzania in Maps: Graphic Perspectives of a Developing Country*, New York, 1971.

*Figure 4. Population Density by Administrative Division, 1967*

*Physical and Social Setting*





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Plateau in the southeast of the country fall within the 750 millimeter (thirty inch) rainfall belt, but because rainfall is unreliable, agriculture production is more precarious and settlement less dense.

The Southern Highlands often receive abundant rainfall, but it sometimes fails. This uncertainty, coupled with poor soils, has led to an uneven distribution of population and a pattern of migration of young males in search of paid work.

Some form of cultivation, usually confined to subsistence cultivation of sorghum and millet, can be carried on in areas receiving as little as 450 millimeters (eighteen inches) of rain yearly. Such areas are sparsely settled. Areas receiving between 200 and 450 millimeters (between eight and eighteen inches) annually can be used for open range grazing except where the tsetse fly occurs. Large areas of the Eastern Plateau and over two-thirds of the Central Plateau are covered with a kind of woodland (locally called *miombo*) that provides a breeding place for the fly. Areas receiving less than 200 millimeters (eight inches) are usually uninhabited.

The level and well-watered lands along the coast support a fairly dense population. The delta of the Rufiji River as well as fertile Kilombero Valley farther inland had not been populated until the late 1970s despite their fertile soils and favorable climate. Seasonal flooding rendered much of the area unsafe for permanent settlements until water control measures were taken at that time and in the early 1970s.

The highest densities in Tanzania are found on the Indian Ocean islands, with Pemba's appreciably higher than Zanzibar's. Pemba has a fairly evenly distributed population, but in Zanzibar there are heavy concentrations in the north and in Zanzibar town, but less dense settlement in the central and southern parts.

#### **Urbanization**

Tanzania is one of the least urbanized countries in Africa despite the growth of its cities. According to the 1967 census there were only fourteen towns with populations over 10,000. In 1974 it was estimated that about 6 percent of the population lived in cities. On the island of Zanzibar, however, 27 percent of the population is urban.

There are ancient settlements along the coast, some dating back to at least the tenth century. A few inland towns, such as Mpwapwa, Tabora, and Ujiji became prominent in the nineteenth century as way stations for Arab traders engaged in the slave trade. During colonial times a few towns developed as centers of administration, around missions and in response to the establishment of transport facilities. But generally urban life is foreign to the majority of Tanzanians.

Dar es Salaam (the name means "haven of peace" in Arabic) was established in the 1860s by the Sultan of Zanzibar as a mainland refuge. It became under the Germans the starting point of the Central line railroad. By the time Tanzania achieved indepen-

dence Dar es Salaam was the center of government, the leading commercial and financial center, and the site of the country's university. Its heterogeneous population has substantial minorities of Arabs, Indians, and Europeans. Between 1957 and 1967 the population of Dar es Salaam increased by 14 percent. At the time of the 1967 census 40 percent of the urban population lived there.

In an effort to decentralize, the second five-year plan included a project to move certain government functions to eight towns pinpointed for urban development. In the first year, however, only ten of about thirty major enterprises that were established were outside of Dar es Salaam, and seven of these were set up in Arusha.

In November 1974 it was announced that the capital was to be moved to Dodoma, situated 480 kilometers (300 miles) to the west on the Central lines and 1,300 meters (500 feet) above sea level. The move is taking place in installments and is to be finished by 1990. In keeping with Nyerere's picture of a primarily agricultural population, small-scale farming will be a part of living in Dodoma and will be carried on in immediate proximity to residential quarters, which will be in clusters of roughly ten units. Its inhabitants will form ten-house party cells, which are to be the basis of the city's political and social organization (see *New Institutions: The Ten-House Cell*, this ch.).

Tanga, the second largest city in Tanzania, was established by Persian traders in the fourteenth century and experienced great development under the Germans. The railroad, begun in 1893, gave Tanga a wealthy hinterland and facilitated the development of the sisal industry. Mtwara, on the southern coast, is an important port for the hinterland and coastal trade and potentially important for the Southern Highlands and the transit traffic with Zambia.

Moshi and Arusha are the natural focal points for the densely settled and prosperous areas surrounding them. Moshi, the headquarters of the coffee industry, moved from tenth to fourth place in size in the 1957-67 interval. Arusha is an important business center as well as the terminus of the Tanga railroad. Because of an international airport nearby, it is also a center for tourism; it is close to Serengeti National Park, Masailand, Mount Kilimanjaro, the Ngorongoro Crater, and Olduvai Gorge.

Tabora in the western part of the country and Morogoro in the eastern part, are both located on the Central lines and both are important markets for agricultural produce. Ujiji, strategically located at one of the few breaks in the clifflike Rift wall surrounding Lake Tanganyika, is an important fishing center. Mwanza, on the southern shores of Lake Victoria, is a major transportation center handling trade with Kenya and Uganda. Zanzibar, the center of government, trade, and commerce for the island of the same name, is situated behind a well-protected, natural deepwater harbor.

Cities have been growing, a trend that the government tries to stem. The hope is that the establishment of prosperous villages will make rural living so attractive that people will no longer be drawn to the cities. In 1977 certain categories of unemployed persons were forcibly removed from the cities and sent to the countryside, but many of them apparently drifted back.

### **Ethnic Groups**

Tanzania's 1967 census recognized some 120 ethnic groups (often called tribes, particularly in the older literature), each of which differs in varying degrees from the others in culture, social organization, and language. Only the smallest groups are homogeneous, however; most groups are marked by some internal variation in language and culture. Further most of them are characterized by traditions of varied origin, and very few had a clear sense of themselves as ethnic entities before the colonial period (see ch. 1).

Roughly a dozen ethnic groups make up half of Tanzania's population, and none is large enough to be dominant. The largest, the Sukuma, constitutes nearly 13 percent of the population, the remaining large groups under 5 percent each (see table 3, Appendix A). Ethnicity coincides substantially with locality (see fig. 5). Some members of many groups have pushed outward from the core areas, however, and others have moved even further in search of opportunity.

In colonial times administrative subdivisions were often drawn along ethnic lines, and these have persisted into the modern period despite the government's desire to minimize ethnic considerations, largely because the boundaries of ethnic groups coincide with features of the terrain or with the boundaries of ecological zones. Terms for the loci of ethnic groups are in common use in historical sources and even in modern times in some contexts. For example, one may refer to Sukumaland, Gogoland, or Chagaland (in Swahili they become Usukuma, Ugogo, and Uchaga).

### **Language**

About 95 percent of Tanzania's population is commonly referred to as Bantu or more accurately, as Bantu speaking—the term has no racial meaning (see ch. 1). The most important Bantu language for interethnic communication is Swahili, the mother tongue of Zanzibaris, Pembans, and some coastal people. It became a lingua franca in some areas even before the colonial period, and its use was encouraged by both German and British colonial authorities. In 1963 it became Tanzania's national language (see *The Role of Swahili in Nationbuilding*, this ch.).

Nilotic, including Paraniotic, languages are spoken by about half a dozen groups. There has been a good deal of disagreement about the nature and degree of the relationship between the languages called Nilotic (represented in Tanzania by the Luo) and those called Paraniotic (represented in Tanzania chiefly by the

Masai). In 1966 a work on the non-Bantu languages of eastern Africa by Archibald N. Tucker and Margaret A. Bryan recognized the link between the two groups of languages but considered them sufficiently distinct to warrant the term *Paranilotic* (as opposed to their simple inclusion in Nilotic or their exclusion under the term *Nilo-Hamitic*). The term *Paranilotic* was adopted in 1973 for use in a survey of East African languages.

A few groups, of which the largest are the Iraqw, speak Southern Cushitic languages otherwise found chiefly in Ethiopia and Somalia. Two groups, the Sandawe and, less certainly, the Hadzapi (or Kindiga) speak Khoisan languages, related to those spoken by people in southern Africa who are commonly called Bushmen and Hottentot by Europeans.

### **Major Ethnic Groups**

Given the very large number of groups only the five largest (constituting more than one-quarter of the population in 1967) are briefly mentioned here. They are, however, sufficiently different to suggest the range of variation of the Bantu-speaking population.


The Sukuma (the name means "people to the north") living just south of Lake Victoria constitute by far the largest ethnic group in the country, but their ethnic consciousness is relatively recent and by no means pervasive. Quite varied in origin, they were organized in a large number of small chiefdoms in the precolonial period. Although some chiefdoms were affected by nineteenth-century trade, they were not strongly influenced by missionary activity, modern education, and cash cropping until well into the twentieth century. Most of them practice mixed agriculture—cultivation and cattle herding. Until the development of cotton cultivation the Sukuma engaged chiefly in subsistence cropping, although they produced a good many cattle for sale at a fairly early period. Colonial efforts to change their agricultural techniques and to impose a consolidated form of chieftainship on them led to their substantial support for Nyerere's movement toward independence.

The Makonde, relatively isolated on the Makonde Plateau in the southeastern section of the mainland, are also represented in Mozambique where they constituted the major portion of the rank and file in the anti-Portuguese guerrilla forces. Of the five largest groups they have been perhaps least influenced by colonial and postcolonial developments, and they have a reputation for cultural conservatism and a willingness to defend their territory and way of life fiercely. That territory, in part dense jungle lowland, in part more densely populated escarpment and high plateau, is penetrated only with the greatest difficulty.

Perhaps because of their isolation and resistance to outsiders the Makonde have developed a substantial degree of ethnic self-consciousness. This has not been associated with a unified political system, however; their traditional political units encompass no



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Source: Based on information from L. Berry (ed.), *Tanzania in Maps: Graphic Perspectives of a Developing Country*, New York, 1971.

Figure 5. Core Areas of Selected Ethnic Groups

### *Physical and Social Setting*



more than a few villages. The Makonde are famous for their imaginative woodcarvings, which are sold internationally.

The Chaga whose core area is the southern slope of Mount Kilimanjaro constitute the third largest group. Benefiting from very fertile, well-watered soil and generally healthful conditions their population has grown to the point where it is one of the densest in the country; they have been forced to spill over into the land below the 1,000 meter (3,500 foot) mark. The Chaga were among the earliest groups affected by Roman Catholic and Lutheran missionary activity, modern education, and cash cropping (chiefly coffee), and they achieved a comparatively substantial level of income through both their sales of coffee and their involvement in wage labor, much of it better compensated than that of other ethnic groups because of the Chaga's high level of education.

In the precolonial period the Chaga were divided into roughly thirty chiefdoms of varying size. Influenced in part by competition for trade with the coast several chiefs sought to establish hegemony over larger areas, and some achieved a degree of temporary success. The process was interrupted by the arrival of the Germans who, like the British after them, sought to consolidate these chiefdoms for administrative convenience.

Chaga involvement in relatively rapid social change led to substantial internal conflict and the emergence of local political activity, particularly after World War II. That activity and the Chaga participation in a cooperative union in connection with coffee production generated a clear sense of ethnic identity among them, although it has not precluded continuing internal conflict.

Like the Sukuma, their northern neighbors, the Nyamwezi are heterogeneous in origin and were formerly divided into a great many very small chiefdoms. In the mid-nineteenth century and later, however, several of their chiefs, stimulated by the trade route through the newly established town of Tabora in the heart of Nyamwezi territory, attempted to dominate larger areas (see ch. 1). Although primarily cultivators (with some cattle) the Nyamwezi early made a reputation as traders, and some are found in many parts of eastern and even central Africa. Nyamwezi (probably "people of the moon," that is, of the west) is a name given the people of the area by outsiders—the Swahili speakers of the coast—and their sense of ethnic identity is both recent and fragile.

Unlike most other Tanzanian ethnic groups, the Haya living west of Lake Victoria were organized into a relatively small number of centralized states like their northern and western neighbors, the interlacustrine Bantu, to whom they are culturally and linguistically related. Indeed in the eighteenth century the Haya kingdom of Karagwe was a dominant force in the area. The Haya grew coffee and used it in trade long before the Europeans came and created an outlet for it. Local coffee and tea processing plants now make it possible for the Haya, living 1,400 kilometers (900

miles) from the coast, to export their crops in powdered form. Like the Chaga and Nyakyusa in the Southern Highlands the Haya intercrop coffee and plantains in permanent settlements, in this case in very densely populated villages.

Again like the Chaga the Haya became vitally interested in education and support a relatively large number of secondary schools and a teachers' training college in their area. Since colonial times many Haya have gone elsewhere in Tanzania to take jobs for which their education qualifies them.

As a result of centuries of immigration from the Middle East and mixture with the local African population the islanders of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Mafia (which was part of Tanganyika in colonial times and continues to be administered as part of the mainland) are extremely heterogeneous. Until the revolution in Zanzibar (and Pemba) in 1964 they could be divided into three main groups: the ruling Arabs, the Shirazi, and mainland Africans or their descendants. The Shirazi are a mixture of Africans and persons said to have come at a very early time from the Shiraz area of Iran (see ch. 1). They are divided into three so-called tribes: the Hadimu, Tumbatu, and Pemba.

These Africans are descendants of mainlanders who came involuntarily to work on the islands, chiefly on the clove plantations. Until the slave trade was ended in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most rural and other laborers were slaves (see ch. 1). Beginning particularly in the early twentieth century, some mainlanders came of their own accord seeking work. Many have maintained their ethnic identity through contact with seasonal migrants and the more recent settlers. Descendants of earlier mainlanders have often become Muslims and may call themselves Shirazi.

#### **Non-Africans**

Less than 1 percent of the population is constituted by non-Africans: Europeans, Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, and Goans), and Arabs. All whites, regardless of origin, are referred to as Europeans. In 1961, the year of Tanganyika's independence, they numbered just over 23,000, including personnel in the colonial administration, businessmen and professionals, missionaries, and farmers, the last chiefly settled in the northeastern highlands around mounts Kilimanjaro and Meru and in the Southern Highlands. By 1975 their number was reduced to 1,500.

Below the Europeans in the colonial social hierarchy were the Asians, most of them engaged in business but ranging from the very wealthy to poor rural traders. The 1967 census listed about 75,000 Asians, but roughly half have departed since then because of concern about their future. President Nyerere has explicitly avoided a racially tinged attack on them and has in fact deplored their brutal ouster by President Idi Amin of Uganda, but Tanzania's ideology and the nationalization of various kinds of property pose a different kind of threat to the way of life of most



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Asians. Nyerere seemed, in the mid-1970s, to value their economic contribution, but it is not clear what mutual adaptations can be made to keep Asians in the country.

Arabs have been in East Africa longer than either of the other groups. Until the establishment of the seat of the Sultanate of Oman in Zanzibar in the late eighteenth century, however, most Arabs were in some degree mixed with the local population to produce a ruling group that, while strongly Islamic and familiar with Arabic, were often Swahili speaking and bearers of a coastal and island culture somewhat different from that of the Middle East. Later the Arabs of Zanzibar maintained a degree of separation from the earlier mixed ruling class (the Shirazi). In one way or another Arabic influence has been substantial in some parts of mainland Tanzania, particularly along the coast; a substantial part of the Swahili lexicon is Arabic in origin.

The 1967 census listed 30,000 Arabs living on the mainland. In Zanzibar, until they were ousted in the revolution of 1964, they were the dominant group although they constituted less than 20 percent of the population. Thousands were killed, and the others left for Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, and the Arabian Peninsula.

#### **Interethnic Relations**

Generally interethnic conflict has not been a significant political problem in Tanzania as it has been elsewhere in Africa. No single group has dominated the ruling party and, because ethnic group and locality tend to coincide, the National Assembly is a fair cross-section of the country's ethnic composition. Perhaps one reason for the relative absence of conflict in the political domain is the fact that there are a great many groups and not one of them is clearly dominant numerically. The largest, the Sukuma, constituting less than 13 percent of the population, had developed only a limited sense of ethnic identity in the preindependence period. By and large a sense of ethnic identity is also recent (beginning usually in the colonial period) among other groups. Like many other African governments Tanzania has formally deprecated ethnic appeals and considerations in political matters but with somewhat greater success than most, perhaps because President Nyerere, himself of a very small group, has meticulously avoided such appeals and considerations and would look askance at high party and government officials who failed to do likewise. It has also been official policy to assign regional and district representatives of the central government to areas other than those from which they originated.

The absence of interethnic conflict expressed in the national political domain does not mean that complaints couched in ethnic terms do not occur in local contexts, or that Tanzanians are wholly indifferent to the ethnic identity of those with whom they may interact in an ethnically heterogeneous situation. For example, non-Meru (particularly Arusha) in the area around the town of Arusha have been said to feel that Meru get the better jobs, and

some Tanzanians have been said to resent the Chaga and Haya who, having taken advantage of educational opportunities before others did, had earlier access to prestigious and remunerative jobs and are seen as unduly wealthy and aggressive. But there are not enough of either of these people to make a pervasive difference in the country at large.

### **Traditional Elements of the Social System**

#### **Kinship and Kin-Groups**

It is very difficult to fix a date before which the social systems and cultures of Tanzanian groups may be said to have been traditional, that is, relatively unchanging. Sociopolitical and even religious change was taking place to varying degrees in the nineteenth century before the imposition of European rule, and the history of movement and mixture of African groups for at least the last two millennia implies adaptation to both new physical and human environments and therefore change in social arrangements. Such change notwithstanding kinship, as the basis for interpersonal relations and less pervasively for group formation, seems to have persisted throughout the earlier period and into the present-day.

For individuals kin ties through one's parents and by marriage to a wide range of persons define rights, obligations, and opportunities. The precise nature of these ties, that is, which kin are more important, which are lumped together, and which distinguished, varies from one ethnic group to another and sometimes within a group. In general, however, the range of fairly important kin is wider than that in Western societies. But kinship rights and obligations are not immutably fixed: an individual often has a choice as to which links he will seek to shore up or, looked at in another way, take advantage of. Sometimes this will be governed by propinquity. A "cousin" of the same order of relationship as another is closer because he is physically near. However, a physically more remote cousin may also be able to provide land or other support. Kin relationships thus may define certain kinds of pro forma behavior—styles of address, modes of deference—but they do not necessarily lock an individual into a fixed position vis à vis all relatives.

Virtually all groups distinguish between kin ties established through the father and those established through the mother; for example, an individual's rights and obligations with respect to his father's brother may differ substantially from those with respect to his mother's brother (they are usually terminologically differentiated). Which ties are more important—economically, ritually, and so on—varies from group to group and occasionally within a group. Thus some chiefs among the Nyamwezi inherited their positions matrilineally, that is, from a mother's brother, others patrilineally, from a father. In any case the mode of succession in the chiefly family was not necessarily the same as that among commoners.

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Among many Tanzanian peoples kinship also provides a basis for group formation. In all well-attested cases such descent groups are unilineal in principle, that is, they include all persons actually or putatively descended from a common male ancestor through males or a common female ancestor through females. With some exceptions matrilineal descent groups are found among the peoples of the coastal hinterland, particularly in that area south of the railroad running from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro and Kilosa: included are such ethnic groups as the Makonde, the Yao, the Luguru, and the Zaramo.

Descent groups vary in size (sometimes but not always related to the generational remoteness of the common ancestor), degree of localization, function, and degree of internal segmentation. Thus some groups, called clans, claim putative descent from a remote common ancestor (that is, the links between the living and that ancestor cannot be traced, and often no effort is made to do so). Such units are quite large, are rarely localized in specific communities (their numbers may indeed be scattered in several chiefdoms), and have few if any political or economic functions. A clan may, however, have a place sacred to all its members at which occasional rituals may be performed; the clans in some ethnic groups may be exogamous.

Clans are subdivided into smaller units, usually called lineages, in which the common ancestor is not as remote and to whom the links can be traced through the generations. Such lineages do, however, vary in generational depth, in size, and to some extent in function. Perhaps most ubiquitous is what has often been called the minimal lineage, a unit in which the common ancestor is three generations removed from the youngest living generation of adults, that is, their great-grandfather or great-grandmother. Such a unit is very likely to be localized and, formerly at least, to have had a degree of control over the land cultivated by its members, although the fruits of cultivation are used by specific households. In some ethnic groups such a lineage is in fact the only one with significant economic, social, and even political functions. Often, however, a lineage perhaps five to seven generations in depth (but containing minimal lineages) exercised a degree of political control over the members within it (settling disputes between members of different minimal lineages) and representing them vis-à-vis other lineages and chiefs where chiefs existed. Minimal lineages and even larger ones are almost always exogamous even when the clans of which they may be a part are not.

Lineage localization does not mean that local communities (whether in nucleated villages or dispersed) necessarily consist of a single minimal or larger lineage. One lineage may be numerically dominant in a local community or have special status as its founder, but typically several are found in a local community and in some contexts at least must cooperate.

In some ethnic groups, for example, among the Nyamwezi and

Sukuma where unilineal descent groups do not exist (except among chiefly families, which constitute a small proportion of the population) an individual's kin may be fairly widely scattered, and relationships within the local community are in many respects more important in daily life, although kin by blood and marriage do cooperate especially in ritual matters—sacrifices to ancestors, birth, marriage, and death. Even in those cases, however, neighbors are present as they are expected to be, and neighbors (who may or may not be kin) participate in marriage negotiations.

Neighborhood groups (usually members of a single village but sometimes of a village section and sometimes of two adjacent villages) cooperate in a range of daily tasks, particularly those connected with cultivation and housebuilding. In most cases the sexual division of labor implies that a group engaged in a particular task consists exclusively of men or women. Neighborhood cooperation, particularly in such matters as housebuilding, is not restricted to the Sukuma and Nyamwezi; it is, for example, found among the Chaga and others with unilineal descent groups. But its relatively formal organization and ubiquitousness in the central Tanzanian groups is somewhat unusual.

Because marriage is seen as a way of perpetuating the kin-group and of establishing links between kin-groups, there were usually limits to individual choice. Initial contacts might be made by the persons involved (in most groups individual initiatives became increasingly important in the colonial period), but the process was usually completed by representatives of the kin-groups. Even where negotiations were carried out by neighbors, as among the Nyamwezi, the basic premise was that a union was of some importance to the community and not a purely individual affair.

In those societies with patrilineal descent groups or in which (as among the Nyamwezi and Sukuma) the rights of the father to the children were to be established, bridewealth was paid to the kin of the woman. The kind, quantity, and mode of payment varied: among cattle-keeping people, cattle were often the chief elements in marriage payments. Beer, cloth, meat and, increasingly, money were often used elsewhere or in addition to livestock. In some groups the kind and quantity of part of the bridewealth was customary as was the stage in the relationship at which it was paid. Some portion, however, was subject to negotiation and was affected by the status and wealth of the kin-groups involved and by changes in the availability of the entities (for example, cattle) to be given.

Marriage payments were often stretched out over a long period of time as a matter of custom, each element having specific significance with respect to the status of the marriage (for example, some payments might be made only after children were born to the union) and to the relationship between the kin of the married pair. There have been cases among the Chaga where the final payment was made by the adult son of the woman to her brothers.



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In matrilineal societies marriage payments from the man's kin to the woman's are rare or very small. He does acquire sexual rights to her and part of her labor power, but the system precludes his acquiring rights to the children she bears: they belong to her matrilineage and inherit from their mother's brothers.

#### **Chieftainship**

By the mid-nineteenth century some form of territorial chieftainship (as opposed to village headmanship or clan chieftainship) had developed in most groups. Such chieftainships were often quite small, and there were numbers of them in any ethnic group (for example, roughly thirty among the precolonial Chaga and many more among the Nyamwezi and Sukuma). But in some areas they were of larger scale and more elaborately organized into hierarchies of subchiefs and headmen as among the Haya and Ha west of Lake Victoria and east of Lake Tanganyika. Even there, however, no ethnic group was organized in a single chiefdom. Succession to the chieftainship was almost always hereditary, but this did not mean that it descended to a specific heir fixed at birth. Either the chiefly lineage or certain officials or councils, sometimes including commoners, chose a man considered suitable (and in the absence of such a man, a woman was occasionally chosen, at least as regent). Among other things competition for succession between political heirs sometimes led to overt conflict: for example, in central Tanzania where land was available, the losing claimant and his followers might leave to establish another chieftainship.

In precolonial times chiefs had several functions varying in importance from one ethnic group to another and in the frequency with which they were performed. Most chiefs had a ritual role, in some cases their most important. It was often a chief's task to communicate with his ancestors who were thought to have primary responsibility for the welfare of the people and the territory over which he presided. In many cases, usually with his councillors, he made important decisions affecting the chiefdom as a whole, particularly those involving relations with other chiefdoms. He might also be a military leader. Frequently he had an economic function, especially in time of famine when he was expected to redistribute to his people grain and livestock that he had accumulated by virtue of his position. Finally he had a judicial role. It was not so much that he directly heard many cases but that he might confirm or alter the decisions of his councillors or a subordinate chief.

The imposition of colonial rule led to many changes, which often put a chief in conflict with his people. The Germans and, more systematically, the British preferred to deal with chiefs, but they thought of chiefs as primarily secular leaders and administrators. Their judicial role was recognized but not fully understood in that they were expected to act directly as magistrates. By and large, at least in the beginning, their ritual role was ignored. Above all the colonial authorities were reluctant to accept the task of dealing

with a great many chiefs and soon undertook to consolidate chiefdoms and impose on them one of the chiefs, preferably one who met colonial standards of competence but not necessarily local standards of legitimacy. Other chiefs were either given subordinate roles or retired. But the colonial rulers were in turn sometimes manipulated by the chiefs for their own aggrandizement. For example, concerned as they were with consolidation, they were sometimes persuaded by certain chiefs—who had quickly learned what the Europeans seemed to want—that they had a legitimate title in African terms to be given posts superior to other chiefs, or that some adjacent territory was legitimately part of their domain.

In any case the actions and demands of colonial regimes and chiefs led to situations in which Tanzanians of many ethnic groups came to see their chiefs as responsible and responsive not to them but to the colonial government. In a number of places (notably on Mount Kilimanjaro among the Chaga) antichief political movements developed either before the emergence of Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954 or in connection with it.

In 1962, shortly after independence, chieftainship was abolished, and administrative officials were elected who were often not members of traditional chiefly families. Chiefdoms may, however, continue to exist informally as social and geographic units, especially among groups least touched by social change.

#### **Councils and Elders**

Whether or not chieftainship existed, councils, usually of elders, were present in most local communities, although the degree of formality with which they were chosen and functioned varied. Such councils were concerned with certain kinds of decisions and dealt with a wide range of disputes. In those societies without territorial chieftainship the local council was, in effect, the decisionmaker in matters that went beyond the level of the family or lineage. In hierarchically organized societies the council communicated the concerns of the community to the headman or subordinate chief and acted as his adviser and even as decisionmaker and dispute settler subject to his ultimate approval. A senior chief also had councillors, usually consisting in part of the members of the chiefly family but also including specially selected commoners.

Typically councillors, particularly in the local community, were senior members of the lineages or extended families constituting the community and were leaders and dispute settlers in the units they represented. They were not necessarily the oldest men, although they were almost always senior men, but those with a reputation for the ability to settle disputes and present an argument. In those societies where the economic situation permitted a degree of differentiation in wealth, they were also likely to be men who were both comparatively well-off and influential and thereby

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able to collect a set of supporters who depended on them for protection in return for their allegiance.

The notion that seniority conferred certain rights and capacities persisted through the colonial period, although with modifications, particularly in those groups in which fairly large numbers of young people achieved a substantial degree of education. It has not altogether disappeared in the years since independence, especially at the local level where certain kinds of traditional disputes occur, but also in some cases in elections to local councils (see ch. 2).

#### **Age Divisions**

Some degree of division of labor and allocation of rights and duties is common in many groups. Rarer is the formal organization of persons (especially males) who are roughly contemporaries into age-sets, each set moving through a limited series of age-grades. In Tanzania this system is best exemplified among the pastoral Masai for whom it provides a basic mode of social and political organization. The date for opening a new age-set is recommended by a ritual specialist (*laibon*). Eventually a set is closed, its membership fixed, and a new one started. The newly formed set finds itself in the junior warrior age-grade and moves through those of senior warrior, junior elder, senior elder, and retired elder as new sets are formed. Rights and responsibilities of members of each set change as it moves through the age-grade system. For example, they are expected to marry and settle down when they become junior elders, sometime between the age of thirty and forty. Senior elders acquire the right and responsibility to make decisions for the community and are expected to exhibit wisdom and moderation in doing so.

Other groups also developed age-sets, usually derived from the Masai, but these groups were settled, and the part played by the system was less pervasive than among the Masai. Thus among the Masai-speaking but agricultural Arusha of Mount Meru lineages had a more important political role. Among the Bantu-speaking Chaga, where chieftainship became increasingly important in the nineteenth century, the process of initiation and age-set formation was to some extent under the control of the chief, and the relatively early impact of missionary activity, education, and participation in the labor market brought the process to an end roughly at the time of World War I.

#### **Religion**

It has been estimated that from one-quarter to one-third of the Tanzanian population claims adherence to one form or another of Christianity and another one-quarter to one-third identifies itself as Muslim. It is also likely that many who have not made a formal commitment to either religion but who live among those who have are influenced by them. For example, most indigenous faiths have some concept of a high god, and it has been argued that mission-

aries, whether Christian or Islamic, have explicitly or implicitly grafted the monotheistic idea on to that concept. It may also be argued that those who have not become Christians or Muslims have nevertheless given a more salient position, publicly at least, to the notion of a high god.

Many Tanzanians, whether or not they are Muslims or Christians, retain in their world views notions that stem from indigenous beliefs. Details of these faiths vary considerably as does their emphasis. Almost all, however, assume that there are spirits (often but not entirely ancestral) in addition to the high god, that they are concerned with what men and women do, and that they may manifest their displeasure by visiting illness, or other inconvenience, or disaster or, that properly placated, they may be helpful to one.

Also widespread is the notion that men and women, whether deliberately or inadvertently, are capable of harming others by magical means. Again details and emphases vary: some groups assume that sorcerers become such by acts of will and training; others that witches are either born or acquire their proclivities by means not under their control. Witches may also be thought to have animal familiars. In some cases both kinds of persons are thought to exist. Whatever the belief it provided a kind of explanation for one's difficulties whether these be illness, death, crop failure, or animal disease.

Given the possibility that several kinds of human or spirit agencies may be responsible for what has happened, a crucial role is played by the diviner whose task it is to discover whether it is sorcerer, witch, ancestor, or other spirit that has caused the misfortune. Such diviners employ a variety of techniques, but their diagnoses seem to be based on their knowledge of the social relations and personal characteristics of the individual afflicted.

The colonial regime forbade accusations of witchcraft or sorcery and made the accuser rather than the accused guilty of a crime, a process that kept most accusations out of the courts of record but did not end the belief system underlying them. Occasionally during the colonial period states of tension and uncertainty gave rise to or at least supported the emergence of witchfinding movements, sometimes led by a person who claimed the power to discover and therefore cleanse the area of witches.

Given the tendency of witchcraft accusations to occur between persons who, by virtue of their social situations, are in states of tension or potential conflict with each other but who may not, because of certain social norms, engage directly in overt conflict, and given the rapidity of sometimes forcible change in Tanzania, it is not likely that belief in or accusations of witchcraft or sorcery have vanished. On some matters the Tanzanian government takes a clearly secular attitude that may not be matched at lower levels. Thus when marauding lions were disturbing one community in the 1970s higher officials saw the problem as one of animal control, but



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some members of the local council, like many of their constituents, considered the lions to be familiars.

#### **A Society in Flux**

By the end of 1966, shortly before Nyerere's Arusha Declaration, 70 percent of the population was living in scattered homesteads or hamlets and less than 25 percent in villages. But there were variations among these two major kinds of settlement that mirrored different adaptations to local ecology. The Shambaa, for example, living in tight clusters of houses, are traditionally members of the same lineage who cultivate their individual plots outside the village. In contrast the loosely grouped houses of Nyakyusa villages, generally aligned on both sides of a broad main street, belong to men of roughly similar age and mirror a social organization based on age divisions. Chaga and Meru live in independent homesteads set on individual bounded holdings, but they are so densely settled that the provision of social services presents no problem. In contrast the Sukuma live in widely dispersed homesteads, which nevertheless form part of a village with fixed boundaries marked by a stream or other natural phenomena. Pastoralists, like the Masai, live in scattered impermanent settlements.

#### **Background to Villagization**

Efforts to concentrate Tanzania's scattered people in villages are long standing. During colonial times attempts were made to clear areas of tsetse fly, and persons displaced in the course of such actions were then settled in newly created villages. In 1960 the World Bank (see Glossary) advocated a program of villagization to relieve population pressures in overcrowded areas and to facilitate the provision of social services, especially of agricultural extension services.

A year after independence the People's Plan for Village Development was launched and resettling scattered people into permanent village communities begun. The planning of local development projects was left to newly set up autonomous village development committees, and TANU urged its local representatives to become, in effect, community development planners.

By 1966 the program had turned out to be a disappointment for a number of reasons, among them overcapitalization and the fact that settlers had become too dependent on the government. But the most important reason was that it seemed nearly impossible to change rapidly the outlook of a subsistence cultivator. Living as he does in a harsh environment, he knows that his survival is closely tied to circumstances beyond his control. He feels that there is no margin for taking risks. This outlook is buttressed by the belief that success and failure, health and disease, and luck and calamity are the result of magical forces (see Religious Beliefs, this ch.).

In January 1967 Nyerere announced the national goal of establishing *ujamaa* villages over the entire country. They were to



*Arusha, a major urban center  
Courtesy Gladys M. Mott*

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operate as economic and social units, recalling the sharing and mutual help traditional among family members. Within the next four years more than 1.5 million people were resettled in new villages, often in the country's poorer regions. Of thousands of villages, however, only ninety-eight were declared to be true *ujamaa* villages. To qualify a village had to have at least 250 families, a TANU party branch, all land clearly used for agricultural production, be economically self-supporting, and to follow cooperative practices. Another 271 villages were declared to have achieved a certain degree of social cohesion with people cooperating at some tasks, but all the rest were said to be only in the initial stage.

Nevertheless beginning in 1972 villagization was pursued with even greater speed and energy. Roughly 60 percent of the Gogo, 250,000, for example, were moved within one year into 124 planned villages, some of which had populations of 4,000 or more. From late 1973 on, however, the emphasis was merely on settling people together; the *ujamaa* aspect was no longer stressed as a short-term goal. Only a small number of villages farmed collectively.

#### **Promises and Failures of Ujamaa**

In 1977 Nyerere said that 13,065,000 people, or about 70 percent of the population, were living in 7,684 villages. How many of these thousands of settlements are genuinely new villages, how many simply old villages, how many just nominal villages enclosing the same scattered homesteads as before and thereby receiving all kinds of government benefits, no one knows. Visitors have described seeing abandoned houses in the countryside, indicating that the inhabitants have moved away. There have also been reports of people who moved to new villages—put in perhaps two days of work—and lived and worked the rest of their time in the old homesteads. Some apparently moved but left their wives in the old homestead to retain a stake in the traditional system.

When work on the communal fields brought little return people spent as little time as possible on them and concentrated their major efforts on their gardens where they grew their own food and sometimes even cash crops, which they sold for their own benefit. People who had been settled in villages far from their old home missed their relatives, weddings, religious rituals, and beer parties, which used to provide a welcome break in a tedious work routine.

When promises of a better life failed to attract settlers, the government and party tended to use threats and, out of frustration and impatience, even physical force in transporting unwilling people to a new settlement. Some people were jailed. Sometimes the old houses were burned after people had moved to the new villages. Nyerere himself admitted that force might sometimes be needed. He cautioned, however, that "a man . . . is not being developed if he is herded like an animal into the new venture."

Conversely the few *ujamaa* villages that seem to function well are those that were set up voluntarily by people who understood the advantage of cooperation and knew how to organize their work efficiently. Examples are the villages in the Ruvuma area set up in the early 1960s by young idealistic members of the TANU Youth League and some villages in the Tanga region that were established in 1963 by people who had worked on nearby sisal plantations.

Tanzania's history has been one of continuous movement of small groups splitting off and settling somewhere else. Why should the setting up of *ujamaa* villages have created so many difficulties, especially since Nyerere stressed the traditional roots of his *ujamaa* concept? B.B. Bakula, a young Haya, in a political science paper published in March 1969 at the University College of Dar es Salaam, points to a basic difference between traditional practices in Haya society and Nyerere's concept.

It is true, he says, that there are in Haya society certain aspects of communalism. Land, for example, is owned by the lineage, and there is extensive cooperation among family and lineage members. Although land is owned communally, however, its use is not communal. Rights to use specific plots are allocated by the chief to the different families who must cultivate them and who cannot sell them. But the usufruct rights are inherited so that the arrangement in fact resembles private property more than it does communal ownership.

*Ujamaa* rhetoric proclaims that the mobilization of cooperative efforts is to the advantage of the group. To the contrary, says Bakula, people help each other ultimately for their own benefit. Help was given to and received from relatives, not strangers, but this was not a problem because neighbors usually were members of the same clan. When individuals had to move away because landholdings, which were subdivided among a father's sons, became too small, or for other reasons such as witchcraft or quarrels, they preferred to move where relatives were already settled because they would help in building a temporary shelter and provide food until the first harvest. The local headman would give them a plot of land, usually in the communal grazing area surrounding Haya villages. The impetus for settling therefore came from the individual.

Although structures of cooperation and reciprocity are not necessarily the same as among the Haya, the pattern of mutual aid or cooperation for the ultimate advantage of individuals or families is quite widespread. In some places, as among the Chaga, the degree of individual control over land may have gone even further than among the Haya, although this did not preclude cooperation among lineage mates and neighbors in certain circumstances. The presence among the Chaga of a coffee marketing cooperative union since the 1930s (with antecedents in the 1920s) was seen as a business enterprise conducive to the well-being of the individual



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Chaga. Elsewhere, as among the Sukuma and Nyamwezi, the neighborhood and certain kinds of societies were the significant units of cooperation, but they were not collectives.

In contrast *ujamaa* villages are laid out by government planners, and then a search is made for new settlers by local party members. Bakula describes one particular instance in which the settlers brought provisions to the new place, a village called Omurunazi. The provisions eventually gave out so the settlers appealed to local people for help. Invariably the local people would feed only those among the settlers to whom they were related and refused to help the others. There were many people who had come from more than forty-five kilometers (twenty-eight miles) away and had no local kinfolk. Party leaders tried to persuade the newcomers that they were now one clan and should share everything. Some did indeed pool their resources for a while, but the tradition to favor relatives remained strong.

Moreover in a traditional village there is strong social pressure on individuals to do their share, says Bakula. If someone, for example, refuses to help with the building of a house, he will get no help with his own house and becomes a social outcast. Planners hoped that the same social pressures would prevail in *ujamaa* villages, but people failed to perceive these villages as newer versions of the old ones. In the traditional situation people knew exactly what was expected of them. They had a very hazy idea what they were supposed to do in the *ujamaa* village. The result was that they had to be told what to do.

#### **New Institutions: The Ten-House Cell**

Villagization has led to the emergence of new institutions and new leaders. Under the colonial government the administration relied on chiefs and village headmen to implement their programs, and at first the party and the newly independent government also endeavored to enlist their cooperation. In 1964, however, Village Development Committees (VDCs) were set up. Their members were usually young men, fairly well educated, and not related to former headmen. Villagers regarded them with mistrust. In some cases respect for the old chiefs remained strong, and before long the traditional leaders were asked to join the VDCs. Isolation and comparative autonomy remained the most outstanding characteristics of village life.

To cope with this situation the National Executive Committee of TANU voted in April 1964 to immediately put into effect a resolution passed the year before that called for the establishment of party cells below the village level. There was to be one cell for every ten houses in urban and rural areas. In rural areas the term *house* was more likely to mean a homestead, usually several structures housing the different members of one extended family. Ten homesteads, in turn, often house the different families belonging to one lineage.

In sparsely settled areas a cell might actually contain fewer than



*Coastal village near Dar es Salaam  
Courtesy James L. McLaughlin*

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ten houses and in densely populated areas more than ten. According to the Constitution the party members of a cell must elect a cell leader. In reality, however, all people belonging to one cell vote, and there are instances on record where they elected as leader someone who was not even a party member. Party and government merged at the lowest level when in 1966 all the cell leaders became members of the VDCs.

The cell leader is intended to be the link between the people and the national leader. He must communicate and explain government and party policies and is in turn expected to transmit the wishes and views of the cell members. There are conflicting reports on how he fulfills these two functions. According to some he is better at transmitting directives from above than demands from below and that, moreover, he is apt to identify and report local opponents to the regime. According to others, cell leaders, especially in remote areas, remain foremost villagers who want to live in peace and harmony. Therefore they remain largely passive and do not force changes on unwilling village members (see ch. 2).

There is no way for an outsider to determine how thoroughly the country is blanketed by the Ten-House Cell system. There have been public complaints that in many parts of the country cell leaders have not been elected for a long time. According to one study entire sections of some towns are without functioning cells. According to others the role played by the cell system in communicating national decisions is impressive and nationwide.

A number of studies have been made to determine who gets elected as cell leader, and it seems that the dividing line between old and new leaders is not clear-cut. One report by Astrid Nypan on the Meru shows that old and new institutions are interwoven, although chiefs were abolished by government decree on January 1, 1963, and lineages have lost control over land—a function taken over by the Meru-Arusha District Council. It seems that clans and age-grades, Christian congregations and cooperatives, and ten-house cells form interlocking clusters, with several kinds of leadership sometimes vested in the same individual. The Meru seem to make no distinction between the traditional and modern elements of their social structure.

These observations have been borne out elsewhere in Tanzania. Clyde R. Ingle reports great continuity in village leadership. Not only are the cell leaders often the former headmen or village council members, but cell leaders often do more or less what the traditional village leaders used to do, namely help people with their personal problems. They arbitrate quarrels between neighbors, between married people and between parents and children. They deal with adultery and divorce and minor crimes like abuse, threats, petty theft, or drunkenness. They settle disputes over bridewealth, debts, and land use. Problems that they cannot handle they refer to the party officer.

That cell leaders are often the traditional leaders is not astonish-

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ing because in many areas there are no other competent and acceptable leaders available. Some traditional leaders are educated men with a modern viewpoint who have become enthusiastic party leaders. Moreover persons with potential leadership qualities but without traditional sanctions may be reluctant to step forward and offer themselves for the new role for fear of exciting jealousy or becoming ostracized.

When traditional leaders are not elected they retire from public life and use their influence surreptitiously. People then expect the cell leader to deal with problems arising from the new situation but continue to go with their domestic problems to the traditional leader who, in their eyes, is protected by strong religious sanctions. He continues to conduct rituals connected with the agricultural cycle, gives offerings to ancestral spirits, plays an important role in marriage and burial ceremonies, and is a respected witness in court cases concerning land disputes. He knows the local customary law with which modern judges are often unfamiliar. In fact it seems that traditional headmen continue to function as informal dispute settlers below the official court system.

In Tanzania's heterogeneous towns cell leaders are not likely to be traditional leaders. They help migrants deal with the difficult adjustment in urban living without accustomed family support, with unemployment, and with job search, a role played in many other African countries by ethnic associations.

Cell leaders do not get paid, in contrast to former headmen who used to get a small salary. They may have to give a lot of time to party duties when they should be working at their jobs or in their fields. But reportedly they do get a certain amount of presents and tributes.

### **Changing Role of Women**

Nyerere's new society is to provide a more favorable place for women, and women have responded by giving him their allegiance. Long before independence their status had been deteriorating with the introduction of the money economy and of modern education. Cash crops have become the domain of men, and in schools boys vastly outnumber girls. As a result women have often become economically dependent on fathers, brothers, and husbands, while formerly they enjoyed some independence. In the traditional subsistence economy their position remains fairly strong even though they are expected to be subservient to men. They are not only mothers and wives but producers. They do the major part of the cultivating tasks, and they feed the family. They earn small amounts of cash by selling the surplus of their fields and perhaps some handicrafts on local markets, and they can dispose of this money as they wish.

TANU espoused their cause. On the mainland (but not on Zanzibar) a new marriage law was introduced designed to ameliorate their situation. It superseded African customary and Islamic laws.



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According to this law a first wife has to officially register her approval in court before a husband can take a second wife. She is entitled to inheritance in case her husband dies, which formerly she was not. The minimum age for marriage is set at fifteen (eighteen for men); a woman may no longer be coerced into a marriage. Uniform rules are to be applied in case of divorce. Formerly all a Muslim had to do was to say three times, "I divorce thee." Cases of divorce must first be discussed before a marriage conciliatory board and no longer before elders or village headmen.

There are reports that women prefer to go to the party leader or the marriage conciliatory board to settle a marital dispute because they see this as a chance to break away from the traditional authority of men. There are few legal experts, however, so that people are often forced to resort to traditional mechanisms for handling family affairs.

The party also emphasizes the importance of formal education for women, has facilitated their enrollment at higher places of learning, and has urged them to attend adult education courses (see Education, this ch.). Thus they could acquaint themselves with their new rights, of which few seem to be aware. In town the party has set up cottage industry training centers to give women new opportunities to make a living.

What effect the new laws have had is difficult to ascertain. But even the casual observer can detect considerable change by such a seemingly unimportant fact that men and women can now be seen eating together, which traditionally they never did.

Women also seem to like the idea of communal farms better than men. They appreciate the availability of social services and the fact that they get paid at the same rate as men. There are even reports that women have started communal farms on their own.

#### **Egalitarianism or New Stratification**

Equality not only for women but for all citizens is Nyerere's aim and preventing the development of social stratification his continuing concern. With independence and the departure of Europeans a whole array of new economic, social and political roles have become available to Tanzanians. This has led to an increase in upward social and economic mobility and the formation of social classes, a trend that Nyerere deplors. Steps were taken to reduce income differentials in the salaries of public officials, which, at independence, stood at eighty or 100 to one. Within ten years that differential was reduced to a ratio of between nine and fourteen to one—still a far cry from equality.

In the same egalitarian spirit it was decided in 1974 that henceforth the proper address between all people, regardless of occupation, status, or age should be *ndugu* (Swahili for brother but translated as comrade). This is a difficult habit to acquire in a society where respect for older people is ingrained from childhood and where older persons are customarily addressed as "honorable elder."

Nyerere tends to interpret all inequality as exploitation. In his eyes a successful farmer who is able to hire laborers is taking advantage of his poorer neighbor who would be better off in an *ujamaa* village. One analyst has suggested that the poor farmer does not consider himself exploited by his rich neighbor but aspires to be like him. Moreover he is likely to view the *ujamaa* village as an alien institution, a place for the inefficient and luckless who have to follow government regulations.

In fact the very setting up of a new village seems to have brought about a new kind of social stratification. In a study of a settlement scheme in eastern Tanzania James L. Brain reports that the *ujamaa* staff, that is, the agricultural, technical, and administrative personnel, were living in a special area by themselves to which villagers referred as *uzunguni* (the place of the Europeans), the very name villagers had used during colonial times for European areas—a good indication of the new social gap that has developed.

Neither has Nyerere been able to reduce the sizable income differentials existing between city and countryside. In 1974 it was estimated that after taxes urban people earned five times as much as rural people.

### **Education**

Education plays a paramount role in fashioning the society envisioned by Nyerere. In a white paper entitled *Education for Self-Reliance* published in April 1967 he argued that: "Our education must inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community and help the pupils to accept the values to our kind of future, not those appropriate to our colonial past. Education . . . must encourage the development of a proud, independent, and free citizenry, which relies upon itself for its own development and which knows the advantages and the problems of cooperation." According to Nyerere the big mistake of the former system was that primary education was seen as a step toward secondary education. Since only about 1 percent of primary-school graduates were able to go on to secondary education, it left the vast majority with a deep sense of failure, and it produced in that tiny minority who made it through university a sense of belonging to an elite entitled to special considerations and material rewards. In other words education in the past produced social classes.

Under the system proposed by Nyerere, education at each level is complete in itself rather than a preparatory course for the next level. He raised the entrance age to seven to make primary-school graduates older and thus better able to become immediately productive. Instead of preparing for examinations students are now preparing for the kind of nonacademic agricultural life most of them will lead.

Farms and workshops, where modern methods are taught with simple tools, have become an integral part of schools. The farms provide food as well as teach the students and preferably are near

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
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
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roads where passersby can see the students learning the principles of efficient agriculture. Students are also expected to participate in housekeeping and administrative tasks as means of learning responsibility and the benefits derived from work and cooperation. Primary and secondary school students in towns must work in nearby villages to prevent gaps from forming between urban and rural people. At all levels teachers must try to make the students aware of their potential. During vacation students in higher education are expected to participate in practical projects related to their field of study, with part of their wages going to their college or institution. Failure to do this leads to a lower grade.

Since independence the government has been allocating about 20 percent of its recurrent budget for education. This is still far from sufficient, and planners have been torn between different priorities. At first the desperate need for trained manpower led to an emphasis on secondary and higher education. Since the Arusha Declaration and in line with the government's egalitarian philosophy and goal of self-reliance the emphasis has been on primary and adult education.

The National Executive Committee of TANU decided during a meeting at Musoma in November 1974 to aim at obligatory universal primary education beginning in 1977 and urged villagers to build schools. Shortened courses were devised to train primary-school teachers, and where teachers were lacking, good students only fifteen or sixteen years old were pressed into helping out as teachers.

Three years after the TANU meeting nearly all seven-year olds were indeed entering school. The total population in primary school was reported to be 3.6 million, or more than seven times the number at independence.

About 7.7 percent of those who leave primary school or about 10,000 young people—32 percent of them women—enter vocational training programs each year. The programs, run by both church and government, are designed to teach skills that are needed in rural areas, thus preventing migration to urban areas. From available reports it seems, however, that the program has failed and that graduates continue to migrate to the cities. In principle students may be trained in twenty-two different skills, but most seem to learn only carpentry, or masonry or—in the case of girls—domestic science. The courses that would specifically prepare them for rural living are either not offered or not taken.

The number of secondary school students had tripled by 1975. About three-quarters of them were boys. There are one or more secondary schools in all regions, but most are concentrated in or near a few urban areas. The majority are boarding schools. The emphasis in secondary school curricula is on agriculture, commerce, home economics, and technical and scientific subjects. In 1967 about 72 percent of the teachers were expatriates, but since



*Children of an ujamaa village assembled for a reading lesson  
Camera Press photo*

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that time they have been rapidly replaced by Tanzanians who take two-year courses at one of fifteen teachers' colleges.

At the 1974 party meeting in Musoma it was decided that students could no longer pass directly to institutions of higher learning. They first have to work for several years in an industry, a village, or in the administration. Before being admitted to the university they have to pass three hurdles. They are judged by the university on their academic standards, local party representatives evaluate their devotion to national policies, and their employers and coworkers testify to their character and professional performance. Once they have passed all three counts they are accepted and sign a contract that they will work at least five years wherever they are posted in government service on completion of their studies. For the time being women were exempt from these rules as a temporary compensation for the disadvantages suffered by them in the past.

No reports were available on students' reactions to these regulations. However, eight years earlier in 1966 students had rebelled when a compulsory period of national service was introduced for all who had completed higher education.

Whether these regulations will prevent the emergence of what has been called a "modernizing oligarchy," remains to be seen. It will be difficult to keep substantial material rewards from the highly skilled that the country so desperately needs. An investigation into the kind of candidates elected for public office shows that other things being equal, voters choose the better educated candidates.

In 1975 there were more than 3,000 students at the University of Dar es Salaam. There had been only 100 university graduates at independence, all of whom had studied abroad. The university has a number of faculties including law, arts and sciences, the Department of External Studies, and the institutes of public administration, adult education, Swahili research, and fisheries. The Institute of Public Administration gives three to nine months' training courses to high local government administrators and district magistrates.

Because of a serious lack of mid-level technicians three-year courses for students in civil, electrical, or mechanical engineering have been offered since 1967 at Dar es Salaam Technical College. In December 1975 a West German-financed engineering faculty was inaugurated at the University of Dar es Salaam with 120 students. Two-year courses in management and general commercial training are offered at the Business Training Institute, which is operated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

One of the government's great achievements has been the extraordinary expansion of adult education. "First we must educate adults," said Nyerere during the inauguration of the first five-year development plan in 1964. "Our children will not have an impact on our development for five, ten, or even twenty years. The

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attitudes of adults, on the other hand, have an impact now."

In 1967 an estimated 71 percent of the rural population and 30 percent of the people in cities were without any formal schooling. This included much lower percentages for females. In Zanzibar 68 percent of the population were estimated to have no formal schooling whatsoever, and 15 percent had only from one to four years of elementary school. Adult education was considered indispensable to implement *ujamaa* effectively.

A pilot scheme was started in Mwanza in 1968, followed by a universal campaign conducted with the help of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): the government contributed 10 percent of the education budget. The campaign, using radiobroadcasts, pamphlets, and regular courses, aimed not only at functional literacy in Swahili but at what was called "consciousness raising," which included the principles of hygiene, agricultural techniques, crafts, basic mathematics, and explained the principles of *ujamaa*. Students were told over and over again that they should fight fatalism—that they were capable of changing their own fate.

In April 1971 about 75,000 adults started taking the courses. Their number increased to nearly 3 million within two years. In 1973 workers' education was made compulsory in government offices, parastatal organizations, industries, town councils, all TANU bodies, and other public institutions. The campaign stopped then because of an upheaval caused by forced villagization, but by 1975 up to 3 million had taken the literacy tests conducted in August 1975, half of whom passed at the third or fourth level, which means that they could read, write, and do simple arithmetic.

About 700,000 volunteers worked in the campaign of whom only about 60,000 received a small monthly sum of TSh60 (for value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary). Some of these teachers were given accelerated three-month courses. They included professional teachers, but 40 percent were literate farmers and 13 percent were government employees. Cooperating in the program were various ministries, including the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

It was hoped at first that the entire nation could be made literate by 1975. This hope was not realized because there was not enough money to recruit enough teachers or to buy vehicles to transport them. There were not enough books, nor follow-up programs, and enthusiasm tended to subside after a few weeks.

### **Role of Swahili in Nationbuilding**

Swahili is used not only in all adult literacy programs but also in primary school and through the fourth form in secondary school. Children no longer learn to read, write, and do numbers in their own language but in Swahili. English is taught as a second lan-



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guage. The government makes gigantic efforts to train qualified Swahili teachers, but in 1977 their lack continued to be a serious problem.

Swahili was declared the national language of Tanganyika at independence in 1961. In 1963 it became the official language of newly independent Zanzibar, and in 1967, three years after the two countries merged, it became the official language of Tanzania. Leaders felt strongly that use of a foreign language signified psychological dependency. In most other African countries where the official language is that of the former colonial power, leadership positions are in the hands of a small elite whose knowledge of a European language accentuates the gap that separates them from the masses. Many party officials have very poor or no knowledge of English, and Abeid Karume, Tanzania's former vice president, knew no English at all. The choice of Swahili as Tanzania's official language was made easier by the fact that no ethnic group is large enough to promote its own language. While Kenyans sing their national anthem in English and Senegalese sing theirs in French, Tanzanians sing "Mungu ibariki Africa" (God bless Africa) in Swahili. Because Swahili is the national language a much wider circle of people can be called on to serve in the government or be elected to parliament.

Swahili is a Bantu language with a number of foreign loanwords, particularly from Arabic, and is thus easier to learn for Bantu speakers than English. It developed as a coastal language as early as the thirteenth century and was carried inland by traders. (*Sawahil* is an Arabic word meaning *coast*.) It is spoken as far north on the East African coast as southern Somalia, as far south as Mozambique, and in such inland countries as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and parts of Zaire. Only in Tanganyika, however, was Swahili given substantial encouragement as the official lingua franca by the colonial government.

Once a vehicle for the expression and transmission of Islamic culture it has become a tool for nationbuilding, somewhat comparable to the role of Hebrew in Israel. From its beginning TANU has used Swahili to reach and organize people in rural areas. The word *ujamaa*, which expresses the national ideology, is a Swahili word. Nyerere and party officials can easily communicate with local people whether they are in Dodoma, Arusha, or Mwanza, and so can civil servants who are rarely appointed to their region of origin. All government and party meetings must be conducted in Swahili on threat of a fine. Time spent in the army and the National Service also helps spread its use.

The media, which play a crucial role in linking the government and party to the people also use Swahili. Aside from the English language *Daily News* two daily newspapers, *Uhuru* and *Ngurumu* (with a combined circulation of about 36,000), two weekly publications *Mfanya Kazi* and *Kwetu* (each with a circulation of about 10,000), and fifteen other publications dealing with specific

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interests and appearing only once or twice a month are published in Swahili. Of two radio stations one broadcasts only in Swahili, the other in both Swahili and English. Color television, which began in January 1973 on Zanzibar also uses Swahili. Even the Christian missions, some of whom spurned Swahili as the language of Islam have shifted to Swahili, and a Swahili bible is widely sold.

Swahili has had a tendency to proliferate and to stabilize into separate dialects each tied to a specific community. The preferred standard for what is considered "correct" Swahili is kiUnguja, spoken in Zanzibar town. The name means literally "language of Zanzibar," *unguja* being the ancient name for the town. Besides kiUnguja, there are a number of other Swahili dialects spoken as far apart as the Somali coast and eastern Zaire, but they are mutually intelligible.

The government has established two institutions to implement its language policy. One is the Institute of Swahili Research, which collects, preserves, and publishes manuscripts—especially traditional poetry—and has produced an extensive reference dictionary.

The other is the National Swahili Council, the authority on what words to incorporate. The council promotes and develops standard Swahili, advises the government and public on linguistic problems, and promotes Swahili literature by giving out prizes for the best novels. It also has published, after several years of hard work, a legal vocabulary containing about 3,300 words.

Difficulties arise because certain technological concepts are new to Swahili. Words had to be coined or borrowed (usually from English) for such modern terms as *parliament*, *president*, *republic*, *capitalism* and many others. There is still a lack of Swahili words for technical concepts, and English continues to be used in those areas where Swahili proves inadequate. In fact many national and government activities are still carried on in English.

Nor can Swahili adequately express the cultural nuances specific to the languages of the various ethnic groups. Something essential is lost when Chaga or Sukuma poems are translated into Swahili. To prove that it can be done at all, Nyerere has translated Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* into Swahili. Swahili is a useful means of communication and an invaluable tool for creating a national consciousness, but it is not a vehicle for a Tanzanian culture as much as some eager advocates proclaim it to be. The mother tongue remains the language of family life, a means of ethnic identification. Swahili has become the language of the Tanzanian citizen and has added a new dimension to the individual's consciousness.

### **Health**

In 1975 the government decided to nationalize all hospitals, including those run by private organizations (mainly Christian churches), which had provided two-fifths of all hospital and dispensary beds and one-third and more of maternal and child care

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services. The immediate effect was the exodus of many medical practitioners.

In line with Nyerere's egalitarian philosophy the government has embarked on a comprehensive plan to provide a modicum of basic health care to the greatest number of people. Access to a simple facility is one of the promises of *ujamaa* villages. In 1975 the health budget took 6.3 percent of the national budget; the highest priority was given to rural health infrastructure and increasing the number of training centers for rural based health-workers. By that time a growing number of people took advantage of modern health care, paying on an average three visits annually to a health facility.

Accurate information on the incidence of common diseases is lacking because only a limited percentage of those who are ill come to the attention of medical practitioners, and only hospitals and dispensaries submit reports of illness and mortality. According to these reports three-quarters of all hospital deaths are caused by four poverty linked groups of diseases. They are infectious and parasitic diseases, illnesses of the respiratory system, such nutritionally related diseases as malnutrition and anemia, and diseases of the digestive system.

Among the common tropical diseases are malaria, sleeping sickness, leprosy, and various diseases of parasitic origin. Other common illnesses are tuberculosis, pneumonia, poliomyelitis, venereal diseases, and various childhood diseases.

Despite major efforts at eradication malaria is the greatest single cause of illness and death. Less than 10 percent of the population lives in the very dry or high areas where malaria is not endemic. Children suffer the most from malarial infection; many, especially those who are not well nourished, die of it within their first two years. Older children and adults who have developed a certain immunity are less susceptible to the seasonal outbreaks that occur after the beginning of the rainy season.

Schistosomiasis (bilharzia) ranks second to malaria as a debilitating disease. Transmitted by water harboring infected snails it is endemic in many areas of the mainland and the islands where swamps and slow moving water are contaminated by human waste. A survey near Mwanza found half of the people infected of whom two-fifths had suffered permanent damage.

The danger of sleeping sickness is especially acute because over two-thirds of the land area is infested with tsetse flies that transmit the disease. The fly thrives on the wooded banks of rivers and lakes. Incidence of the disease declines after use of insecticides and after bush clearing for settlement and cultivation.

There are an estimated 150,000 cases of pneumonia annually. Transmission is favored by close contact and is a serious problem in areas of high population density. Poliomyelitis occurs sporadically in all regions, and onchocerciasis (river blindness) in



*Physician member of a mobile medical  
team examines a young patient  
Camera Press photo*



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several separate locations. In some locations over one-third of the population is infected.

There are estimated to be about 150,000 cases of leprosy in Tanzania. Of a probable 30,000 new cases a year, only about one-third are diagnosed and one-fifth adequately treated.

Nutritional disorders create susceptibility to other diseases and are the direct or indirect cause of death, especially among children. Malnutrition results from deficiencies in the overall diet but also from uneven distribution of available food within a community or within a family. Children frequently get the last and the least nourishing portions.

In 1974 it was estimated that out of ten babies three suffered from undernourishment, one from malnutrition, and two from various diseases. In that year a campaign was started called *Chakula ni Uhai* (Nourishment is Life) during which party and government officials, university teachers, and members of the Institute of Adult Education taught principles of good nutrition. The campaign was closely tied to another one called *Siasa ni Kilimo* (Politics is Agriculture), which urged people to raise agricultural production.

Much of the ill health is attributable to unsanitary conditions and crowded or unventilated houses. Food is stored in the open and exposed to dust and flies that breed in open latrines and unprotected waste disposal sites. Only four towns have partial sewage systems.

Almost all water in rural areas, which is generally gotten from rivers, lakes, stagnant pools, and only rarely from springs and wells, is subject to contamination. Water polluted with human waste is frequently used for laundering, bathing, and sometimes drinking. In new villages a clean water supply is theoretically one of the first requisites, done by communal labor, with a party official often digging the first spadeful. In 1977 Nyerere claimed that about 3 million people in rural areas were reasonably near a clean water supply, which, however, meant that about 10 million people were not.

The simplest medical facilities available are the dispensaries, which provide basic curative care and dispense drugs. They are headed by a rural medical aide who must have seven years of schooling and three years of training. There were 1,785 operating in 1975, receiving about 20,000 patients a year. It was hoped to increase their number to 2,000 by 1980, or one for each 6,000 rural inhabitants.

The dispensaries are attached to the Rural Health Centers, which provide preventive and curative services to about 50,000 people annually and maintain about thirty hospital beds. They are headed by a medical assistant who has had eleven years of schooling and three years of training. In 1976 their number was 152, to be raised to 300 by 1980. Hospitals were mainly in urban areas, and in 1975 a decision was made not to expand them.

### *Physical and Social Setting*

In 1975 of about 500 doctors (including eighty Chinese and 200 in private practice) only one-fifth were situated in towns in contrast to most other African countries where doctors were rarely found in the countryside. In Tanzania graduates of the Medical School in Dar es Salaam are required to serve a specified number of years in outlying areas. Health planning also called for 12,000 medical assistants by 1980, 2,500 rural medical aides, 2,500 maternal and health aides, 800 health auxiliary, and other personnel for the rural infrastructure.

Plans also call for one family planning expert in each dispensary, to ensure better health for mothers and children rather than to curb population growth. Nevertheless Nyerere has said it was more important to have well cared for children than to have many and to remember that children are only consumers during the first ten years of their life without helping to produce, a message that is broadcast over the radio. The Family Planning Association, affiliated with the International Planned Parenthood Association (IPPS), was founded in 1969; in 1978 it had forty-one branches.

Large numbers of Tanzanians have recourse to traditional methods of diagnosis and treatment. There is a widespread belief that illness and death are caused by malevolent spirits, or angry ancestors, or are the result of the conscious and unconscious misconduct of the sick person or a member of his family. Important aspects of traditional cures therefore involve discovering the cause through divination and restoring the social equilibrium through magical acts and sacrifice. Other traditional methods include drinking herbal potions or applying salves. The medical value of many traditional remedies is dubious. Some may even be harmful and result in severe infection or death. Others, however, are based on observation of natural phenomena and have been shown to be very effective.

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For more detailed information on traditional ethnography the reader should consult the series published by the International African Institute in London. Each study in the series includes an extensive bibliography of the works published to that point. A recent one on the Chaga and Meru by Sally Falk Moore and Paul Puritt was published in October 1977 but was not available at the time this study was written. No single book deals comprehensively with Tanzania's present-day social society, but a great deal has been published on various aspects of the social system in periodical literature. (For further information see Bibliography.)

## Chapter 4. The Economy



*African elephant*



**TANZANIA'S ECONOMY** IN the mid- and late-1970s was profoundly agriculturally based. It was socialist in character and structure and distinguished by its approach to economic development, which demanded that economic growth be accompanied by an equitable distribution of the wealth generated. It differed markedly from the economy at independence, which bore the imprint of colonial capitalism and was part of, and dependent on, the international capitalist system. Moreover in 1961 the country's limited manufacturing, modern agricultural, commercial, and financial sectors were overwhelmingly foreign owned. The new government then looked forward to substantially greater African participation and ownership but essentially along the lines of the existing economic system. It also intended to make a significant break with the old pattern by altering the emphasis on the production of agricultural commodities for export to develop an economy more balanced structurally.

In line with this intention, the first comprehensive, long-term development effort, a five-year plan begun in 1964, stressed development of the manufacturing and marketing sectors as the way to increase the national income. Because of Tanzania's low level of indigenous capital resources as well as debt-servicing constraints on government borrowing abroad, the plan placed great reliance on securing capital from the country's private (in essence, foreign) sector—in the form of reinvestments in Tanzania—and from new investment from abroad. Indigenous cooperative movements and joint government participation with the private sector in industrial and commercial projects were anticipated and looked on as the best way to effect a more equitable distribution of the nation's increasing gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), which was projected to grow at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent.

Implementation of the five-year plan did not go as expected, and in 1966 a mid-plan assessment was made. The assessment pointed out that because of a shortage of skilled and professional staff and certain constraints on fund availability in the public sector, the private sector was expanding at a relatively greater rate than anticipated, and problems had been encountered in securing foreign aid for public sector projects. The government had also learned, however, that it was able to mobilize internal resources to a much greater extent than it had believed possible. Between 1964 and 1966 the GDP had grown at an average annual rate of only about 5 percent; this was partly explained by a drought in 1965 and a drop in world commodity prices in 1965 and 1966. A concurrent decline in agricultural employment had occurred, whereas employment in industry and public services rose, and urban real incomes over the two years had shown a considerable

increase. The net result of this had been to widen the gap between the incomes of urban wage earners and those of smallhold farmers.

After the assessment a new course was charted for the economy by President Julius K. Nyerere in a document presented to a national conference of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) at Arusha in January 1967. Published the following month and since known as the Arusha Declaration, its basic theme was self-reliance. It called for primary emphasis to be placed on rural development and stated the determination of TANU to lead the nation on the path to a socialist society. The broad objectives enunciated were social equality, self-reliance, the abolition of stark poverty, and the transformation of the economy and society. Two major economic strategies were considered fundamental to achieve these goals. The first called for state ownership of industry, services, financial institutions, and the export-import marketing apparatus; and the second for collective ownership and production in agriculture, which was to be achieved through the medium of the *ujamaa* village (see Glossary) (see *Ujamaa Villages and Villagization*, this ch.). There would also be a limited number of state farms cultivating certain crops that could benefit from large-scale operations and management.

The economy that evolved after the Arusha Declaration followed these two strategies, but pragmatic considerations resulted in certain modifications from time to time as programs were implemented, and external forces—world inflation, for one—over which Tanzania had little or no control necessitated readjustments within the economy. The general nature and thrust, however, remained socialist, but comparisons with the centrally planned socialist economies of Eastern Europe showed important dissimilarities. Tanzania has rejected the idea that improvement in the material standard of living could best be achieved through an emphasis on industrialization. The model projected was rather one of an agrarian society in which industrialization was to have an important but subsidiary role. Social ownership of the principal means of production was a basic tenet; but a place was seen for private capital in modern small-scale industries and businesses. Also distinguishing Tanzania's socialism was the decentralization of responsibility for regional and district development activities, including the delegation to local bodies of a large amount of control over local expenditure. The Arusha Declaration gave no attention to the classic Marxist-Leninist concept of struggle between existing economic classes, although a principal argument advanced for the economic transformation intended was that it would prevent the formation of socioeconomic classes.

### **Income Distribution and Gross Domestic Product**

Since the Arusha Declaration of 1967, a fundamental policy position has been that disparities between urban and rural incomes must be minimized and that significant differences in wages and salaries generally must be prevented from developing.

A major move in this direction was the nationalization of significant parts of the productive and commercial sectors that had as one principal aim preventing the emergence of an urban class earning high incomes through capital investment in industry and commerce. Government leaders and the leadership echelons of the parastatal corporations also were forbidden to enter into private businesses or other activities for remuneration, a prohibition that was aimed at forestalling the rise of an urban elite enjoying higher incomes (see ch. 2; ch. 3). The principal measures affecting urban income distribution, however, were progressive taxation and, in wage and salary raises, the use of inverse scales that greatly reduced and frequently allowed no increases at the top levels. In early 1977 President Nyerere noted that in 1967 the highest salary in the public sector after taxes was twenty times greater than the minimum wage but that, as the result of the government's incomes policy, the ratio had been reduced to nine to one by the end of 1976.

Rural income distribution varied considerably by regions because of natural differences in conditions affecting cultivation. Within regions the development of cash crops in certain areas had resulted in marked income differences between the occupier of the land and workers—for example, among the Chaga—although the establishment by the government of minimum wages for agricultural workers had reduced this somewhat (see land Tenure, this ch.). Villagization, especially after 1973, may also have had some effect in such areas in leveling incomes, but information on this was scant (see Ujamaa Villages and Villagization, this ch.).

In general rural incomes were well below those of urban areas—in 1967 the average small farmer had a real income only about 25 percent to under 35 percent of the urban income derived from wages and salaries. Efforts to hold urban wage increases to an annual fixed 5 percent after 1967 were only partly successful. Taxes and inflation appear to have reduced urban income real growth, however, and there was some evidence that the earlier urban-rural real income differential had not widened as of 1973.

This situation may have been altered, however, by a number of major economic actions and events, an assessment of which was not available in late 1977. These included the effects on farm production and income of the mass villagization program of the 1974-76 period and the generally substantial increases in producer prices for farm commodities between 1974 and 1977 (see Agriculture, this ch.). Also affecting the rural but proportionately much more the urban sector was a large increase (over 40 percent) in 1974 in the minimum wage—there were also raises for middle- and upper-level staff—and sharp price increases in food and other consumer goods. A further, smaller wage adjustment (12 percent), applied to lower paid employees only, was also made in 1975.

The economy exhibited a strongly dualistic character in the late 1970s, the subsistence sector accounting for well over a quarter of GDP (see table 4, Appendix A). An unknown, but in certain areas

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large, number of people were only marginally involved with the money economy. Monetized production, however, has gradually increased its share from about three-fifths of total GDP in 1958—estimated by a World Bank (see Glossary) survey mission in 1959—to 72.5 percent in current prices in 1974. Food shortages—as a result of the 1973 and 1974 drought years—led to an emphasis on subsistence crop production in 1975 by many farmers, to the exclusion of cash-cropping, and the imputed value of the subsistence sector's contribution to GDP rose substantially in that year.

Overall growth of GDP has been unimpressive, however, in view of the high level of gross domestic investment attained (see Savings and Investment, this ch.). In real terms GDP grew during the period from 1964 to 1973 at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent, in contrast to projections of the First Five-Year Plan (1964-69) of 6.7 percent and of the Second Five-Year Plan (1969-74) of 6.5 percent. The achieved rate, moreover, measured against the annual population growth of 2.7 percent, meant that real per capita product increased during this time at only 1.8 percent a year. The economic setback of 1974 was reflected in the GDP growth rate of 2.2 percent for the year. In 1975 it had returned to 4.6 percent, roughly the average for the 1967-73 period, and reached 5.2 percent in 1976. The Third Five-Year Plan (1977-81) established a growth rate of 6 percent for the plan period.

A principal explanation for the comparatively low rate of GDP growth was the emphasis on slow-return infrastructure projects, which characterized the period before the economic crisis of 1974 and 1975. Between 1970 and 1973, for example, transport and communications accounted for almost 47 percent of fixed capital formation—in part related to political considerations involving the construction of major oil pipeline, railroad, and road connections to Zambia—and over the 1966-73 period the sector received over 43 percent of fixed capital investment compared to about 23 percent for the productive sectors (see Transportation, this ch.; ch.2).

Growth in agriculture, the main source of livelihood, and of exports was particularly low. Between 1967 and 1973 this sector grew in real terms at an average annual rate of only 2.7 percent, and in 1973, the first year of major impact of the 1973 and 1974 droughts, suffered a decline of about 3 percent. The agricultural sector experienced considerable uncertainties during this time because of major institutional changes including villagization and decentralization, which were believed to have affected production levels (see Agriculture, this ch.). The pragmatic reallocation of development funds to agriculture by the government beginning in the 1974 fiscal year (July 1974-June 1975) to counter the economic crisis; increases in producer prices; and exhortations to increase food output, plus improved weather conditions, were followed by an estimated 6.6 percent growth rate in 1975 and one of 4.7 percent in 1976.

### **Agriculture**

Agriculture was the dominant sector of the nation's economy in the late 1970s. It accounted for roughly 40 percent (of which the imputed



value of subsistence agriculture made up half) of GDP and employed some 90 percent of the economically active population. In 1975 agricultural wage earners numbered over 122,500 and constituted more than a quarter of the total wage-earning work force. Agricultural products, unprocessed and processed, constituted in value about 80 percent of exports, and agriculture provided a substantial proportion of the raw materials for the domestic manufacturing industry.

A notable feature of the agricultural sector was the government's ongoing efforts to change the traditional structure of rural production, in implementation of its socialist transformation of the economy. Agricultural production in Tanzania had been carried out predominantly by smallholding cultivators operating in dispersed family units. This pattern applied not only in subsistence farming but also in the growing of cash crops—with a few exceptions that included sisal—which for historical reasons developed primarily as a plantation operation, and tea and wheat, which were originally grown largely on private estates. After the Arusha Declaration the government initiated its *ujamaa* village program, envisioned to shift agricultural production to a communal undertaking carried out by the rural population regrouped in villages.

By the end of 1976, according to government announcements, most of the rural population was living in village communities; these included units in more heavily populated areas which, although consisting of separate homesteads, had been established by definition as village entities. Through mid-1977, however, there was little clear information on the extent and degree of communal farming. Many agriculturists appeared to be carrying on their activities much as before, and foreign observers had expressed the opinion that few villages could yet be classified as functional collectives. These observations are supported by the fact that, since 1974, government emphasis has been on the process of villagization as such rather than on their collective character (see *Ujamaa Villages and Villagization*, this ch.).

#### **Land Use and Soils**

In 1977 there was still an abundance of agricultural land. Only about 9 percent of the total land area of the mainland was under cultivation, another 10 percent was either fallow or temporarily in use as pastureland, and an estimated additional 25 percent was potentially cultivable if developed. Limiting factors on expansion beyond that included poor soils, variations in amount—and lack of reliability—of rainfall, and the infestation of some 60 percent of the mainland by the tsetse fly (see ch. 3).

A number of regions had a fortuitous combination of rich or generally good soils and adequate rainfall. Among them were the highlands of the northeastern part of the country, which included the fertile soils around Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru that were used mainly by the Chaga and Meru to grow coffee, and other areas producing bananas, vegetables, grains, and mixed beans. The usually favorable conditions had also led to some of the country's highest population concentrations there (see ch. 3). The remainder of the

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region had poor soils on which little cropping was possible but which were generally suitable for livestock raising.

Soils of somewhat less fertility occurred around Lake Victoria but could be upgraded through the use of fertilizers and, in conjunction with sufficient rainfall—which characterizes this region—were farmed extensively. Major crops included cotton, coffee, bananas, tea, tobacco, and cassava. Population concentration was also high in this region. Other good soils were found in the Southern Highlands in the Mbeya-Iringa area where the production of tea had become important. Other important crops there were coffee, pyrethrum, maize, and tobacco.

In contrast the soils of the large central plateau region were mostly of low fertility and required up to ten years lying fallow to recover after several years of cultivation unless fertilizers were used. Rainfall over much of the area was between 500 and 760 millimeters (between twenty and thirty inches) a year and highly variable, posing serious hazards for agriculture. Largely as a result the region was rather sparsely populated, and crops were primarily of a subsistence nature.

Soils of the coastal zone vary from low to high fertility, and a variety of crops are grown there under generally favorable rainfall conditions of 760 millimeters (thirty inches) or more a year. The area produces most of the country's copra, sisal, and cashew nuts and also substantial quantities of cotton and rice. Good alluvial soils are found in the larger river valleys of the coastal zone and in the river valleys and flood plains of rivers in various other parts of the country. Problems of flooding and drainage exist, and in some places of salinity, but these soils offer an excellent potential for development as illustrated in a mid-1970s project to expand sugarcane production in the Kilombero Valley in Morogoro Region (see Cash Crops, this ch.).

#### **Land Tenure**

The government's position on land tenure was that all land belonged to the nation, not in the sense of an abstract entity but of the people as a whole for whom the government acted as trustee. This concept stemmed from the pre-European period when Africans in Tanzania almost universally thought of land as belonging to the community consisting of the clan or chiefdom. Individual clan members or families held land under customary rules of tenure in accordance with the traditional rules of the particular group. Basically the occupant of the land had usufructuary rights only, which, however, were secure so long as he cultivated the land and conducted himself properly in the eyes of his society. The rights were permanent and could be passed on to heirs but could not be disposed of otherwise; in essence land was not conceived of as a marketable commodity although transfer of land for a customary price did occur in a few places.

German colonization, which began in the mid-1880s, brought substantial alienation of land for plantations, thereby introducing



*Maizefield at the base of Mount Kilimanjaro  
Courtesy Gladys M. Mott*

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the European concept of private ownership, as well as that of leaseholds (see ch. 1). After World War I the British administration, which took control of Tanganyika as a League of Nations mandated territory in 1922, was directed to give due regard to native laws and customs, and in 1923 all lands in the mandate were declared public lands, regardless of whether they were occupied or not. An exception was made, however, in the case of the former German alienated land, which on proper registry under the 1923 and subsequent ordinances acquired freehold status; former German leaseholds might also be converted into freehold. British policy otherwise was usually to grant leases, or certificates, of occupancy only, and at the end of the British colonial period the area of freehold land remained roughly the same as at the close of the German occupation, or about 1 percent of the total mainland area. Leaseholds also included titles given to African communities occupying land under customary law. At various times, however, Africans were evicted from such land opened up to European settlement with little regard for their rights of occupancy.

During the 1950s the British colonial government seems to have concluded that the emergence of a landed, wealthy African farmer class would promote political stability. A royal commission looking into land and population in East Africa at the time also recommended individualization of land ownership on a freehold basis as a means, in part, of promoting economic advancement. In 1958 the Tanganyika government declared in favor of the recommendation. This was strongly opposed by Nyerere and TANU. Nyerere's argument was that if people were given land that they could then sell, it would result eventually in a small landlord class owning the land and the vast majority of Africans being tenants, thereby creating deep antagonisms that would be detrimental to society as a whole. Nyerere agreed that everyone should be able to possess land, but contended that it must be on a leasehold basis, with the land itself remaining the property of the public.

By this time a feeling for individual freehold ownership existed among some Africans in the areas where cash crops were raised. This was particularly so among the Chaga and Haya, and presumably among other cultivators of perennial crops, who developed a proprietary attitude toward their land. That attitude was intensified in areas of high population pressure and accompanying intensive agricultural practices where shortage of land gave it a high value—also characteristic of the Chaga and a number of other groups. The vast majority of the population, however, still looked on land as community property.

In 1962, after independence, President Nyerere published a paper expounding on African socialism in which he again rejected the concept of private ownership of land. The following year the government passed the Freehold Titles (Conversion and Government Leases) Act, 1963, under which all existing freehold land was converted into long-term government leaseholds. This action has



subsequently been referred to as land nationalization. There appears to have been little if any opposition to the move, perhaps because only a very few Africans held any freehold land and because the length of the government leases (ninety-nine years) posed no immediate threat to continued occupancy by the then current lessees, who were given new leases. The lack of friction in the attainment by Tanzania of this fundamental socialist objective has been contrasted with the difficulties experienced by, as Nyerere has put it, other "more aggressive socialist parties."

Although community ownership of land, with individual members holding rights of occupancy, was the common pattern of land tenure in precolonial Tanganyika, feudal landlord-tenant systems existed in a number of places, the most notable being in Bukoba (located in present-day West Lake Region). The tenant lacked security of tenure, owed certain services and payments in kind to the landlord, and if he left or was forced from his holding, had no claim for improvements. Neither could he pledge or sell his holding or on his own effect any form of transfer.

The British administration carried out some enfranchisement of tenants in 1956, and the new Tanzanian government enacted legislation in 1965 applying to West Lake Region that was intended to enfranchise tenants who held land there when the law went into effect. The law was not completely clear, however, and resulted in a flood of court litigations. The Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act, 1968, which went into effect in West Lake Region in August 1969, sought to correct this situation. It was subsequently extended to certain other areas where landlord-tenant relations existed. In the areas in which it was applied the act enfranchised all lands held by tenants, including squatter tenants, and prohibited the formation of any new landlord-tenant arrangements. Landlords who were disenfranchised, however, were compensated for unexhausted improvements that they had made. To what extent the act had been applied to other parts of mainland Tanzania was unknown in late 1977. It would appear, however, that in line with the government's socialist philosophy the eventual goal of the act would be the complete extinguishment of the institution of landlordism and tenancy in the rural areas of the country.

A new feature was introduced into the rural land tenure situation after the Arusha Declaration. This was the *ujamaa* village in which production was, at least ultimately, to be completely collectivized with the implication that land in such villages would be communally held. The village council would take over the role of land allocator, which formerly was in the hands of the village elders, clan head, or other accepted authority (see *Ujamaa Villages and Villagization*, this ch.). The traditional right of occupancy presumably would be restricted in the *ujamaa* village to the occupant's abode and possibly to any associated plot used for subsistence agriculture.

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The slow pace of the *ujamaa* program led in the 1970s to a broader villagization effort aimed primarily simply at getting the entire rural population into village units. The result was a variety of patterns ranging from existing villages in which land tenure concepts and practices apparently remained as before, through various combinations of communal and traditional right-of-occupancy holdings. All such villages were under the control of village councils, however, and it was not clear in late 1977 to what extent customary rights to buy, lease, or pledge land held under earlier construed rights of occupancy actually continued in effect.

#### **Ujamaa Villages and Villagization**

Shortly after independence the new government in line with certain recommendations on the development of agriculture made by a survey mission from the World Bank initiated a program for the establishment of planned farming villages, whose goal was a rapid increase in agricultural production. Formed through the regrouping and resettling of farmers in more favorable locations, the settlements were to be of economic size and were to carry on intensive cultivation using the land on a permanent basis. The required capital investment in each settlement was expected to be substantial, including expenditures for equipment and infrastructure development.

The settlement scheme, known as the transformation approach to agricultural development in contrast to efforts aimed mainly at improving existing practices, which would require a much longer time to raise output, was continued in the First Five-Year Plan. Both the initial program and the five-year plan continuation proved to be unsuccessful. Studies have noted that the regrouped farmers had little feeling of commitment to their project, lacked the knowledge needed for intensive agriculture, and showed little enthusiasm for changing their traditional methods. It became apparent that considerably more time would be required to make such a project successful than originally anticipated, thereby destroying the rationale for the program—that of a quick return on investment—and by 1966 agricultural development through transformation imposed from above had been abandoned.

About the same time a rethinking of overall development objectives led to the conclusion that development of a self-reliant economy was dependent on rural development and the proper use of the nation's land wealth and the energies of the rural population. This was formally stated in the Arusha Declaration, which also restated the need for rural development to be carried out in conformity with Tanzania's socialist principles. The government noted with concern that small-scale capitalist agriculture had emerged in some rural areas and was leading to the contravention of the traditional African ideas of equality, mutual sharing, and the obligation to work.

In October 1967 President Nyerere called for rural development to be carried out in accordance with the principles of *ujamaa*

(the principles of the traditional extended family), which emphasized cooperation, mutual respect, and individual acceptance of responsibility (see ch. 2; ch. 3). Farmers should group themselves into socialist villages to work and farm the land collectively, largely self-reliant and using their own skills and resources to develop and improve their lives. In this way cooperative use of farm machinery could be effected, and there could be economically advantageous joint purchasing of supplies and the marketing of crops. Association in villages would also make it easier to provide the rural population with such essential services as educational and medical facilities and clean water supplies.

The formation of *ujamaa* villages was to be voluntary, with the government and TANU leadership offering encouragement through explanation of their purpose and potential. Encouragement, however, would also include giving priority in securing services to groups that decided to establish a village. Nyerere noted that like farmers elsewhere, Tanzanian farmers tended also to be conservative when it came to new ideas, and that progress might be quite slow at the start.

Through the early 1970s the formation of most so-called *ujamaa* villages resulted from enthusiasm generated by party and government authorities through massive persuasion campaigns; planning for, and the acquisition of, services by these villages was also directly related to government activities. By the end of 1968 about 180 such villages were reported throughout the country having a total of not quite 60,000 inhabitants. The number increased to about 650 villages in 1969 having some 300,000 residents and by the end of 1970 to approximately 1,200 villages and 500,000 villagers. These early villages were mostly located in the economically poorer sections of the country, whose inhabitants had more to gain by entering the program. The areas, moreover, had adequate land, cultivation was principally of a subsistence nature, and social and economic disparities between residents were few, thus presenting little hindrance to the development of a spirit of cooperation.

The number of villages rose to over 5,500 in early 1973 having a combined population of more than 2 million, or about 15 percent of the total population. Village formation continued to be concentrated largely in the poorer areas of subsistence farming, however. Major cash crop regions, such as Kilimanjaro, Arusha, and Mwanza, where farmers were individually relatively well-off, showed little development. In a report to the TANU biennial conference of September 1973, President Nyerere noted the importance of the eventual villagization of such areas but also contrasted the obvious difference in incentives for action between farmers there and those in areas such as Dodoma District with its sun-baked and waterless fields and lack of elementary medical and education facilities.

Apparently disappointed at the rate of progress, TANU then

altered the voluntary aspect of villagization through a decision to require all rural residents to live in villages. Later the end of 1976 was set as the date for completion of the move. The distinction between this required villagization and the voluntary settlement of an *ujamaa* community should be noted. The *ujamaa* village continued to be a voluntarily formed collective functioning along socialist lines. The other villages simply ranged from those with very little or minimal communal cultivation activities to those exhibiting a substantial amount of cooperative farming. In all cases the stated basic aim was to group people into units that would better permit the introduction of social and other services, technology, and the like.

A massive movement into villages in areas of dispersed settlement and the arbitrary establishment of village units in thickly populated places went on from 1974 through 1976. By early 1977 some 80 percent of the total population, or more than 13 million people, had been grouped in almost 7,700 villages. Both persuasion and compulsion were used to effect the movement, with party and government officials reportedly displaying undue enthusiasm in a number of incidences. In addition to the coercion there was much poor planning: some people were moved to areas without adequate water, and others were taken to the new village site without any preparation for shelter. President Nyerere, acknowledging some maladministration, pointed out, however, that substantial cooperation in the movement occurred and that it would have been physically impossible simply to have forced so many people into villages.

The TANU policy decision on universal villagization was supplemented in late 1975 by enactment of the Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, 1975. Under the act a village to be designated as such was required to register, whereupon it attained legal status and classification as a cooperative society. The act provided for a village assembly comprising all inhabitants eighteen years of age and older. This assembly elected a village council, which had the authority to carry out any actions necessary or expedient for the economic and social development of the village, including planning and coordinating the village's activities. The act and related legislation, in effect, gave the council practically complete control of the agricultural and other activities of the villagers. The position of the village as an economic unit was strengthened in 1976 when the long-standing independent farm produce marketing cooperatives and the regional farmers' cooperative unions were abolished, and villages assumed the function of multipurpose cooperatives that could deal directly with newly organized parastatal crop marketing and distribution bodies. The eventual demise of the earlier cooperatives was foreshadowed as early as 1967 when President Nyerere pointed out that although socialist in principle, these cooperatives were in general serving the interest of capitalist agriculture.



The act established three categories of villages: development villages, cooperative villages, and *ujamaa* villages. A village acquired the status of a designated *ujamaa* village when it could demonstrate that a large part of its economic activities were carried out communally. Capital equipment, such as tractors, transportation equipment, and storage facilities must be communally owned, with the village council the owner of record. Individuals, however, might continue to own small farm tools and equipment and also livestock. All working members of the village must engage in some aspect of communal activities. So-called development and cooperative villages were in the initial or intermediate stage of progress toward the *ujamaa* village ideal.

The number of villages in the different categories was not known in late 1977. Foreign observers were of the opinion that *ujamaa* villages were very few. It seemed likely that a large portion of villages was still in the development stage involving relatively little communal work. In the period after the 1973 TANU decision a much more pragmatic attitude was evident on the part of the government. The emphasis on the development of communal agriculture was substantially muted, and the newly "villagized" farmers were largely permitted to continue to farm, both in new and regrouped villages, as they had previously done on an individual basis.

The extent to which the villagization program affected agricultural productivity was difficult to assess. Villagization was accompanied by other major institutional changes having an impact on, and presumably creating further uncertainty among, the rural population, including the decentralization of administrative functions to the regions in 1972 and the dissolution in 1976 of the regional cooperative unions, of which farmers' cooperative societies had long been a part. Moreover during the height of the mass villagization campaign from 1974, drastic declines in agricultural production occurred as a result of serious droughts during the 1973-74 and 1974-75 growing seasons. Favorable factors, including improved weather conditions in 1976, new agricultural inputs, an increase in producer prices, and some normalization of farm life appear to have led to a return to the earlier growth pattern of the late 1960s and early 1970s in which an annual average production increase in real terms of between roughly 2.5 and 3 percent a year had occurred. With Tanzania's overwhelming dependence on agriculture for export earnings this appeared to offer little hope for improvement in the country's already unfavorable balance of trade position (see Composition of Trade, this ch.; ch. 3).

#### **Subsistence Farming**

Although villagization has introduced communal farming in varying degrees, by the mid-1970s such farming was concerned largely with cash crops. Most food crops continued to be produced by individual farm families on private plots or farms that were

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legally part of a village but whose harvest belonged to the cultivator.

The major subsistence crops include maize, millet, sorghum, wheat, rice, cassava, potatoes, plaintains, bananas, and beans. Maize, millet, and sorghum are grown throughout much of the country, with heavier production of maize in areas of better rainfall including particularly the Southern Highlands and the northeastern and western parts of Tanzania. Wheat farming is more heavily concentrated in the northeast, and rice, although rather widely grown, is cultivated chiefly in the well-watered valley areas of Mbeya, Rukwa, and Morogoro regions, along the coast, and in some areas near Lake Victoria. A very large rice growing area of 3,200 hectares (7,900 acres) has been developed by technicians from the People's Republic of China (PRC) at Mbarali, in Mtwara Region. Handed over to the Tanzanian government in September 1977, the area will be operated as a state farm and is expected to produce about 12,000 tons of milled rice a year.

Cassava, the principal edible root crop, is also widely grown and is easy to cultivate. It is not as popular in the diet as grains, however, but can be left stored in the ground for as long as twelve to eighteen months and is relied on as a food source during times of drought or of other crop failures. According to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) crop estimates, production in the mid-1970s was about 3.5 million tons annually, an amount far greater than that of any other staple. Along the coast and in the heavier rainfall areas of the northeast and in the region west of Lake Victoria bananas constitute a major staple.

Drought conditions in 1973 and 1974 resulted in major decreases in foodgrain production, forcing the importation of large quantities of grains to avert a possible famine. In 1974 and 1975 the government and TANU carried out a campaign to attain self-sufficiency in food production through a massive propaganda effort based on the slogan "Farming—A Matter of Life and Death." More tangible economic measures included increases in producer prices between 1974 and 1977. Before the drought the National Maize Project, begun in 1973, provided free fertilizer and seeds to farmers during a two-year period as a practical means to increase the acreage sown and raise production. This program, which the government hailed as a success, has been continued, but in 1976 recipients of aid paid for part of the cost of the inputs, and in 1977 the government was subsidizing only half the cost as a measure to encourage efficient use of the inputs.

#### **Cash Crops**

Cash crops comprised not only those grown primarily for export—coffee, cotton, cashew nuts, sisal, tea, tobacco, pyrethrum, and cloves—but also sugarcane for domestic use and various food crops that were produced by subsistence farmers in surpluses for sale in the domestic market (see table 5, Appendix A).



*Traditional cultivators engaged in subsistence farming  
Courtesy Priscilla C. Reining*

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Included in the latter category were maize, wheat, rice, bananas, and oil seeds. Wheat also was produced for internal consumption by a number of large state farms established in sufficient size to use mechanized operations.

#### **Sugarcane**

Sugarcane, produced almost entirely by four large sugar estates supplemented by the output of outgrower villages and a number of small outgrower estates, was turned into sugar for domestic use in the late 1970s, although export was planned eventually. The oldest of these larger operations, the Tanganyika Planting Company in the Arusha area, was privately owned by Danish interests. The government had a majority interest in the Kagera Sugar Company in West Lake Region and a 50 percent interest in the Mtiba Sugar Estates in Morogoro Region. The Kilombero Sugar Company in the Kilombero Valley, also in Morogoro Region, was completely owned by the government.

In the mid-1960s sugar production at some 62,000 tons a year was about equal to domestic consumption, then averaging over twenty-six kilograms (twelve pounds) per person. Although production grew, by 1970 the domestic demand considerably exceeded output requiring external purchases. Consumption reached a high of forty-eight kilograms (twenty-two pounds) per person in 1972, and imports totaled 50,000 tons against a domestic production of 88,500 tons. Expansion of facilities has since increased output to over 100,000 tons annually. A substantial boost in the price of sugar in 1974 as part of measures to reduce foreign exchange expenditure, cut consumption to about twenty-eight kilograms (thirteen pounds) per person in 1975, for a total demand below domestic production in that year.

#### **Sisal**

Sisal, introduced into Tanzania in the 1890s by German colonists, became the major export commodity in the mid-1920s and in 1951 accounted for almost three-fifths of the value of the country's total exports. It held its leading position among commodities until the mid-1960s when greatly increased production in Brazil and Angola and growing use of synthetic fiber substitutes depressed world prices; these did not begin to recover until 1973. Sisal held third place in value of exports until 1975, when its foreign exchange earnings of TSh302 million (for value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary) were next only to those of coffee.

As part of the nationalization program after the Arusha Declaration, in October 1967 the government created the Tanzania Sisal Corporation (TSC), which took over control of about fifty plantations, constituting more than two-thirds of the largest sisal producers. Six foreign-owned plantations were completely nationalized, and 60 percent of the shares of locally owned establishments were acquired. Eleven of the locally owned plantations were subsequently denationalized in 1968, and the TSC also divested itself



the same year of two of the former foreign-owned operations. Estimates at the time were that eventually the TSC would own or have a controlling interest in about four-fifths of the sisal production capacity. The actual percent controlled in late 1977 was not known.

Sisal cultivation is almost exclusively a plantation operation because of the great amount of raw material required in processing. Because of its bulk adequate transportation facilities are also a requisite. For that reason the first plantations were along waterways in present-day Tanga Region, and later others were located on waterways near Mtwara. The extension of railroad lines was followed in adjacent suitable areas by sisal cultivation, including new large plantations in Tanga, at Morogoro and Kilosa, and even near Kigoma in far western Tanzania. Land devoted to sisal totaled over 226,000 hectares (558,446 acres) of mature plantings in 1964, with production reaching 233,540 tons. The depressed prices of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a drop in area under cultivation to some 211,500 hectares (522,616 acres) in 1971 and a production that year of 181,100 tons. The decline continued thereafter with production amounting to only 113,700 tons in 1976.

#### **Coffee**

Coffee, the most important export crop in the mid-1970s, was grown by both African smallholders and as an estate crop since German times. By the late 1960s almost 50 percent of production was by smallholders. By then annual production was close to 50,000 tons, and concern had developed over possible further increases in output because sales in the international market were largely restricted by quotas established under the International Coffee Agreement. The government as a countermeasure encouraged diversification of crops to take land and labor away from the coffee industry. Production continued to rise, however, except in crop year 1974 (October 1973–September 1974), when a substantial decline occurred largely because of drought conditions and disease. Fears of overproduction were temporarily dispelled by the serious damage to the Brazilian crop in 1975, which was followed by substantial increases in coffee prices and in Tanzania's export earnings. Production in 1975 was over 62,000 tons.

Both Arabica and Robusta coffee are grown. The principal species is Arabica, grown on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru since the early 1900s, and found elsewhere in the late 1970s in the Bukoba area west of Lake Victoria, in the Rungwe River area, and in Mbeya and Iringa regions. Robusta, an indigenous species cultivated in pre-European times, used for blending instant coffee, was grown mostly in the Bukoba area.

#### **Cotton**

From the end of the 1960s until 1974 cotton held either first or second place in the value of agricultural commodity exports. A peak was reached in 1974 of TSh473 million, which constituted

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almost one-fifth of foreign exchange earnings from all visible exports. Production, which totaled 394,000 bales of 181.4 kilograms each (400 pounds) in crop year 1974 (July 1974-June 1975), dropped drastically in 1975, however, to under 240,000 bales. The steep decline was ascribed to less acreage planted to cotton, largely because of the preceding year's food shortage, which resulted in greater use of land for, and concentration on, food production. The government then initiated an intensive campaign to expand cotton planting, with apparent success; production for crop year 1976 was reported to be over 350,000 bales.

Well over 90 percent of Tanzania's cotton is grown in areas east and south of Lake Victoria populated chiefly by Sukuma. The rest is cultivated in the eastern part of the country. Cotton is almost entirely a smallholder crop. The average farmer had some two to three hectares (roughly five to seven-and-one-half acres) of land and planted about half to cotton and the remaining half to subsistence food crops. Most of the work was done by hand; however, in some larger tracts, oxen, or even a tractor, were used for plowing. The villagization program in the western cotton region included so-called block farming in which farmers cultivated adjacent fields and to some extent assisted one another in clearing, plowing, and weeding (see *Ujamaa Villages and Villagization*, this ch.). Communal use of mechanized equipment might be part of such operations.

Much of the large increase in cotton production in the 1950s and 1960s was due to expansion of land used for this crop. By the early 1970s, however, a limit to such expansion was apparently approaching, and further substantial rises in output to meet projected government goals for export and domestic processing seemed possible only through better husbandry, increased inputs, and the introduction of such measures as production incentives. The government has subsidized the purchase of fertilizers and insecticides by smallholders, and in 1974 the International Development Association (IDA) furnished a loan through which credit was made available to small farmers in certain areas for the same purpose. The IDA program appears to have been somewhat disrupted, however, by the intensification of the villagization effort between 1974 and 1976. Several increases by the government since 1974 in the unit price paid for cotton may result in improved output, but information on any effects of the price boosts was lacking in late 1977.

#### **Cashew Nuts**

Cashew nuts have long been one of Tanzania's principal foreign exchange earners, regularly in fourth or fifth place in agricultural export earnings. In world production the country has ranked either second or third behind Mozambique and India. Cashews are grown throughout the coastal zone, but approximately three-quarters of the total output comes from Lindi and Mtwara regions and the eastern part of Ruvuma Region. Purchases by the Cashew

Nut Authority of Tanzania (CATA) reached a high of some 145,000 tons in the 1973 crop year (October 1973–September 1974). Production declined thereafter, and the 1976 crop was expected to be only about 110,000 tons.

The decline was ascribed by the CATA in part to poor weather conditions, but poor husbandry by the smallholders who produce most of the crop was also blamed. Smallholdings, which average about one hectare (2.47 acres), are usually congested having from 200 to 400 trees that have been planted in a scattered fashion, rather than in rows. Weeding was often not carried out, nor was thinning as the trees matured. As a result the average crop per hectare was only about one-third of a ton, whereas if properly tended the same area could produce up to a ton or more according to foreign agricultural experts.

In 1977 most cashew nuts were exported in the shell, at a lower market value, with only about a quarter of the crop processed domestically—a small portion by hand and the remainder mechanically by two factories in Dar es Salaam and one in Mtwara. Additional processing factories were under construction, however, and discussions were under way with the World Bank for financing for two or three more. If all facilities under construction, or proposed, are completed they will be able to handle 120,000 tons of raw cashew nuts a year by machine.

#### **Tobacco**

Tobacco cultivation, primarily a smallholder and in 1977 also a village communal operation, is concentrated in five regions: Tabora and Iringa, which produce most of the flue-cured variety; Kigoma and Ruvuma, which are the main producers of fire-cured tobacco; and Mbeya. In the 1970s production increased at a rapid annual rate stimulated by several substantial raises in the producer price set by the parastatal Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT), by government efforts to improve farming methods, and by a program financed by the IDA to encourage and assist more farmers to undertake tobacco cultivation.

About one-fifth of the tobacco crop goes into the domestic production of cigarettes, and most of the remainder is exported. The 1975–76 season crop totaled over 19 million kilograms (41.9 million pounds), of which 14.5 million kilograms (32 million pounds) were flue-cured and 4.5 million kilograms (9.9 million pounds) fire-cured, making Tanzania the third largest producer in Africa. Foreign exchange earnings of almost TSh140 million placed tobacco in fourth position in value among commodity exports.

#### **Tea**

Tea was one of the country's major crops, although production constituted less than 2 percent of the world total in 1976. Tea is grown in the Usambara Mountains in the northeast; in Bukoba District, West Lake Region; and at two main locations in Mbeya Region in the Southern Highlands. Until the 1960s tea was an estate crop, but since 1961 there has been a substantial increase of

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smallholder and village communal operations in line with government policies. In particular, the World Bank in 1972 provided funds for expansion of smallholder cultivation in the four producing areas and the construction or extension of several tea factories. This program suffered for some time from management problems and in places from competition with other cash crops and from labor shortages. By mid-1976, however, although considerably delayed in execution, more than 5,700 hectares (14,085 acres) had reportedly been planted to tea. (The total area under tea was somewhat over 14,000 hectares—34,600 acres—in 1975.)

Smallholders have made an increasing contribution to tea production over time. In 1964, for instance, they accounted for only three tons of tea compared with over 4,800 tons produced by estates. In 1975, however, their output had risen to more than 2,100 tons out of a total for Tanzania of 13,700 tons. Their proportionate share should increase substantially when the large areas of new plantings made under the World Bank program reach full bearing age.

#### **Cloves**

Cloves have been the single most important export of Zanzibar (Zanzibar and Pemba islands) since the nineteenth century. They accounted for about 90 percent of Zanzibar's foreign exchange earnings in the 1970s. Some three-fourths of the crop is grown on Pemba. Crop production falls in a three-year cycle in which a good harvest year is followed by two poor years. Overall harvests, however, appear to have been declining, reportedly because of the neglect of the clove trees due to a shortage of labor and possibly a related spread of disease from lack of attention.

In a maximum harvest year clove production has reached 18,000 tons. Output, however, drops off substantially in the succeeding two lean years. Average annual output was estimated at about 11,000 tons in the 1960s, the last period for which production figures were issued. Exports, which go principally to Indonesia and Singapore, where cloves are used in flavoring cigarettes, and to India vary substantially; in 1974 exports were 3,700 tons and 7,500 tons in 1975. Zanzibar's only major competitor in the clove trade is Madagascar. In April 1977 an agreement on marketing was signed between Tanzania and Madagascar under which the Tanzanian-Malagasy Marketing Organization was set up with headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

#### **Marketing**

In 1977 the marketing of farm products—both cash and food crops—was carried out by village cooperative societies under 1975 legislation that authorized them to sell directly to parastatal purchasing agencies. This function had been performed earlier by the so-called farmers' primary cooperative societies until their dissolution in May 1976 (see *Ujamaa Villages and Villagization*, this ch.). The parastatal agent (variously authorities, boards, and corporations) usually had responsibility for purchasing a specific





*Preparing fields for a tobacco crop  
Courtesy U.S. Department of Agriculture, F.A.S.*



*Local market on slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro  
Courtesy Gladys M. Mott*

commodity or category of commodities, for example, the Tanganyika Coffee Board, Tanzania Cotton Authority, National Milling Corporation (principal foodgrains buyer), but in areas where minor sales crops were also grown the particular parastatal handling the most important commodity was usually charged with purchasing all crops.

## **Livestock, Forestry, and Fisheries**

### **Livestock**

Cattle raising, either as a subsistence or commercial activity, can be carried on successfully only in the some 40 percent of the country not infested by the tsetse fly. The tsetse-free areas are found across the northern part of the country, in a north-south zone extending through Dodoma Region and the Southern Highlands, and in a part of the southwest around Mbeya. Large cattle concentrations occur in a region south of Lake Victoria inhabited by the Sukuma, who raise cattle as a subsidiary activity to farming. Large numbers also are raised by the pastoral Masai in Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions and by the Gogo in Dodoma Region.

For most ethnic groups cattle represent a source of wealth (see ch. 3). Many cattle owners have been reluctant to sell their animals, and the offtake was estimated in the mid-1970s at only about 14 percent. The Sukuma, however, have long treated cattle as a marketable commodity. The national herd has grown substantially, from an estimated 3 million head in the early 1920s to between 10 and 12 million in the late 1970s, despite low reproduction rates attributable to poor nutrition because of overgrazing, disease, and the comparatively low quality of the shorthorn Zebu strain that makes up most of the herd.

Experts consider the development possibilities for cattle to be great, but this will require extensive efforts to teach herd management, nutrition, disease control measures, and marketing values to the rural population. The government was conducting experimental work on improving cattle strains. In 1977 it also maintained beef herds on some fifteen ranches, operated through the National Ranching Company (NARCO), both for stock purposes and also as meat-producing establishments.

Tanzania had a goat population estimated at 4.5 million by the government in 1972 and sheep totaling about 3 million. The offtake rate was much higher than for cattle—over 30 percent for goats and over 20 percent for sheep—and goats and sheep contributed a fair amount to the domestic meat supply. Both animals were widely kept since they were suitable for areas where cattle cannot be raised because of disease.

### **Forestry**

Forests are estimated to cover more than 414,000 square kilometers (160,000 square miles) or well over two-fifths of the country's total area. Most of this is open savanna woodland, known locally as *miombo*, but the country also has a limited amount

(roughly totaling 9,300 square kilometers—3,600 square miles) of high altitude rain forest and some 1,550 square kilometers (600 square miles) of mangrove forest. In 1977 approximately 30 percent of the total forested area, including all the rain forest, was contained in 540 government reserves. Some 12 percent of the reserves (about 16,000 square kilometers—6,200 square miles) were protected catchment areas in the headwaters of the major rivers and streams.

The forest products industry was quite small, and in the mid-1970s used only about 500,000 cubic meters (17,657,350 cubic feet) annually, although this was expected to rise to 1 million cubic meters (35,314,700 cubic feet) in the early 1980s. The primary demand is for fuelwood, charcoal, and building poles, which constituted approximately 98 percent of total consumption. The *miombo* woodlands were the principal source of wood for domestic use, but mangrove forests provided some building poles. Most of the valuable timber harvested for export came from the rain forest.

The colonial government began a forest plantation program in 1958, which has been continued since independence. By June 1976 softwood stands covered about 540 square kilometers (210 square miles), and there were smaller stands of hardwoods. The plantations are expected to meet most of the demand for wood by a slowly expanding domestic industry during the next two decades, including a new paper and pulp industry. The government is also promoting afforestation by the villages through distribution of seedlings and the provision of technical know-how, in order to ensure a continued future supply of fuelwood and building materials in the rural areas, where appreciation of the value of local forests remained relatively limited.

### **Fisheries**

Tanzania's freshwater and marine fisheries potentials were only partially exploited in the late 1970s by some 40,000 traditional and 3,000 commercial fishermen. The greatest potential for expansion was offered by Lake Tanganyika whose waters, according to United Nations (UN) fisheries experts, held an estimated stock of roughly 2.5 million tons from which close to 750,000 tons might be safely harvested annually. This total compared with a catch in the 1970s of about 50,000 tons a year. Some three-quarters of this catch consisted of a kind of sardine known as *dagaa* that was locally consumed fresh and sun dried. An unknown part of the *dagaa* catch was also shipped throughout Tanzania in dried form, and some was exported, chiefly to Zambia. About 13,500 individuals were engaged in fishing on Lake Tanganyika.

The Tanzanian portion of Lake Victoria was producing about 40,000 tons of fish annually, much of it consisting of tilapia and related species. The catch was largely from the shallow portions of the lake, which appeared to be near their sustainable harvest limit in the mid-1970s. It was believed that the lake's overall catch could be raised to possibly 200,000 tons a year through more

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extensive fishing of deeper waters; however, data on deepwater fishing were still too meager for accurate estimates.

Fishing in Lake Nyasa appeared to be mostly of a subsistence nature; estimated production in 1972 was about 21,000 tons. Fishing, both subsistence and commercial, was also carried on on Lake Rukwa and Lake Kitangiri but was variable because of their shallowness and the effects on the fish stock of wide fluctuations in water level during the year, especially in periods of drought. Subsistence fishing was found also in many other areas where swamps existed or streams were of a permanent nature, and small dams and ponds had been constructed.

In all, about 75 percent of the estimated total fish production of roughly 160,000 tons was from freshwater sources in the mid-1970s, with the remaining 25 percent coming from the waters of the Indian Ocean. The marine catch included shrimp, rock lobster, red snapper, and various flat fish, most of which was sold fresh. Qualified observers were of the opinion that the sustainable marine catch could be increased, but sound estimates awaited the collection of more adequate data.

### **Manufacturing**

At independence the country's industrial base was extremely small as indicated by manufacturing's contribution of only 3.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) and its employment of under 22,000 people, less than 6 percent of individuals working for wages. This situation stemmed largely from British colonial administrative actions, which had joined the economies of Great Britain's three East African colonies, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, in a common market and from certain factors that favored the locating of industry in Kenya. The latter included the highly suitable climate of the Kenya Highlands for Europeans, which led to a much greater concentration of expatriates in Kenya. After World War II this community turned its skills and substantial capital to the development of a manufacturing industry that also served the common market. In turn the development acted as a magnet, drawing foreign investors, banks, and trading firms interested in establishing themselves in the East African market to Kenya.

The new Tanzanian government's initial industrialization strategy, and one generally pursued to the early 1970s, was to promote the expansion or construction of import-substitution industries, both those mass-producing consumer items and others turning out various intermediate products for local consumption. Among major new plants constructed during this period were a large textile mill—a joint project of the government and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—in Dar es Salaam, a large textile factory in Mwanza, a cement plant at Wazo Hill, north of Dar es Salaam, an oil refinery, also at Dar es Salaam, a radio assembly plant at Arusha, and a tire factory near Arusha. Largely because of the success of the import-substitution program, consumer goods



imports declined as a proportion of all commodity imports from over one-half in 1961 to one-quarter by the early 1970s.

In 1974 the government decided that industrial development during the ensuing two decades would place emphasis first on developing basic industries that processed domestic raw materials—cotton, sugarcane, hides, sisal, phosphate rock, and the like—into products for the domestic market to the point where quantities would meet total internal demand; this would be followed by production for export (see table 6, Appendix A). In reality from the early 1970s there had already been some investment in industries principally or entirely aimed at producing products for export; these included plants processing cashew nuts, meat and leather, and operations such as sisal spinning.

The contribution of the manufacturing industries to GDP reached 8.1 percent in current prices in 1966. Manufacturing establishments employing ten or more persons numbered 438 in that year, and the total number of employees was almost 32,600. By the early 1970s manufacturing accounted for over 10 percent of GDP and attained a high of 11.6 percent of GDP (10.1 percent at 1966 prices) in 1973 when there were 538 registered plants that employed more than 72,600 workers. Value added by manufacturing during the 1967–73 period increased at an average annual rate of 7.6 percent in constant 1966 prices. During 1974 and 1975, however, serious foreign exchange shortages attributable in good part to the great rise in oil prices and general worldwide inflation, brought cutbacks in the importation of raw materials, spare parts, and petroleum. Together with domestic problems in manufacturing, including declining productivity and plant capacity utilization, the result was a drastic drop in the rate of growth to 1.4 percent in 1974 and 0.3 percent in 1975, although manufacturing's contribution to GDP in 1975 amounted to 10.6 percent. An improved foreign resource position in 1976 permitted greater raw material imports, and the growth rate in manufacturing was reported to have been about 6.2 percent in that year.

#### **The Public and Private Sectors in Manufacturing**

Immediately after the Arusha Declaration new legislation enabled the government to begin taking over the country's major manufacturing establishments, and by the mid-1970s most of the sizable foreign-owned private manufacturing operations were under the control of parastatal corporations. In most cases outright ownership was secured; in others control was exercised through majority financial participation, and in a very few the parastatal held a minority position. Acquisitions, both full and partial, were arranged through negotiation with the owners, with compensation mutually agreed on; no confiscation was involved. Moreover after the Arusha Declaration all major new industrial projects undertaken were in the public sector, although in some instances minority private foreign investment was accepted.

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
In the mid-1970s more than one-half of value added in the manufacturing sector was attributable to the activities of some forty to fifty parastatal operating companies. These companies in turn were subsidiaries of a small number of parastatal holding companies, which were under the then Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The operating parastatals employed about one-half of the sector's work force and accounted for nine-tenths of its new capital formation. About 25 percent of value added was accounted for by well over 400 other privately owned, mostly small, registered companies, including foreign-owned concerns, employing ten or more workers. These companies performed an important role in the economy by manufacturing a wide range of consumer items and fabricating spare parts, components, and the like.

Despite the seeming importance of the private sector in manufacturing, however, considerable uncertainty appears to have existed for some time with respect to government policy regarding further private investment in manufacturing. During 1977 this apparently was resolved in favor of supporting the continuance and expansion of existing, and the establishment of new, small private manufacturing enterprises. Affirmation of this policy was made by President Nyerere in October 1977, in a statement in which he called on the government to encourage the expansion or starting of small-scale privately owned industries throughout the country as a way to make essential commodities easily available to people in the regions. At the same time, according to President Nyerere, such activity would relieve the parastatal corporations from the necessity of engaging in small-scale operations and allow them to concentrate their efforts on major developmental undertakings. To what extent foreign investment could participate in small business sector expansion was not known in late 1977, however.

#### **Industrial Productivity**

The dominant position of the parastatal companies in manufacturing lent a special significance to their performance. Both government representatives and foreign observers noted in the mid- and late 1970s a relative inefficiency in management, a gradual decline in productivity, and a wide underutilization of productive capacity, which appeared to have increased from about the mid-1970s. Management problems were due in considerable part to a shortage of capable individuals for a wide range of positions, especially at the middle level. Largely responsible for the decline in productivity were the lack of incentives both for managerial staff and for the production work force. The prices of parastatal products were set by the National Price Commission and included a cost-plus factor. Coupled with product import and wage controls, the result was a general disassociation of parastatal activities from market forces and an accompanying lack of incentive for management to strive for improved output.

Productivity appears to have been seriously affected also by widespread overmanning among the parastatals, which persisted



*Spinning cotton at the country's largest textile mill  
Camera Press photo*

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despite government action taken on occasion to reduce the work force. An example was the reduction in 1976 of the work force at the Wazo Hill cement plant. External factors, including power outages and water shortages (accented in 1973 and 1974 by droughts) as well as parts and materials shortages due to lack of foreign exchange, have also affected plant utilization and overall production. Efforts to raise productivity through a bonus system for laborers, of several years standing, appeared to have been relatively ineffective because of a lack of established production norms, and in the late 1970s the system was in disuse. One result of the comparatively poor parastatal performance was the shortfall in internally generated investment funds. President Nyerere noted in early 1977 that between 1967 and 1974 only one-fifth of new investment was financed from the resources of the public corporations. That is, four-fifths of the funds for parastatal investment programs came from foreign and domestic borrowing, with concomitant added strain on the national treasury.

#### **Internal Trade**

In early 1978 the institutions responsible for carrying on wholesale trading were largely in the public sector, but much of the country's retail trading activities remained in private hands. Government and TANU-sponsored efforts had been under way since early 1976, however, to increase public participation in the retail field. Wholesale distribution was chiefly carried out by twenty parastatal regional trading companies, one in each of the mainland's twenty regions. These companies obtained their merchandise either from a group of parastatal importing companies that specialized in particular commodity areas—the importers also engaged in the domestic distribution of their imports and of similar local products—or directly from domestic manufacturers (see *The Handling of Foreign Trade*, this ch.). Certain parastatal corporations marketed their manufactures through their own distribution systems. Others sold their products directly to regional farmers' cooperative unions until the unions were dissolved in 1976.

Changes and disruptions in the mechanism of retail trade that began in early 1976 precluded a clear-cut depiction of the actual situation in this sector at the end of 1977. Until 1976 retail trade throughout most of the country was carried on by a large number of small, mostly privately owned shops (*maduka*; sing., *duka*) that provided the neighborhood or locality with essentials such as soap, cooking oil, salt, sugar, and the like. In February 1976 Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa suddenly announced that all private shops—in villages, on plantations, or operating in industrial or parastatal establishments—were to close, and their place was to be taken by cooperative stores. The move was declared to be another step toward ending all forms of domestic exploitation.

Within a short time "Operation Maduka," as it was labeled, had resulted not only in shortages of essential items but also had created great inconvenience for many people, as numerous shops



closed and were replaced by a much smaller number of cooperative stores. In May President Nyerere called for a slowdown in the operation, blaming the excessive zeal of government and TANU officials for the hardships caused. He cited as an example the official closing of 100 stores in some areas where there was only one cooperative shop to take their place. He stated that the movement was not a competition and that the aim was to establish cooperative stores, not shutdown private ones. Private shops, he said, would eventually close on their own when enough well-run cooperative shops were in operation.

The number of privately owned shops at the start of "Operation Maduka" was unknown. In August the Office of the Prime Minister announced that as a result of the movement general cooperative shops had increased from 300 to 879 and that similar shops run by villages had risen from 600 to 2,191. The prime minister's office stated that there was still a long way to go because each of the country's over 6,000 villages had need of its own cooperative store. At the same time it was noted that the performance of the village shops was unsatisfactory because of inexperience, shortage of capital, and inadequate facilities to transport and store stock.

Although the government appeared committed to eventual nationalization of the retail trade, the pragmatic approach of President Nyerere was in evidence in the denationalization of the retail meat business in Dar es Salaam in August 1977. Private butcher shops in the city had been taken over in 1971 by the parastatal Dar es Salaam Development Corporation. During the next two years the corporation earned a profit but thereafter regularly showed losses. The losses were explained in part as due to fixed selling prices for meat, but there were also reports of theft, corruption, and general inefficiency of operation. Whatever the cause, the continuing loss, accentuated by the local shortage of meat, resulted in a government order to return the retail meat trade to private operation.

### **Mining**

The decade from 1966 through 1975 was characterized in the mining sector by a general stagnation in development and a gradual decline in the sector's contribution to GDP—from 2.9 percent in 1966 to 1.3 percent in 1970 and to about 0.6 percent in 1975, the latest year for which information was available. The country has a variety of known mineral deposits or occurrences that range from precious metals—diamonds (of both gem and industrial quality) and colored gemstones—to iron, tin, copper, and other metallic mineral ores and limestone, gypsum, kaolin, salt, soda ash, mica, coal, and natural gas. Production, however, by world standards was small except for diamonds, in which Tanzania was in either eighth or ninth place in the mid-1970s—diamonds made up from 85 to 90 percent of the value of the country's mineral exports.

Almost all diamonds came from the Mwadui deposit in Shinyanga Region. The deposit has been worked since 1940 and is approaching the end of its estimated resources; however, steps have been taken to

delay the eventual closing of the mine until the 1990s, as an economic measure, by including the processing of lower grade ores that ordinarily would be passed over. The mine is operated by Williamson Diamonds, associated with De Beers of London, which owns 50 percent, while the remaining 50 percent is owned by the government. Exploration for other diamond sources has been going on but without success through the end of 1977.

Gemstones and salt constituted the other chief minerals exported in the late 1970s. The government has stated that considerable export revenue was lost through smuggling these two items, particularly of gemstones, which occur in small scattered deposits not easily subject to security measures. Gemstone mining is under the control of the Tanzania Gemstone Industries, a subsidiary of the parastatal State Mining Corporation. Salt is obtained from mineralized springs at Uvinza in western Tanzania, mined by a private firm having government majority participation, and from solar evaporation along the coast, in operations carried on by private outfits. About two-thirds of the salt produced, averaging about 40,000 tons a year, is consumed domestically.

Gold mining was a major industry before and after World War II and a principal earner of foreign exchange until the mid-1960s when mine closings, as deposits were worked out, brought a drastic reduction in output. Soviet and UN teams carried out prospecting in two older fields in the early to mid-1970s as preliminaries to possible renewed mining operations. The country's reported production of gold was still negligible in 1976, however.

An unknown quantity of gold, mined illegally by individuals and small groups, is smuggled out of the country causing, according to government sources, a considerable loss of foreign exchange. In September 1977 the government banned all private prospecting in goldfields in the Lake Victoria area after a reported influx of thousands of illegal gold hunters including individuals from Zaire, Rwanda, and Kenya.

Several large deposits of coal and iron ore have been found in southwestern Tanzania. With the completion of the Uhuru (freedom) Railway in 1976, making the region more easily accessible, there appeared some possibility for the development of a local iron and steel industry, provided adequate financing could be obtained (see Transportation, this ch.). The PRC was reported to have carried out an investigation of the potential for the new industry, as part of an interest-free loan of TSh525 million made to Tanzania in 1974 for development activities, but further information was unavailable in 1977. Opening up the coalfields would offer the possibility of reducing the country's dependence on oil imports to some extent by supplying certain industries with an alternative fuel.

Natural gas was discovered in shallow coastal waters near Songo Songo Island, north of Kilwa, in 1974. A test well has been drilled, but little further information on the full extent of the find was available in late 1977. The gas is almost entirely methane and, depending on the

size of proved quantities, offered the possibility for domestic industrial conversion into such products as fertilizers and plastics. Another alternative was use as a fuel to reduce the country's dependence on energy imports.

### **Power**

The substantial potential for generation of hydroelectric power by the several major river systems emptying into the Indian Ocean constituted the principal domestic energy resource in the late 1970s. Smaller river basins in the Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika areas also had some potential. The resource had been tapped to some extent on the Pangani River in northeastern Tanzania and on the Great Ruaha River in Morogoro Region. Further development was under way in 1977 through a major addition to facilities at Kidatu on the Great Ruaha River. An unknown potential for possible thermal generation of power existed in the large unexploited coal deposits in the southwestern part of the country (see Mining, this ch.).

The parastatal Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) generates, transmits, and distributes power on the mainland. The company, founded in 1931 by private interests but completely government-owned since 1964, had an installed generating capacity in the late-1970s of 151,000 kilowatts of hydroelectric power and 100,000 kilowatts of thermal power (diesel and steam); 15,000 kilowatts were gas-turbine generated. Fuel for the nonhydro units was imported oil. The expansion of the Kidatu facility, financed by the World Bank, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), will increase TANESCO's installed hydroelectric capacity to over 250,000 kilowatts in about 1980.

Between 85 and 90 percent of all power sold is distributed through an interconnected system extending from Dar es Salaam westward through Morogoro to Kilosa and northward to Tanga, Moshi, and Arusha. This conforms generally to the principal distribution of the urban population and the concentration of industrial activity. Separate generating units had been established in some fifteen other population centers in various parts of the country by 1977; this service was being gradually extended to additional towns. Electric power sales totaled 486 million kilowatt-hours in 1975 (more than double 1966 sales) to almost 76,000 listed consumers (about 1 million people had access to electricity). Approximately 70 percent of sales was for industrial use, and another roughly 12 percent was consumed by commercial establishments. Home use accounted for approximately 18 percent of the total.

### **Transportation**

The country's transportation system in the late 1970s consisted of about 3,600 kilometers (2,230 miles) of railroads, some 33,500 kilometers (20,770 miles) of roads, three major and several minor ports on the Indian Ocean, several inland ports on Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika, and air facilities, including two international airports and

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more than fifty domestic airfields (see fig. 6). There was also an oil pipeline running from Dar es Salaam to Ndala in the Zambian copper-belt.

#### **Railroads**

The basic rail transportation network inherited at independence was developed during the colonial period to meet the needs of an economy geared to the production and export of agricultural raw materials. This system (in 1976 2,600 kilometers—1,610 miles—in length) included the northern Tanga line, constructed from the port of Tanga to serve the sisal producing region and on to the Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru areas where coffee developed as a major crop, and the Central line, built from the port of Dar es Salaam westward to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, with a branch to Mwanza on Lake Victoria, the major cotton-growing area. Another branch of the Central line ran to the eastern part of the Southern Highlands; this branch has been extended since independence. In 1963 an interconnecting link was opened between these two lines thereby permitting not only direct movement of freight and passengers throughout the system but, perhaps more important, permitting the shifting of surplus rolling stock from one section to the other to meet peak seasonal requirements.

In 1970 construction of a new major rail line, running from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border west of Mbeya, was begun, and the line commenced initial operations in late 1975. This line, roughly 1,000 kilometers (about 620 miles) in length, was built largely with financial and technical aid from the PRC. In the late 1970s the line's principal purpose was to furnish a main transportation route for Zambian exports and imports, but in time it could also be expected to spur development in mineral-rich southwestern Tanzania (see Mining, this ch.). The Uhuru Railway, as it was known in Tanzania and Zambia (a considerable stretch of the line was also built in Zambia), offered substitute facilities to the outside world for Zambia, replacing a rail link through Southern Rhodesia that was closed for political reasons by Zambia in 1973, and another link through Angola that was severed in 1975 by internal Angolan military action. In 1977 Zaire, which had been shipping copper out through Southern Rhodesia also began using the new line for some export and imports.

In late 1977 the railroads were operated as two separate systems. Until mid-1977 the Tanga and Central lines were part of the three-country (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) railroad network operated jointly by the East African Community (EAC) through the East African Railways Corporation (EARC). The Tanzanian lines were linked directly to the Kenyan and Ugandan systems by a connection between the Tanga line and the Kenyan main line. There was also a railroad ferry between Mwanza and Kisumu, Kenya, on Lake Victoria. Disagreements among the three countries finally resulted during 1977 in the effective breakup of the EAC (see ch. 2). As a result Tanzania in mid-1977 established its own Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) to control and operate the Tanga and Central systems.



The rail line between Dar es Salaam and the Zambian border is operated by the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA), jointly owned by the governments of the two countries. Although tracks of both systems run into Dar es Salaam, rolling stock is not interchangeable, TAZARA having 1.067 meter (3 feet, 6 inches) track, while the TRC system has 1 meter (3 feet, 3.37 inches) track.

#### **Road Transportation**

The road network built during colonial times was designed primarily as a feeder system for the railroads and ports. In the railroadless southeastern region roads were built to carry produce to the port of Mtwara and the smaller port of Lindi. The newly independent government adopted the long-range goal of establishing an east-west, north-south grid of trunk roads that would traverse corridors of economic activity and link economic population centers. During the 1960s, however, the main emphasis was on expansion of the feeder system, and in the early 1970s efforts were made to upgrade existing primary roads through asphaltting rather than the construction of new roads. By the mid-1970s the improved road network included only about 2,600 kilometers (1,610 miles) of hard-surfaced roads and 1,100 kilometers (about 680 miles) of engineered gravel roads. The remaining roughly 30,000 kilometers (some 18,600 miles) in the road system were dry-weather roads, many of them tracks or little better.

A major road improvement and construction undertaking carried out during the Second Five-Year Plan was the design and engineering upgrading and asphaltting of a highway running from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border near Mbeya. Known as the TanZam Highway, the project was undertaken by Tanzania primarily to provide Zambia with a reliable route for its exports and imports in view of frictions that had arisen following Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 and the possibility of a Zambian-Rhodesian border closing. Assistance in the undertaking, which was completed in 1972, was received from the SIDA, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank.

The country's Third Five-Year Plan (1977-81) calls for considerable amounts to be spent on upgrading and extending the primary road system, which includes 6,000 kilometers (3,720 miles) of trunk roads and close to 1,200 kilometers (745 miles) of other main roads. This system interconnects the regional capitals and also the Tanzanian system with those of adjacent states.

The motor vehicle fleet in 1975 totaled about 105,000 and was approximately double the number of vehicles in 1964. In 1972 privately owned vehicles of all kinds made up 91 percent of the total. Trucks and buses and light commercial vehicles constituted close to two-fifths of all vehicles, and private passenger cars made up another 36 percent. The remainder included more than 10,000 motorcycles and some 8,000 other motorized vehicles of various kinds.

Truck transport was vital to the economy, handling about three-fifths of all domestic freight moved. The industry was privately operated until 1973, when the government entered the field of public transport

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



Figure 6. Transportation System

*The Economy*



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as part of its expanding program of direct participation in economic activities. This was followed by a drop in private trucking operations and the withdrawal of service from some problem regions; a greater concentration by private interests on more profitable long-distance hauling also occurred. Government services reportedly have since proved less efficient than private ones. This, together with inadequate supplies of spare parts for the sector as a whole and deterioration of the fleet because of road conditions, had introduced important constraints on general economic activity by the late 1970s.

#### **Ports and Shipping**

The principal port, Dar es Salaam, was greatly overcongested in 1977, and foreign shipping lines were imposing surcharges because of delays in cargo handling. Increased Tanzanian economic activity was partly responsible for the congestion, but the chief cause was the greatly augmented volume of imports and exports for Zambia occasioned by the opening of the Uhuru Railway in 1975; in 1976 Zambian cargo totaled under 1.3 million tons, roughly 29 percent of the under 4.4 million tons that passed through the port. The problem was further compounded by increasing, although still comparatively small, imports and exports for Zaire, which began using the railroad in 1976.

The two other main ports, Tanga and Mtwara, handled a much smaller tonnage than Dar es Salaam; between them they accounted for under 9 percent of total imports and exports in 1976. Mtwara had deepwater berthing facilities, and about 70 percent of the country's cashew nut exports passed through the port. Tanga lacked deepwater berthing, and cargo movement required lighterage. The two ports, like Dar es Salaam, were under the EAC's East African Harbours Corporation (EAHC)—although they operated relatively independently—until mid-1977 when effective dissolution of the EAC led to formation of a separate Tanzanian harbors corporation.

A relatively smaller but important link in the general transport system in the late 1970s was the coastal passenger and domestic cargo service between Dar es Salaam, the ports of Lindi and Mtwara, and other small coastal and island ports. This was provided by vessels of the Tanzania Coastal Shipping Line (TCSL), an operating subsidiary of the National Transport Corporation. TCSL services were especially valuable to southeastern Tanzania during the rainy period when sections of the coastal road connection with Dar es Salaam were frequently impassable, and the major ferry crossing over the Rufiji River was interrupted by flooding.

Ferry transport facilities to Tanzanian ports on Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika were operated by the EARC until 1977 when Tanzania took direct control. Services on Lake Victoria, however, had actually stopped in 1976 as a result of a dispute within the EAC and Kenya's impoundment of the ferries. The loss of the ferries had seriously affected communications between the Tanzanian ports of Bukoba, Mwanza, and Musoma, and Tanzania



ordered three lake steamers from Belgium to reopen service on the lake; the first prefabricated parts arrived in mid-1977. The principal operation on Lake Tanganyika involved the movement, on Burundi-owned vessels, of exports and imports between Bujumbura and Kigoma.

#### **Air Services**

Domestic air service had special significance because of distances within the country, unsatisfactory road conditions between various towns, and lack of rail service to a number of these. Tanzania in 1977 had two international airports, at Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro. There were also about fifty other government-designated domestic airfields, many of which were little more than landing strips. Some eighteen of these airfields had been provided with regular service by East African Airways Corporation, an agency of EAC, until February 1977, when the airline halted operations because of long-standing financial problems. Tanzania then continued limited internal operations itself to the two international airports and to major airports at Mtwara and Mwanza. In April 1977 a new national airline, Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC), was established to furnish regular domestic flights, which began in May. Later in 1977 the ATC initiated international flights to several other African states.

#### **Foreign Trade**

In view of Tanzania's great dependence on exports the performance of the export sector between 1966 and 1976 was considered by the government to have been disappointing. In that decade exports grew only moderately at an average annual rate of under 4 percent, with sharp annual fluctuations in volume occurring in the half dozen chief primary agricultural products and particularly in coffee, cotton, and sisal, which made up between 40 and 50 percent of all agricultural commodity exports. Total exports of goods and nonfactor services actually declined as a percent of GDP—at current prices—from 26.5 percent in 1967 to 18.4 percent in 1975, and goods alone dropped from 22.5 percent to 13.1 percent of GDP. The ratio would have declined even further, except that from about the 1972–73 period world inflation resulted in substantially higher unit prices for the country's primary exports.

During the same ten-year period imports grew in value at an average annual rate of almost 14.5 percent. That high rate was related in large part to the growth in volume of imports of capital goods for development projects and of industrial raw materials and, from about 1973, to a jump in world prices. From 1973 a significant element in the rate was the surge in oil prices. In 1974 and 1975 the situation was further compounded by the need to import food grains because of drought conditions (see Agriculture, this ch.). Available data vary somewhat, but about the 1966–67 period imports of goods and nonfactor services were approx-

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imately 26 percent of GDP. In 1974 they were estimated at between 35 and 38 percent and in 1975 at 32 to 34 percent. The result was a gradual widening of the resource gap from less than 0.5 percent of GDP in about 1967 to between about 13.4 percent and over 15 percent in 1975.

#### **Direction of Trade**

At independence Great Britain was the principal single source of imports, a position it retained until 1971, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) assumed first place (see table 7, Appendix A). A surge in imports from the PRC began in 1970 implementing an agreement between Tanzania and the PRC under which large quantities of manufactured goods were imported for domestic sale with the proceeds to be used to finance local costs in the construction of the Uhuru Railway (see Transportation, this ch.). PRC preeminence declined after 1974, in part because of smaller imports of project supplies as work on the railroad neared completion. Imports from the PRC in 1976 were half those of the peak year 1973, when the PRC supplied over one-fifth of Tanzania's imports.

In 1975 Great Britain regained its position as the leading single supplier of imports in value and held its lead in 1976. Over time, however, its share of total imports declined, from one-third of non-EAC imports in 1962 to slightly over one-fifth in 1970 and to only one-seventh in 1976. Aggregate imports from the European Economic Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), excluding Great Britain and Ireland, remained above 20 percent of non-EAC imports during this time and in 1976 constituted more than one-fourth of total imports. The largest of the EEC suppliers was West Germany, which accounted for nearly 40 percent of the EEC total in 1976. Japan was also an important source of imports, providing from over 6 percent to 10 percent of imports annually in the 1970s.

The relative importance of suppliers in the import trade pattern was considerably disrupted in the mid-1970s as a result of the droughts in 1973 and 1974 and by the substantial increases in world petroleum prices. The import of large quantities of grain from the United States beginning in 1974 and continuing into 1976 gave that country a leading role as a supplier, second to Great Britain in 1975. Imports from Iran, the principal source of petroleum at the beginning of the 1970s, more than doubled in value in 1973 and in 1976 were well over four times the 1970 level making Iran Tanzania's second most important source of imports by value in that year. Saudi Arabia also became a major trading partner from 1974 as a supplier of petroleum.

The destinations for Tanzanian domestic (non-EAC) exports after independence were greatly widened by government efforts, and in 1976 exports, although in some cases in quite small amounts, went to about eighty different countries. Great Britain,

the principal destination in 1962, continued to be the main purchaser to the mid-1970s, but its relative share declined from almost 35 percent in 1962 to a little more than 14 percent in 1976 (see table 8, Appendix A). The United States was also a major importer of Tanzanian products during this period, usually occupying second or third position. Members of the EEC (excluding Great Britain and Ireland) took over one-fifth of exports annually during this time, the proportion rising to 28 percent in 1976. In 1976 West Germany absorbed almost 15 percent of exports, placing it slightly ahead of Great Britain. In 1976 the United States took about 10 percent of exports and was Tanzania's third best customer that year. India was an important trading partner throughout the period making substantial purchases of raw cashew nuts and cloves. In East Asia, in addition to the PRC, Hong Kong and Singapore were regular destinations for Tanzanian products in some value; in 1976 they took 5.6 percent and 7.4 percent respectively of exports.

Trade with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia (excluding the PRC) has had no particular political implications nor significance with respect to the country's trade pattern other than to represent a certain degree of intentional diversification of markets for exports and supplies. Beginning at a very low level at independence both exports and imports rose to a value plateau in about 1963 that continued until 1972. Imports consisting principally of consumer goods and some project supplies during the 1968-72 period averaged under TSh44 million a year, and exports, almost entirely agricultural commodities, averaged somewhat more than TSh41 million annually. Throughout the 1968-72 period imports ranged between under 2 percent to about 3 percent of Tanzania's non-EAC trade and exports from about 2 percent to over 3 percent. In 1973 exports (not including those to Yugoslavia) almost doubled in value and remained higher generally through 1976, mainly because of the rise in world coffee prices—the largest buyer was the Soviet Union. Tanzania's import costs also rose, however, and no change occurred in the socialist countries' share of Tanzanian exports or imports.

The principal inter-Africa trade was with Kenya and Uganda, with whom Tanzania was associated in the EAC common market until its effective dissolution in 1977 (see *Manufacturing Industries*, this ch.; ch. 2). Imports from Kenya in 1976, totaling TSh459.9 million, constituted 12.2 percent of Tanzania's total. Exports to Kenya were just about half that in value; an adverse trade balance had characterized the two nations' trade since independence. Notably, however, the proportion of manufactured goods and articles at 34.5 percent of exports in 1976 was substantially greater than Tanzanian exports in those categories (9.5 percent) to the rest of the world.

Two-way trade with Uganda was on a much lower level than with Kenya and during the 1960s was also consistently in deficit. After

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Ugandan President Milton Obote was ousted by a military coup headed by Major General Idi Amin in 1971 relations between Uganda and Tanzania became strained, and trade between the two states gradually declined. The drop was much greater in imports by Tanzania resulting in positive trade balances for Tanzania from 1971. By 1975 the amount of trade was extremely small; in that year imports from Uganda were negligible, and exports amounted only to TSh5.7 million.

Trade with other African states constituted only a small part of total trade in the mid- and late 1970s. In 1966 Tanzania had six or seven other non-EAC African trading partners but most trade was with adjacent Burundi, Zambia, and Malawi, which combined took about 0.6 percent of exports and supplied about 1 percent of imports. In 1976 the number of countries had expanded to about fifteen although only neighboring Burundi, Zaire, and Zambia were of some importance. These fifteen states absorbed under 5 percent of all exports in that year—the largest purchasers were Zambia and Burundi—but provided only roughly 0.5 percent of Tanzania's imports.

#### **Composition of Trade**

Consumer goods and materials made up the largest portion of imports in 1966 accounting for 47 percent of the total (see table 9, Appendix A). Intermediate goods, including petroleum products, building and construction materials, and others accounted for about 34 percent, and capital goods made up 19 percent. With the development of the domestic consumer goods industries, imports in this category gradually declined reaching a low of 25.3 percent in 1971. In 1971 intermediate goods had risen to 44 percent of the total, and capital goods were 31 percent. For the mid-1970s comparisons were inadvisable since the importation of great quantities of food grains after the droughts of 1973 and 1974 introduced substantial distortion. In 1974 consumer goods imports rose sharply to 37 percent of imports. In that year foods accounted for 55 percent of consumer goods, compared with 20 percent in 1966. In 1975 foods again made up almost 57 percent of consumer goods imports, although import restrictions on other consumer items helped in part to reduce the share of the category to 31.4 percent.

Little change occurred in the composition of merchandise exports between 1966 and 1975 (see table 10, Appendix A). In 1966 unprocessed agricultural commodities accounted for 69 percent of all exports, manufactured and mineral products for under 17 percent, and miscellaneous other exports made up over 14 percent. Ten years later, in 1975, primary agricultural commodities made up just under 66 percent, manufactured and mineral products accounted for 18 percent, and other exports were over 16 percent. The principal exported commodities remained the same—cotton, coffee, sisal, and raw cashew nuts—with clove exports contributing greatly varying values over the decade. The export base of



manufactured (processed) items also remained much the same, with the important addition of refined petroleum. Processed cashew kernels, sisal products, and wattle extract increased relatively in export value, but the consistently most important foreign exchange earners in the category were petroleum products and diamonds, which together accounted for 62 percent of manufactured and mineral products in 1975.

### **Tourism**

Tourism has been an important source of foreign exchange earnings, annually bringing in roughly between TSh100 million and TSh120 million in the early 1970s. Receipts dropped in 1973 and 1974 (TSh83 million in 1974), however, largely because of the effects of worldwide economic recession and inflation. In 1977 the Tanzania Tourist Corporation (TTC), a parastatal company that controlled tourism, was attempting to expand tourism and increase earnings. These efforts included campaigns abroad to promote the very well-known wildlife attractions of Tanzania's national parks.

### **The Handling of Foreign Trade**

Nationalization of the export-import trade was a fundamental concept of the policy of socialism enunciated in the Arusha Declaration. In February 1967, shortly after the declaration, the parastatal State Trading Corporation (STC) was established by an act of the National Assembly to serve as the national agency to handle not only export and import trade but also wholesale trade. STC's activities during its first years were relatively limited, however, covering only about one-fifth of import business, roughly one-tenth of exports, and a small amount of the wholesale trade.

In 1970 the government, apparently dissatisfied with the progress achieved, announced that the STC would take over all export, import, and wholesale trade from the private sector during the ensuing twelve months. President Nyerere at the time noted that most of such business was in the hands of Asians and stated that nationalization was intended to place control of the important trading sector of the economy under people's institutions. The task given the STC, which lacked an adequately trained staff for the job, was almost insurmountable involving the takeover of the operations of several hundred exporters-importers, an equally large number of wholesalers, and a much greater number of sub-wholesalers. Subsequently numerous problems developed concerned with inventory, ordering procedures, accounting, and the like. Criticism of the STC handling mounted to the point that in 1972 the STC was dissolved. Its export-import functions were taken over during the next two years by a number of new parastatals specializing in particular commodity areas and its wholesale operations by parastatal trading companies newly established in each of the mainland regions. These all operated under the direc-

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tion of the Board of Internal Trade, a parastatal holding company, which in 1977 was responsible to the Ministry of Trade. Various manufacturing parastatals have also been authorized to act as sole importers for goods of the same category they themselves produced, and in 1977 some private companies continued to carry on export-import trading, although information on the nature and extent of their participation was unavailable.

### **Balance of Payments**

Between 1967 and 1972 the country's overall balance of payments was usually in surplus. The trade balance, however, was usually in deficit, although small favorable trade balances were recorded in 1967 and 1969. Adverse balances on current account were more than offset by net earnings on services and by capital inflows, which came chiefly from international and bilateral governmental sources (see table 11, Appendix A). Official reserves during the period ran between TSh400 million and TSh625 million, and in general there was little cause for concern over the payments position. In 1973 world prices for the country's agricultural commodity exports rose substantially, but at the same time imports also increased and a trade deficit of TSh979.3 million was registered. Again, increases in capital inflow together with the net favorable services balance still resulted in a further addition to foreign exchange reserves, which reached TSh1,050 million late in the year. This amount was roughly equivalent to the costs of imports for approximately a four months' period.

A sudden reversal in the exchange position occurred in 1974, mostly due to factors over which the government had little control. These included the serious droughts in 1973 and 1974, which caused a sharp decline in food production and forced the importation of large quantities of food grains; a related substantial drop in export commodities output, and a consequent smaller volume exported; and the steep increase in world prices for petroleum products, accompanied by sharply mounting costs for raw materials, spare parts, and capital goods needed by the Tanzanian economy. The trade balance deteriorated rapidly, and the deficit was well over double that of the previous year. Reserves were heavily drawn down, and the reserve position had dropped to below TSh300 million by late 1974.

In the crisis that developed the government sought and received assistance from the World Bank, which provided funds on a loan basis for the purchase of raw materials, capital goods, and other essential imports that could have been procured otherwise only by cutting back the country's development efforts. A large amount of grant and food aid was also received from a number of foreign governments, and between 1974 and 1976 substantial drawings were made on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) amounting to TSh796.6 million.

For its own part the government in 1974 and 1975 strengthened controls on consumer goods and raw material imports; at the same time the importation of certain items, including tobacco and liquor, was completely barred. From 1974 the importation of automobiles was greatly restricted also, and measures were taken to cut down the use of gasoline and other petroleum products. Food retail prices were increased substantially, and indirect taxes raised on certain consumer goods for the purpose of reducing private consumption demand—further tax increases were made in fiscal years 1975 and 1976. Additionally from mid-1975 the minimum wage was frozen, and future pay raises were tied to productivity.

The trade balance continued to worsen in 1975 as export volume declined further, and overall import costs, despite restrictions on consumer goods imports, showed an increase—primarily because of price rises than of volume. World prices for certain Tanzanian commodities also softened at the same time, especially for cotton and sisal, although gains were made in other commodities including coffee, tea, and pyrethrum extract. A substantial increase in the surplus balance on services occurred, in part related to the growth of transshipments to and from Zambia after the opening of the Uhuru Railway (see Transportation, this ch.). A large increase in net transfers resulting from increased foreign grants, food aid, and others, and a tightening of exchange controls; multilateral program import assistance; and further IMF drawings also helped to reduce the trade balance deficit. An improvement in the trade balance occurred in 1976 as export earnings increased, bolstered by high coffee and cotton prices, and by export volume, which resulted from improved weather and growing conditions. Expenditure for imports declined somewhat as larger harvests permitted a reduction in food grain imports. Project aid was still at a high level, and the government reported that the overall balance of payments had shown a surplus of TSh445.2 million for the year. In June 1977 foreign reserves were about TSh2 billion.

### **The Financial Sector**

In 1977 the country's relatively well-developed financial system was entirely within the public sector, in marked contrast to the period before 1967, when the major credit-providing institutions were private operations. The earlier institutions arose during the British colonial period principally to meet the needs of the export and import trade and of the commercial sector of the East African common market, comprising Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda. The market used a single currency, the East African shilling, which was issued and supported by the East African Currency Board (EACB). Founded in 1919 as the central currency authority for Kenya and Uganda, the EACB had assumed a similar role for Tanganyika in 1920 and in 1936 for Zanzibar.

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After the East African countries became independent in the early 1960s, one of the major drawbacks of the EACB was its lack of monetary powers to influence national credit policies with respect to the kinds and numbers of loans made by the financially dominant commercial banks. It also offered no facilities to the governments for deficit financing of development programs or for other purposes through money creation or borrowing. For these and other reasons the Tanzanian government withdrew from the arrangement and established its own central bank, the Bank of Tanzania, which began operations in June 1966. Tanzania also created its own currency, the Tanzanian shilling, for which the sole issuing authority was the new bank; the new shilling appeared in June 1966. Otherwise the monetary system remained essentially as before, consisting mainly of the commercial banks—mostly branches of foreign institutions—insurance companies, and a number of specialized financial institutions established by the government to meet credit needs not adequately met by the commercial banks.

#### **Financial Institutions in 1977**

After the Arusha Declaration the commercial banking system was nationalized in February 1967, bringing under government control this major financial sector, which previously had functioned outside the scope of government power and whose earnings had largely been invested outside the country. The government at the time promised fair and full compensation based on the value of net assets. The nationalized banks were merged into the newly created National Bank of Commerce (NBC), wholly owned by the government. Also nationalized was the insurance industry, which included private companies and the National Insurance Corporation (NIC), founded in 1964. In the case of the NIC in which the government already held a majority interest and which initially was chiefly a property and casualty insurer, the government merely acquired outstanding private holdings. Most of private insurance company earnings had also been invested abroad. Such companies were permitted to serve policies written before 1967, but a certain part of earnings had to be invested in Tanzania. After 1967 all new life insurance, and after 1968 all other kinds of insurance, were the sole prerogative of the NIC, although the NIC continued to use several foreign insurance companies as agents until 1974.

In 1977 in addition to the Bank of Tanzania—which was charged with overall monetary policy—the NBC, and the NIC, Tanzania had several other banking institutions whose functions were to meet specific requirements of the financial sector. Four were development banks, including the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), which was founded in 1970 and whose main purpose was to furnish long- and medium-term loans for operations and projects in the productive sectors and to arrange and finance industrial feasibility studies and technical assistance. TIB operations have



received substantial financing from foreign sources including Canada, Norway, Sweden, West Germany, and the World Bank. The Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), set up in 1971, made loans of varying length to the rural sector—chiefly to *ujamaa* villages, the District Development Corporations, and the like for seasonal inputs, purchase of livestock, and to a lesser extent for equipment and the development of local small-scale rural industries. A considerable part of TRDB bank funds have also come from international and bilateral loans.

Financing primarily projects in the manufacturing sector was the Tanganyika Development Finance Company Limited (TDFL), established in 1962. Paid-in capital in the mid-1970s had been contributed in equal shares by the TIB and aid agencies of West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the company's board of directors included representatives of those agencies. During much of its earlier period, the TDFL financed only private sector projects but in the late 1970s was also funding public sector undertakings.

The fourth source of development funds, specifically for industrial projects, was the East African Development Bank (EADB), a corporation of the EAC with headquarters at Kampala, which was set up in 1967. Approximately 93 percent of the bank was owned in equal shares by Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, and the remaining 7 to 8 percent by a number of private banks and a consortium of Yugoslav interests. Under its charter the EADB was required to allocate 38.75 percent of its investments each to Tanzania and Uganda and the rest to Kenya during the bank's first ten years. To 1976 EADB financing in Tanzania had gone mostly to large projects and was usually part of a joint funding scheme with a Tanzanian entity such as TIB.

Other financial institutions included the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB), which financed business and residential construction and low- and medium-cost housing. In the mid- and late-1970s the bank also made small loans to individuals to purchase materials for home repair and improvement. Founded in 1972, the THB had branches and agencies in various parts of the country and had constructed housing in Tanga, Tabora, Shinyanga, Dodoma, and Mbeya. Another institution, the National Provident Fund (NPF), originally provided only retirement benefits, but since 1975 had also offered unemployment benefits to members. Employers having four or more workers had to participate, with contributions to the fund based on employee salaries and paid half by the employee and half by the employer. All NPF surplus funds were held in government bonds. The Tanganyika Post Office Savings Bank, with over 250 branches, was the principal institution available to the small saver in both urban and rural areas. Its surpluses were also, by law, invested in government bonds.

### **Savings and Investment**

The Tanganyika Post Office Savings Bank, the THB, and the NBC were the only institutions mobilizing savings directly from the private sector. Increases in savings through these banks, however, have been attributed more to expansion of facilities tapping new sources rather than to a higher rate of saving. In part this was due to the low interest paid. The government had generally shown limited concern over the savings interest rate structure but in 1976 was reported to be weighing the part higher interest rates might play in reversing the gradual decline in gross domestic savings that had begun in 1971. After having reached 18 percent of GDP in 1970 (rising from 15 percent of GDP in 1965), gross domestic savings were estimated to have fallen by 1975 to only about half the 1970 ratio.

The factors behind the decline were not altogether clear, but the strong inflationary trend that began in 1974, when prices after a long period of moderate increases averaging 4 percent a year rose by 20 percent (followed by rises of 26 percent in 1975 and 15 percent in 1976), was believed to have encouraged individuals to buy capital goods as an economic hedge, as well as forcing the greater current use of income. Sectorally a substantial drop in private monetary savings, including savings by cooperative organizations, occurred from 1970. That year private savings constituted 12 percent of GDP, but by 1973 they had declined to only about 8 percent. Although increased taxation was considered to be partly responsible, it was speculated that declining investment possibilities for private capital also discouraged savings.

In the public sector, although government recurrent revenue had increased, recurrent expenditure rose at an even higher rate resulting in a relative substantial decline in direct government savings to GDP from an estimated annual average of 1.5 percent between 1966 and 1968 to about 0.4 percent in the early 1970s. Parastatal corporations at the same time have produced a low level of savings, while increasing their share of disposable income in the economy at the expense of the higher saving private sector (see *Industrial Productivity*, this ch.).

During the latter half of the 1960s the gross domestic savings rate as a proportion of GDP was roughly the same as that for gross domestic investment, which ranged between 15 percent and 18 percent of GDP. Since 1970, however, in sharp contrast to the decline in gross domestic savings, Tanzania's development efforts have been characterized by a very commendable performance in overall gross domestic capital formation, which has remained at over 20 percent of GDP annually, and in the case of monetary gross domestic fixed capital formation has been even more noteworthy, averaging over 25 percent of monetary GDP. In investment, the change in direction of the economy that began with the nationalizations of 1967 was reflected by the early 1970s in an almost complete reversal of the private sector-public sector rela-

tionship. Whereas the private sector in 1965 had accounted for three-fifths of monetary fixed capital formation, by 1973 its share had declined to just over one-fifth. Subsequently with the completion of several major public sector development projects, the private sector's share increased again to over 31 percent in 1974 but was still only about half its 1965 total.

#### **National Budget**

Ordinary government activities—education, defense, administration, and others—measured by budgetary revenue and expenditure and in relation to the country's monetary GDP, grew tremendously in the decade from 1966 to 1975 (see table 12, table 13, Appendix A). During this time recurrent revenue increased two and a half times, from less than a quarter (22.9 percent) to over a half (56.6 percent) of monetary GDP. The growth in revenue averaged 8.7 percent a year in real terms, which was far above the 3 to 4 percent projected in the Second Five-Year Plan. Accounting in part for the rapid growth were the introduction of new taxes and tax increases intended not only for revenue purposes but also as income leveling devices and as measures to discourage certain consumer goods consumption. Completion of production projects also raised the tax take. The rather moderate growth of the economy throughout the period was considered to have been responsible for only a marginal share of the increase in overall revenue.

In the mid-1970s the single most important revenue source in the recurrent budget was the sales tax. Introduced in 1969 this tax, which applied to both imported and domestically manufactured goods, with certain items excepted, was levied at the point of entry or manufacture. The tax placed an additional burden on the rural population that was, however, immediately offset by a reduction in other rural tax levies. In fiscal year 1976 budget estimates, the sales tax accounted for about 37 percent of recurrent revenue, compared with about 27 percent for income taxes, 19 percent for customs and excise duties, and some 17 percent provided by miscellaneous taxes and other receipts.

Recurrent expenditure rose at an even faster rate averaging 10.8 percent a year, considerably above the projected annual 6.5 percent increase; government efforts in the mid-1970s to reduce expenditure had only limited success. Responsible were substantial increases in government-provided social services and in wage increases, new recurrent charges arising from completed development projects, and inflation. Because surpluses in the recurrent budget, intended for application to development projects, were smaller Tanzania was forced to rely, to a greater extent than it wished, on foreign aid. At the beginning of the 1970s domestic financing met over two-thirds of the overall budget deficit (TSh800 million) occasioned by development expenditure, but budget estimates for the 1976-77 period projected foreign funding to cover more than two-thirds of the deficit (estimated at over TSh2,600 million).

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### **Foreign Aid**

Foreign financing has come from donors including Canada, the PRC, West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States among governments and among international organizations agencies of the World Bank. More than twenty countries had furnished aid through loans or grants as of the end of 1975. The African Development Bank (ADB) and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development had also provided funds. At the beginning of 1976 disbursed funds from all sources amounted to US\$737.8 million, and there remained US\$396.5 million still available—to which a substantial additional amount was added in 1976 and 1977.

A substantial part of foreign aid was secured on concessional terms in the form of interest-free, long-maturity loans; about four-fifths of external debt in the mid-1970s had a maturity of twenty years or more. The government has used suppliers' credits and commercial loans very sparingly, and at the start of 1976 such credits and loans still outstanding amounted to only about 2.6 percent of outstanding external public debt; the last disbursement of suppliers' credits to that date was reportedly in 1971, and of private bank (commercial) credits in 1973. The total external debt service requirement in 1975 was equivalent to 7.3 percent of exports. Tanzania had also received assistance through a large number of grants, of which the largest were from the Scandinavian countries. Between 1967 and 1975 such grants totaled almost US\$360 million.

\* \* \*

The development of socialist institutions in the economy began about 1967. In the decade since then a considerable number of economic studies—mostly dealing with aspects of rural development and villagization—have been published in monographs, dissertations, journal articles, and the like. Many of these were used in the preparation of this chapter. Through the end of 1977, however, no comprehensive analysis of the economy was known to have appeared in print. A detailed examination of the origins and development of the land tenure structure is presented by R.W. James in *Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania*; G.M. Fimbo also discusses the land question in "Land, Socialism and the Law in Tanzania." A Marxist critique of Tanzania's socialist economic course is available in Issa G. Shivji's *Class Struggles in Tanzania*. (For further information see Bibliography.)



## Chapter 5. National Security



*A Makonde mask*

IN THE LATE 1970s the security of the country was in the hands of an army, a navy, and an air force (known collectively as the Tanzania People's Defense Force—TPDF), the People's Militia, and the national police forces. The mission of the TPDF was to protect the integrity of the country's borders and, when necessary, to assist the national police in the maintenance of public order and internal security.

The London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that the 1977 strength of the TPDF was 18,600—about 600 in the navy, 1,000 in the air force, and 17,000 in the army. Ten years earlier the TPDF had been only a token military force numbering under 2,000 army troops without naval or air force components. The growth of the TPDF over the ten-year period was dramatic as external pressures demanded that the country develop armed forces capable of defending its sovereignty and as internal attitudes about the role of a front-line state in southern Africa's liberation struggle also seemed to demand something more than a token army. Despite that growth, maintaining these relatively small forces out of a total population of about 16 million in mid-1977 did not put any strain on the nation's manpower resources. During the 1970s the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been the chief sponsor of Tanzania's military forces.

The constitutional commander in chief of the armed forces was the president of the United Republic of Tanzania. He was advised and assisted at the top civilian level by the minister for defense and national service. Actual military command was vested in the commander of the TPDF who held the rank of major general. In early 1978 President Julius K. Nyerere was commander in chief; his long-time friend and political associate, Rashidi M. Kawawa, was minister for defense and national service; and Major General Abdallah Twalipo was commander of the TPDF.

At the beginning of 1978 there did not appear to be any major threat to internal security. The early and mid-1970s had seen no great upheavals within the society, no unruly mass demonstrations had disturbed the peace, and there had been no rioting. University students had held demonstrations at various times, but they posed no threat to public order, the preservation of which presented no extraordinary problems to the country's police and security forces in early 1978.

Ordinary (nonpolitical) crimes were said to be increasing, but no statistics were available to prove or disprove the premise. At any rate the police were kept busy trying to curb the illegal activities of thieves, cattle rustlers, poachers, smugglers, and others. The incidence of crimes of violence was not very high, but increasing numbers of assaults and armed robberies worried authorities. Corruption among government officials and employees was a

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recurrent theme in newspaper reports and editorials, but observers considered the scale of corruption relatively low compared with many other African states.

The police forces are national organizations under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Police work is constitutionally a national matter but Zanzibar has exercised a large measure of autonomy ever since unification, and central government records in the late 1970s listed the Zanzibar Police Force separately. The national police on the mainland were listed as the Police Main Force. In addition to these two basic police forces several specialized organizations existed for specific kinds of functions and operations. The police were aided in their operations by the People's Militia, which has become an important instrument in maintaining public order. At the beginning of 1978 there were no obvious subversive movements and no organized political opposition.

### **Armed Forces**

#### **Constitutional Basis**

The authority to raise and maintain armed forces in Tanzania is contained in the country's Constitution. Day-to-day affairs of the military are regulated by acts of the National Assembly. Because Tanzania is a one-party state, however, that party—the Revolutionary Party, known as Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)—is the most powerful element in the entire society, and it is the party that has dictated the wording of the Constitution as well as the content of legislation passed by the assembly. The CCM was created in early 1977 by the merger of the mainland party—Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)—and the Zanzibari party—Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The premise that national security must be everybody's business is basic to party philosophy as well as to the philosophy of Nyerere. The party has stated that, "Tanzania's defense and security depend on Tanzanians themselves—every Tanzanian, in particular each patriot, each specialist."

In stressing that defense and security must be public affairs, the party guidelines state that the regular army is but a core around which a widespread popular defense movement is built. "Our army must be the people's army, used in teaching the people how to defend themselves in their localities and to enable them to report on matters of national security." The TANU Guidelines (Mwongozo) called for the formation and training of a militia that would be posted throughout the country working in cooperation with the regular army "to defend our territorial borders, our air space and to expose traitors and enemies." The People's Militia, armed and trained by the TPDF and estimated to have 35,000 members in 1977, was the answer to the party's call for a citizen's army.

The president is commander in chief of the TPDF as prescribed



by the Constitution. Subject to the provisions of any act of parliament the commander in chief has the power to order the armed forces into operations in defense of the homeland. He also may order the forces to assist the police in maintaining public order, to respond to emergencies such as natural disasters, and for any other purpose "appearing to the commander in chief to be expedient" whether they exist within the country's borders or outside. The president's prerogatives also include the authority to commission officers, to appoint officers to command positions, to terminate appointments, and to dismiss personnel from the forces.

#### **Attitudes Toward the Armed Forces**

To some of the sophisticated, urbanized Tanzanians, armed forces personnel seem to have inherited the perquisites that had formerly been reserved to the European colonists. To some extent this attitude damages the acceptance that the authorities have carefully tended to instill in the people by integrating the military closely into the political and governmental apparatuses. Despite the efforts at integration the military by its very nature—organized, disciplined, and armed—stands out because it is different from civilian institutions. In areas of the country where the government ordered soldiers to force people to abandon their homes and move into *ujamaa* villages, there have been hard feelings and antagonism toward the army. For the most part, however, the military seems to be an accepted part of Tanzanian life, and its small size gives it a low profile. One authentic present-day hero in 1977 was Filbert Bayi, a captain in the TPDF, who was known throughout the country not for his military exploits but for his spectacular feats as an international track star. Bayi first gained prominence as an army private breaking track records in 1973.

The true attitude of the people toward the country's armed forces is difficult to discern. There are no published public opinion polls, and the newspapers do not carry many stories, either news or features, about the TPDF or its members. In a country so large and so diverse where most people live in villages, it is not out of the ordinary for small-scale armed forces to have a low profile, but because the principal newspapers are published in Dar es Salaam which is the headquarters for the country's armed forces, it does appear that the lack of news about the military results from policy rather than coincidence. At any rate news items about the TPDF are rare, and in those stories that do appear there is usually no mention of unit designations, names of commanding officers, locations, or other information of that nature.

In the highly publicized Defense Forces Games of 1977 the *Daily News*, a government newspaper, devoted most of its sports page everyday during the seventeen-day games to coverage of the vast array of sporting events. Seeming to ignore publicity as an aid to morale and esprit de corps, the newspaper did not mention battalions, ships, or squadrons represented by athletes nor did it say whether they were soldiers, sailors, or airmen. The term

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*ndugu*—Swahili for brother but translated as comrade—was used exclusively with the names of individuals, leaving readers in the dark concerning the ranks of the participants as well as of any other personal data.

An indication of popular attitudes toward the military might be the number of young people trying to enlist in the all-volunteer force. From bits and pieces of information that are available in the popular press or from travelers and interested observers, it would appear that military service is sought after by many more young people than can be accommodated in such a small organization. Although military pay scales are not published by the government, there has been a general assumption ever since the 1964 mutiny that military personnel are well paid. For those Tanzanians who do not serve in the TPDF, that is, the vast majority of the population, acceptance of the armed forces as a natural and necessary element of national life would probably be the general attitude if a poll could be taken.

#### **Manpower**

Even if the 1977 estimates of a total armed force of 18,600 were accepted, that number did not make any significant impact on the labor market. Compared with the tiny TPDF that was created after the mutiny and existed until the late 1960s, the 1977 force seemed rather large and actually was about ten times the size of the 1964 force. Nevertheless in a country of nearly 16 million people Tanzania's armed force was small. In 1977 there were almost 2 million men in the fifteen-to-forty-nine age-group, and slightly over half of these were considered fit for military service. Just under 100,000 men annually reach the entering military age of nineteen. Since 1969 women have also been accepted for military service; no estimates on the number serving have been available, but the total was believed to be quite small.

The population is made up of more than 120 ethnic groups but recruiting was generalized, and there was no domination of the TPDF by any particular group. During colonial times it was common for British recruiters to enlist 25 to 30 percent of Tanganyika's King's African Rifles quota from among just two groups—the Hehe and the Kuria. Since independence no preference has been given to any group or to any section of the country, a practice that has resulted in a military force that represents a cross-section of the country's people.

All service in the TPDF is voluntary. Authorities have not seen any necessity to institute a system of conscription even as the army expanded from 1,700 to 17,000 during the period of independence. Military recruits are drawn from the National Service, which provides a large pool of young men and women. The National Service is a public service organization in which, theoretically, all young people must serve for a period of two years. In practice, those who serve are generally graduates of secondary schools or

higher institutions. All National Service trainees receive three months of regular military basic training after which the small number of recruits needed to fill TPDF and police ranks are allowed to volunteer, and the remainder of the trainees are sent to National Service camps where they are assigned to agriculturally or industrially oriented training programs. If a problem has existed in the recruiting of military and police volunteers, it would seem to be that there are always more applicants than can be accommodated in the ranks. Military recruits must be party (or Youth League) members, nineteen years old, in good health, and able to read and write Swahili. Term of service is two years.

Four years of secondary schooling are required of those aspiring to be military officers, and successful applicants are those who have generally demonstrated qualities of leadership and intelligence. Candidates must be party or Youth League members between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two. Potential officers are also screened for physical fitness, and only the most qualified are selected for training. Because of the educational qualifications candidates for commissions have more often than not come from urban centers where there is greater access to schools than in the rural areas.

#### **Military Traditions**

In 1964 when Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged their governments to form the United Republic of Tanzania, both states had only recently gained independence from Great Britain—Tanganyika in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963. The military traditions of Tanzania, therefore, are the heritage of the component peoples rather than of a national entity. The TPDF, which in 1977 consisted of a relatively small army, a tiny air force, and a tiny navy, have not engaged in warfare since their inception although during the 1970s various units were involved in border clashes at different times with units of the armed forces of Uganda, Burundi, and Malawi. These actions, however, were quick skirmishes that did not contribute much to the country's military traditions. When Tanzanians celebrate Heroes' Day on September 1 they look to a more distant past for the heroes that they honor.

Many of the ethnic groups that make up the population have histories in which warfare plays a significant part. The warriors of the Masai, for example, enjoyed a reputation that protected them from the rapacious slave traders of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who preferred to attack less formidable peoples. Less militant neighbors were often protected by their proximity to the Masai. The Ngoni, an offshoot of the warlike Zulu group to the south, also cherished their military traditions. Although most of East Africa's ethnic groups consisted of peaceful farmers and pastoralists, oral history indicates that great and small military ventures occurred as migrations from north and south took place, and numerous groups established themselves in areas that eventually became their homelands (see ch. 1).

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For the indigenous groups of peoples, the arrival of outsiders generally meant conflict. Although the Arabs had arrived on the coast and islands by the end of the first millennium A.D., extensive slave trading in the Tanzanian area did not begin until the late 1700s, but it then had substantial effects on the southern quarter of the mainland. Some groups were able to defend themselves against the slavers, but more often peaceful rural peoples were easy prey for the caravans that scoured the countryside. In central Tanzania the Africans were not so strongly affected because the caravans passed through on their way to what was to become the Congo (later Zaire) (see ch. 1).

The slave trade continued until the late 1800s, and foreign domination did not end until the early 1960s. By 1890 Zanzibar had come under British control and Tanganyika under German. The colony of German East Africa lasted only from the mid-1880s until World War I, but the legends of African uprisings against oppressive German rule during that short period have become part of the military traditions of present-day Tanzania. Before the turn of the century, for example, warriors of the Hehe group attacked German caravans that were making incursions into Hehe territory. The Germans retaliated by sending an army of about 1,000 men to attack the recalcitrant Hehe. The punitive expedition, consisting mostly of trained African mercenaries led by German officers and noncommissioned officers, was ambushed and all but wiped out by the Hehe under Chief Mkwawa. Incensed by the fact that an African chief had the temerity to attack (and defeat) a colonial army, the German authorities determined to capture and punish Mkwawa.

For the next seven years Chief Mkwawa successfully evaded the German expeditions sent against him, but when his small force was surrounded in 1898 he committed suicide rather than surrender to his enemy. Mkwawa's head was severed from his body and taken to Germany where the skull was exhibited in a museum until 1954 when, at the request of the Hehe, the skull of the revered leader was returned to his people. The name of Mkwawa is proudly remembered when Tanzanians commemorate their past heroes.

The next major military action in German East Africa was the uprising known as the Maji Maji Rebellion. Again the harsh rule of the Germans was the cause of the trouble. Workers in the southern part of the colony, mostly work gangs of forced laborers, were encouraged by religious leaders to revolt. Distributing a liquid concoction that supposedly had magic qualities, the leaders convinced the rebels that drinking the magic liquid would protect them from enemies and even turn German bullets into water. The Swahili word for water, *maji*, became the rallying cry of the workers-turned-warriors. From August until October of 1905 the rebels held sway in the southern part of the colony wreaking vengeance on all foreigners including missionaries. After the



arrival of fresh troops from Germany, the tide of battle turned. Employing Sudanese and Zulu mercenaries, the Germans spent more than a year stamping out all vestiges of rebellion and punishing the errant groups. About 120,000 lives were lost in the abortive attempt to overthrow the German colonial regime.

In the East African campaigns of World War I, several thousand African troops acquitted themselves well in the service of the Germans as well as in the service of the Allies. On the German side most of the African troops were from the Nyamwezi group, and in retrospect it would seem that they should have been overwhelmed from the beginning by the much stronger British, Belgian, and South African forces. Under the brilliant leadership of General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, however, the Tanganyikan force fought and ran, then fought and ran again during the entire four years of the war. Again a legend was born; not only a legend about the great leadership of Lettow-Vorbeck but also about the tenacity, loyalty, and combat effectiveness of his Tanganyikan soldiers.

Defeat in World War I brought the forfeiture of Germany's colonies. Great Britain, in effect, had been ruling German East Africa since the capture of Dar es Salaam in 1916 even though Lettow-Vorbeck was still at large and still fighting. It wasn't until 1922 that the League of Nations mandate made the British administration of the Tanganyikan part of the former German colony official.

At the outbreak of World War II thousands of Africans were recruited into the British armed forces, and during the course of the war almost 100,000 Tanganyikans, including Nyamwezi, served the British as well as an earlier generation had served the Germans during the previous war. Tanganyikan elements of the King's African Rifles fought against Italians in Ethiopia and Somalia, against Germans in North Africa, and against Japanese in Burma. When the war ended demobilized veterans did not form dissident or nationalist groups, and when the independence movement did emerge it was not based on veterans' organizations; its orientation was political rather than military.

From the end of the war in 1945 until independence in 1961, the Tanganyikan element of the King's African Rifles was a typical colonial force—small in number, a garrison army rather than a field force, and dedicated more to ceremony than to operations. When the British Union Jack was lowered for the last time and the new colors of an independent Tanganyika were raised, part of the King's African Rifles became the Tanganyika Rifles, an army numbering fewer than 2,000 men.

The military, which had played no significant part in the independence movement, remained politically passive during the immediate postindependence period. Therefore, when the army's two battalions mutinied in January 1964, the government of the new republic was taken by surprise. As it turned out the mutiny

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was not a political event; the causes were purely military—pay, promotions, and command affairs. Coming as it did at a time when the country was trying to establish itself economically and its people were being called on to sacrifice in the austere present in order to provide a more abundant future, the mutiny seemed to belong more to the colonial past than it did to the new era.

The mutiny began late on Sunday night, January 19, 1964, when the troops of the First Battalion of the Tanganyika Rifles deposed their officers and moved out of Colito Barracks (now Lugalo Barracks) on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam and occupied key government buildings in the city. By Monday morning the mutineers controlled the State House, the home of the president, police stations, radio stations, and transportation terminals. The mutiny had all the appearances of a coup d'état and following so closely the revolution on Zanzibar of the previous week, officials feared the worst. President Nyerere and Vice President Kawawa went into hiding to protect themselves and their government as Minister for External Affairs and Defense Oscar Kambona negotiated with the mutinous soldiers. The army stated that it was not trying to overthrow the government but simply wanted better pay and Africanization of its officer corps. Two-thirds of the officers including all those above the rank of captain were still British; after two years of independence the soldiers and lower ranking officers considered that unacceptable.

On the second day of the mutiny the Second Battalion stationed at Tabora and a company at Nachingwea joined in the mutiny, which meant that the country's entire armed force was in a state of rebellion. President Nyerere returned and met with the leaders of the mutiny but was unsuccessful in his efforts to get the troops back into their garrisons. In effect there was a standoff, but even with assurances from the mutineers that this was not a coup, the situation remained extremely volatile. Looting of shops had taken place in the capital, and the spirit of mutiny had spread across the borders to the armies of neighboring Kenya and Uganda. By Saturday January 25, with mutineers still in control in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, and Nachingwea, the president reluctantly asked for British help in resolving the situation. The British quickly landed a force of Royal Marine commandos from the nearby aircraft carrier H.M.S. *Centaur*. In a short time the British marines had routed the First Battalion mutineers from the streets of the capital and had subdued the rebels at the other two locations. For Nyerere and the country the entire episode, particularly calling on British forces to control Tanganyikans, was a great embarrassment. Furthermore the Tanganyikan army was in a state of collapse.

Taking stock of the country's military situation after the mutiny had been quelled and after the British marines had been replaced by Nigerian soldiers, top government officials decided that the future security forces—both military and police—would have to be

drawn from the politically active segment of society. The previously held idea that such forces should be apolitical was discarded in favor of a new premise that urged soldiers and policemen to become party members and to participate actively in political affairs. The Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded. Many of the ring-leaders of the mutiny were tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison; other participants were discharged from the service and sent back to their villages. The British officers were also dismissed from the service and were deported. Some Tanganyikan soldiers and officers whose loyalty was unquestioned were promoted to much higher grades as a new army, later the TPDF, was created.

#### **Administration and Organization**

For the first few years of its existence the TPDF was little more than a token force—the army was even smaller than the 2,000-man force that had been the Tanganyika Rifles, the air force was a miniscule group of airmen without any combat capability, and the navy had not yet been formed. Toward the end of the 1960s developing situations demanded substantial increases in the number of men under arms and the amount of money budgeted for military purposes. In early 1971 the rise of Idi Amin as military dictator of Uganda and his belligerence and unpredictability emphasized the need for increased Tanzanian defenses, but Nyerere's own policies also indicated such a need. Nyerere had become, or had always been, an outspoken advocate of all liberation movements on the African continent, and Tanzania had become headquarters and training ground for guerrilla forces seeking the overthrow of various white regimes. Tanzania was thus possibly subject to hostile reprisals, another factor in the perceived need for increased defense.

#### **Military Command and Mission**

As commander in chief of the TPDF the president has ultimate authority for the organization, administration, and operation of the forces. President Nyerere, who has led his country since independence in 1961 and was reelected in 1975, has generally relied on subordinates in his government for the day-to-day management of the armed forces not because he has been uninterested in military affairs but because his philosophy of government has been basically nonmilitary. If conditions had permitted, he probably would have preferred to dispense completely with armed forces after the mutiny of 1964, but reality dictated the need for some kind of defense so the TPDF was created.

In statements made during the recruitment and training of the soldiers who would replace the mutineers, Nyerere outlined his ideas on what the new armed forces should and should not be. He was adamant in his belief that the forces must be integrated into the party and the state. They must not be allowed to become an elite force that could be a threat to the government instead of its protector. In Nyerere's view the army would, in effect, be an arm

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of the party. Such a concept would probably have been almost impossible to achieve in the premutiny army because of its colonial background and British orientation, but creating a force almost from scratch gave Nyerere the opportunity to introduce his own ideas and to ensure that those ideas were implemented. The new TPDF became a politicomilitary force whose officers and noncommissioned officers were forced to be political activists. Overall control of the military, however, was firmly held by civilians.

The major supervisory body for defense matters was a high-powered committee chaired by the president and included in its membership both vice presidents (later the single vice president), the minister for defense and national service, the commander of the TPDF and his chief of staff, and the chiefs of political education for the TPDF from the mainland and from Zanzibar. Subcommittees existed to implement party directives in the armed forces. Routine management of the forces was a responsibility of the Defense Forces Committee established by the National Defense Act of 1966. Subject to the approval of the president this committee supervised administration and logistics. As originally constituted, the committee was chaired by the second vice president who at that time also held the defense portfolio. Later, when the second vice-presidency was abolished and the Ministry of Defense and National Service established, the Defense Forces Committee was chaired by its minister. Other members included the commander of the TPDF, the secretary of the Department of National Defense, and the chief of military personnel.

At the time of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar defense affairs were the responsibility of the minister for internal affairs and defense, then Kambona. About a month after the union the defense portfolio was separated from internal affairs and made a responsibility of the second vice president, Rashidi M. Kawawa. This arrangement lasted until early 1972 when Kawawa was made prime minister, and a separate cabinet position for defense and national service was created with Edward M. Sokoine as minister. In a reshuffling of his cabinet in 1977 President Nyerere promoted Sokoine to the prime ministership and demoted Kawawa to the defense position. No explanation was given, but observers guessed that Kawawa had been associated with some recent economic setbacks.

The commander of the TPDF in 1977 was Major General Abdallah Twalipo. Major general was the highest rank in the armed forces, and on active duty only the commander held that rank. From its inception in 1964 until the government reorganization of 1974, the TPDF was commanded by Marisho S. H. Sarakikya, a Sandhurst-trained lieutenant at the time of the mutiny, who was catapulted to the rank of brigadier and became the first commander of the TPDF. For several years Sarakikya was the only brigadier on active duty, but in 1969 he was promoted to the



newly added rank of major general, and soon a few other positions were designated for brigadiers. Sarakikya, who had distinguished himself by his loyalty to country and president and by his ability to manage military affairs during the incubation of the new armed forces, was made minister for national culture and youth in Nyerere's cabinet in 1974, and Twalipo became commander of the TPDF jumping from the grade of colonel to major general. In 1977 Sarakikya was named envoy to Nigeria.

Another important member of the military hierarchy is the individual charged with overseeing the political education and activities of the troops. In November 1964 President Nyerere created the position of political commissar of the TPDF to ensure that a high-ranking party member would have an official position in the top level of the armed forces. Nyerere chose Selemani J. Kitunda, a civilian who was then Coast Regional Commissioner, to be the first commissar of the forces and gave him the rank of colonel. For lower levels the president decreed that company commanders would henceforth be chairmen of the elected party committees that each company would have. As company political leader the commander would be held responsible for the political education and indoctrination of the troops. Nyerere expressed the hope that an army actively participating in the building of a new nation would be unlikely to repeat the mutiny.

#### **Army**

The country's army from independence in December 1961 until the mutiny in January 1964 had been formed from units of the British colonial army known as the King's African Rifles, renamed the Tanganyika Rifles. It was a small force made up of professional soldiers, a few of whom were veterans of World War II and a few others who were veterans of the British campaigns against the Mau Mau in Kenya. As was customary with colonial troops (as well as with British troops), the men of the Tanganyika Rifles were apolitical; their function was to fight during wartime and to train for that fighting or perform ceremonial duties during peacetime. The soldiers had not played a role in achieving independence nor were they called on for any meaningful tasks during the infancy of the new state. In essence the life of a soldier in January 1964 had not changed measurably in two years of independence; he was poorly paid, most of his officers were British, and his monotonous day-to-day routine allowed him plenty of time to meditate on his dissatisfactions. The week-long mutiny brought an end to the semi-colonial Tanganyika Rifles and paved the way for a truly national army.

The army that was created differed not only from its predecessor but also from most other African armies that had evolved from colonial antecedents. Tanzania's military lacked much of the colonial orientation that was the hallmark of the armies of newly independent African states. It is true that British rank structure and insignia and British methods of training continued to be used,

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but recruiting a completely new complement of troops and promoting a handful of young African officers into command positions allowed Nyerere to set standards that were in accord with his own precepts rather than those developed by the British. The nationalistic atmosphere that prevailed after the mutiny also was conducive to the creation of a truly African force—one that was Tanzanian rather than the hybrid contingent that had previously existed. As soon as possible after the Royal Marine commandos had put down the mutiny and reestablished order in the country, Nyerere secured African assistance. A Nigerian battalion moved in to replace the British on April 9, 1964, and stayed for almost six months, providing the stability needed by the Nyerere government while it recruited and trained its new army.

During 1964 the president impressed on his people and particularly on his army recruits that their new military organization was indeed different. Instead of the professional soldier of old, the new man in the ranks would be a citizen-soldier, recruited not only for his "worthwhileness as a soldier," which had been the guideline of British recruiters, but also for his worthwhileness as a citizen. The authorities at first encouraged recruits to become party members, but before long party or Youth League membership became a prerequisite to enlistment. Nationalism and enthusiasm for nationbuilding were to be instilled in the new soldiers, and they were to be involved in projects that would take them out among the people rather than being sequestered in garrisons. In the years up to the end of 1977, however, there has been no definite evidence that the military has been engaged in construction or other activities of the kind suggested.

Eventually an air force and a navy were established, but for most of the 1960s the army was the only fighting force, and during the 1970s it has been by far the largest component of the TPDF. In 1977 reasonable estimates placed army strength at about 17,000 out of the total TPDF of 18,600 men and women. The army was deployed in a regional structure based on several brigades that appeared to be set up for administrative rather than tactical purposes. Four mainland brigades were referred to according to their general locations; the Eastern Brigade was located at Dar es Salaam; the Western Brigade at Tabora; the Southern Brigade probably at Nachingwea; and the Northern Brigade near Arusha. The Zanzibar contingent of the army may constitute a fifth brigade. Each of the brigades is commanded by a brigadier.

During the Defense Forces Games of 1977 servicemen and women participating in the games were listed as coming from five brigades: Ngome (Stronghold), Faru (Rhinoceros), Tembo (Elephant), Chui (Leopard), and Nyuki (Bee). The relationship, if any, of these brigades to the army's territorial brigades is unknown. From news reports it was obvious that Ngome Brigade was from Dar es Salaam, Tembo Brigade was from the southern part of the country, and Nyuki Brigade was from Zanzibar. Locations for Faru

and Chui brigades were not disclosed. The athletes on the teams making up the listed brigades were both men and women, and some were from the navy and, presumably, some from the air force. In at least one case noted in the news accounts, a member of an army team was actually a national serviceman rather than a soldier.

The basic combat formation of the Tanzanian army in 1977 was still considered to be the battalion as it had been since colonial times. Observers estimated that there were ten infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one tank battalion, and one engineer battalion, but how these units were distributed among the territorial brigades was not known. Some reports originating outside of the country alleged that two Tanzanian battalions (approximately 1,500 men) were stationed in Mozambique; there was no indication that they had been engaged in combat on the Rhodesian-Mozambique border, however. These reports were neither confirmed nor denied by the authorities in Dar es Salaam. It can reasonably be assumed that the West Lake Region, located on the western shore of Lake Victoria and having Tanzania's only common border with Uganda, has been well garrisoned ever since Amin came to power.

Heavy weapons and major items of military equipment in 1976 (the most recent year for which information was available) were primarily of PRC origin. Some Soviet artillery pieces were still on hand as well as a few weapons manufactured in various other countries, but the PRC has been the principal supplier, particularly during the 1970s. Included in the army inventory in 1976 were: twenty PRC T-59 medium tanks, fourteen PRC T-62 light tanks, several BTR-40 and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers that were of Soviet design but of PRC manufacture, twenty-four Soviet 76-mm guns, eighteen PRC 122-mm howitzers, thirty PRC 120-mm mortars, and several 37-mm antiaircraft guns and 14.5-mm antiaircraft machine guns.

#### **Air Force**

In 1964 Tanzanian military authorities accepted an offer from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to organize, equip, and train an air transport squadron that would become the air wing of the TPDF. Nyerere had earlier declined a British offer to train air personnel. By early 1965 a group of Tanzanian trainees were in West Germany studying to be pilots, and forty German air force officers were in Dar es Salaam to train other pilots and technicians. Before any substantial benefits could accrue, however, the West Germans withdrew their military personnel from Tanzania and terminated all military aid because the Nyerere government had allowed the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) to open a consulate. Nyerere, declaring that no country could pick his friends or enemies for him, told the West Germans to terminate their economic aid as well.

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After the West Germans had withdrawn, the Tanzanian government requested Israel and Sweden, in turn, to take on the task of training the air force, but both declined. Canada, which had already agreed to train the new army, also took the air force assignment. Under terms of the agreement, Canada pledged to give several transport aircraft and to train pilots, aircrews, and technicians for the operation and maintenance of a small air wing. The program began in 1965 and ended in 1969. Canada fulfilled its commitments and was thanked personally by President Nyerere during a visit to Ottawa in 1969. Nyerere, however, did not ask the Canadians to renew the program. Surprised observers, who thought that the Canadians would have been willing to continue the aid program, attributed the lack of such a request to Nyerere's intense commitment to the liberation of all Africa and his dislike for Portugal, a colonial power and a partner to Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At any rate the Tanzanian airwing was left without foreign advisers after the departure of the Canadians.

Even before the end of the Canadian training program Tanzanian authorities had made known their desire to have something more than the air transport capability developed for them by the Canadians. Official spokesmen had stated their intention of building a small, modern combat air force, and in 1971 several Tanzanians were sent to the PRC to receive training as jet pilots and mechanics. It wasn't until May 1972, however, that an agreement was made with the PRC to supply enough MiG fighters (Soviet design, PRC manufacture) to equip a squadron. Several MiG-17s and MiG-19s were delivered in late 1972 and early 1973, and shortly thereafter a fighter squadron became operational at a new fighter base that had been constructed at Ngerengere, about 130 kilometers (eighty miles) west of Dar es Salaam. The PRC had also assisted in the construction of the air base. By 1977 MiG-21s from the PRC had also been added to the Tanzanian inventory, and the 1,000-man air force operated three jet fighter squadrons, plus a transport squadron using an assortment of de Havilland aircraft from Canada and six Cessna 310s purchased in the United States.

#### **Navy**

For several years after independence Tanzania did not have a navy. Necessary coastal patrols were carried on by the Police Marine Unit, which operated four small patrol boats that had been loaned to the country in December 1964 by the West Germans. In 1968 the PRC agreed to build a small naval facility for the Tanzanians at Dar es Salaam and also to sell several patrol boats of the Shanghai class. Two years earlier the PRC had donated four small patrol boats to be used by the marine police; the Shanghai-class boats, however, were the nucleus of a Tanzanian navy. Work on the naval base was begun in January 1970 and completed in December 1971. Meantime the PRC had been training Tanzanian





*TPDF infantry unit participating in ceremonial parade  
in Dar es Salaam*

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seamen to man the vessels that arrived during construction of the naval base. Four Hu Chwan-class hydrofoil torpedo boats were later added to the inventory.

#### **Uniforms, Rank, and Insignia**

The uniforms and rank structures of the TPDF, a descendant of the King's African Rifles, show the influence of the British heritage. By 1977 army troops might be seen in regular duty uniforms, parade uniforms, or combat fatigues. The basic duty uniform was of the same British style that had been worn by African troops as well as by British troops in Africa before independence. The material for this uniform is a lightweight cotton khaki suitable to the climate (at times woolen sweaters are worn). The enlisted men's khaki uniform consists of a short-sleeve, open-collar shirt; Bermuda shorts; knee-length socks; and black, low-quarter shoes. On certain occasions white web belts with ornamental buckles become part of the enlisted uniform. Visored service caps are generally worn although berets are also authorized. The cap ornament is a gilt miniature of the Uhuru (freedom) Torch, which symbolizes the country's independence.

The khaki uniform worn by officers consists of a short-sleeve, open-collar bush jacket and long trousers rather than Bermuda shorts. At times the bush jacket is replaced by a short-sleeve shirt worn with a necktie. The company grade officer's service cap and cap ornament are the same as those worn by enlisted men, but field grade and general officers have braid on their cap visors. Sam Browne belts are sometimes worn over the bush jacket, and berets are authorized as an alternate to the garrison cap.

The combat uniform, adopted for all ranks sometime during the early 1970s, was the familiar camouflaged fatigues that have become commonplace in armies involved in jungle environments. The combat fatigues are worn with soft caps of the same material or with steel helmets. Both officers and enlisted men wear combat boots with the fatigue uniform and on special occasions, when this uniform is designated for wear on parade, officers wear Sam Browne belts with sabers and side arms.

All ranks wear a parade or ceremonial uniform consisting of coat and trousers, visored service cap, and low-quarter shoes. The coat, which buttons to the neck and has a short stand-up collar, is worn with the white web belt by enlisted men and with the Sam Browne belt by officers. Officers also wear sabers on ceremonial occasions. The differences between the officers' and enlisted men's versions of this uniform are only in ornamentation. Officers' coats have looped braid on the lower sleeves, the width of the braid depicting rank, and there is a double stripe on the outer legs of the officers' trousers. Officers also wear shoulder boards to display rank insignia.

There are five enlisted ranks—private through sergeant major. Noncommissioned officer ranks are designated by inverted chevrons worn on the sleeves of outer garments. Company grade

officer ranks—second lieutenant, lieutenant, and captain—are designated by one, two, and three pips respectively as are their British counterparts. Officers' rank insignia are worn on shoulder boards with the parade uniform, on the collars of khaki shirts, or on shoulder straps of the combat fatigue jacket. In place of the miniature crowns that are used to designate British field grade and general officer ranks, Tanzanians wear miniature replicas of the national coat of arms. The field grades are those that have become familiar to most armies—major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel—but there are only two general officer grades—brigadier and major general. At the beginning of 1978 the only major general on active duty in the TPDF was the commander of the forces.

As with so many other aspects of national security policy, the military pay system was cloaked in secrecy, and no information concerning pay scales was publicly available. Ever since the rebuilding of the forces after the mutiny, however, observers have believed that military pay was sufficient to provide a better than average standard of living. Soldiers of the premutiny Tanganyika Rifles received considerably less than average urban workers, and noncommissioned officers were also low paid. The mutiny was in part an expression of dissatisfaction with the low pay scales and, even though the mutineers did not benefit, the government remedied that situation by substantially raising the pay scales of the newly created TPDF. One knowledgeable writer of that period stated that pay for the lower ranks had been trebled, and through the years writers have indicated that, "the Tanzanian army has been well treated in the budget." In 1977 it was still assumed that military personnel were ahead of most other segments of the society as far as income was concerned.

#### **Military Justice**

The system of military justice used by the TPDF is based on the National Defense Act of 1966 as amended by subsequent legislation. During the 1965–69 period the most influential foreign military advisers on duty with the TPDF were the members of the Canadian mission. Because the Tanzanian authorities drew heavily on the experience and training of their Western-oriented advisers, the system of military justice developed for the TPDF was patterned on those used by the forces of Canada and the United Kingdom. The manual for courts-martial adopted by the Tanzanians was similar to the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, and because the system has proved suitable as far as is known, it has not been altered to any great extent.

According to the National Defense Act of 1966, military personnel were to be governed by a special code, distinct from civil law, and administered by military authorities. All members of the TPDF are subject to trial by courts-martial for offenses against the code. A military court must be made up of at least three officers, and the president of the court must be a major or higher. In the case of an officer being tried, the president of the court must be of

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higher rank than the defendant. Punishments that may be awarded by courts-martial to either officers or enlisted men include fines, reduction in rank, confinement, and dismissal from the service.

There are no military prisons in Tanzania. Long periods of confinement are served in civil prisons; short sentences are served on military posts under military guard. A sentence to confinement is usually combined with hard labor. Public records of trials by military courts are rare, which is not surprising in a society where all information about the military is treated as secret. Nevertheless it may safely be assumed that discipline has not been a great problem in such a highly motivated force as the TPDF in which the young men and women who serve are politically oriented and enter the armed forces eager to advance the aims of their party and government.

#### **Foreign Military Aid**

In the early days of the TPDF Nyerere called on many nations to assist in training and equipping his fledgling armed forces. Because Great Britain had been the colonial power in Tanganyika since World War I and, further, because of his embarrassment at having to call on the British in putting down the mutiny of 1964, Nyerere was disinclined to accept British offers of aid. Nevertheless aid was imperative, and after the Nigerians had withdrawn in the fall of 1964, offers of assistance were accepted from Canada, West Germany, Israel, and the PRC. The PRC along with East Germany and the Soviet Union had been active in training armed forces on Zanzibar ever since the revolution earlier in the year. Naturally with such a mix of trainers and suppliers there were inevitable difficulties with coordination between units and with maintenance of equipment, but more important than the technical problems were the potential international political tangles. Nyerere had already expressed his goal of nonalignment, and he had no intention of getting involved in the East-West conflicts of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

For the period from 1965 to 1969 the Canadians carried the lion's share of the task of establishing and training the new TPDF, but after they had fulfilled their agreements and departed in 1969, the PRC was the only country providing military equipment and training to the Tanzanian forces. Despite Nyerere's strong inclination toward nonalignment, the fact that the PRC was involved with all of the military forces in addition to its construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railroad, gave it a decided edge as a friend and ally.

#### **External Threats to National Security**

Two major external threats to national security existed in the late 1970s: the first was the possibility of generalized trouble in all of southern Africa, and the second was the possibility that Amin might carry out one of his oft-repeated threats to take action against Tanzania. As chairman of the group of leaders of the so-



called front-line states President Nyerere has been outspokenly opposed to the white minority governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. As leader of the opposition of those governments Nyerere put his own country in some jeopardy, but evidently he had the backing of the Tanzanian people. Military units have frequently and publicly pledged their support to their commander in chief in his opposition role, and the party also has frequently pledged its support as have the leaders of public organizations of labor, youth, and women. Tanzania does not have contiguous borders with either of the white-ruled countries but Mozambique does, and Tanzanian troops in advisory and training roles have been reported as being stationed in Mozambique although this has never been confirmed by Tanzanian authorities. The stationing of troops in neighboring Mozambique would be a calculated risk on Nyerere's part that increases the threat to Tanzania.

The other major external threat to national security came from the mercurial leader of Uganda. From the time that Amin ousted Milton Obote and took power in January 1971, Nyerere has been brutally frank in his public condemnation of his neighbor, referring to him immediately after the coup as a "murderer." Fighting between the armed forces of the two countries on their common border broke out as early as August 1971 when, according to Tanzanian sources, Ugandan soldiers in tanks crossed the border and engaged a police Field Force Unit. Casualties occurred on both sides, and in the next few days Tanzanian army units moved in force into the West Lake Region from Tabora. This was the first time since independence that Tanzanian forces had engaged in combat, but Nyerere ordered his troops to do no more than was necessary to defend Tanzanian sovereignty and in effect cooled a potentially explosive situation. The border hostilities forced the Nyerere government to give greater attention to military preparedness and fostered the formation and training of the People's Militia, which has since become an important element of national security.

## **Public Order**

### **Police Organization**

Supervision of police activities is a function of the Office of the Commissioner of Police in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The national police in 1977 probably comprised forces that totaled about 12,000 men and women although the figure is unofficial. The major police forces in the country included the Police Main Force (mainland), Zanzibar Police Force, Police Marine Unit, Harbours Police, Railways Police, TAZARA Police Division—a separate unit for the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA)—Diamond Protection, Police Airwing, and the Criminal Investigation Division (CID). The armed People's Militia reinforced the police throughout the country and was reported to have 35,000 members in 1977. In addition there was a heavily armed, highly mobile

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paramilitary force known as the Field Force Unit, elements of which were strategically located at various region and district capitals. The strength of the Field Force Unit was estimated at 1,400 men in 1977, but its small size belied its capability for fast reaction to emergency situations anywhere in the country.

Before the arrival of European colonists in East Africa the indigenous peoples policed themselves without the institution of formal police forces. Miscreants were dealt with by fellow members of a kinship group or local community according to long-standing custom that dictated methods of handling antisocial behavior. The German colonial authorities and the British, in turn, established police forces according to their own customs, curtailing to some extent the roles that had previously been played by chiefs and elders. By the time that Tanganyika became independent in 1961 its police force numbered almost 5,000 men under the direction of a British commissioner. Most key positions were held by British subjects, but by the mid-1960s about 99 percent of the force had been Africanized.

All police activities in the late 1970s were centrally directed from police headquarters in Dar es Salaam under the immediate supervision of the deputy commissioner of police. Police headquarters was divided into three divisions—administration, operations, and criminal investigation—each of which was under a senior assistant commissioner who reported directly to the deputy commissioner. The Administration Division was concerned with housekeeping duties, personnel matters, transportation, and similar routine functions that kept the organization operating. The Operations Division was concerned with the actual functioning of the many different police elements except for the CID. The CID was, in effect, the country's security police and was concerned primarily with the investigation of crimes that might have a bearing on national security. A murder, for example, would not come under CID scrutiny, but a political assassination or any other politically oriented crime would be within its jurisdiction as would many other crimes directed against the government or against a government figure. The CID also was charged with the maintenance of central files on all serious crime in the country.

The Police Main Force has a network of police stations at the regional capitals, each one operating under the supervision of the regional police commander who is appointed by the central government. At the next lower level stations are directed by the district police commander who is responsible to the regional commander. Substations within the districts are supervised by the district commanders. Although the Police Main Force is directed from Dar es Salaam, there is a working relationship (and generally a political relationship) between regional and district police commanders and the government commissioners at those levels. CID personnel operate outside the regular police structure in

pursuing their security duties but also have a working relationship with the government commissioners.

Recruits for the various police forces are selected from the ranks of the National Service, and standards for selection are relatively high. Recruits are expected to be fluent in Swahili and in English and must be members of the party or of the Youth League. All enlistments are voluntary. Newly trained policemen and police-women are generally assigned for duty outside their home areas, but it is thought that Zanzibaris ordinarily serve on the islands rather than on the mainland.

Constitutionally police forces and police work are "union matters," that is, they are under the purview of the central government. In practice, however, it appeared that the Zanzibar Police Force, even though centrally funded, was a separate force operating under the direction of Zanzibari government authorities rather than the Dar es Salaam headquarters.

Central direction of the police is somewhat hampered by less than adequate communications and transportation. Tanzania is one of the world's poorer nations, and it is also a large country in which many of the outlying areas are still remote and often isolated. As a result local police sometimes acquire more autonomy than is considered acceptable by central authorities, and there have been some abuses of power that have required dismissals and shake-ups in some police units. In early 1977 President Nyerere accepted the resignations of two cabinet officers and two regional commissioners in whose jurisdictions gross misconduct by police had been revealed. Police and security officers in two regions had been criticized for not having taken action in a large number of murder cases during 1974 and 1975. When the police finally did take action they arrested great numbers of people indiscriminately and secured confessions through the use of torture. After several detainees died in custody the whole story came out, at which time the minister of state in the President's Office (in charge of security) and the minister for home affairs (in charge of police) plus the two regional commissioners resigned citing reasons of moral responsibility. Nyerere accepted their resignations with a "heavy heart" and lauded their "maturity in leadership."

#### **Penal Code**

The penal code that was brought into most of British Africa was based on the Indian Penal Code, which earlier British colonial authorities had developed for the Indian subcontinent. Some modifications were made by the British in Africa but, more often than not, these were based on English common law rather than local customary law. In effect the code was quite alien to the people who were subject to its provisions. In Tanzania the code has not been substantially revised except for innovation of minimum sentencing, which was legislated in 1963 and again in 1972.

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Two major categories of offenses covered by the code are felonies and misdemeanors. Felonies are serious crimes that may be punishable by death or imprisonment; misdemeanors are less serious offenses that are usually punishable by imprisonment or fines. Murder, manslaughter, treason, offenses against public order, arson, rape, theft (particularly theft of cattle), aggravated assault causing bodily harm, and official corruption are all felonies. Petty theft, common assault, minor disturbances of the peace, and various traffic violations are misdemeanors.

In 1963 a minimum sentence act made flogging a mandatory sentence for a variety of crimes and seriously curtailed the discretion of judges and magistrates in sentencing. Minimum sentences also included imprisonment and fines, but flogging became a paramount form of punishment. Many jurists and interested observers both at home and abroad considered the 1963 law to be a giant step backward, but most Tanganyikan legislators argued vociferously for passage of the bill. A few prominent leaders, including Kawawa, were less than enthusiastic about corporal punishment, however. Flogging had been a common punishment in German East Africa, but after World War I, when the territory was mandated to the British, colonial authorities curtailed such punishments. Later the British tried to abolish corporal punishment completely as had been done in the United Kingdom, but local sentiment was for retention. A committee formed in 1952 to study the problem reported that people throughout the territory were against its abolition. In 1963 the same sentiment prevailed despite the argument of some that it seemed incongruous and anachronistic for a newly independent African state to endorse a form of punishment that had been considered degrading and brutalizing to Africans in the past.

Official statistics concerning crime in Tanzania have been unavailable for several years, but unofficial reports indicate that the 1963 law (termed *draconian* by its critics) had little or no effect on the country's increasing crime rate during the remainder of the 1960s. In 1969 Kawawa, who was then second vice president, sponsored legislation that would have repealed the mandatory requirement for flogging in minimum sentences, but most legislators again voiced disapproval of repeal, thus ending the attempt to amend the 1963 law. The crime rate apparently continued to climb in the early 1970s and opponents of mandatory flogging, able to argue that flogging had not made a significant difference, pushed through the Minimum Sentence Act of 1972, which ended the requirement for corporal punishment in minimum sentences. Flogging was permitted but not mandatory. New increases of minimum and maximum prison sentences in the 1972 law continued the severe limitations on the prerogatives of judges and magistrates but did allow for some discretion in the sentencing of first offenders convicted of stealing low-value property.



Offenses against public order, which appear to be rare occurrences in Tanzania, include rioting, destruction of public property, desecration of national monuments and symbols, and affiliation with hostile political organizations. Political offenses, however, have led to imprisonment for many Tanzanians. The Preventive Detention Act of 1962 provides the president with the authority to order the arrest and detention of any person who threatens the security of the republic or is perceived to be a threat to public order. The detainee may be held without hearing or charge for fifteen days after which, by law, he must be informed of the cause of his detention. It has been alleged by Amnesty International, however, that political detainees have been incarcerated for as long as ten years without having been charged or told why they are in custody. Tanzanian courts cannot contravene orders issued under the Preventive Detention Act. An article in the *New York Times* in January 1977 suggested that the number of political detainees could be as high as 3,000 whereas an earlier report from Kenya had estimated 5,000. In October 1977 Amnesty International estimated the number being held in indefinite detention at about 1,000. Some of these persons are members of southern African liberation movements, that is, from Namibia (Southwest Africa) and Southern Rhodesia, who are presumably being held as antagonistic to the movements that Tanzania supports (see ch. 2).

#### **Incidence of Crime**

If crime statistics are recorded in Tanzania they are not reported. The last time official crime statistics were published was in 1963, the year before the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Crime news is reported in the newspapers, including government newspapers, but it is impossible to determine the scope of the problem without access to official statistics. From news reports and records of trials, it appeared in the late 1970s that the country had a serious crime problem, and various foreign officials who had resided in Dar es Salaam confirmed as much. Another indication of the seriousness of the situation was President Nyerere's call for the police and the People's Militia to demonstrate greater cooperation in fighting the country's crime problem. Added to these obvious indications was the apparently valid assumption that crimes in the more remote regions often go unreported.

Theft was the most common crime in the period from independence to the late 1970s, but smuggling had also become a major problem. Theft by officials as well as by workers in government, in the party, in the labor union, and in the parastatal organizations was common and was considered very serious in a society that was striving to achieve a socialist democracy. Long prison sentences had been meted out to persons convicted of such crime, but from the frequency of news reports it seemed in 1977 that the long sentences were having little deterrent effect. There

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have been instances where public outrage at theft have led to pursuit of an alleged thief by ordinary citizens.

Cattle theft was a common crime and also a very serious one in a country in which wealth is often counted by the number of cattle owned. Many times instances of cattle theft involved only one or a few animals, but at times there was wholesale rustling; for example, in November 1977 when a gang of about fifty thieves (armed, incidentally, with bows and arrows) were apprehended in Shinyanga Region with more than 400 head of stolen cattle. Police and People's Militia were joined by residents of the area in apprehending the large gang of rustlers. Prime Minister Sokoine mentioned in a speech in late 1977 that over 4,200 head of cattle had been stolen in Shinyanga and Arusha regions in the two months of August and September of that year. Special meetings of regional authorities in the northern regions, the cattle country, were held in the fall of 1977 to discuss the scope of the problem and methods to combat it.

The incidence of crimes of violence, such as murder and rape, seemed to be comparable to that of other African nations at the same stage of development and was not considered to be alarming. Aggravated assault and crimes involving firearms were increasing. Street crime (mugging) and the brazen, daylight holdups of business establishments had been the subject of editorial comment in the late 1970s and had become of prime concern to police and other government officials. Traffic offenses, petty theft, and common assault had all increased as the country became more urbanized, but the situation did not appear to be out of hand. Of greater concern to authorities were the attempts to circumvent government regulations on prices, production, and other aspects of business life. Sellers of goods who were caught charging more than price control regulations allowed received heavy fines or had licenses suspended. Peasant farmers found taking produce to black markets were fined or incarcerated. Industrial workers caught stealing from their factories received long prison terms, but officials appeared to be worried about the numbers of such incidents in which the perpetrators were not apprehended.

The fastest growing criminal activity, or perhaps the one most frequently reported, was smuggling. The *Daily News*, a government newspaper, reported in October 1977 that millions of Tanzanian shillings were being lost to black marketeers and smugglers dealing in cardamom. Peasants selling their cardamom crop to official purchasers were receiving about TSh25 (for value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary) per kilogram (2.2046 pounds) whereas on the black market they could get as much as TSh60 for the same amount. Most of the illegally purchased cardamom was being smuggled into Kenya for transshipment. Police made several arrests of cardamom smugglers, but the General Agricultural Exports Company, (a government monopoly) feared the loss of income for the 1977-78 cardamom season would

be very great because surveys indicated that more of the crop was going into the black market than into legal channels.

The police and government officials were not the only persons concerned with smuggling in late 1977; letters to newspaper editors indicated that some citizens were also bothered by the economic menace posed by the increase in illegal trade. One letterwriter decried the use of fines as punishment for smuggling, another stated that smugglers did not even notice the loss of money paid out in fines, and still another called for long prison sentences for anyone convicted of smuggling. Another aspect of the smuggling problem that concerned the authorities as well as the people was the increase in the number of policemen and other officials who were involved in the illicit transport and trading of all kinds of goods into as well as out of the country. At a meeting of the Tanga Regional Development Committee during the summer of 1977, for example, delegates complained that it was difficult to end smuggling because of the participation of officials in such activities. It was alleged that government vehicles were being used to carry contraband and that this could only occur with some official connivance. A few days after the Tanga meeting police in the region announced the formation of a special investigative team to look into the allegations.

#### **Legal System**

In 1964 the newly merged republic inherited a legal system that had grown out of a *mélange* of local and colonial influences. Local law, peculiar to specific communities or ethnic groups, had developed over many centuries and regulated various aspects of life in the interior, on the islands, and along the coast, Islamic law had become influential, and the two coexisted until the European colonization of East Africa in the late nineteenth century. German imperial law was superimposed on the existing customary and Islamic systems of the mainland, and the generally heavy-handed German administration applied the law often and harshly. After the British defeat of the Germans in East Africa during World War I British law, modified by imperial experience in India, was introduced. Out of all these influences the legal system for Tanzania developed; it has been further influenced by the unique brand of African socialism fostered by President Nyerere. The president's goal has been the development of a uniform code that would be administered essentially at the local level, but Zanzibar has proved to be recalcitrant in the drive toward uniformity of laws. At the beginning of 1978 two distinct systems existed—one for the mainland and one for the islands.

The three-tiered court system of the mainland consisted of the primary courts, the district courts, and the High Court. Primary courts were the courts of first instance at the local level, and appeals could be made first to the district level and from there to the High Court at the national level. Mainland courts heard both civil and criminal matters. The High Court had general super-

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visory and review powers over all courts. Both High Court and district courts could review primary court decisions.

The High Court was the superior court of record. Constitutionally it was granted "such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution (the Interim Constitution of 1965) or any other law." Its judges included the Chief Justice of Tanzania and at least eight puisne judges, all of whom were appointed by the president. The chief justice advised the president in selecting the puisne judges.

Until 1977 final appeal in nonconstitutional matters of general public importance could be made from the High Court to the Court of Appeal for East Africa, which had evolved from a similar colonial entity and had been incorporated into the East African Community (EAC) in 1967. This three-nation appellate court also heard appeals from the highest courts of Kenya and Uganda, but when the EAC collapsed in July 1977 the court ceased to function. In order to deal with appeals that had been formerly heard by the EAC court, Tanzania in late 1977 established a judiciary department pending the passage of legislation for the creation of a national appeals court. Also in 1977 the Constitutional Court was established as the arbiter of constitutional disputes. The court was to have equal numbers of judges from the mainland and the islands.

On the mainland the president appointed not only the judges of the High Court but also lower court judges, residential magistrates, and other judicial personnel. His appointments were made with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, a body of three persons appointed by the president. It included the chief justice, an associate judge of the High Court, and a third member. Aside from recommending appointees to the president the commission also had the power to terminate the appointments of any judicial officers other than judges of the High Court. A High Court judge could be removed from his post for inability to perform the functions of his office or for misbehavior but only on the recommendation of a judicial tribunal appointed by the president.

The judiciary was granted its jurisdiction by the National Assembly but was constitutionally protected from undue legislative influence in the performance of its duties. Members of the High Court and any judicial tribunal, with certain exceptions, had to be qualified by prior judicial experience, as did two of the three members of the Judicial Service Commission. A member of the National Assembly could not be appointed to positions on the lower courts.

Furthermore in order to preserve judicial independence the Permanent Commission of Inquiry was specifically enjoined from reviewing any judicial decision. This body, established in 1965, had the function of investigating misconduct or abuse of power on the part of officeholders or government employees. It had the necessary authority to investigate wide areas of the party, government,



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local governments, and parastatal organizations. Its three members were appointed by the president, who viewed the commission as an instrument by which the people might be protected from a possibly oppressive bureaucracy.

Jury trial was not part of the judicial procedure. Assessors, who were court officers, presented the facts of a case to the magistrate of the primary or district court, after which the magistrate made his recommendations. The Director of Public Prosecutions was responsible for presenting the government's case in a criminal trial according to the practice and procedure set out by the Criminal Procedure Code. Civil cases were handled according to the pattern developed by the British for their colonies and recorded in the Indian Code of Civil Procedure of 1908.

In 1974 President Nyerere created the Judicial Review Commission to make a thorough study of the country's legal system. After almost three years' work the seven jurists and party leaders appointed by the president presented their report to Minister for Justice Julie Manning in August 1977. In addition to reviewing the operations of the Tanzanian system during the years since independence, the commission also studied the systems of other Commonwealth countries and other socialist countries and interviewed knowledgeable people throughout Tanzania. Accepting the report Manning made reference to the changes that had taken place since independence and the efforts to develop a socialist society as the reasons that necessitated revision of the inherited legal system. The three-volume report was to be studied by party and government officials before any action would be taken.

By 1977 it appeared that the judicial system on the mainland had not changed much since the colonial period. Rather than the High Court sitting only in Dar es Salaam, its judges also were posted to other major towns. Both Africans and non-Africans staffed the courts at all levels; the chief justice was an African. Most lawyers received their legal training at the University of Dar es Salaam; some were sent abroad for advanced training. Lawyers had to conform to a dress code requiring dark jackets and ties for men and neat dresses for women. Gowns were still required for lawyers appearing before the High Court, and barristers had to wear gowns and wigs.

During fourteen years of union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the legal system has diverged rather than come together. The "High Court of the United Republic" as it is termed in the Constitution was in reality only the High Court of the mainland. On Zanzibar the primary and district courts were abolished in 1968 by First Vice President Abeid Karume who was also the president of Zanzibar. Karume established the People's Court as the court of first instance for the islands and decreed that a tribunal consisting of three laymen would be judge and jury in the People's Court. People's courts have full jurisdiction over all criminal matters except murder, attempted murder, and man-

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slaughter. As court of first instance for such crimes and to hear appeals from people's courts, the High Court of Zanzibar was established. The highest level judiciary body was the Supreme Council, which was established in 1970; its members were political appointees who were required to have legal training. Evidently Karume had decided that the cause of justice in Zanzibar would be better served by party stalwarts (appointed by and loyal to himself) rather than by trained jurists. The right of an accused to be defended by counsel was abolished. Karume was assassinated in 1972, but the system he had instituted had not been repealed or amended by the end of 1977.

Social controls are also enforced in more or less traditional ways by local groups. Many aspects of life, particularly in rural areas, are regulated by patterns that have deep roots, although they are by no means unchanging. Because so much of the country is rural, much deviant behavior that in a more urban society might require legal action is simply handled according to the custom of the ethnic group concerned. Each member of a local community is subject to its disciplines and controls. Public opinion does not generally require that such offenses as family quarrels or minor disturbances of the peace be formally adjudicated according to the law of the land. The persons and community involved prefer that such issues be resolved privately according to custom rather than involving police and courts. There are indications that the leaders of the ten-house cells that are at the base of party organization sometimes function as dispute settlers (see ch. 3).

Despite the prevalence of traditional social controls, new manners and customs have entered Tanzanian life since the end of colonialism. Independence brought meaningful political activity, the creation of a mass party, and the organization of party offshoots such as youth groups, labor unions, and women's groups that became means of social control. Additionally Tanzania has had a charismatic leader who has been able to whip up enthusiasm for the building of a new society despite the adversity of extreme national poverty—President Nyerere himself has been a form of social control and will be as long as he has the overwhelming backing of the people, which he has enjoyed since before independence.

#### **Penal System**

Until the coming of the European colonists, prisons were unknown in East Africa. Malefactors were punished according to the custom of their particular group. Punishment of the offender, however, often was considered to be less important than compensation to the offended. The coming of the Europeans and their penal systems and different legal concepts changed the African systems and generally left victims of crime dissatisfied and doubtful of the value of justice that did not compensate them for losses. The fact that an offender was serving a prison sentence did nothing for the injured party.

The first prisons in the area of mainland Tanzania were built by the Germans during their colonization of East Africa. These prisons provided for maximum security and hard labor as well as minimum security. Capital punishment by beheading was also part of the German criminal code, and corporal punishment, although not specifically mentioned in the code, was widely used according to German colonial records. When the British displaced the Germans they increased the use of the penal system, built some new prison facilities, and curtailed the use of corporal punishment.

The government does not publish statistics on the number of prisoners in confinement or the crimes for which they have been incarcerated, but the generally obsolete facilities of the Tanzanian penal system in the late 1970s were reported to be seriously overcrowded. Even in Dar es Salaam conditions at Ukonga Prison in 1977 were said to be deplorable. Prisoners complained that even by prison standards the food and living conditions at Ukonga were grossly inadequate. In addition medical facilities were said to be almost nonexistent, prisoners complained that they were not allowed to have writing materials, reading matter consisted only of propaganda, and visits from relatives or legal counsel were rarely permitted. Many prisoners had been held in custody for years without having been charged or tried. Others had been tried and acquitted but had been retained in custody without explanation. Amnesty International has sought to aid Tanzanian prisoners during the 1970s, but in 1977 the organization reported that its efforts had so far been unsuccessful.

Prisons, prison farms and industries, and the Prison Staff College are the responsibility of the Commissioner of Prisons under the Ministry for Home Affairs. In a developing country, particularly one as poor as Tanzania, the Commissioner of Prisons has difficulty in securing sufficient funds to maintain the operation at even a minimal level. At budget time the priority for prisons is low. To add to the problems of the commissioner, some prisons constructed by the Germans before World War I, which, it is acknowledged, should be demolished, have been kept in service because there are no funds for new prison construction. Conditions are generally bad bringing complaints from prisoners, interested citizens, and international agencies. Prison conditions are a sore point for the Tanzanian leadership, but legal authorities, prison officials, and legislators perhaps contribute to the adverse situation by allowing excessively long sentences, too many prison sentences in cases where fines or other punishment could have been substituted, and by incarcerating too many remand prisoners.

#### **Internal Threats to National Security**

There have been no great internal threats to the stability of the central government of the republic. The army mutiny, which occurred before unification, was not an attempted coup. The

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assassination of Karume, the Zanzibari strongman, was said to be part of an attempt to overthrow the island's government, but the possibility exists that the assassins simply wanted to eliminate a dictator who had made himself hated by a segment of his people. The student protests against the National Service in 1966 also were not threats to the government nor were they intended to be. In sum, from an outsider's perspective it would seem that the government has enjoyed an unusual degree of stability that should continue as long as Nyerere is in a leadership position (see ch. 2).

The student demonstrations at the University of Dar es Salaam in October 1966 were protests against legislation whereby the National Assembly had made duty in the National Service compulsory for graduates of the university and of secondary schools. The students delivered an ultimatum to the president in which they demanded repeal of the legislation. They further stated that salaries of government officials (including Nyerere's) were too high, and graduates should not be expected to subsidize those salaries by providing cheap labor through the National Service.

Agreeing with student complaints concerning inflated salaries, Nyerere decreased his own by 20 percent and ordered cuts throughout the government. The president, however, argued vehemently that young people who were fortunate enough to receive an education from the government should be proud to serve that government after graduation. Almost 400 students were expelled because of the demonstrations, but most were reinstated in the fall of 1967. The National Service legislation was enacted into law. Nyerere defused a potentially dangerous situation by the act of expulsion and then eliminated a possible long-term source of disaffection by allowing the repentant students to return to classes the following year. Social controls were also at work in that the majority of the people backed the president in both actions, thus alerting all students to the fact that there were limits within which they must stay in order to gain public acceptance. Nevertheless for both government and people, the obvious lesson was that students would henceforth form a source of potential dissidence that would have to be considered when major social change was being proposed.

The most publicized case regarding national security occurred in 1977 when a Tanzanian citizen, Juma Thomas Zangira, was convicted on charges of selling security information to a foreign agent. The information that Zangira was accused of selling to a contact in England was said to be prejudicial to the interests of Tanzania, but he was also charged with selling information about the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, the Zimbabwe African National Union, the Zimbabwe African People's Union, the African National Congress (South Africa), and the Southwest African People's Organization, all of which had headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Zangira, who was convicted on circumstantial evidence, could have been imprisoned for life but



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was sentenced to a total of twenty years. This was the second espionage trial since independence and the first of a Tanzanian citizen. The only previous trial of this kind occurred in 1973 when former British army officer Percy Cleaver, a freelance photographer, was sentenced to three years on espionage charges.

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This chapter has been pieced together from fragmentary information appearing in newspapers, magazines, and brief references in some general surveys of the country. Available bibliographies do not list any studies that pertain specifically to the armed forces or to the police. The lack of such comprehensive studies on national security seems to result from what appears to be a definite government effort to restrict publication of any information considered to be sensitive. Information on weapons and equipment inventories may be found in Jane's publications, and the size of the forces may be found in the *Military Balance* published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies. The *Africa Contemporary Record* and the *Africa Research Bulletin* were also helpful. Two books that were of particular help in the discussion of the legal system were *Personal Freedom and the Law in Tanzania* by Robert Martin and *A Handbook on Sentencing* by Brian Slattery. (For further information see Bibliography.)

## Appendix A

Table

- 1 Population Distribution and Density by Region, 1967
- 2 Population by Sex and Age-Group, 1967
- 3 Ethnic Composition of African Population by Language Group, 1967
- 4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Factor Cost by Industrial Origin, 1964-75
- 5 Principal Cash Crops (Marketed Quantities), 1964, 1969-75
- 6 Production in Selected Manufacturing Industries, Selected Years, 1967-75
- 7 Destination of Exports, 1962, 1968-75
- 8 Sources of Imports, 1962, 1968-75
- 9 Composition of Imports, 1965, 1968-75
- 10 Composition and Value of Principal Exports, 1962, 1969-75
- 11 Balance of Payments Summary, 1972-75
- 12 Central Government Revenue and Expenditure, Selected Fiscal Years, 1967-76
- 13 Central Government Consolidated Expenditure by Function, Selected Fiscal Years, 1968-76

Appendix A

Table 1. Population Distribution and Density by Region, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Region	Population	Percentage of Total Population	Area (in square kilometers) <sup>2</sup>	Accumulated Percent of Total Area	Density (persons per square kilometer)
Dar es Salaam .....	272,821	2.2	88	0.01	3,100.2
Zanzibar <sup>3</sup> .....	354,815	2.9	2,644	0.3	134.2
Mwanza .....	1,055,883	8.6	19,684	2.5	53.6
Kilimanjaro .....	652,722	5.3	13,209	4.0	49.4
Tanga .....	771,060	6.2	26,807	7.0	28.8
Mara .....	544,125	4.5	21,797	9.5	25.0
West Lake .....	658,712	5.3	28,749	12.7	22.9
Shinyanga .....	899,468	7.3	50,764	18.5	17.7
Dodoma .....	709,380	5.8	41,311	23.1	17.2
Coast .....	511,506	4.1	33,719	26.9	15.2
Kigoma .....	473,443	3.9	37,039	31.1	12.8
Mtwara .....	1,041,146	8.4	82,751	40.5	12.6
Iringa .....	689,905	5.6	56,845	46.9	12.1
Mbeya .....	969,053	7.9	83,139	56.3	11.7
Morogoro .....	685,104	5.6	73,038	64.5	9.4
Singida .....	457,938	3.7	49,340	70.1	9.3
Arusha .....	610,474	4.9	82,098	79.3	7.4
Ruvuma .....	393,043	3.2	61,254	86.2	6.4
Tabora .....	532,871	4.6	121,989	100.0	4.6
TOTAL .....	12,313,459	100.0	886,265	100.0	13.9

<sup>1</sup> Areas listed in order by density.

<sup>2</sup> One square kilometer is equal to 0.386 square miles.

<sup>3</sup> Zanzibar (and Pemba) technically comprised several regions but is here treated as a single unit.

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1967 *Population Census*, Dar es Salaam, Vol. 1.

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*Table 2. Population by Sex and Age-Group, 1967*

Age-Group	Male	Female	Total
0-4 .....	1,090,982	1,114,896	2,205,878
5-9 .....	976,419	968,170	1,944,589
10-14 .....	657,135	590,843	1,247,978
15-19 .....	512,637	570,575	1,083,212
20-24 .....	378,412	542,953	921,365
25-29 .....	461,238	571,995	1,033,233
30-34 .....	358,597	401,778	760,375
35-39 .....	341,089	334,724	675,813
40-44 .....	221,921	236,317	458,238
45-49 .....	252,604	231,270	483,874
50-54 .....	178,079	183,553	361,632
55-59 .....	108,971	102,615	211,586
60-64 .....	110,563	117,416	227,979
65-69 .....	76,597	73,446	150,043
70-74 .....	60,438	63,414	123,852
75 and over .....	226,931	183,233	410,164
Stated .....	6,012,613	6,287,198	12,299,811
Not Stated .....	3,141	2,604	5,745
TOTAL .....	6,015,754	6,289,802	12,305,556

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1967 *Population Census*, Dar es Salaam, Vol. 3, p. XXII.



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
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# Appendix A

**Table 3. Ethnic Composition of African Population by Language Group, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

Ethnic	Number	Ethnic	Number	Ethnic	Number
<b>Bantu Speakers</b>		Makua .....	161,689	Shashi .....	14,951
Ankole .....	3,674	Malila .....	28,895	Shirazi .....	17,384 <sup>5</sup>
Bajuni .....	1,866	Manyema ...	21,895	Soga .....	923
Baluhya .....	4,004	Mambwe ....	13,994	Sonjo .....	12,418
Bena (2.1) <sup>2</sup> ..	251,949	Matengo ....	96,246	Suba .....	16,123
Bende .....	8,269	Matumbi ....	60,583	Subi .....	51,291
Bondei .....	47,944	Mawia .....	20,830	Sukuma(12.9)	1,529,917
Chaga (3.7) ..	440,239	Mbugwe ....	4,280	Sumbwa .....	91,935
Digo .....	40,104	Mbunga .....	10,957	Swahili .....	7,721
Doe .....	13,869	Meru .....	51,729	Taita .....	4,926
Fipa .....	162,369	Mwera <sup>3</sup> .....	185,121	Taturu .....	16,648
Ganda .....	9,664	Nata .....	7,336	Tongwe .....	12,851
Gogo (3.0) ..	360,131	Ndali .....	85,003	Turu (2.1) ...	246,317
Ha (3.2) ....	383,021	Ndamba .....	32,748	Tuzi .....	23,002
Hangaza .....	51,612	Ndendeule ..	44,783	Twa .....	1,321
Haya (3.5) ..	412,356	Ndengereko ..	67,817	Vidunda .....	19,585
Hehe (3.0) ..	360,686	Ndonde .....	17,653	Vinza .....	6,898
Holoholo ....	10,931	Ngindo .....	113,193	Wanji .....	33,269
Ikizu .....	10,229	Ngoni .....	104,790	Wemba .....	12,932
Ikoma .....	8,568	Ngurumi ...	20,863	Wungu .....	17,487
Iramba .....	193,932	Nguu .....	64,980	Yao (1.7) ....	204,399
Irambi .....	1,208	Nyamwanga ..	44,383	Zanaki .....	35,430
Isanzu .....	20,355	Nyakyusa (2.6)	306,786	Zaramo (1.9) ..	227,741
Isenye .....	9,235	Nyamwezi(3.4)	405,976	Zigua .....	185,595
Jiji .....	14,957	Nyasa .....	62,733	Zinza .....	52,723
Jita .....	149,766	Nyiha .....	83,005		
Kamba .....	25,271	Nyika <sup>4</sup> .....	37,571	<b>Nilotic Speakers</b>	
Kaguru .....	113,831	Pangwa .....	100,194	Luo .....	134,649
Karanga .....	2,861	Pare .....	182,887	<b>Paranilotic Speakers</b>	
Kerewe .....	54,922	Pimbwe .....	13,773	Arusha .....	89,934
Kikuyu .....	8,249	Pogoro .....	91,688	Barabaig .....	35,826 <sup>6</sup>
Kimbu .....	30,760	Rangi .....	105,200	Dorobo .....	858
Kinga .....	95,553	Regi .....	41,703	Kwavi .....	7,037
Kisi .....	12,707	Rongo .....	49,087	Masai .....	79,649
Kisii .....	2,215	Ruanda .....	47,167	Sabaot .....	194
Konongo ....	26,759	Rufiji .....	77,966	<b>Cushitic Speakers</b>	
Kuria .....	123,488	Rundi .....	114,605	Burungi .....	10,607
Kutu .....	22,922	Rungu .....	20,437	Gorowa .....	18,396
Kwaya .....	23,584	Rungwa .....	7,144	Iraqw .....	198,560
Kwere .....	48,132	Safwa .....	80,416	Mbugu .....	12,555
Lambia .....	11,847	Sagara .....	38,056	Wasi .....	15,746
Luguru (2.2) ..	257,443	Sangu .....	39,563	<b>Khoisan Speakers</b>	
Machinga ...	20,204	Segeju .....	18,688	Hadzapi .....	180
Makonde (4.0)	476,135	Shambaa (2.3)	271,536	Sandawe ....	30,000

<sup>1</sup>The figures were established by census takers who asked only heads of households and then listed the entire household as belonging to the ethnic group of the head. This is not always true. In towns, for example, immigrant men often live with local women.

<sup>2</sup>Percentage of the total population given in this table only for the fifteen largest groups.

<sup>3</sup>Includes 3,420 Mwera south of the core area.

<sup>4</sup>Includes 3,497 Nyika of the Tanga Region who are probably not related to the Nyika of Mbeya.

<sup>5</sup>Includes 598 persons who identified themselves as Hadimu and 1,487 who identified themselves as Tumbati.

<sup>6</sup>Includes the Tatog.

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Table 4. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Factor Cost by Industrial Origin, 1964-75  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings at 1966 prices)

Industry	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 <sup>1</sup>	1975 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Monetary Sector</b>												
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing .....	1,246	1,194	1,406	1,350	1,417	1,499	1,589	1,504	1,600	1,611	1,537	1,567
Mining and quarrying .....	141	163	186	192	136	135	97	134	97	74	70	60
Manufacturing and handicrafts .....	384	446	525	572	611	672	716	782	846	887	899	902
Electricity and water supply .....	51	53	62	66	72	82	92	96	98	114	123	133
Construction .....	142	148	173	238	256	236	270	322	329	363	357	320
Transport, storage, and communications .....	387	400	482	536	618	644	729	814	852	889	944	956
Wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels .....	670	710	825	816	912	914	984	986	990	1,068	1,096	1,110
Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services .....	146	177	165	241	230	253	257	279	292	316	361	325
Public administration and other services .....	620	658	688	741	764	772	866	952	1,071	1,158	1,310	1,510
Less input bank service charges .....	32	48	49	98	80	85	99	115	115	136	140	122
Production in the monetary economy .....	3,765	3,901	4,463	4,654	4,936	5,122	5,501	5,764	6,060	6,344	6,557	6,761
(Percent of total GDP) .....	(57.0)	(67.6)	(68.5)	(68.7)	(69.2)	(70.6)	(71.6)	(72.0)	(71.5)	(72.1)	(72.9)	(71.9)
<b>Subsistence Production</b>												
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing .....	1,377	1,381	1,547	1,605	1,660	1,590	1,616	1,662	1,825	1,847	1,807	1,997
Construction .....	48	50	51	52	53	55	57	58	60	61	63	64
Owner-occupied dwellings .....	429	441	453	466	479	492	506	521	536	551	568	585
Total subsistence production .....	1,854	1,872	2,051	2,123	2,192	2,137	2,179	2,241	2,421	2,459	2,438	2,646



Table 4 continued

Industry	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974 <sup>b</sup>	1975 <sup>c</sup>
GDP at factor cost .....	5,619	5,773	6,514	6,777	7,128	7,259	7,690	8,005	8,481	8,803	8,995	9,407
Annual rate of growth (in percent) .....	(. )	(2.7)	(12.8)	(4.0)	(5.2)	(1.8)	(5.8)	(4.2)	(5.9)	(3.8)	(2.2)	(4.6)

<sup>a</sup> For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.

<sup>b</sup> Provisional.

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, p. 7.

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*Table 5. Principal Cash Crops  
(Marketed Quantities), 1964, 1969-75\**  
(in thousands of tons)

Product	1964	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Cashew nuts .....	n.a.	113.5	111.2	126.4	125.6	145.6	121.7	83.0
Coffee .....	33.8	46.1	49.7	45.8	51.4	55.1	44.7	62.4
Cotton .....	53.2	69.4	76.4	65.3	77.6	65.1	71.5	42.5
Pyrethrum flowers .....	2.3	3.8	2.3	3.7	4.3	3.5	3.3	3.9
Sisal .....	233.5	209.3	202.2	181.1	156.8	155.4	143.4	127.8
Sugar .....	61.4	92.0	87.3	95.8	88.5	105.1	96.2	103.2
Tea .....	4.8	8.8	8.5	10.5	12.7	12.7	13.0	13.7
Tobacco (fire-cured) .....	.3	3.5	2.1	3.1	3.6	2.2	2.9	3.5
Tobacco (flue-cured) .....	1.8	8.1	8.9	8.8	10.6	10.8	15.3	14.6

n.a.—not available.

\*Crops year, except for sisal, tea, and pyrethrum flowers, which are calendar years.

Source: Based on information from Bank of Tanzania, *Economic and Operations Report, June 1976*, Dar es Salaam, p. 96; Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1974-75*, Dar es Salaam, p. 64; and Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, pp. 56-60.

Table 6. Production in Selected Manufacturing Industries, Selected Years, 1967-75

Product	Unit	1967	1969	1971	1973	1975
Textiles .....	1,000 square meters <sup>1</sup>	14,497	46,260	67,008	80,763	84,344
Beer and <i>chibuku</i> <sup>2</sup>	1,000 liters <sup>3</sup>	23,275	33,140	53,915	76,417	68,627
Cigarettes .....	million	2,044	2,336	2,923	2,890	3,511
Cement .....	tons	146,910	167,632	179,313	314,000	266,000
Petroleum products .....	-do-	642,150	626,403	716,524	731,000	669,000
Iron sheets .....	-do-	13,265	13,516	21,869	20,800	25,617
Enamelware .....	1,000 pieces	3,841	5,608	5,561	4,150	2,657
Blankets .....	1,000 square meters	3,584	3,644	4,077	5,476	4,309
Fishnets .....	tons	108	148	286	524	210
Aluminum products .....	-do-	1,524	2,323	3,427	3,332	3,247
Sisal rope .....	-do-	15,126	18,724	23,138	25,354	31,294
Pyrethrum extract .....	-do-	291	177	177	156	216
Wheat flour .....	-do-	41,820	42,075	50,002	51,979	35,485
Canned meat .....	-do-	9,673	6,988	8,362	2,044	5,656
Batteries .....	1,000 pieces	...	11,278	24,012	45,049	50,301
Shoes .....	1,000 pairs	...	2,200	1,600	2,320	2,760
Rolled steel .....	tons	...	...	...	4,776	9,296
Fertilizer .....	-do-	...	...	...	32,594	75,457
Konyagi <sup>4</sup> .....	cases	...	...	...	56,127	52,200

<sup>1</sup> ... means none<sup>2</sup> One square meter is equal to 1.196 square yards.<sup>3</sup> *Chibuku* is a somewhat sweet, heavy kind of beer.<sup>4</sup> One liter is equal to 1.057 quarts.<sup>5</sup> A kind of brandy.Source: Based on information from B. of Tanzania, *Economic and Operations Report, June 1976*, Dar es Salaam, p. 96; and Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, p. 70.

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**Table 7. Destination of Exports, 1962, 1968-75**  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings)<sup>1</sup>

Country	1962	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Great Britain .....	373	385	429	371	424	360	415	419	350
India .....	85	115	132	122	144	171	151	165	150
Hong Kong .....	78	126	103	127	132	130	142	183	100
Other sterling areas <sup>2</sup> ...	73	237	227	308	259	247	215	270	397
European Economic Community <sup>3</sup> .....	239	216	209	240	199	281	376	505	586
North America .....	113	117	144	185	155	163	217	248	208
Japan .....	43	111	82	96	46	76	89	94	44
CMEA countries <sup>4</sup> .....	3	35	45	55	33	39	106	70 <sup>5</sup>	48 <sup>5</sup>
People's Republic of China (PRC) .....	...	55	78	59	84	135	98	89	112
Kenya .....	56	74	80	119	159	118	152	191	169
Uganda .....	9	17	24	29	38	15	18	26	6
Other countries .....	69	188	218	126	259	426	424	509	554
Re-exports (n.i.e.) <sup>6</sup> .....	52	41	22	16	57	116	178	91	41
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>1,193</b>	<b>1,717</b>	<b>1,793</b>	<b>1,852</b>	<b>1,989</b>	<b>2,277</b>	<b>2,581</b>	<b>2,861</b>	<b>2,765</b>

... means none.

<sup>1</sup>For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.

<sup>2</sup>Including Ireland.

<sup>3</sup>EEC, also known as the Common Market; excludes Great Britain and Ireland and from 1973 includes Denmark.

<sup>4</sup>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (same as COMECON).

<sup>5</sup>Excludes Yugoslavia.

<sup>6</sup>Not included elsewhere.

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, pp. 14, 18, 23.



# Appendix A

**Table 8. Sources of Imports, 1962, 1968-75**  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings)<sup>1</sup>

Country of Origin	1962	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Great Britain .....	296	424	378	411	487	410	501	605	787
India .....	61	54	48	55	51	42	51	73	123
Hong Kong .....	17	43	34	28	21	20	37	47	38
Other sterling areas <sup>2</sup> ...	75	61	58	73	88	119	128	257	202
European Economic Community <sup>3</sup> .....	126	374	317	466	485	607	683	1,049	1,129
North America .....	58	95	88	173	130	182	115	497	899
Japan .....	111	131	130	143	151	162	302	497	355
CMEA countries <sup>4</sup> .....	11	47	34	37	47	53	86	58 <sup>5</sup>	88 <sup>5</sup>
People's Republic of China (PRC) .....	...	86	79	265	601	508	701	630	581
Kenya .....	207	261	257	295	295	326	337	381	406
Uganda .....	35	41	34	40	16	6	2	0.2	...
Other countries .....	130	217	253	288	353	444	536	1,165	1,087
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>1,127</b>	<b>1,834</b>	<b>1,710</b>	<b>2,274</b>	<b>2,725</b>	<b>2,879</b>	<b>3,479</b>	<b>5,258</b>	<b>5,694</b>

... means none.

<sup>1</sup>For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.

<sup>2</sup>Including Ireland.

<sup>3</sup>EEC, also known as the Common Market; excludes Great Britain and Ireland and from 1973 includes Denmark.

<sup>4</sup>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (same as COMECON).

<sup>5</sup>Excludes Yugoslavia.

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, pp. 18, 22.

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*Table 9. Composition of Imports, 1965, 1968-75<sup>1</sup>*  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings at current prices)<sup>2</sup>

Group <sup>3</sup>	1965	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Food and Live Animals .....	153	164	158	176	183	312	274	1,066	1,011
Beverages and Tobacco .....	39	14	15	20	10	12	22	18	5
Crude Materials (unprocessed) .....	16	29	27	31	39	39	59	138	89
Mineral Oils and Lubricants .....	85	167	174	193	256	298	395	524	676
Vegetable Oils and Fats .....	11	17	23	28	30	46	46	69	95
Chemicals and Fertilizers .....	116	119	165	225	271	309	387	567	673
Manufactured Goods									
Leather and rubber .....	28	41	43	64	63	63	39	55	66
Wood and paper .....	34	64	57	75	74	73	100	148	190
Cloth and yarn .....	199	182	166	133	110	141	254	311	198
Cement .....	18	19	16	27	39	41	21	19	22
Nonmetallic mineral manufactures .....	15	12	24	72	49	41	52	64	62
Iron and steel .....	62	117	96	135	228	284	332	401	335
Other nonmetallic manufactures .....	18	17	22	25	39	34	40	70	51
Metallic manufactures .....	107	113	87	98	162	123	163	237	266
Total Manufactured Goods .....	492	565	501	629	764	800	1,001	1,304	1,190
Machinery and Transport Equipment									
Motor cars .....	24	32	35	33	26	9	26	28	15
Other transport .....	105	211	161	255	345	303	372	1,105	609
Other machinery .....	187	295	283	512	623	582	624	171	1,129
Total Machinery and Transport Equipment .....	327	538	479	800	994	894	1,022	1,304	1,753

Table 9 continued

Group <sup>a</sup>	1965	1966	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Miscellaneous Manufactures .....	131	164	154	153	169	161	262	262	195
Miscellaneous Transactions .....	35	57	24	19	9	8	11	7	7
TOTAL .....	1,405 <sup>d</sup>	1,834	1,710	2,274	2,725	2,878	3,479	5,258	5,694

<sup>a</sup> Includes imports from the East African Community (EAC).<sup>b</sup> For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.<sup>c</sup> By Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).<sup>d</sup> Figures may not add to totals and are as given in source.Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, p. 27.

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*Table 10. Composition and Value of Principal Exports, 1962, 1969-75<sup>1</sup>*  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings)<sup>2</sup>

Commodity	1962	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Cashew nuts .....	47	119	115	120	150	141	196	177
Cloves .....	42	152	109	179	240	233	88	321
Coffee, not roasted .....	132	257	312	227	383	495	375	483
Cotton, raw .....	148	235	247	245	336	333	473	297
Diamonds <sup>3</sup> .....	105	178	161	209	123	165	122	178
Meat and meat preparations ..	46	47	35	38	42	18	45	14
Petroleum products .....	...	105	111	143	216	87	130	139
Sisal .....	315	160	179	134	145	222	463	302
Tea .....	32	48	42	49	54	54	69	81
Tobacco, unmanufactured .....	2	35	45	43	49	56	88	82
Other commodities .....	203	331	333	348	289	429	502	474
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>1,076</b>	<b>1,667</b>	<b>1,689</b>	<b>1,735</b>	<b>2,028</b>	<b>2,233</b>	<b>2,552</b>	<b>2,549</b>

... means none.

<sup>1</sup> Excludes exports to the East African Community (EAC).

<sup>2</sup> For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.

<sup>3</sup> 1972-74 value of sales in London rather than of shipments.

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, p. 16.



Table 11. *Balance of Payments Summary, 1972-75*  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings)<sup>1</sup>

	1972	1973	1974	1975
Exports f.o.b. (including gold and re-exports) .....	2,276.7	2,581.0	2,860.6	2,763.9
Adjustments (value and coverage) .....	-18.3	-27.6	-9.6	n.a.
Imports c.i.f. ....	2,929.1	3,478.8	5,257.8	5,694.2
Adjustments (value and coverage) .....	76.6	53.9	45.2	n.a.
Trade balance .....	-747.3	-979.3	-2,452.0	-2,953.3
Services (net) .....	256.0	190.3	181.7	450.9
Transfers (net) .....	-30.0	34.9	323.4	689.4
Current Account Balance .....	461.3	-754.1	-1,946.9	-1,762.0
Government medium- and long-term loans (net) .....	820.5	990.9	729.0	842.8
TAZARA project <sup>2</sup> .....	(675.9)	(762.4)	(437.4)	(370.6)
Other projects .....	(144.6)	(228.5)	(291.6)	(472.2)
Government compensation payments plus interest .....	-40.8	-36.1	-31.4	-31.6
Parastatal medium- and long-term loans (net) .....	44.1	69.3	160.4	210.1
Private medium- and long-term loans (net) .....	-7.0	10.3	14.5	-2.1
Other capital movements (net) .....	51.5	-125.5	53.0	-52.1
Special financing facilities .....	...	...	383.7	475.4
Capital Account Balance .....	868.3	908.9	1,309.2	1,442.5
Net Errors and Omissions .....	72.7	110.8	36.6	190.5
Balance on Ordinary Transactions .....	479.3	265.6	-601.1	-129.0

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Table 11 *continued*

	1972	1973	1974	1975
Special transactions .....	35.7	-15.6	n.a.	152.5
Net gain or loss from currency adjustments .....	( 7.8)	(-20.4)	(n.a.)	(124.1) <sup>4</sup>
Special Drawing Rights .....	(27.9)	( 4.8)	(n.a.)	( 4.9) <sup>4</sup>
Net Change in Foreign Reserves .....	515.0	250.0	-601.1	23.5

..... means none; n.a. not available

<sup>1</sup> For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.

<sup>2</sup> Loans provided by the People's Republic of China for construction of a railroad from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border. For definition of TAZARA—see Glossary.

<sup>3</sup> International Monetary Fund Oil Facility and Credit Tranches drawings, multilateral funds for support of the balance of payments and program support loans from the World Bank—see Glossary.

<sup>4</sup> Figures as published.

Table 12. Central Government Revenue and Expenditure, Selected Fiscal Years, 1967-76<sup>1</sup>  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings)<sup>2</sup>

	1967/68	1968/70	1971/72	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
<b>Revenue</b>						
<b>Recurrent Revenue</b>						
Direct taxes .....	263.7	352.0	532.0	697.1	1,007.3	996.6
Indirect taxes .....	588.9	827.1	898.6	1,911.2	2,294.2	2,369.1
Income from property .....	107.9	116.2	131.9	153.5	212.8	200.8
Miscellaneous revenue .....	163.1	130.7	182.7	227.2	592.2	177.0
Revenues and capital transfers .....	5.9	150.9	114.0	33.9	80.4	84.1
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>1,129.5</b>	<b>1,576.9</b>	<b>1,859.2</b>	<b>3,022.9</b>	<b>4,186.9</b>	<b>3,827.6</b>
<b>Development Revenue</b>						
<b>External sources</b>						
Loans .....	81.5	121.5	347.4	466.9	661.3	1,205.4
Grants .....	2.5	0.4	37.8	214.4	377.3	645.3
<b>Internal sources</b>						
Loans .....	159.4	230.7	255.4	346.4	481.8	575.0
Grants .....	1.8	3.9	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3
Surplus from recurrent budget .....	64.5	50.2	78.6	237.9	212.3	199.6
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>1,409.1</b>	<b>2,137.2</b>	<b>2,665.0</b>	<b>4,427.2</b>	<b>6,104.8</b>	<b>6,639.7</b>
<b>TOTAL REVENUE .....</b>	<b>1,409.1</b>	<b>2,137.2</b>	<b>2,665.0</b>	<b>4,427.2</b>	<b>6,104.8</b>	<b>6,639.7</b>

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Table 12 continued

	1967/68	1968/70	1971/72	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
<b>Expenditure</b>						
<b>Recurrent Expenditure</b>						
Economic services .....	231.7	307.2	376.0	656.1	934.7	590.4
Social services .....	290.9	434.5	560.3	881.2	1,045.4	1,135.5
General administration .....	346.1	480.0	543.5	943.8	1,261.1	1,157.4
Other purposes .....	196.3	305.0	300.8	303.9	733.4	744.7
Surplus .....	64.5	50.8	78.6	237.9	212.3	199.6
<b>Total</b> .....	1,129.5	1,576.9	1,859.2	3,022.9	4,186.9	3,827.6
<b>Development Expenditure</b>						
Economic services .....	196.2	343.5	644.0	1,205.9	1,421.9	2,174.3
Social services .....	71.4	81.3	73.5	140.3	261.7	375.8
General administration .....	76.5	94.7	166.9	296.0	330.8	461.6
<b>Total</b> .....	344.1	610.5	884.4	1,642.2	2,129.9	3,011.7
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</b> .....	1,409.1	2,137.2	2,665.0	4,427.2	6,104.5	6,639.7

<sup>1</sup>Information for fiscal years 1967/68 and 1973/74 is actual; information for fiscal years 1974/75 and 1975/76, estimated.

<sup>2</sup>For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, p. 30.



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*Table 13. Central Government Consolidated Expenditure by Function, Selected Fiscal Years, 1968-76<sup>1</sup>*  
(in millions of Tanzanian shillings)<sup>2</sup>

	1967/68	1968/70	1971/72	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
<b>General Public Services</b>						
General administration .....	187.9	269.7	256.1	424.4	604.5	562.9
External affairs .....	39.2	26.3	28.8	64.6	37.6	40.0
Public order and safety .....	116.7	151.3	165.5	258.4	307.7	286.9
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>343.8</b>	<b>447.3</b>	<b>450.4</b>	<b>747.4</b>	<b>949.8</b>	<b>889.8</b>
Defense .....	88.2	127.4	260.1	494.2	636.7	729.2
Education .....	94.0	289.4	378.8	543.8	714.2	831.2
Health .....	75.0	117.6	159.0	293.7	384.8	411.7
Social Security and Welfare Services .....	11.3	9.2	12.6	20.1	29.9	20.4
Housing and Community Amenities .....	41.7	43.5	36.7	87.6	106.3	124.3
Other Community and Social Services .....	32.5	56.1	46.9	76.3	111.9	123.7
<b>Economic Services</b>						
General administration .....	42.4	94.5	184.9	516.8	315.9	601.5
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing .....	143.7	218.4	253.6	523.6	1,008.6	1,044.6
Mining, manufacturing, and construction .....	16.8	42.7	41.6	73.7	148.1	157.0
Water supply and electricity .....	69.8	102.2	118.8	480.1	549.9	625.1
Roads .....	131.4	207.6	184.9	200.1	305.1	300.7

Table 13 continued

	1967/68	1969/70	1971/72	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
Inland and coastal waterways .....	2.7	3.1	25.2	2.6	9.3	1.9
Other transportation and communications .....	19.9	38.0	189.6	37.2	60.7	29.8
Other economic services .....	...	35.2	21.1	26.1	39.1	4.1
Total .....	426.7	741.7	1,019.7	1,860.2	2,437.7	2,764.7
Other Purposes						
Public debt .....	133.2	176.5	238.8	224.3	635.0	582.1
Purchase of financial assets and capital subscriptions .....	14.7	98.7	28.3	22.2	40.0	103.3
Pensions and gratuities .....	48.0	30.0	33.7	37.4	58.3	59.5
Total .....	195.9	305.0	300.8	303.9	733.3	744.7
TOTAL RECURRENT AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE .....	1,409.1	2,137.2	2,665.0	4,427.2	6,104.5	6,639.7

... means more.

<sup>1</sup> The fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30 of the following year.<sup>2</sup> For value of the Tanzanian shilling—see Glossary.Source: Based on information from Tanzania, *The Economic Survey, 1975-76*, Dar es Salaam, p. 31.

## Appendix B

### Structure of The Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—CCM)




Figure 7. Organization of the CCM

## **National Level**

### **Leadership**

**Chairman; Vice Chairman:** Elected by National Conference for five-year term. Can be reelected. Removed by two-thirds vote of mainland and Zanzibar National Conference members.

**Chief Executive Secretary; two Deputy Chief Executive Secretaries:** Appointed by chairman. Responsible to him and Central Committee for routine party administration. One deputy for mainland and one for Zanzibar, but jurisdiction of each covers entire country.

### **Central Committee**

**Chairman:** Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—CCM) chairman.

**Membership:** CCM chairman and vice chairman; thirty members nominated by National Executive Committee (NEC) from mainland and islands; up to ten members nominated by chairman.

**Standing subcommittees:** Defense and Security, chaired by CCM chairman; Development Planning, chaired by CCM vice chairman; party activities, chairman appointed by president of republic from Central Committee members; Public Institutional Activity, chairman appointed by CCM chairman from among Central Committee members; Island Affairs, chaired by CCM vice chairman.

**Other Central Committee responsibilities:** Political education programs; prepare NEC agenda; special fundraising authorization; review candidates for all leadership posts at all levels; appoint CCM secretaries and commissars; routine CCM administration under NEC direction.

**Meeting Frequency:** Bimonthly.

### **National Executive Committee (NEC)**

**Chairman:** CCM chairman.

**Membership:** All Central Committee members; all regional chairmen and secretaries; all chairmen and secretaries of designated mass organizations; twenty members from mainland elected by National Conference; twenty from Zanzibar elected by Zanzibar Revolution Council (ZRC).

**Responsibilities:** Chief executive organ of CCM; initiate, discuss, and decide on policy guidelines; CCM policy and supervise all defense and security activities and all development plans and activities; prepare National Conference agenda; monitor conduct and activities of CCM members, with power to dismiss members from leadership positions; elect thirty members from both mainland and Zanzibar to Central Committee; make final nominations of candidates to National Assembly; elect eight members of Board



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of Trustees from both mainland and Zanzibar; fill vacancies in own membership from National Conference members; designate mass organizations. Decisionmaking reached by consensus or by majority of members present and voting. Decisions on structure of government or division of responsibility between mainland and Zanzibar require approval of two-thirds of mainland and of Zanzibari delegates.

**Meeting Frequency:** Semiannually.

**National Conference**

**Chairman:** CCM chairman.

**Membership:** All members of NEC; all members of parliament (MPs); all members of ZRC; all district chairmen and secretaries; ten members elected from each district conference; members of East African Legislative Assembly (EALA); one member from each designated mass organization.

**Responsibilities:** Supreme organ of CCM; formulate general policy and superintend implementation of all party activities; receive reports of NEC; confirm, repudiate, or revoke any decision of any organ or officer of CCM; amend Constitution.

**Standing Committees:** All MPs—ensure implementation of CCM policies in all parliamentary activities; all ZRC members—ensure implementation of CCM policy in all activities carried out by ZRC. Quorum is two-thirds of all mainland members and of all Zanzibari members.

**Meeting frequency:** Every five years.

**Regional Level**

**Leadership**

**Regional Chairman:** Elected by Regional Conference; five-year term; has overall charge of CCM affairs in region.

**Regional Secretary:** Appointed by CCM chairman; principal executive officer of CCM in region; convenes all meetings of CCM regional organs.

**Regional Working Committee**

**Chairman:** Regional chairman.

**Membership:** Regional chairman and regional secretary; three members from each district elected by the Regional Conference to the Regional Executive Committee; members of the NEC who reside in region.

**Responsibilities:** Routine administration of CCM affairs in region under Regional Executive Committee direction; recommend applicants for regional leadership posts; make final nominations for CCM leadership posts for branches in region.

**Meeting Frequency:** Every two months.

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### **Regional Executive Committee**

**Chairman:** Regional chairman.

**Membership:** All members of the Regional Working Committee; all district chairmen and secretaries; two members from each designated mass organization in the region; all ZRC members who reside in region; all MPs from the region; all members of the EALA who reside in the region.

**Responsibilities:** Carry out decisions of national and regional councils; guide and supervise all regional defense, security and developmental activities; guide District Executive Committee in region; monitor conduct of party members and public institutions within region.

**Meeting frequency:** Semiannually.

### **Regional Conference**

**Chairman:** Regional chairman.

**Membership:** All members of the Regional Executive Committee; ten members elected by each district; one member elected by each of the region's Branch Conference; three members elected by each of the region's designated mass organizations; ten members of the National Conference who represent each district in the region.

**Responsibilities:** Supreme CCM organ at regional level; ensure that resolutions passed by National Conference are implemented in region; elect regional chairman and three members from each district to Regional Executive Committee.

**Meeting Frequency:** Every thirty months.

### **District Level**

#### **Leadership**

**District Chairman:** Elected by District Conference; five-year term; overall charge of CCM affairs in district.

**District Secretary:** Appointed by CCM chairman; chief executive officer of CCM in district; responsible to District Executive Committee for routine administration of CCM affairs; convene all meetings of CCM district organs.

#### **District Working Committee**

**Chairman:** District chairman.

**Membership:** District chairman and district secretary; constituency MP for district; a ZRC member who resides in the district; ten members elected by the District Conference to the District Executive Council; members elected by the Regional Conference to represent the district in the Regional Executive Committee.

**Responsibilities:** Responsible for district affairs of CCM under direction of District Executive Committee; decides on applica-

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tions for CCM membership; recommends applicants for CCM leadership positions in district; nominates candidates for district development council.

**Meeting frequency:** Every two months.

**District Executive Committee**

**Chairman:** District chairman.

**Membership:** All members of District Working Committee; all Regional Executive Committee members who reside in district; all ZRC members who reside in district; ten members elected by District Conference; two members from each designated mass organization in district; all branch chairmen and secretaries in district; all EALA members who reside in district.

**Responsibilities:** Carry out decisions and resolutions passed by District Conference, Regional Conference, and National Conference; implement CCM policy within district; guide and supervise all defense, security and development activities within district; guide Branch Executive Committee; monitor conduct of party members and public institutions within district.

**Meeting Frequency:** Semiannually.

**District Conference**

**Chairman:** District chairman

**Membership:** All District Executive Committee members; all Regional Conference members who reside in district; all MPs who reside in district; three members elected by each branch in district; three members from each designated mass organization in the district.

**Responsibilities:** Supreme CCM organ at district level; ensure that National Conference and Regional Conference resolutions are implemented in district; elect district chairman, ten members to District Executive Committee, ten members to Regional Conference, and ten members to National Conference.

**Meeting Frequency:** Every thirty months.

**Branch Level**

**Kinds of Branches:** Village—formed in villages; industrial—formed in places of work; ward—formed in residential towns.

**Minimum Size of Branch:** Fifty CCM members.

**Leadership**

**Branch Chairman:** Elected by Branch Conference; five-year term; overall charge of CCM affairs in branch.

**Branch Secretary:** Appointed by Central Committee; chief executive officer for CCM within branch; convenes meetings of all branch CCM organs.

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### **Branch Executive Committee**

**Membership:** Branch chairman and secretary; six members elected by Branch Conference; all members of District Conference in the branch; two members from each designated mass organization in branch.

**Responsibilities:** Explain CCM politics and programs to branch members; strengthen CCM in branch area; guide and supervise all branch development activities; monitor activities of CCM members and public institutions; consider and recommend applicants for CCM membership; transmit CCM resolutions and guidelines to members and members' recommendations to higher organization.

**Meeting Frequency:** Monthly.

### **Branch Conference**

**Chairman:** Branch chairman

**Membership:** All members of Branch Executive Committee; if a ward branch, all cell leaders; if a village or industrial branch, all branch members; three members from each designated mass organization in the branch.

**Responsibilities:** Supreme CCM organ at branch level; issue directions for implementation of CCM activities in branch; elect branch chairman, three members to attend District Conference, six members of Branch Executive Committee, and one member to Regional Conference.

**Meeting Frequency:** Annually,

### **General Meeting**

**Chairman:** Branch chairman

**Membership:** All branch members.

**Responsibilities:** Discuss all matters relevant to area where branch is situated.

**Meeting frequency:** Monthly.

### **Cell Level**

**Kinds of cells:** Cells in residential areas, consisting of all CCM members residing in the ten households designated a cell; cells at places of work, where the number of CCM members does not exceed fifty cells at places of work, where the branch has so many members it can be divided into cells.

### **Leadership**

**Cell Leader:** Explains to all citizens in jurisdiction all CCM and government decisions; cooperates with them to implement these decisions; knows all people residing in jurisdiction, including visitors; informs appropriate authorities of any suspicious characters or activities.



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**Cell Responsibilities:** Explain and defend CCM and government policies in area; maintain security.

**Meeting frequency:** Monthly.

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## Glossary

- age-set—One of several named groups of (usually) men that together constitute an age-set system, a feature of the socio-political organization of some Tanzanian ethnic groups. Each age-set consists of men initiated in a given period and passes through a series of age-grades taking on certain rights, duties, and activities specific to the grade.
- Arusha Declaration—Narrowly the declaration and policy resolutions promulgated by the National Executive Committee in February 1967 after its earlier presentation at an Arusha meeting, published as *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*. More broadly a number of other statements explicating the meaning of the original document and may be considered part of the declaration (see Julius K. Nyerere's *Freedom and Socialism* for the basic document and related materials).
- Asian—An East African resident of Indian or Pakistani origin. The term replaced the word *Indian* after the partition of India in 1947.
- ASP—Afro-Shirazi Party. Formed in 1959. The sole political party permitted on the islands of Zanzibar from the revolution in 1964 to 1977 when it merged with TANU (*q.v.*) to form the CCM (*q.v.*).
- Bunge—Tanzanian National Assembly or parliament.
- CCM—Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party). Formed in 1977 by the merger of TANU (*q.v.*) and the ASP (*q.v.*). The ruling and only permitted political party in Tanzania.
- clan—A descent group (*q.v.*) the members of which are putatively descended from a common ancestor; often comprises a number of lineages (*q.v.*).
- descent group—A unit the members of which are actually or putatively descended from a common ancestor, in principle either exclusively through males (patrilineal) or through females (matrilineal). The basic units are referred to as clans (*q.v.*) or lineages (*q.v.*).
- EAC—East African Community. Entity comprising Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda instituted by treaty in 1967; it had certain economic and service functions. After a period of deterioration it seemed to have collapsed in 1977.
- European—Standard term applied to whites regardless of the country of origin.
- fiscal year—In Tanzania the period from July 1 through June 30 of the following calendar year.
- front-line countries—Name commonly given to Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, and Zambia organized in opposition to white dominated regimes in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Namibia (South West Africa), and South Africa.



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**GDP**—Gross Domestic Product. The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders during a fixed period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. In countries lacking sophisticated data-gathering techniques the total value of GDP is often estimated. GDP differs from Gross National Produce (GNP) in that it includes the value of net-factor payments (interest, profits, and salary remittances) to nonresidents.

**kujitegemea**—Self-reliance, a slogan emphasized in the Arusha Declaration (*q.v.*), used especially to refer to the need to avoid excessive reliance on foreign aid for development, but also to refer to the need of specific communities to do things for themselves instead of expecting the government to do things for them.

**lineage**—A descent group (*q.v.*) the members of which can, in principle, trace their descent through males from a common male ancestor or through females from a common female ancestor. Lineages of great generational depth may include others of lesser depth. In such systems lineages of greater depth are likely to have different political, social, and economic functions than lineages of lesser depth.

**shamba**—Swahili term for an agricultural plot; by extension it is often used to refer to any smallholding.

**TANU**—Tanganyika African National Union. Independence-oriented party founded in colonial period (1954). The de facto single party on the mainland from 1961 to 1965; thereafter de jure the sole mainland party. In 1977 it merged with the ASP (*q.v.*) to form the CCM (*q.v.*).

**Tanzanian shilling (TSh, *q.v.*)**—Tanzanian currency unit, first issued on June 14, 1966, and sole legal tender from September 14, 1967. One Tanzanian shilling (TSh1) equals 100 Tanzanian cents. Through June 1973 US\$1 equaled a little more than TSh7.14 (TSh1 equaled about US\$.14); from July through December 1973 US\$1 equaled TSh6.90 (TSh1 equaled US\$.145). From January 1974 to October 1975 the rate reverted and TSh1 again equaled US\$.14. In October 1975 the Tanzanian shilling was pegged to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) and the exchange rate between shilling and dollar became subject to market forces. At the end of October 1975 TSh8.15 equaled approximately US\$1 (TSh1 equaled a little more than US\$.12). The rate varied thereafter, the shilling declining to a value of less than US\$.12 at one point. In November 1977 the rate stood at about TSh8.16 to US\$1 (TSh1 equaled a little more than US\$.122).

TAZARA—Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority. Operating agency for the railroad line from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. The railroad itself (formerly called TanZam Railway) is also called TAZARA or the TAZARA line or the Uhuru (freedom) Railway.

TPDF—Tanzania People's Defense Force. Name given to new army created after the mutiny in 1964. Came to include the air force and navy when they were established.

TSh—Tanzanian shilling (*q.v.*).

Uhuru—Freedom (in certain contexts, independence). Often coupled with other words or phrases in slogans: "Freedom and Unity" (Uhuru na Umoja), motto on Tanzania's seal; "Freedom and Work" (Uhuru na Kazi), "Freedom and Socialism" (Uhuru na Ujamaa).

ujamaa—Usually translated as familyhood, in some contexts as socialism, but implying a specific kind of socialism involving the respect for the individual dignity of all (and therefore a kind of basic equality), cooperation, mutual consideration, and the like thought to be characteristic of family relations. Collective (or public) ownership of the means of production in most cases is seen as a characteristic of this kind of socialism.

ujamaa village—A village that has organized its life and production to conform to the ideals expressed or implied in the idea of *ujamaa* (*q.v.*).

villagization—The process whereby the often dispersed communities characteristic of Tanzanian rural life have been turned into nucleated villages in order to furnish them with social services (health, education); considered a first step on the road to *ujamaa* villages (*q.v.*). Some communities already characterized by sufficient population density have been declared villages without further nucleation for the purpose of the Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, 1975, which gives communities so registered certain rights and powers.

World Bank—Name commonly used for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is part of the World Bank Group (*q.v.*).

World Bank Group—Consists of the World Bank (*q.v.*) and its two financial affiliates, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA). IFC works with the private sector in developing countries. IDA operates in the same sectors and with the same policies as the World Bank but provides credits only to the poorer developing countries and on easier terms than conventional World Bank loans.

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